South Africa
Source: bricsconnect.co

In this week’s round-up:

• Trump is isolating America, says Jeffrey Sachs
• Magazine warns about Trump’s BRICS policy
• Cuba and BRICS strengthen alliance at FIHAV 2025
• Cross-border payment system stalled — Russian Finance Minister
• South African students shine on global stage

‘Donald Trump is isolating America,’ says Jeffrey Sachs 

Jeffrey Sachs delivers one of his sharpest critiques yet—arguing that Donald Trump’s refusal to attend the G20 summit reflects a deep “American neurosis” driven by China’s rise, the BRICS expansion, and the collapse of U.S. global dominance. Sachs claims the European and American imperial ages are ending, while emerging economies are reshaping the world order.

Magazine warns about Trump’s BRICS policy 

Foreign Affairs, the influential Council on Foreign Relations’ bi-monthly magazine, published an intriguing article titled “Losing the Swing States: Washington Is Driving the BRICS to Become an Anti-American Bloc”. It was co-authored by the CEO of the Center for a New American Security think tank and his Research Associate. The gist of their article is that Trump 2.0 has recklessly worsened the US’ ties with BRICS members India, Brazil, and South Africa at the risk of radicalising their foreign policies.

Cuba and BRICS strengthen alliance at FIHAV

The forum on economic integration mechanisms, “Cuba and its Global Alliances,” opened within the framework of the Havana International Fair (FIHAV 2025), promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and organised by BioCubaFarma.

Cross-border payment system stalled — Russian Finance Minister

Talks on establishing a cross-border payment system within BRICS are going at a crawl’s pace, as many seem happy with dollar payments, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said.

South African students shine on global stage 

DUT has once again demonstrated its growing global footprint with 13 of their students from the Faculty of Accounting and Informatics competing in the 2025 BRICS Vocational Skills China International Finals at Guangdong Construction Polytechnic in Guangdong, China.

India
Source: eoitashkent.gov.in

Embassy of India TashkentBrief on India-Uzbekistan Bilateral Relations
1. India and Uzbekistan have relations that go back to ancient history. India was one of the first countries to recognize the state sovereignty of Uzbekistan after the latter’s independence. The protocol on establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Uzbekistan was signed in Tashkent on 18 March 1992. India and Uzbekistan declared their Strategic Partnership in 2011. Several institutionalised mechanisms operate at both political and official levels under this partnership, to ensure regular interaction.

Leaders’ engagements

2. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi visited Uzbekistan in July 2015, June 2016 and in September 2022. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visited India in October 2018 and in January 2019. A Virtual Summit between PM Modi and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was held in December 2020. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan attended the first India-Central Asia Summit on 27 January 2022 in a virtual format. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and PM Modi met on the sidelines of the COP-28 in Dubai in December 2023 and also in October 2024 on the sidelines of BRICS Summit in Kazan. On August 12, 2025 the two leaders held a telephonic conversation and reviewed the strategic partnership developments. The leaders last met briefly in September, 2025 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China.

Ministerial engagements

3. Both countries remain in touch at the Ministerial level as well. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries have met on the sidelines of India Central-Asia Dialogue, SCO meetings etc. Foreign Ministers’ last meeting was on the sidelines of the 4th India Central-Asia Dialogue in June 2024 in New Delhi. Defence Ministers and Speakers of Parliament have also met their counterparts.

4. The Finance Minister participated at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Uzbekistan in September 2024. During her visit, she held meetings with President Mirziyoyev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade, Mr. Jamshid Khodjayev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Djamshid Kuchkarov, and Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade, Mr. Laziz Kudratov. She also took part in the Uzbekistan-India Business Forum, during which Bilateral Investment Treaty was signed on the sidelines.

5. A delegation led by Speaker of Lok Sabha Sh. Om Birla participated in the 150th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) held in Tashkent in April 2025. During the visit, Speaker addressed the IPU Governing Council and Assembly, and called on President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. He also met with Uzbekistan Senate Chairperson Tanzila Narbayeva and Legislative Chamber Speaker Nuriddin Ismoilov, reaffirming India’s commitment to enhancing parliamentary ties.

