Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Issue 26.2022
2022.06.27 — 2022.07.03
International relations
Foreign policy in the context of BRICS
China Has Urged The West To Read The New 14th BRICS Summit Declaration Carefully. This Is What It Says (Китай призвал Запад внимательно прочитать новую декларацию 14-го саммита БРИКС. Вот что в ней сказано) / China, June, 2022
Keywords: summit, declaration, off-docs
2022-06-28
2022-06-28
China
Source: www.silkroadbriefing.com
By Chris Devonshire-Ellis
The annual NATO summit has been taking place in Spain, including NATO members Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. This year, Australia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Sweden are not member states of NATO but were invited to attend and participate in the summit, while Ukraine took part remotely. The presidents of the European Council and European Commission were also invited.
The NATO grouping issued a 'Strategic Concept' statement following the meeting in which it stated that members consider Russia the "most significant and direct threat" to its security. The bloc also intends to counter China, expand its partnership in the Asia Pacific Region and on the post-Soviet territory, and reinforce its own defense capabilities.
Here are the key points of the new Strategic Concept followed by my comments.
Russia As A Threat
NATO recognizes Russia the most significant and direct threat to the alliance's security.
The organization no longer wants to view Russia as a partner, but it is ready to maintain communications channel open. NATO also claims it does not seek confrontation with Russia and does not pose a threat to it. The relations between NATO and Russia may change, but this depends on Moscow, the alliance stated.
Comment: NATO has expressly stated that is nothing to do with NATO and that any engagements between Russia and NATO 'depend' on Moscow. This implies that NATO will not be prepared to enter into any discussions with Russia unless they are on NATO's terms.
Countering China
NATO believes that deepening of partnership between Russia and China violates the alliance's values and interests. According to NATO, China seeks to undermine the current world order by controlling global logistics and its economy.
Comment: This signals another communications breakdown, this time with China. The use of the term 'violates' is particularly strong. The mention of the 'current world order' is interesting as in the BRICS statement just last week, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) stated that the 'current world order' was preserving a 'unipolar world' with the United States essentially in control and that they wanted to devolve this structure into a fairer, 'multipolar' world with greater say in world affairs from all nations. NATO appears to view that as a threat to its own interests. This is a clear signal of a near complete breakdown between the Western countries represented by NATO – and the emerging global economies.
It is also of interest that NATO believes that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – although not specifically mentioned – is a security risk as China has invested in logistics capabilities on a global basis – at a time when the West has not. In fact, an OECD report from 2018 stated that the BRI was "regionally positive and statistically significant" in developing global trade. Opinions concerning the BRI have been many and varied, basically boiling down to a choice about the BRI (and therefore China) either being a security threat or being a global trade conduit. This is a matter of perception, rather than facts. In this case NATO's criticism of China appears based less on a reality truth than as a perceived truth. This is a difficult, almost impossible bridge to cross. It also indicates that NATO wishes to cut itself off from any BRI connectivity. Given that there are currently 195 countries globally and that 138 of them have signed BRI agreements that also leaves NATO with a remarkably small pool of future trade and infrastructure partners. I question the wisdom of this.
Indo-Pacific
The alliance plans to deepen cooperation with its partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Comment: NATO – actually the 'North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' – was formed at the end of World War Two to preserve peace and conclude ties between North America and Europe. It has become expansionist with obvious intent to deepen cooperation with its 'partners' in the Indo-Pacific. This geographical enlargement is therefore real and has been largely created to respond to the perceived China threat. Others may view that as an expansion of certain NATO members wishing to increase military sales.
Reinforcement of the bloc
NATO expansion has become a historic success for the alliance, reinforcing it and ensuring "security of millions of European citizens."
Comment: This phrase hangs on the words 'historic success' and how this is measured, which is not provided in any context nor backed up by any statistics. It is hard to know what is meant by this statement. In terms of European murder rates for example, according to the European Commission, they increased by 3.3% in 2020. It is a concern when gun violence in the US has been rapidly increasing under the mantra that increasing gun ownership improves security. The EU needs to be very careful here.
NATO intends to "significantly strengthen" its forces for deterrence of Russia and self-defense. The member states agreed to expand their military budgets above 2% of GDP.
The alliance views strategic nuclear forces, especially the US ones, as the highest guarantee of its security. The NATO nuclear deterrence strategy also depends on forward deployment of US nuclear weapons and contribution of interested allies.
NATO plans to develop advanced technologies, including military application of artificial intelligence.
The bloc considers external attack on its members possible.
Comment: This basically means that weapons of mass destruction will be increased for use in the EU, together with increased deployment of US troops. While it is understood that defenses are necessary, significant increases of foreign troops and weapons in Europe will also add to an element of increased societal fear amongst the population. What used to be a European sense of freedom is in risk of being replaced by a European sense of unease and schizophrenia.
Ties with Ukraine
The bloc will continue reinforcing its partnership ties with Ukraine and Georgia, who seek to join the alliance.
NATO leaders adopted a program of enhanced support to Ukraine, providing as much military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary.
Comment: These will be seen an inflammatory comments in Moscow. It is also uncertain what providing 'military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary' means. To what extent is necessary?
Summary
The NATO 'Strategic Concept' appears to be the military arm to enforce the United States into new geographical territories and to provide increased weapons to the alliance as the lead in what the BRICS countries have stated in contrast is a 'unipolar' world.
It should also be noted that in doing so, it can also be seen as viewing the BRICS countries as a threat – collective China and Russia GDP within BRICS equate to 75% of the BRICS groups total GDP. Taken in this context, it appears that NATO is also now targeting trade.
This is in direct contrast to the recent BRICS Summit Declaration, which was released last week, and which Chinese Premier Xi Jinping suggested should be mandatory reading. The attitudes and opinions expressed in the BRICS agenda are far more inclusive that those emanating from this NATO document.
Quite frankly, it can be read that NATO, which includes most of the G7 nations, the EU, UK and United States, have quite categorically stated that neither China nor Russia are welcome – and if attempts are made to change the NATO Strategic Concept – then force will be applied to uphold it. This is a deeply flawed, provocative and aggressively worrying step to yet more conflicts.
Source: www.silkroadbriefing.com
By Chris Devonshire-Ellis
The annual NATO summit has been taking place in Spain, including NATO members Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. This year, Australia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Sweden are not member states of NATO but were invited to attend and participate in the summit, while Ukraine took part remotely. The presidents of the European Council and European Commission were also invited.
The NATO grouping issued a 'Strategic Concept' statement following the meeting in which it stated that members consider Russia the "most significant and direct threat" to its security. The bloc also intends to counter China, expand its partnership in the Asia Pacific Region and on the post-Soviet territory, and reinforce its own defense capabilities.
Here are the key points of the new Strategic Concept followed by my comments.
Russia As A Threat
NATO recognizes Russia the most significant and direct threat to the alliance's security.
The organization no longer wants to view Russia as a partner, but it is ready to maintain communications channel open. NATO also claims it does not seek confrontation with Russia and does not pose a threat to it. The relations between NATO and Russia may change, but this depends on Moscow, the alliance stated.
Comment: NATO has expressly stated that is nothing to do with NATO and that any engagements between Russia and NATO 'depend' on Moscow. This implies that NATO will not be prepared to enter into any discussions with Russia unless they are on NATO's terms.