6. Foreign Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan Mr. Bakhtiyor Saidov visited India in June 2025 to participate in the 4th India – Central Asia Dialogue. During the visit, he held bilateral meeting with EAM. He, alongwith other Central Asian Foreign Ministers, also called on PM Shri Narendra Modi.
Inter-Governmental Commission

7. The 13th meeting of the Uzbek-India Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was held in New Delhi on 28 July 2022. The meeting was co-chaired by Minister of Commerce and Industry of India Shri Piyush Goyal and Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade of Uzbekistan Mr. Jamshid Khodjaev. An agreement was also reached to hold a meeting of India-Central Asia Ministers of Transport in order to develop mechanisms for developing logistics infrastructure, a regional network of multimodal transport corridors, and increasing direct and transit cargo transportation as part of the North-South initiative.
Foreign Office Consultations (FoC)

8. The then Secretary (West) Shri Sanjay Verma visited Uzbekistan on August 8-9 August 2023 and held 16th Foreign Office Consultations with his counterpart Deputy Foreign Minister Bakhrom Aloyev. Secretary (West) also called on Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov. Earlier, Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Furkat Sidikov led the Uzbek delegation to the bilateral Foreign Office Consultations held in New Delhi on 11 May 2022.

Bilateral Trade and Investments

9. India is among top 10 trade partners of Uzbekistan with bilateral trade of USD 980.4 million (as per Uzbek statistics-2024) which is well below potential. The major items of India’s exports are pharmaceutical products, mechanical equipment, vehicle parts, services, frozen buffalo meat, optical instruments and equipment and mobile phones. India’s import from Uzbekistan consists largely of fruit and vegetable products, services, fertilizers, juice products and extracts, and lubricants.

As per figures released by the Uzbek Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade, Uzbekistan’s bilateral trades with India during the last five years were as follows:


10. Total Indian investments in Uzbekistan amount to US$ 451 million (approx). Indian investments by Indian companies include in pharmaceuticals, healthcare, education and residential building. There are four Indian Universities in Uzbekistan – Amity University in Tashkent, Sharda University in Andijan, Sambhram University in Jizzakh and Acharya University in Bukhara.

11. Development Partnership: India has carried out several projects under HICDP including setting up of an Allergological Center in Tashkent (INR 10,25,95,409), an IT lab at the Academy of Armed Forces of Uzbekistan (INR 8,48,60,376) and provisioning of computers for 125 ICT centers in schools in Syrdarya region (INR 6,74,77,580). The Embassy is also looking to renovate ANFA International Cricket stadium in Tashkent and continue development partnership projects in Karakalpakstan in healthcare and Solar Power projects to support agriculture in Kashkadarya region.

12. The 3rd meeting of the India–Uzbekistan Joint Working Group on Digital Technologies was held on virtual mode on November 7, 2025. Both sides discussed strengthening cooperation in IT, and advancing digital technologies in education, AI, cybersecurity, and other areas.

Defence & Security Cooperation

13. India has longstanding and wide-ranging cooperation with Uzbekistan in the field of defence. A Joint Working Group on defence was established in 2019 and the fourth JWG meeting was held in Uzbekistan in April 2024. India & Uzbekistan regularly participate in joint military exercises “DUSTLIK”, with the fifth edition held in April 2024 and attended by COAS General Manoj Pande during his visit to Uzbekistan. The sixth edition of exercise DUSTLIK was conducted in India in April 2025. There has been considerable interaction between Defence Industries of both nations with recent participation of a delegation from the Defence Industry Agency of Uzbekistan to Aero India 2025. The fifth Joint Working Group meeting on Defence cooperation was held in New Delhi on August 11, 2025. The ninth Joint Working Group meeting on Counter Terrorism was held in Tashkent on September 30, 2025.

14. The 3rd meeting of India–Central Asia NSAs/Secretaries of Security Councils was held on 16 October 2025 in Bishkek, attended by NSA Shri Ajit Doval. The meeting reviewed regional security challenges, advanced counterterrorism and tech cooperation, and continued the dialogue framework launched in 2022.