Countering China
NATO believes that deepening of partnership between Russia and China violates the alliance's values and interests. According to NATO, China seeks to undermine the current world order by controlling global logistics and its economy.
Comment: This signals another communications breakdown, this time with China. The use of the term 'violates' is particularly strong. The mention of the 'current world order' is interesting as in the BRICS statement just last week, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) stated that the 'current world order' was preserving a 'unipolar world' with the United States essentially in control and that they wanted to devolve this structure into a fairer, 'multipolar' world with greater say in world affairs from all nations. NATO appears to view that as a threat to its own interests. This is a clear signal of a near complete breakdown between the Western countries represented by NATO – and the emerging global economies.
It is also of interest that NATO believes that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – although not specifically mentioned – is a security risk as China has invested in logistics capabilities on a global basis – at a time when the West has not. In fact, an OECD report from 2018 stated that the BRI was "regionally positive and statistically significant" in developing global trade. Opinions concerning the BRI have been many and varied, basically boiling down to a choice about the BRI (and therefore China) either being a security threat or being a global trade conduit. This is a matter of perception, rather than facts. In this case NATO's criticism of China appears based less on a reality truth than as a perceived truth. This is a difficult, almost impossible bridge to cross. It also indicates that NATO wishes to cut itself off from any BRI connectivity. Given that there are currently 195 countries globally and that 138 of them have signed BRI agreements that also leaves NATO with a remarkably small pool of future trade and infrastructure partners. I question the wisdom of this.
Indo-Pacific
The alliance plans to deepen cooperation with its partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Comment: NATO – actually the 'North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' – was formed at the end of World War Two to preserve peace and conclude ties between North America and Europe. It has become expansionist with obvious intent to deepen cooperation with its 'partners' in the Indo-Pacific. This geographical enlargement is therefore real and has been largely created to respond to the perceived China threat. Others may view that as an expansion of certain NATO members wishing to increase military sales.
Reinforcement of the bloc
NATO expansion has become a historic success for the alliance, reinforcing it and ensuring "security of millions of European citizens."
Comment: This phrase hangs on the words 'historic success' and how this is measured, which is not provided in any context nor backed up by any statistics. It is hard to know what is meant by this statement. In terms of European murder rates for example, according to the European Commission, they increased by 3.3% in 2020. It is a concern when gun violence in the US has been rapidly increasing under the mantra that increasing gun ownership improves security. The EU needs to be very careful here.
NATO intends to "significantly strengthen" its forces for deterrence of Russia and self-defense. The member states agreed to expand their military budgets above 2% of GDP.
The alliance views strategic nuclear forces, especially the US ones, as the highest guarantee of its security. The NATO nuclear deterrence strategy also depends on forward deployment of US nuclear weapons and contribution of interested allies.
NATO plans to develop advanced technologies, including military application of artificial intelligence.
The bloc considers external attack on its members possible.
Comment: This basically means that weapons of mass destruction will be increased for use in the EU, together with increased deployment of US troops. While it is understood that defenses are necessary, significant increases of foreign troops and weapons in Europe will also add to an element of increased societal fear amongst the population. What used to be a European sense of freedom is in risk of being replaced by a European sense of unease and schizophrenia.
Ties with Ukraine
The bloc will continue reinforcing its partnership ties with Ukraine and Georgia, who seek to join the alliance.
NATO leaders adopted a program of enhanced support to Ukraine, providing as much military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary.
Comment: These will be seen an inflammatory comments in Moscow. It is also uncertain what providing 'military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary' means. To what extent is necessary?
Summary
The NATO 'Strategic Concept' appears to be the military arm to enforce the United States into new geographical territories and to provide increased weapons to the alliance as the lead in what the BRICS countries have stated in contrast is a 'unipolar' world.
It should also be noted that in doing so, it can also be seen as viewing the BRICS countries as a threat – collective China and Russia GDP within BRICS equate to 75% of the BRICS groups total GDP. Taken in this context, it appears that NATO is also now targeting trade.
This is in direct contrast to the recent BRICS Summit Declaration, which was released last week, and which Chinese Premier Xi Jinping suggested should be mandatory reading. The attitudes and opinions expressed in the BRICS agenda are far more inclusive that those emanating from this NATO document.
Quite frankly, it can be read that NATO, which includes most of the G7 nations, the EU, UK and United States, have quite categorically stated that neither China nor Russia are welcome – and if attempts are made to change the NATO Strategic Concept – then force will be applied to uphold it. This is a deeply flawed, provocative and aggressively worrying step to yet more conflicts.
NATO's Strategic Concept 2022 Views 75% Of The BRICS Economies A Security Threat – Analysis (Стратегическая концепция НАТО до 2022 года рассматривает 75% экономик БРИКС как угрозу безопасности – анализ) / Russia, June, 2022
Keywords: summit, global_governance, expert_opinion
2022-06-30
2022-06-30
Russia
Source: www.silkroadbriefing.com
By Chris Devonshire-Ellis
The annual NATO summit has been taking place in Spain, including NATO members Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. This year, Australia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Sweden are not member states of NATO but were invited to attend and participate in the summit, while Ukraine took part remotely. The presidents of the European Council and European Commission were also invited.
The NATO grouping issued a 'Strategic Concept' statement following the meeting in which it stated that members consider Russia the "most significant and direct threat" to its security. The bloc also intends to counter China, expand its partnership in the Asia Pacific Region and on the post-Soviet territory, and reinforce its own defense capabilities.
Here are the key points of the new Strategic Concept followed by my comments.
Russia As A Threat
NATO recognizes Russia the most significant and direct threat to the alliance's security.
The organization no longer wants to view Russia as a partner, but it is ready to maintain communications channel open. NATO also claims it does not seek confrontation with Russia and does not pose a threat to it. The relations between NATO and Russia may change, but this depends on Moscow, the alliance stated.
Comment: NATO has expressly stated that is nothing to do with NATO and that any engagements between Russia and NATO 'depend' on Moscow. This implies that NATO will not be prepared to enter into any discussions with Russia unless they are on NATO's terms.
Countering China
NATO believes that deepening of partnership between Russia and China violates the alliance's values and interests. According to NATO, China seeks to undermine the current world order by controlling global logistics and its economy.
Comment: This signals another communications breakdown, this time with China. The use of the term 'violates' is particularly strong. The mention of the 'current world order' is interesting as in the BRICS statement just last week, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) stated that the 'current world order' was preserving a 'unipolar world' with the United States essentially in control and that they wanted to devolve this structure into a fairer, 'multipolar' world with greater say in world affairs from all nations. NATO appears to view that as a threat to its own interests. This is a clear signal of a near complete breakdown between the Western countries represented by NATO – and the emerging global economies.
It is also of interest that NATO believes that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – although not specifically mentioned – is a security risk as China has invested in logistics capabilities on a global basis – at a time when the West has not. In fact, an OECD report from 2018 stated that the BRI was "regionally positive and statistically significant" in developing global trade. Opinions concerning the BRI have been many and varied, basically boiling down to a choice about the BRI (and therefore China) either being a security threat or being a global trade conduit. This is a matter of perception, rather than facts. In this case NATO's criticism of China appears based less on a reality truth than as a perceived truth. This is a difficult, almost impossible bridge to cross. It also indicates that NATO wishes to cut itself off from any BRI connectivity. Given that there are currently 195 countries globally and that 138 of them have signed BRI agreements that also leaves NATO with a remarkably small pool of future trade and infrastructure partners. I question the wisdom of this.