Education

15. Mission has set up India Study Centres under “Aid to Uzbekistan” in 15 universities of Uzbekistan and activated two short term ‘Chair’ by ICCR in Samarkand State University (Economics) and Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies (Hindi). Some Indian Study Centres also have IT instruments installed in them and equipped with books, musical instruments, Indian traditional dresses and artefacts. In January 2023, four Uzbek Hindi scholars attended World Hindi Conference in Nadi (Fiji). Prof. Nilufar Khodjaeva of Tashkent State University for Oriental Studies was awarded Hindi Samman Award by External Affairs Minister.

16. In 2024-2025, more than 100 candidates were selected from Uzbekistan under ITEC programmes.

Cultural Cooperation

17. There is close affinity between the cultures of the two countries. Indian films, actors and songs are extremely popular in Uzbekistan since the era of the Raj Kapoor. A 5-day Indian Cinema Week from 17 to 21 December 2024 was organized to commemorate the 100th birth anniversary of Raj Kapoor and a 4-day Film Festival was organized on the theme ‘Sashakt Nari – Celebrating Womanhood’ from March 13-16, 2025 showcasing women-centric films from Hindi and regional cinema.

18. The Lal Bahadur Shastri Centre for Indian Culture (LBSCIC) had approximately 384 yoga students and 250 Kathak students in 2024 attending classes. Yoga is immensely popular with more than 2000 participants attending International Yoga Day. Yoga Federation of Uzbekistan has an Indian Yoga Teacher and maintains close relationship with Indian Embassy. Two batches of Yoga Volunteers from Yoga Federation of Uzbekistan (YFU) have been certified by Ministry of Ayush to teach Yoga. The 7th International Conference on Yoga under the theme ‘Yoga for One Earth One Health’ was held in Tashkent in September 2025 with the participation of eminent Yoga experts from 10 Eurasian countries.

Diaspora & people-to-people ties

19. The size of the Indian community in Uzbekistan is estimated to be 18,500 which includes students (10,000) studying in different universities in Uzbekistan, workers (8000) and business professionals (500). First ever India-Uzbekistan Consular Dialogue was held in Tashkent on July 23, 2025 during which discussions were held on visa processes, consular cooperation, security matters concerning students, medical travellers and tourists in both countries. Details of visitors from India to Uzbekistan and vice versa during last two years are as follows:


Multilateral engagement

20. India and Uzbekistan cooperate closely at several multilateral platforms such as the UN, G20, BRICS & SCO. In St. Petersburg, on the sidelines of Xth BRICS Parliamentary Forum in July 2024, Senate Chairperson Tanzila Narbaeva held talks with Shri Om Birla, Speaker of Lok Sabha. Both sides also interact under the India-Central Asia framework in India-Central Asia Summit, India-Central Asia Dialogue at EAM level, Joint Working Group on Afghanistan and Central Asia Business Council. There is also India-Central Asia National Security Advisors’ meeting. Uzbekistan has also been actively participating in Voice of Global South Summit (VOGSS). In August 2024, in the third VOGSS, Uzbekistan participated in two Ministerial sessions on Trade (represented by H. E. Mr Gulamov Shokhrukh, Acting Deputy Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade) and Environment (represented by H. E. Mr. Jusipbek Kazbekov, Dy. Minister of Ecology, Environmental Protection). A delegation led by Speaker of Lok Sabha Sh. Om Birla participated in the 150th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) held in Tashkent in April 2025.

21. India supports the Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO with the caveat that accession process should not be used as a medium to bring in plurilateral issues into multilateral process of accession.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr Ryzhenkov,

Mr Glazyev,

Colleagues,

Friends,

I am pleased to welcome you to Moscow for another joint meeting of the collegiums of the foreign ministries of Russia and Belarus.

Work in this format, which we maintain only with our Belarusian friends, speaks to the unprecedentedly high level of foreign policy coordination between Moscow and Minsk. Annual collegium meetings have a proven track record as an effective mechanism for developing common approaches to key international issues and synchronising our efforts on the global stage. They provide a good opportunity to strengthen professional contacts between the senior officials and experts from our two ministries, as well as simply to have a friendly unofficial discussion.

Today, we are looking back at the outgoing year, which marked the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, a sacred holiday for Belarusians and Russians. I would like to express my gratitude to our Belarusian allies for their consistently close cooperation and support in all our joint undertakings. Guided by the Programme of Coordinated Actions in Foreign Policy of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State for 2024-2026, we have closely cooperated within the framework of our common Eurasian associations, such as (in addition to the Union State) the CSTO, the EAEU, the CIS, and the SCO, as well as within BRICS, the UN, and the OSCE. In all of these organisations, we act in solidarity on virtually all international issues. We are implementing important joint initiatives, including those aimed at strengthening security and stability in Eurasia. Diplomatic support of large-scale bilateral cooperation and integration processes within the Union State has remained our overriding priority.
Undoubtedly, the Union State is a format that sets the tone for interaction across several areas. In accordance with the resolution adopted by the collegiums and instructions issued by the respective heads of state and government, we primarily focused on promoting cooperation within common integration entities, deepening ties among them, and expanding cooperation with the countries from the Global South. Likewise, we focused on coordinating our efforts on international legal issues, among them countering the West’s sanctions aggression, and other areas.

I believe we have tangible results to present to the people of our countries. Russia’s initiative to grant the SCO an observer status with the CIS has been implemented, and the CIS Plus format has been created. In September, secretaries general of the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO signed a roadmap to promote trilateral cooperation drafted by the Russian side and a Joint Statement on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII and the foundation of the UN. The practice of cross-inviting heads of the executive bodies of the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO to one other’s summits continued. I believe it would be useful to have the Permanent Committee of the Union State step up to this interaction as well, if the State Secretary of our Union, Mr Glazyev, who is here today, supports this idea.

We have facilitated the dialogue between the EAEU and the SCO and BRICS, and the coordination of 2026-2030 EEC-ASEAN Cooperation Programme. We have started looking into the possibility of expanding CIS contacts with African organisations and established cooperation between the CSTO Secretariat and the AU Counter Terrorism Centre.
As I mentioned earlier, we have jointly promoted on all international venues the initiative advanced by the President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, on the development of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century which aligns with the initiative put forward by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to form a new architecture of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia. We helped ensure the success of the 3rd Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security in October. We are pleased to note the growing number of the countries that share our approaches and are willing to join this work.

The bilateral interstate Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State entered into force in March. Special representatives of Russia and Belarus - deputy foreign ministers Alexander Grushko and Igor Sekreta - began reviewing its implementation. On September 26, the first meeting of respective interagency delegations took place in Moscow. Overlapping assessments of the security situation in the Union State were noted.

The sector-specific departments of our respective ministries coordinated approaches to international legal cooperation priorities, which I mentioned earlier. Notably, the support in the UN General Assembly for the traditional resolution on the report by the International Criminal Court has significantly decreased. For the first time in all the years this resolution has been put to a vote, and fewer than half of UN member states voted in favour. In March, the presidents of Russia and Belarus signed a milestone bilateral Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Citizens from Unjustified Prosecution by Foreign States and International Judicial Bodies. A draft directive of the Supreme State Council of the Union State on mutual support and cooperation in the field of international justice has been drafted and submitted for consideration. In conjunction with our Belarusian friends, we are promoting the Declaration on Enhancing the Role of International Law and guiding principles on qualifying unilateral coercive measures as unlawful, which was signed at the previous meeting of the collegiums. In May, our permanent representatives circulated it in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.

We have made significant efforts to expand international support for countering the practice of illegal unilateral sanctions. On the initiative of the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, of which Russia and Belarus are members and play an important role, the UN General Assembly adopted, in June, a resolution establishing the International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures. It will be observed on December 4. We ensured the inclusion in the final document of the 16th UNCTAD ministerial session of provisions on the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on world trade. I’m aware that many in this audience took part in this work. Thank you all.

The agenda of today’s meeting is quite extensive. We will begin by discussing issues related to the joint use of humanitarian policy tools, the promotion of traditional values, and the preservation of historical memory. We will then consider matters related to cooperation with friendly states and their associations, as well as our approaches to building relations with the countries whose governments pursue an openly unfriendly policy towards us. This will also include our relations with the organisations that deviate from their own founding principles, do not adhere to impartiality and equal distance, but instead seek to take predominantly pro-Western political positions.
We will place special emphasis on sharing experience in foreign policy information support. Following the meeting, we plan to sign a Resolution of the collegiums and a Plan for inter-ministerial consultations for 2026.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

2025 BRICS+ Counter-Terrorism Conference in Moscow
 
On December 3-4, Moscow will host the 2025 BRICS+ Counter-Terrorism Conference: National and Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies Amid Emerging Security Challenges and Threats.