Indo-Pacific
The alliance plans to deepen cooperation with its partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Comment: NATO – actually the 'North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' – was formed at the end of World War Two to preserve peace and conclude ties between North America and Europe. It has become expansionist with obvious intent to deepen cooperation with its 'partners' in the Indo-Pacific. This geographical enlargement is therefore real and has been largely created to respond to the perceived China threat. Others may view that as an expansion of certain NATO members wishing to increase military sales.
Reinforcement of the bloc
NATO expansion has become a historic success for the alliance, reinforcing it and ensuring "security of millions of European citizens."
Comment: This phrase hangs on the words 'historic success' and how this is measured, which is not provided in any context nor backed up by any statistics. It is hard to know what is meant by this statement. In terms of European murder rates for example, according to the European Commission, they increased by 3.3% in 2020. It is a concern when gun violence in the US has been rapidly increasing under the mantra that increasing gun ownership improves security. The EU needs to be very careful here.
NATO intends to "significantly strengthen" its forces for deterrence of Russia and self-defense. The member states agreed to expand their military budgets above 2% of GDP.
The alliance views strategic nuclear forces, especially the US ones, as the highest guarantee of its security. The NATO nuclear deterrence strategy also depends on forward deployment of US nuclear weapons and contribution of interested allies.
NATO plans to develop advanced technologies, including military application of artificial intelligence.
The bloc considers external attack on its members possible.
Comment: This basically means that weapons of mass destruction will be increased for use in the EU, together with increased deployment of US troops. While it is understood that defenses are necessary, significant increases of foreign troops and weapons in Europe will also add to an element of increased societal fear amongst the population. What used to be a European sense of freedom is in risk of being replaced by a European sense of unease and schizophrenia.
Ties with Ukraine
The bloc will continue reinforcing its partnership ties with Ukraine and Georgia, who seek to join the alliance.
NATO leaders adopted a program of enhanced support to Ukraine, providing as much military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary.
Comment: These will be seen an inflammatory comments in Moscow. It is also uncertain what providing 'military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary' means. To what extent is necessary?
Summary
The NATO 'Strategic Concept' appears to be the military arm to enforce the United States into new geographical territories and to provide increased weapons to the alliance as the lead in what the BRICS countries have stated in contrast is a 'unipolar' world.
It should also be noted that in doing so, it can also be seen as viewing the BRICS countries as a threat – collective China and Russia GDP within BRICS equate to 75% of the BRICS groups total GDP. Taken in this context, it appears that NATO is also now targeting trade.
This is in direct contrast to the recent BRICS Summit Declaration, which was released last week, and which Chinese Premier Xi Jinping suggested should be mandatory reading. The attitudes and opinions expressed in the BRICS agenda are far more inclusive that those emanating from this NATO document.
Quite frankly, it can be read that NATO, which includes most of the G7 nations, the EU, UK and United States, have quite categorically stated that neither China nor Russia are welcome – and if attempts are made to change the NATO Strategic Concept – then force will be applied to uphold it. This is a deeply flawed, provocative and aggressively worrying step to yet more conflicts.
Source: www.silkroadbriefing.com
By Chris Devonshire-Ellis
The annual NATO summit has been taking place in Spain, including NATO members Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. This year, Australia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Sweden are not member states of NATO but were invited to attend and participate in the summit, while Ukraine took part remotely. The presidents of the European Council and European Commission were also invited.
The NATO grouping issued a 'Strategic Concept' statement following the meeting in which it stated that members consider Russia the "most significant and direct threat" to its security. The bloc also intends to counter China, expand its partnership in the Asia Pacific Region and on the post-Soviet territory, and reinforce its own defense capabilities.
Here are the key points of the new Strategic Concept followed by my comments.
Russia As A Threat
NATO recognizes Russia the most significant and direct threat to the alliance's security.
The organization no longer wants to view Russia as a partner, but it is ready to maintain communications channel open. NATO also claims it does not seek confrontation with Russia and does not pose a threat to it. The relations between NATO and Russia may change, but this depends on Moscow, the alliance stated.
Comment: NATO has expressly stated that is nothing to do with NATO and that any engagements between Russia and NATO 'depend' on Moscow. This implies that NATO will not be prepared to enter into any discussions with Russia unless they are on NATO's terms.
Countering China
NATO believes that deepening of partnership between Russia and China violates the alliance's values and interests. According to NATO, China seeks to undermine the current world order by controlling global logistics and its economy.
Comment: This signals another communications breakdown, this time with China. The use of the term 'violates' is particularly strong. The mention of the 'current world order' is interesting as in the BRICS statement just last week, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) stated that the 'current world order' was preserving a 'unipolar world' with the United States essentially in control and that they wanted to devolve this structure into a fairer, 'multipolar' world with greater say in world affairs from all nations. NATO appears to view that as a threat to its own interests. This is a clear signal of a near complete breakdown between the Western countries represented by NATO – and the emerging global economies.
It is also of interest that NATO believes that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – although not specifically mentioned – is a security risk as China has invested in logistics capabilities on a global basis – at a time when the West has not. In fact, an OECD report from 2018 stated that the BRI was "regionally positive and statistically significant" in developing global trade. Opinions concerning the BRI have been many and varied, basically boiling down to a choice about the BRI (and therefore China) either being a security threat or being a global trade conduit. This is a matter of perception, rather than facts. In this case NATO's criticism of China appears based less on a reality truth than as a perceived truth. This is a difficult, almost impossible bridge to cross. It also indicates that NATO wishes to cut itself off from any BRI connectivity. Given that there are currently 195 countries globally and that 138 of them have signed BRI agreements that also leaves NATO with a remarkably small pool of future trade and infrastructure partners. I question the wisdom of this.
Indo-Pacific
The alliance plans to deepen cooperation with its partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Comment: NATO – actually the 'North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' – was formed at the end of World War Two to preserve peace and conclude ties between North America and Europe. It has become expansionist with obvious intent to deepen cooperation with its 'partners' in the Indo-Pacific. This geographical enlargement is therefore real and has been largely created to respond to the perceived China threat. Others may view that as an expansion of certain NATO members wishing to increase military sales.
Reinforcement of the bloc
NATO expansion has become a historic success for the alliance, reinforcing it and ensuring "security of millions of European citizens."
Comment: This phrase hangs on the words 'historic success' and how this is measured, which is not provided in any context nor backed up by any statistics. It is hard to know what is meant by this statement. In terms of European murder rates for example, according to the European Commission, they increased by 3.3% in 2020. It is a concern when gun violence in the US has been rapidly increasing under the mantra that increasing gun ownership improves security. The EU needs to be very careful here.
NATO intends to "significantly strengthen" its forces for deterrence of Russia and self-defense. The member states agreed to expand their military budgets above 2% of GDP.
The alliance views strategic nuclear forces, especially the US ones, as the highest guarantee of its security. The NATO nuclear deterrence strategy also depends on forward deployment of US nuclear weapons and contribution of interested allies.
NATO plans to develop advanced technologies, including military application of artificial intelligence.
The bloc considers external attack on its members possible.