The conference will take place under the aegis of the Russian Foreign Ministry, coinciding with the 5th anniversary of the BRICS counter-terrorism strategy adopted at Russia’s initiative while the country chaired the association in 2020. The document laid a solid foundation for an extensive interaction of the BRICS countries to raise their counter-terrorism protection.

The forum will bring together over 100 delegates from the BRICS member and partner countries. The guests will include representatives of specialised government agencies, academic circles, and civil society. In addition, high-ranking colleagues from the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre, and the CSTO Secretariat will take part in the forum. Experts from the Monitoring Group of the UN Security Council 1267/1989/2253 committee on ISIS and Al-Qaeda sanctions and 1988 committee on Taliban sanctions will also join the discussions.

The conference will serve as a unique platform for a discussion and non-politicised exchange of views on a wide range of pressing issues on the counter-terrorist agenda. Specifically, there are plans to pay particular attention to a variety of aspects of developing progressive theoretical and methodological approaches to opposing terrorism and raising the efficiency of the joint work to curb the financial and economic support for terrorist activities. The participants will also exchange their assessments of the existing terrorist and extremist threats at the regional and global levels, and share advanced practices in fighting dissemination of destructive ideologies, including on the Internet.

A round table to discuss the experience of international organisations in working out collective principles and regional strategies of countering terrorism will be the core event of the forum. Its participants will focus on various initiatives and projects aimed at improving cooperation in neutralising contemporary challenges and threats.

We regard the upcoming conference as Russia’s contribution to the implementation of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2020), the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (2021), and the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group Position Paper (2024).

We are confident that the conference will give an additional impetus to developing a multifaceted dialogue on combatting terrorism in the BRICS format and underline the crucial role played by our country, its partners and colleagues in the forum in the global efforts to ensure international peace and security.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

On BRICS strategic complementarity

Since its inception the BRICS as a bloc has been criticized for bringing together economies that are too diverse, too different and heterogeneous to pursue common approaches to policy. This criticism has been leveled in particular with respect to the China-India duo, that was seen as a source of contradictions due to either cultural differences or geopolitical orientation. In reality the two Asian giants managed to coordinate numerous joint BRICS initiatives, including the creation of the New Development Bank and more recently the bloc’s expansion in membership on the back of earlier BRICS+ meetings. There may be perhaps ways to render this joint coordination more systematic with one of the possible paradigms in this area being the well-known principle of “strategic complementarity”. We proceed to explore the possible modalities of this principle in streamlining and facilitating greater coordination among BRICS core members.

In economics and in game theory, “strategic complementarity” takes place when a player’s optimal strategy increases along with the increase in other players’ strategies, providing for a mutual reinforcement of the parties’ strategies[1]. Examples of such complementarities may range from network effects in platforms to spending on public goods and R&D in the presence of positive spillover effects[2]. Experimental studies on the relative merits of strategic complementarity vs. strategic substitutability in game theoretic settings reveal that “there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes“[3]. The multiple equilibria associated with a “strategic complementarity” setting may enhance the optionality of scenarios for the coordinating parties, something that may be of significant value in settings that have frequently been characterized by limited optionality for emerging market economies in the past.

With respect to BRICS, the operation of the strategic complementarity principle needs to go beyond the narrow spirit of short-term game theory, to a broader type of cooperation that is systemic, forward-looking and multi-faceted. It should seek to exploit the differences in economic specialization, market positioning, regional and global market presence, but also the differences in values, culture and geopolitical orientation. Such a strategic complementarity orientation has the potential to increase not only the economic prowess of the bloc, but also its soft power via appealing to the widest possible segments of the global community.

In this sense, the operation of the strategic complementarity principle within BRICS may to some degree be compared to the principle of additionality in impact investing. In the latter case impact investors aim to direct their financial resources into areas that have hitherto not been adequately covered by other investors. This effort to find new areas that have not been attended to in earlier investment rounds raises the potential for delivering a more emphatic impact (diminishing returns likely prevalent in more “saturated” segments), whether in the social or in the environmental sphere.

In the case of the strategic complementarity between China and India in BRICS the following areas of coordination could be explored:

• Policy impulses and initiatives: while China’s approach on issues of BRICS cooperation has frequently been more focused on top-down initiatives and proposals (BRICS+ initiative being one such example), in India’s case these tended to be more bottom-up, emphasizing the need to improve the micro-level conditions for entrepreneurship, start-ups and business activity. 
• Trade alliances: while China’s trade alliances such as RCEP are focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific, India has its regional integration initiatives positioned in South Asia and bilateral alliances forged across developed and emerging economies across the globe.
• Transportation corridors: while China actively builds the East-West transportation corridors in Eurasia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India focusses more on other pathways to connectivity, including via North-South corridors. A co-integration between these transportation projects/networks would greatly improve the optionality of transportation routes in Eurasia, though this would require significantly more coordination between the two economies. 
• Complementary nature of economic specialization and trade patterns in global markets: China specializing in manufacturing and capital-intensive goods, with India being more present in segments such as raw materials, intermediate goods, pharma and services.

Admittedly, the above spheres of coordination may call for a far greater degree of cohesion between these two BRICS members – something that skeptics may see as a tall order in the current international setting. At the same time, such coordination if advanced could result in substantial welfare gains not only for China and India, but likely for the broader Global South. In the extreme case of a firm alliance exploiting the opportunities of strategic complementarity, the two economies could substantially strengthen their position on the international stage to the point where they become dominant not only in a developing world setting, but also globally.  

At the same time, alongside opportunities there may also be risks and costs associated with the “strategic complementarity” paradigm. The use of the game-theoretic lens for BRICS cooperation may limit the weight of the broader humanistic and humanitarian issues that are so critical for the bloc’s global role. Such a paradigm may also be difficult to implement and coordinate in a setting characterized by mounting geopolitical risks and expanding membership in the bloc’s core and the partnership belt. 

In the end, the “strategic complementarity” principle should not be confined to the China-India pair, but needs to be seen as an operational guide for the broader BRICS+ formation. With cultural differences and divergence in national economic models becoming even more pronounced after the bloc’s expansion, “strategic complementarity” may serve to turn such differences into a key strength, rather than a weakness. Such a principle may also focus the priorities of BRICS members away from short-term considerations to longer-term win-win outcomes and cooperation pathways in which policy initiatives coming from various members reinforce each other. Strategic complementarity may also become an important feature of the annual succession in the presidencies of BRICS countries, whereby the bloc’s development priorities and undertakings are reinforced through complementary initiatives of the subsequent BRICS presidencies.

[1] Tirole, J. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1998)
[2] https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1336.PDF
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326279453_Cooperation_and_Strategic_Complementarity_An_Experiment_with_Two_Voluntary_Contribution_Mechanism_Games_with_Interior_Equilibria
[3] https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/d5f6ed6d-1f93-4646-b4b2-6cdd37c05ad4/content

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Digital economic agreements advance in 2025

One of the questions frequently discussed this year by economists has been the surprising resilience of global economic growth and trade dynamics to the unprecedented shocks of rising protectionism and unilateralism in the world economy. With respect to economic growth performance, Gita Gopinath, the former IMF’s Chief economist, outlined a number of factors, including the AI investment boom, wealth increases driving consumption (also thanks to AI), and government spending being more generous[1]. In our view, global trade benefited from these factors supporting economic activity as well as a number of other developments, including the rising role of digital economic agreements (DEAs) and digital trade. Indeed, this year witnessed important milestones in digital economic diplomacy that are likely to deliver important impulses to economic openness in the coming years.

Among the advanced economies, Singapore is a clear leader in advancing the propagation of digital economic agreements across the world economy. It has concluded digital economic agreements with partners such as Australia, the UK and Korea, while also championing regional digital initiatives within ASEAN[2]. In 2025 Singapore continued to push the digital economic agenda forward concluding talks with some of the key regional blocs on the launching of digital economic agreements. In particular, in September 2025 Singapore signed a DEA accord with EFTA. According to the EFTA official website, the DEA “builds on the EFTA–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2003”, with the digital accord establishing “clear and predictable rules for digital trade between the EFTA States and Singapore” [3].