Comment: This basically means that weapons of mass destruction will be increased for use in the EU, together with increased deployment of US troops. While it is understood that defenses are necessary, significant increases of foreign troops and weapons in Europe will also add to an element of increased societal fear amongst the population. What used to be a European sense of freedom is in risk of being replaced by a European sense of unease and schizophrenia.
Ties with Ukraine
The bloc will continue reinforcing its partnership ties with Ukraine and Georgia, who seek to join the alliance.
NATO leaders adopted a program of enhanced support to Ukraine, providing as much military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary.
Comment: These will be seen an inflammatory comments in Moscow. It is also uncertain what providing 'military and financial aid to Kiev as necessary' means. To what extent is necessary?
Summary
The NATO 'Strategic Concept' appears to be the military arm to enforce the United States into new geographical territories and to provide increased weapons to the alliance as the lead in what the BRICS countries have stated in contrast is a 'unipolar' world.
It should also be noted that in doing so, it can also be seen as viewing the BRICS countries as a threat – collective China and Russia GDP within BRICS equate to 75% of the BRICS groups total GDP. Taken in this context, it appears that NATO is also now targeting trade.
This is in direct contrast to the recent BRICS Summit Declaration, which was released last week, and which Chinese Premier Xi Jinping suggested should be mandatory reading. The attitudes and opinions expressed in the BRICS agenda are far more inclusive that those emanating from this NATO document.
Quite frankly, it can be read that NATO, which includes most of the G7 nations, the EU, UK and United States, have quite categorically stated that neither China nor Russia are welcome – and if attempts are made to change the NATO Strategic Concept – then force will be applied to uphold it. This is a deeply flawed, provocative and aggressively worrying step to yet more conflicts.
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi speaks on telephone with His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (Премьер-министр Нарендра Моди поговорил по телефону с президентом Российской Федерации Владимиром Путиным) / India, July, 2022
Keywords: vladimir_putin, narendra_modi, global_governance
2022-07-01
2022-07-01
India
Source: www.mea.gov.in
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi had a telephone conversation today with His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation.
The two leaders reviewed the implementation of the decisions taken during President Putin's visit to India in December 2021. In particular, they exchanged ideas on how bilateral trade in agricultural goods, fertilizers and pharma products could be encouraged further.
The leaders also discussed global issues, including the state of the international energy and food markets.
In the context of the ongoing situation in Ukraine, Prime Minister reiterated India's long-standing position in favour of dialogue and diplomacy.
The leaders agreed to maintain regular consultations on global and bilateral issues.
Source: www.mea.gov.in
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi had a telephone conversation today with His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation.
The two leaders reviewed the implementation of the decisions taken during President Putin's visit to India in December 2021. In particular, they exchanged ideas on how bilateral trade in agricultural goods, fertilizers and pharma products could be encouraged further.
The leaders also discussed global issues, including the state of the international energy and food markets.
In the context of the ongoing situation in Ukraine, Prime Minister reiterated India's long-standing position in favour of dialogue and diplomacy.
The leaders agreed to maintain regular consultations on global and bilateral issues.
Investment and Finance
Investment and finance in BRICS
NDB board of directors held its 36th meeting (36-е заседание совета директоров НБР) / China, June, 2022
Keywords: ndb
2022-06-29
2022-06-29
China
Source: www.ndb.int
On June 27, 2022, the Board of Directors (Board) of the New Development Bank (NDB) held its 36th Meeting in a virtual format.
The Board approved the Bank's new sovereign lending rates in USD and EUR. The Board was also updated on the implementation of funding programmes and the status of LIBOR-SOFR transition.
The Board discussed project pipeline and ongoing project implementation, disbursements and procurement.
The Board provided guidance on the Bank's Evaluation Policy and approved the proposal of undertaking two project independent evaluations in the second half of 2022.
The Board was briefed on the progress of membership expansion and provided guidance for the next steps.
The 23rd meeting of the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee and 19th meeting of the Budget, Human Resources and Compensation Committee were held on June 21 and 22, 2022 respectively.
Background Information
New Development Bank was established with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging market economies and developing countries, complementing the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.
Source: www.ndb.int
On June 27, 2022, the Board of Directors (Board) of the New Development Bank (NDB) held its 36th Meeting in a virtual format.
The Board approved the Bank's new sovereign lending rates in USD and EUR. The Board was also updated on the implementation of funding programmes and the status of LIBOR-SOFR transition.
The Board discussed project pipeline and ongoing project implementation, disbursements and procurement.
The Board provided guidance on the Bank's Evaluation Policy and approved the proposal of undertaking two project independent evaluations in the second half of 2022.
The Board was briefed on the progress of membership expansion and provided guidance for the next steps.
The 23rd meeting of the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee and 19th meeting of the Budget, Human Resources and Compensation Committee were held on June 21 and 22, 2022 respectively.
Background Information
New Development Bank was established with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging market economies and developing countries, complementing the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.
Calls for concessional financing grow as G7 rolls out infrastructure plan (Призывы к льготному финансированию растут по мере того, как G7 развертывает план инфраструктуры) / China, June, 2022
Keywords: expert_opinion, global_governance
2022-06-29
2022-06-29
China
Source: www.gtreview.com
GLOBAL / BY FELIX THOMPSON
As the G7 works to launch a new infrastructure strategy and compete with China's multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the developing world, experts suggest the plan is overly reliant on non-concessional financing.
During a summit held in Germany this week, G7 nations launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative and pledged US$600bn in private and public funds over the next five years towards emerging market infrastructure projects.
The US and EU nations are the largest backers of the project, pledging US$200bn and US$316bn respectively in grants, federal funds and private investment.
The programme signals a renewed attempt to boost western involvement in infrastructure projects across developing nations, after its predecessor the Build Back Better World (B3W) strategy, which was announced last June and carried the same aims, stalled.
Taking on China's multi-trillion dollar BRI programme is a core part of the PGII, as it was with the B3W, experts say. There is also a focus on supporting specific types of projects and growing business for western companies and exporters. The programme will target four key sectors, namely health, clean energy, gender equality and digital connectivity.
"I want to be clear: This isn't aid or charity; it's an investment that will deliver returns for everyone, including the American people and the people of all our nations. It'll boost all of our economies," US President Joe Biden said in a speech on June 27.
A memo from the White House suggests the country's export credit agency (ECA) will play a key role in the new programme.
According to a policy brief, the US secretary of commerce will consult the chair of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (US Exim) and other agency heads, who together will develop and implement a strategy to "boost competitiveness" and promote the use of America-made equipment and services in international projects as part of the programme.
US Exim, USAID and the DFC will also be involved in crafting a strategy of using "embassy deal teams" that can identify potential priority infrastructure projects for the PGII and refer promising opportunities to relevant agencies.
Speaking this week, US Exim's chair Reta Jo Lewis said PGII will offer developing countries a "positive alternative to the kinds of infrastructure financing that sell debt traps, exploit workers, and leave recipient nations in worse conditions".
ECAs in fellow G7 countries are likewise preparing to support the new strategy in the coming years.
A spokesperson for UK Export Finance (UKEF) tells GTR the agency provided billions towards critical infrastructure projects such as hospitals, clean transport and renewable energy last year, while noting "there is much more to do in these critical areas".
Concessional finance need?
Despite these expressions of intent, industry figures argue G7 governments need to rethink their approach if they are to offer affordable infrastructure financing for sovereign borrowers with strained balance sheets.
China has pumped trillions of dollars into a vast swathe of infrastructure projects such as roads, railways and airports globally over the past decade. But there are signs Beijing is scaling back its commitments in regions such as Africa.
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Focac) in late November, the country unveiled an action plan that included around US$40bn of commitments in the form of trade finance, commercial investments and a share of China's Special Drawing Rights. This included little in the way of concessional loans, Beijing's primary tool for financing infrastructure.
Drawing on data from China Exim and China Development Bank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes in a report that investment has "plummeted" since a high of 2016, when infrastructure spending topped US$50bn.
In 2019, both infrastructure investment and overall spending dipped below US$10bn for the first time since BRI's launch, it says.
As Beijing's appetite ostensibly dwindles, estimates put the infrastructure funding gap in the developing world at over US$40tn.
"The G7 announcement is pure rhetoric, more spin than substance," says Gabriel Buck, managing director of boutique export finance consultancy GKB Ventures.
Buck argues the private sector is unlikely to back infrastructure expansion in low-income countries in sectors such as health, given investors are "generally looking for hard currency generating projects and typically seek around 25% returns per annum for developing market risk projects".
"The [PGII] strategy shows they are hoping developing nations will be the solution to stimulate growth in their own countries. The developing market needs aid, grants and long-term concessional or near concessional finance to make these projects affordable," he says.
Experts say traditional ECA support is often too expensive for low-income countries with sizeable levels of debt. But there are growing calls for these agencies to strike partnerships with other government departments and make financing accessible.
In May, the UK published a new strategy for international development which made reference to a new programme, known as the British Support for Infrastructure Projects (BSIP), which the government says will facilitate concessional loans to help foreign countries access "high quality and affordable" infrastructure finance.
The BSIP programme is expected to become operational during 2023 and will be managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, a UKEF spokesperson tells GTR.
"It is anticipated that BSIP finance could potentially be blended with support from UKEF, however, the financing arrangements will depend on the needs of the particular countries seeking BSIP support," they add.
James O'Brien, a partner at law firm Baker McKenzie and member of US Exim's Sub-Saharan Advisory Committee, likewise touts the amplified potential of US Exim partnering with other government financing agencies.
"When Exim financing is matched together with other pieces of US government finance, they very much can compete with the likes of China. One of the key parts of Biden's policy directs Exim to work with DFC to provide financing for the projects, which is in a much better position to provide concessional financing than Exim."
"There is no rule against them working together, it is just they customarily have not in the past. I think what Biden is saying is these agencies need to look at ways they can cooperate and compete with financing from rival countries."
Source: www.gtreview.com
GLOBAL / BY FELIX THOMPSON
As the G7 works to launch a new infrastructure strategy and compete with China's multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the developing world, experts suggest the plan is overly reliant on non-concessional financing.
During a summit held in Germany this week, G7 nations launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative and pledged US$600bn in private and public funds over the next five years towards emerging market infrastructure projects.
The US and EU nations are the largest backers of the project, pledging US$200bn and US$316bn respectively in grants, federal funds and private investment.
The programme signals a renewed attempt to boost western involvement in infrastructure projects across developing nations, after its predecessor the Build Back Better World (B3W) strategy, which was announced last June and carried the same aims, stalled.
Taking on China's multi-trillion dollar BRI programme is a core part of the PGII, as it was with the B3W, experts say. There is also a focus on supporting specific types of projects and growing business for western companies and exporters. The programme will target four key sectors, namely health, clean energy, gender equality and digital connectivity.
"I want to be clear: This isn't aid or charity; it's an investment that will deliver returns for everyone, including the American people and the people of all our nations. It'll boost all of our economies," US President Joe Biden said in a speech on June 27.
A memo from the White House suggests the country's export credit agency (ECA) will play a key role in the new programme.
According to a policy brief, the US secretary of commerce will consult the chair of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (US Exim) and other agency heads, who together will develop and implement a strategy to "boost competitiveness" and promote the use of America-made equipment and services in international projects as part of the programme.
US Exim, USAID and the DFC will also be involved in crafting a strategy of using "embassy deal teams" that can identify potential priority infrastructure projects for the PGII and refer promising opportunities to relevant agencies.
Speaking this week, US Exim's chair Reta Jo Lewis said PGII will offer developing countries a "positive alternative to the kinds of infrastructure financing that sell debt traps, exploit workers, and leave recipient nations in worse conditions".
ECAs in fellow G7 countries are likewise preparing to support the new strategy in the coming years.
A spokesperson for UK Export Finance (UKEF) tells GTR the agency provided billions towards critical infrastructure projects such as hospitals, clean transport and renewable energy last year, while noting "there is much more to do in these critical areas".
Concessional finance need?
Despite these expressions of intent, industry figures argue G7 governments need to rethink their approach if they are to offer affordable infrastructure financing for sovereign borrowers with strained balance sheets.
China has pumped trillions of dollars into a vast swathe of infrastructure projects such as roads, railways and airports globally over the past decade. But there are signs Beijing is scaling back its commitments in regions such as Africa.
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Focac) in late November, the country unveiled an action plan that included around US$40bn of commitments in the form of trade finance, commercial investments and a share of China's Special Drawing Rights. This included little in the way of concessional loans, Beijing's primary tool for financing infrastructure.
Drawing on data from China Exim and China Development Bank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes in a report that investment has "plummeted" since a high of 2016, when infrastructure spending topped US$50bn.
In 2019, both infrastructure investment and overall spending dipped below US$10bn for the first time since BRI's launch, it says.
As Beijing's appetite ostensibly dwindles, estimates put the infrastructure funding gap in the developing world at over US$40tn.
"The G7 announcement is pure rhetoric, more spin than substance," says Gabriel Buck, managing director of boutique export finance consultancy GKB Ventures.
Buck argues the private sector is unlikely to back infrastructure expansion in low-income countries in sectors such as health, given investors are "generally looking for hard currency generating projects and typically seek around 25% returns per annum for developing market risk projects".
"The [PGII] strategy shows they are hoping developing nations will be the solution to stimulate growth in their own countries. The developing market needs aid, grants and long-term concessional or near concessional finance to make these projects affordable," he says.
Experts say traditional ECA support is often too expensive for low-income countries with sizeable levels of debt. But there are growing calls for these agencies to strike partnerships with other government departments and make financing accessible.
In May, the UK published a new strategy for international development which made reference to a new programme, known as the British Support for Infrastructure Projects (BSIP), which the government says will facilitate concessional loans to help foreign countries access "high quality and affordable" infrastructure finance.
The BSIP programme is expected to become operational during 2023 and will be managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, a UKEF spokesperson tells GTR.
"It is anticipated that BSIP finance could potentially be blended with support from UKEF, however, the financing arrangements will depend on the needs of the particular countries seeking BSIP support," they add.
James O'Brien, a partner at law firm Baker McKenzie and member of US Exim's Sub-Saharan Advisory Committee, likewise touts the amplified potential of US Exim partnering with other government financing agencies.
"When Exim financing is matched together with other pieces of US government finance, they very much can compete with the likes of China. One of the key parts of Biden's policy directs Exim to work with DFC to provide financing for the projects, which is in a much better position to provide concessional financing than Exim."