Earlier in mid-2025 Singapore signed a digital trade accord (DTA) with the EU. According to the EU press release, the agreement (that is yet to be ratified) “will enhance consumer protection, facilitate trusted cross-border data flows and provide legal certainty for businesses that want to engage in cross-border digital trade, as well as addressing unjustified barriers to digital trade[4]… The DTA will prevent protectionist practices and policies by prohibiting unjustified data localisation measures… [serving] to ensure trusted cross-border data flows and the protection of source code against unauthorised disclosure[5].

With Singapore being an uncontested leader in the advancement of digital economic agreements across countries, ASEAN is in pole position in the digital race among the regional blocs. In October 2025 ASEAN reached a crucial milestone in its digital development by announcing the substantial conclusion of talks on an ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA). This digital accord is expected to be signed in 2026 with ASEAN’s digital economy expected to reach USD 2 trillion by 2030 on the back of the agreement’s implementation[6]. Among its key areas, the ASEAN DEFA seeks to advance digital economic cooperation in digital payments, data privacy and cross-border data transfer[7], with this ASEAN regional framework potentially providing pathways to similar regional accords in the digital sphere to be pursued by other regional blocs[8]. ASEAN has also committed to implementing digital rules under e-commerce Chapters of ASEAN-plus agreements that include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the recently upgraded ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA)[9].

Beyond the EU-EFTA-ASEAN triangle, digital cooperation expanded in other regional integration arrangements as more regional blocs strive to enter into the top league of digital development. One of the cases in point is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[10] that concluded an agreement with the Digital Cooperation Organization (DCO) in 2025[11], while in mid-2025 the UAE, one of the digital leaders in the GCC bloc, launched its Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA)[12] accession process[13]. In November 2025 during the Second Meeting between the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) and the GCC Ambassadors’ Council in Jakarta, the two regional blocs singled out the digital economy as one of the key/priority areas of mutual economic cooperation[14].

In our previous publications, we have highlighted the possibility of OASES economies (Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Austria, Switzerland, Emirates (UAE) and Singapore) and their respective regional integration arrangements building a network of trade and digital alliances, with the digital agreements concluded in 2025 providing further momentum to the emergence of these platforms[15][16]. Such networks of digital economic/trade accords may in turn serve to further multilateralize digital and trade treaties at the level of regional blocs, with DEA accords expanding the coverage of FTA agreements to the sphere of digital economy. This in turn may lead to the emergence of mega-regional formations in the sphere of trade and digital cooperation, whose weight could potentially impact the evolution of global agreements, particularly in areas where multilateral coordination through global organizations is either absent or weak.

For BRICS economies, the developments in DEA accords in 2025 point to the need to prioritize digital economic agreements within the BRICS+ network in the coming years, with a particular emphasis being placed on exploring the potential modalities of building regional DEAs as well as “RTA-to-RTA” digital economic accords. With ASEAN leading the current upward momentum in the development of such digital agreements and with greater cooperation between BRICS and ASEAN throughout 2025[17], the coming years could present a unique opportunity for BRICS+ to narrow the “digital gap” for the economies of the Global South.

[1] https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7400562205710241792/
[2] https://www.mti.gov.sg/trade-international-economic-relations/agreements/digital-economy-agreements-dea/
[3] https://www.efta.int/media-resources/news/efta-and-singapore-sign-digital-economy-agreement-joint-communique
[4] According to the press release, this includes “the protection of privacy and personal data, customs duties on electronic transmissions, electronic contracts, electronic authentication and trust services, online consumer trust, unsolicited direct marketing communications, open government data, and regulatory cooperation on digital trade”.
[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1152
[6] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/10/asean-defa-digital-economy-pact-negotiations/
[7] https://asean.org/asean-economic-community-council-statement-on-the-substantial-conclusion-of-the-asean-defa-negotiations/
[8] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/asean-summit-expands-pathways-to-economic-cooperation/
[9] https://www.mti.gov.sg/trade-international-economic-relations/regional-and-international-platforms/association-of-southeast-asian-nations-asean/asean-digital-integration/
[10] https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/087/2025/003/article-A001-en.xml
[11] https://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/digital-plans-in-gcc-shift-from-talk-to-action-in-new-pact-1.500271779
[12] DEPA was launched in 2020 by Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore and created a framework for digital trade cooperation with the aim of lowering barriers in the digital economy
[13] https://neweconomy.expert/news/259427/
[14] https://asean.org/asean-the-cooperation-council-for-the-arab-states-of-the-gulf-reaffirm-commitment-to-enhance-relations/
[15] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/scenarios-for-mega-regional-agreements/
[16] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394452058_OASES_as_an_International_Platform_for_Economic_Cooperation
[17] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/indonesia-becomes-a-full-fledged-brics-member/
https://brics-plus-analytics.org/assessing-the-potential-of-the-brics-partnership-circle/