"There is no rule against them working together, it is just they customarily have not in the past. I think what Biden is saying is these agencies need to look at ways they can cooperate and compete with financing from rival countries."
US makes another stab at 'challenging' China's BRI (США наносят еще один удар по «вызову» Китаю BRI) / China, July, 2022
Keywords: obor, expert_opinion
2022-07-02
2022-07-02
China
Source: asiatimes.com
By VIJAY PRASHAD
At the Group of Seven Summit in Germany on June 26, US President Joe Biden made a pledge to raise $200 billion within the United States for global infrastructure spending. It was made clear that this new G7 project, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), was intended to counter the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Given Biden's failure to pass the Build Back Better bill (with its scope being almost halved from $3.5 trillion to $2.2 trillion), it is unlikely that he will get the US Congress to go along with this new endeavor.
The PGII is not the first attempt by the US to match Chinese infrastructure investment globally, which initially took place bilaterally, and then after 2013 happened through the BRI.
In 2004, as the US war on Iraq unfolded, the US government set up a body called the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which it called an "independent US foreign assistance agency."
Also read: G7's infrastructure scheme is no 'BRI killer'
Before that, most US government development lending was done through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was set up in 1961 as part of the John F Kennedy administration's charm campaign against the Soviet Union and against the Bandung spirit of non-alignment in the newly assertive Third World.
Former US president George W Bush said USAID was too bureaucratic, and so the MCC would be a project that would include both the US government and the private sector. The word "corporation" in the title is deliberate. Each of the heads of the MCC, from Paul Applegarth to Alice P Albright, has belonged to the private sector (the current head, Albright, is the daughter of the late US secretary of state Madeleine Albright).
The word "challenge" in MCC refers to the fact that the grants are only approved if the countries can show that they meet 20 "policy performance indicators," ranging from civil liberties to inflation rates. These indicators ensure that the countries seeking the grants adhere to the conventional neoliberal framework.
There are also great inconsistencies among these indicators: For instance, the countries must have a high immunization rate (monitored by the World Health Organization), but at the same time they must follow the International Monetary Fund's requirements for a tight fiscal policy.
This in essence means that the public health spending of a candidate country should be kept low, resulting in the required number of public health workers not being available for the immunization programs.
The US Congress provided $650 million to the MCC for its first year in 2004, as a US government official told me; in 2022, the amount sought was more than $900 million.
In 2007, when Bush met with Nambaryn Enkhbayar, the former president of Mongolia, to sign an MCC grant, he said the Millennium Challenge Account, which is administered by MCC, "is an important part of our foreign policy. It's an opportunity for the United States and our taxpayers to help countries that fight corruption, that support market-based economies, and that invest in the health and education of their people."
Clearly, the MCC is an instrument of US foreign policy, but its aim seems to be not so much to tackle the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (on hunger, health and education), as Bush said, but to ensure extension of the reach of US influence and to inculcate the habits and structures of US-led globalization ("market-based economies").
In 2009, then-US president Barack Obama developed a "pivot to Asia," a new foreign-policy orientation that had the US establishment focus more attention on East and South Asia. As part of this pivot, in 2011, then-secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave an important speech in Chennai, India, where she spoke about the creation of a New Silk Road Initiative.
Clinton argued that the US government, under Obama's "pivot to Asia" policy, was going to develop an economic agenda that ran from the Central Asian countries to the south of India, and would thereby help integrate the Central Asian republics into a US project and break the ties the region had formed with Russia and China.
The impetus for the New Silk Road was to find a way to use this development as an instrument to undermine the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. This US project foundered because of lack of congressional funding and because of its sheer impossibility, since Afghanistan, which was the heart of this road project, could not be persuaded to submit to US interests.
Two years later, in 2013, the Chinese government inaugurated the Silk Road Economic Belt project, which is now known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Rather than go from North to South, the BRI went from East to West, linking China to Central Asia and then outward to South Asia, West Asia, Europe and Africa.
The aim of this project was to bring together the Eurasian Economic Community (established in 2000) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (set up in 2001) to work on this new, bigger project.
Roughly US$4 trillion has been invested since 2013 in a range of projects by the BRI and its associated funding mechanisms (including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund). The investments were paid for by grants from Chinese institutions and through debt incurred by the projects at rates that are competitive with those of Western infrastructure lending programs.
The US government's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (2019) notes that China uses "economic inducements and penalties" to "persuade other states to comply with its agenda." The report provides no evidence, and indeed, scholars who have looked into these matters do not see any such evidence.
US Admiral Philip S Davidson, who previously commanded the Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress that China was "leveraging its economic instrument of power" in Asia. The MCC, and other instruments, including a new International Development Finance Corp, were hastily set up to give America an edge over China in a US-driven contest over the creation of infrastructure investment globally.
There is no doubt that the MCC is part of the broad Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States to undermine Chinese influence in Asia.
Only a handful of countries have thus far received MCC grants, starting with Honduras and Madagascar. These are often not very large grants, although for a country the size of Malawi or Jordan, they can have a considerable impact.
No large countries have been drawn into the MCC compact, which suggests that the United States wants to give these grants to mainly smaller countries, to strengthen their ties with the US. Nepal's accession to the MCC must be seen in this broader context, although the discovery of uranium in Nepal's Upper Mustang region in 2014 seems to play an important role in the pressure campaign on that country.
In May 2017, Nepal's government signed a BRI framework agreement, which included an ambitious plan to build a railway link between China and Nepal through the Himalayas; this rail link would allow Nepal to lessen its reliance on Indian land routes for trade purposes.
Various projects began to be discussed and feasibility studies were commissioned under the BRI plan. These projects, more details for which emerged in 2019, were the extension of an electricity transmission line and the creation of a technical university in Nepal, and of course, construction of a vast network of roads and rail, which included the trans-Himalayan railway from Keyrung to Kathmandu.
During this time, the United States entered the picture with a full-scale effort to disparage the BRI funding in Nepal and to promote the use of MCC money there instead. In September 2017, the government of Nepal signed an agreement with the United States called the Nepal Compact. This agreement, worth $500 million, is for an electricity transmission project and for a road maintenance project.
At this point, Nepal had access to both BRI and MCC funds and neither of the parties seemed to mind that fact. This provided an opportunity for Nepal to use both these resources to develop much-needed infrastructure, or as former prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal told me in 2020, his country could get new loans from the Asian Development Bank.
After both deals had been signed, a political dispute broke out in Nepal, which resulted in the split of the Communist Party of Nepal and the fall of the leftist government. One major issue on the table was the MCC and its role in the overall Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, which seems to be targeted against China.
This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.
Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism and (with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of US Power.
Source: asiatimes.com
By VIJAY PRASHAD
At the Group of Seven Summit in Germany on June 26, US President Joe Biden made a pledge to raise $200 billion within the United States for global infrastructure spending. It was made clear that this new G7 project, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), was intended to counter the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Given Biden's failure to pass the Build Back Better bill (with its scope being almost halved from $3.5 trillion to $2.2 trillion), it is unlikely that he will get the US Congress to go along with this new endeavor.
The PGII is not the first attempt by the US to match Chinese infrastructure investment globally, which initially took place bilaterally, and then after 2013 happened through the BRI.
In 2004, as the US war on Iraq unfolded, the US government set up a body called the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which it called an "independent US foreign assistance agency."
Also read: G7's infrastructure scheme is no 'BRI killer'
Before that, most US government development lending was done through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was set up in 1961 as part of the John F Kennedy administration's charm campaign against the Soviet Union and against the Bandung spirit of non-alignment in the newly assertive Third World.
Former US president George W Bush said USAID was too bureaucratic, and so the MCC would be a project that would include both the US government and the private sector. The word "corporation" in the title is deliberate. Each of the heads of the MCC, from Paul Applegarth to Alice P Albright, has belonged to the private sector (the current head, Albright, is the daughter of the late US secretary of state Madeleine Albright).
The word "challenge" in MCC refers to the fact that the grants are only approved if the countries can show that they meet 20 "policy performance indicators," ranging from civil liberties to inflation rates. These indicators ensure that the countries seeking the grants adhere to the conventional neoliberal framework.
There are also great inconsistencies among these indicators: For instance, the countries must have a high immunization rate (monitored by the World Health Organization), but at the same time they must follow the International Monetary Fund's requirements for a tight fiscal policy.
This in essence means that the public health spending of a candidate country should be kept low, resulting in the required number of public health workers not being available for the immunization programs.
The US Congress provided $650 million to the MCC for its first year in 2004, as a US government official told me; in 2022, the amount sought was more than $900 million.
In 2007, when Bush met with Nambaryn Enkhbayar, the former president of Mongolia, to sign an MCC grant, he said the Millennium Challenge Account, which is administered by MCC, "is an important part of our foreign policy. It's an opportunity for the United States and our taxpayers to help countries that fight corruption, that support market-based economies, and that invest in the health and education of their people."
Clearly, the MCC is an instrument of US foreign policy, but its aim seems to be not so much to tackle the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (on hunger, health and education), as Bush said, but to ensure extension of the reach of US influence and to inculcate the habits and structures of US-led globalization ("market-based economies").
In 2009, then-US president Barack Obama developed a "pivot to Asia," a new foreign-policy orientation that had the US establishment focus more attention on East and South Asia. As part of this pivot, in 2011, then-secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave an important speech in Chennai, India, where she spoke about the creation of a New Silk Road Initiative.
Clinton argued that the US government, under Obama's "pivot to Asia" policy, was going to develop an economic agenda that ran from the Central Asian countries to the south of India, and would thereby help integrate the Central Asian republics into a US project and break the ties the region had formed with Russia and China.
The impetus for the New Silk Road was to find a way to use this development as an instrument to undermine the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. This US project foundered because of lack of congressional funding and because of its sheer impossibility, since Afghanistan, which was the heart of this road project, could not be persuaded to submit to US interests.
Two years later, in 2013, the Chinese government inaugurated the Silk Road Economic Belt project, which is now known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Rather than go from North to South, the BRI went from East to West, linking China to Central Asia and then outward to South Asia, West Asia, Europe and Africa.
The aim of this project was to bring together the Eurasian Economic Community (established in 2000) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (set up in 2001) to work on this new, bigger project.
Roughly US$4 trillion has been invested since 2013 in a range of projects by the BRI and its associated funding mechanisms (including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund). The investments were paid for by grants from Chinese institutions and through debt incurred by the projects at rates that are competitive with those of Western infrastructure lending programs.
The US government's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (2019) notes that China uses "economic inducements and penalties" to "persuade other states to comply with its agenda." The report provides no evidence, and indeed, scholars who have looked into these matters do not see any such evidence.
US Admiral Philip S Davidson, who previously commanded the Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress that China was "leveraging its economic instrument of power" in Asia. The MCC, and other instruments, including a new International Development Finance Corp, were hastily set up to give America an edge over China in a US-driven contest over the creation of infrastructure investment globally.
There is no doubt that the MCC is part of the broad Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States to undermine Chinese influence in Asia.
Only a handful of countries have thus far received MCC grants, starting with Honduras and Madagascar. These are often not very large grants, although for a country the size of Malawi or Jordan, they can have a considerable impact.
No large countries have been drawn into the MCC compact, which suggests that the United States wants to give these grants to mainly smaller countries, to strengthen their ties with the US. Nepal's accession to the MCC must be seen in this broader context, although the discovery of uranium in Nepal's Upper Mustang region in 2014 seems to play an important role in the pressure campaign on that country.
In May 2017, Nepal's government signed a BRI framework agreement, which included an ambitious plan to build a railway link between China and Nepal through the Himalayas; this rail link would allow Nepal to lessen its reliance on Indian land routes for trade purposes.
Various projects began to be discussed and feasibility studies were commissioned under the BRI plan. These projects, more details for which emerged in 2019, were the extension of an electricity transmission line and the creation of a technical university in Nepal, and of course, construction of a vast network of roads and rail, which included the trans-Himalayan railway from Keyrung to Kathmandu.
During this time, the United States entered the picture with a full-scale effort to disparage the BRI funding in Nepal and to promote the use of MCC money there instead. In September 2017, the government of Nepal signed an agreement with the United States called the Nepal Compact. This agreement, worth $500 million, is for an electricity transmission project and for a road maintenance project.
At this point, Nepal had access to both BRI and MCC funds and neither of the parties seemed to mind that fact. This provided an opportunity for Nepal to use both these resources to develop much-needed infrastructure, or as former prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal told me in 2020, his country could get new loans from the Asian Development Bank.
After both deals had been signed, a political dispute broke out in Nepal, which resulted in the split of the Communist Party of Nepal and the fall of the leftist government. One major issue on the table was the MCC and its role in the overall Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, which seems to be targeted against China.
This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.
Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism and (with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of US Power.
Can China Achieve Its BRICS Ambitions? (Сможет ли Китай реализовать свои амбиции в БРИКС?) / China, July, 2022
Keywords: top_level_meeting, vladimir_putin, xi_jinping, political_issues
2022-07-02
2022-07-02
China
Source: thediplomat.com
By Jacob Mardell
Leaders virtually attend the 14th BRICS summit, June 23, 2022.
Credit: Press Information Bureau, India ADVERTISEMENT
Beijing and Moscow have so far failed to repurpose the BRICS group into an anti-U.S. coalition, but they are not done trying and might yet succeed. The BRICS countries share a common dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the group is becoming increasingly important to Beijing's global agenda.
The five leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa met virtually on June 23 for the 14th annual BRICS summit. In his opening remarks, Chinese President Xi Jinping, this year's host, was the only leader to directly reference what he called the "Ukraine crisis."
Russian leader Vladimir Putin made a swipe at Western sanctions, decrying the "selfish actions of certain states," but Xi was even more explicit and detailed in his criticism of the West, claiming that attempts by "some countries [to] expand military alliances" and "pursue unilateral dominance" were "dangerous trends" that could not be allowed to continue.
In this context, Xi pushed his Global Security Initiative (GSI), a new Chinese security concept that forwards Beijing's global leadership claims in the realm of international security.
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Despite constant criticism of the West's "Cold War mentality," the initiative ironically touts the Cold War-era principle of "indivisible security." Taken in a generous spirit, the term suggests that states' security concerns are inextricably linked. In Moscow's usage it simply means that Russian insecurities about NATO and EU expansion justify the invasion of Ukraine.
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It is "might is right" realpolitik dressed up in the language of peaceful internationalism, and it is typical of the double-think necessary to appreciate some aspects of Chinese foreign policy. When Xi talks about crafting a "community of common destiny" that is governed by "win-win" rather than "zero-sum" thinking, he is describing harmony through conformity with Chinese interests.