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

New treatment offers rapid, low-risk therapy for iron deficiency anaemia, attracting global attention.

When Kazakhstan quietly achieved the World Health Organisation’s goal of reducing premature mortality from non-communicable diseases by 25%, as the first Central Asian nation to do so, global headlines have been quiet. One can only wonder if this is because this milestone signals something larger than public health success. It represents the broader structural shift of the industrialisation of healthcare in the Global South as a foundation for economic sovereignty.

Development in the Global South has mostly been built around aid, imported solutions, and dependency on multinational supply chains. Imagining a Global South where industrialisation emerges from within is a new phenomenon that the west is still trying to understand and weigh the consequences of. Kazakhstan’s model of combining a network of 85 stroke centres, digitised emergency medical services, and state-driven R&D partnerships, is less about catching up to the West and more about building independent systems of production and capability, which is inherently not something we will Western media celebrate.

From Consumption to Capability

What sets Kazakhstan apart is not just that it met a WHO benchmark, but how it did so. The country’s health transformation was achieved through a deliberate industrial strategy of investing in medical technology, expanding manufacturing capacity for health products, and building local expertise. 
In the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s health system was highly centralised and underfunded, relying on imports for everything from diagnostics to pharmaceuticals. Today, its model reflects a regional movement, trickling over into other countries.

Iran has developed an injectable nano iron supplement, the first of its kind and Russia now has a full-cycle human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine. The localisation of science and production as the backbone of sovereign development is now beginning to become a pattern in the Global South.
This kind of progress is often overlooked because it doesn’t fit the old narrative of industrialisation as heavy industry or export-led growth, but in the 21st century, the ability to build health technologies domestically is as strategically important as manufacturing cars or steel. It’s the infrastructure of human development and it signals that parts of the Global South are moving from being consumers of medical innovation to producers of it.

A Shift in Development Power

The significance of these advances extends beyond national borders. When a country like Kazakhstan builds internal capacity to tackle chronic diseases, it reduces dependency on imported pharmaceuticals and international aid. This independence, in turn, frees up fiscal space, strengthens domestic industries, and creates export potential in healthcare services and biotechnologies.

For example, Russia’s HPV vaccine production line in Kirov is expected to meet domestic demand by 2027, but it also creates regional supply opportunities, particularly for BRICS+ and Eurasian partners. Similarly, Iran’s new nano-iron formulation addresses local anaemia challenges but could serve as a cost-effective solution for Africa, where iron deficiency remains a leading cause of maternal health complications.

These are not isolated stories. They form part of reordering of development power. The Global South is no longer waiting for Western pharmaceutical giants to transfer technology, it is building its own. This, in turn, reshapes the global aid and trade architecture, with countries exchanging knowledge and products horizontally rather than vertically.

Lessons for the Future of Southern Development

The lesson here is that industrialisation in the Global South must now be measured by the ability to create self-sustaining systems, particularly in health, food, and technology. Kazakhstan’s success was not a miracle of GDP growth but of policy consistency, institutional investment, and public-private coordination. It shows that development can be both industrial and inclusive when states treat health not as social expenditure, but as a productive sector.

The global development community should take note. The next wave of industrialisation will not come from building factories for export; it will come from building capacities that keep societies functional and independent.

For African and BRICS-aligned economies, the path forward lies in this same model of local innovation, regional cooperation, and investment in knowledge-based production. 

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: If France wants to join BRICS, will BRICS accept France?

Sergey Lavrov: President of France Emmanuel