Unfortunately for Beijing, neither the Global Security Initiative, nor its counterpart, the Global Development Initiative, made it into the rather bland BRICS summit readout.
Neither did the Chinese-led proposal to expand the grouping gain much traction. Beijing claimed in May that the BRICS foreign ministers had reached consensus on expansion, but the upshot of the recent summit is that the BRICS have simply agreed to carry on talking about it. Russian media has since reported that Iran and Argentina have filed applications to join, but it is unclear when or even how they would accede to the group.
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Against the backdrop of deepening tensions with the West, expansion makes sense for Russia and China, who are keen to see the emergence of a counter to the G-7. Potential candidate countries are also interested, but for Brazil, India, and South Africa, the argument is less clear cut. New Delhi in particular is reluctant to dilute its own voice and hand greater clout to China.
Still, reluctance to join a Chinese-led anti-Western alliance does not signal a complete lack of common ground between the BRICS members. The five share a reformist agenda that Beijing will continue to leverage.
Commentators in the West have long been skeptical of the BRICS' potential as a politically relevant grouping. Despite the group's steady march toward institutionalization over the years, the creation of the New Development Bank, and consistent engagement by its members, it is largely written off as a talk shop.
Skepticism has turned on the assumption that the BRICS members' differences outweigh their interests. On the face of it, there isn't much that all five members share in common. China's economy is larger than the other four combined, and collectively they escape definition – they are neither all democracies, nor all in the Global South, nor all non-Western.
The main thing that has kept the leaders of these very different countries engaged, year after year, is their shared ambition for greater representation on the global stage. They are the underdogs – those that feel excluded from the club of developed, former colonial powers led by the United States. Of course, Russia has its own history of imperialism, but it's an underdog if you view the international order as a product of U.S. hegemony.
Despite talk of Russia's international isolation, none of the BRICS countries voted in favor of Russia's expulsion from the U.N. Human Rights Council in April of this year. This shouldn't come as a surprise – in fact, it is consistent with their positions following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.
China and Russia are the most vocal in their criticism of economic sanctions, but Brazil has also criticized what it calls "indiscriminate sanctions" against Russia. Brazil, India, and South Africa will not stand with Russia and China against the West, but even in the face of Russian atrocities, they remain hostile to U.S. hegemony and share China's mission of "democratizing" international relations.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
The West has for a long time underestimated the importance of the Global South to China's struggle for supremacy against the United States. As China-U.S. relations further deteriorate, developing countries will become increasingly important to Beijing as trade partners, as sources of legitimacy on the global stage, and as battlegrounds to set international standards for emerging technologies.
As the most prominent and established political grouping of non-G-7 countries, the BRICS will continue to be an important vehicle for China's mission to increase its clout. Beijing may have failed this time to make much headway in pushing its agenda, but it will not give up easily.
Source: thediplomat.com
By Jacob Mardell
Leaders virtually attend the 14th BRICS summit, June 23, 2022.
Credit: Press Information Bureau, India ADVERTISEMENT
Beijing and Moscow have so far failed to repurpose the BRICS group into an anti-U.S. coalition, but they are not done trying and might yet succeed. The BRICS countries share a common dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the group is becoming increasingly important to Beijing's global agenda.
The five leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa met virtually on June 23 for the 14th annual BRICS summit. In his opening remarks, Chinese President Xi Jinping, this year's host, was the only leader to directly reference what he called the "Ukraine crisis."
Russian leader Vladimir Putin made a swipe at Western sanctions, decrying the "selfish actions of certain states," but Xi was even more explicit and detailed in his criticism of the West, claiming that attempts by "some countries [to] expand military alliances" and "pursue unilateral dominance" were "dangerous trends" that could not be allowed to continue.
In this context, Xi pushed his Global Security Initiative (GSI), a new Chinese security concept that forwards Beijing's global leadership claims in the realm of international security.
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Despite constant criticism of the West's "Cold War mentality," the initiative ironically touts the Cold War-era principle of "indivisible security." Taken in a generous spirit, the term suggests that states' security concerns are inextricably linked. In Moscow's usage it simply means that Russian insecurities about NATO and EU expansion justify the invasion of Ukraine.
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It is "might is right" realpolitik dressed up in the language of peaceful internationalism, and it is typical of the double-think necessary to appreciate some aspects of Chinese foreign policy. When Xi talks about crafting a "community of common destiny" that is governed by "win-win" rather than "zero-sum" thinking, he is describing harmony through conformity with Chinese interests.
Unfortunately for Beijing, neither the Global Security Initiative, nor its counterpart, the Global Development Initiative, made it into the rather bland BRICS summit readout.
Neither did the Chinese-led proposal to expand the grouping gain much traction. Beijing claimed in May that the BRICS foreign ministers had reached consensus on expansion, but the upshot of the recent summit is that the BRICS have simply agreed to carry on talking about it. Russian media has since reported that Iran and Argentina have filed applications to join, but it is unclear when or even how they would accede to the group.
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Against the backdrop of deepening tensions with the West, expansion makes sense for Russia and China, who are keen to see the emergence of a counter to the G-7. Potential candidate countries are also interested, but for Brazil, India, and South Africa, the argument is less clear cut. New Delhi in particular is reluctant to dilute its own voice and hand greater clout to China.
Still, reluctance to join a Chinese-led anti-Western alliance does not signal a complete lack of common ground between the BRICS members. The five share a reformist agenda that Beijing will continue to leverage.
Commentators in the West have long been skeptical of the BRICS' potential as a politically relevant grouping. Despite the group's steady march toward institutionalization over the years, the creation of the New Development Bank, and consistent engagement by its members, it is largely written off as a talk shop.
Skepticism has turned on the assumption that the BRICS members' differences outweigh their interests. On the face of it, there isn't much that all five members share in common. China's economy is larger than the other four combined, and collectively they escape definition – they are neither all democracies, nor all in the Global South, nor all non-Western.
The main thing that has kept the leaders of these very different countries engaged, year after year, is their shared ambition for greater representation on the global stage. They are the underdogs – those that feel excluded from the club of developed, former colonial powers led by the United States. Of course, Russia has its own history of imperialism, but it's an underdog if you view the international order as a product of U.S. hegemony.
Despite talk of Russia's international isolation, none of the BRICS countries voted in favor of Russia's expulsion from the U.N. Human Rights Council in April of this year. This shouldn't come as a surprise – in fact, it is consistent with their positions following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.
China and Russia are the most vocal in their criticism of economic sanctions, but Brazil has also criticized what it calls "indiscriminate sanctions" against Russia. Brazil, India, and South Africa will not stand with Russia and China against the West, but even in the face of Russian atrocities, they remain hostile to U.S. hegemony and share China's mission of "democratizing" international relations.
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The West has for a long time underestimated the importance of the Global South to China's struggle for supremacy against the United States. As China-U.S. relations further deteriorate, developing countries will become increasingly important to Beijing as trade partners, as sources of legitimacy on the global stage, and as battlegrounds to set international standards for emerging technologies.
As the most prominent and established political grouping of non-G-7 countries, the BRICS will continue to be an important vehicle for China's mission to increase its clout. Beijing may have failed this time to make much headway in pushing its agenda, but it will not give up easily.
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