Australia
Source: theconversation.com

Brics has emerged as a significant international force since 2009 when it was established at a summit in Russia. What began as a five-member group encompassing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, is now expanding with the integration of five new members and eight new partner countries. Even more countries may be joining in the next few years.

This growth raises essential questions about whether Brics will challenge the leadership of traditional powers such as the US, UK and the European Union.

But analysts are also questioning how united the bloc really is and whether a perceived lack of unity constitutes an obstacle to the bloc’s expansion. Brics is undoubtedly diverse. Iran and Saudi Arabia compete as regional powers in the Middle East, Egypt and Ethiopia have had different conflicts around the Nile’s governance, and the skirmishes between China and India are well known.

Yet, the bloc’s strength may reside in its capacity to integrate this diverse array of countries that are not fully aligned. Building loose international organisations might be the key to navigating international politics in these times of increasing polarisation.

The rise of Brics must be contextualised within the ongoing competition between the US and China. The rivalry between the world’s two largest economies is likely to intensify in the coming years, shaping the contemporary global order. China’s announcement of a record US$1 trillion (£804 billion) trade surplus for 2024 and its solid 5% economic growth have bolstered the narrative that its development model represents an alternative to the US-sponsored neoliberal policies that have dominated much of the world in the past four decades.

Political leaders and economic elites worldwide are closely observing the US-China competition – and most countries strive to maintain an equidistant approach. Countries traditionally within the US sphere of influence, including Brazil and Peru, have been cautiously moving towards China, attracted by the economic opportunities the Asian giant offers. Others previously in China’s orbit, like Vietnam, are working to maintain or expand their ties with the US.

China is unquestionably the driving force that holds Brics together. Without China, it wouldn’t have come into existence. All Brics countries share two key characteristics. They are global south countries that do not belong to the traditional group of hegemonic powers. And they have significant economic ties with China, especially through trade relations.

Belt and road

The official Brics narrative emphasises multilateralism, cooperation and fair global development. But in fact the group serves primarily as an instrument for China to project its power and influence. China achieves this through a combination of rhetoric and by using the bloc as a special trade platform linked to the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).

Brics seeks to position itself as an alternative to US hegemony, promoting free trade and multilateralism. In times of political turbulence and the growth of illiberal forces, this narrative serves as a powerful legitimising tool for the group globally. But the group’s diversity also poses significant challenges to its rise as an alternative to the US-led global order. It is unlikely that Brics will evolve into a unified military alliance like Nato or a free trade area like Asean or the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA – formerly Nafta). The group’s diversity prevents it from acquiring these characteristics.

Aware of this, China strategically uses Brics to increase its business opportunities and international influence. It maintains a fine balance between a loose bloc and a more solidified military or economic alliance. Contrary to the Cold War era, when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, had well-defined spheres of influence, the current world order appears to be shaped by loose, interconnected international blocs.

China’s prominence within Brics is clear and unlikely to change. It accounts for two-thirds of both the group’s GDP and intra-Brics trade. The country is the primary trade partner for Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran. China also holds significant investments in these nations. Russia is the largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment within the Brics with an accumulated stock of more than USU$10 billion.

Most Brics member states are also directly or indirectly involved in BRI. While the major BRI projects may not be located within Brics countries – they are primarily in central, south and southeast Asia – Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Iran also host BRI initiatives. Though not an official BRI member, Brazil has become a key partner due to its role as a central food supplier to China.

These figures highlight that expanding Brics is one of China’s foreign policy priorities. The country uses the group to project both economic and ideological influence. Donald Trump’s plans to impose trade tariffs on several countries, including China, is likely to prompt China to intensify this policy. It is a distinct possibility that the recent episode with Colombia, where the US president reportedly threatened to impose tariffs if Colombia continued to push back against deportation flights, could encourage more countries to seek closer trading relationships with China.

Strategic friendships

Some analysts correctly claim that Brics is divided between anti-western states and those that prefer to remain nonaligned. While the anti-western group, led by Russia, advocates for a confrontational stance towards the US, the nonaligned countries – including India and Brazil – favour a more nuanced approach.

Analysts argue that the US should try to develop closer relations with non-aligned countries to influence internal Brics debates. But this overlooks the fact that China is not only the de-facto leader of Brics but also has an unequivocal strategy of favouring a nuanced approach towards the west, based on multilateralism and free trade. So, despite what Russia may want, it’s unlikely that Brics will assume a confrontational stance towards the west.

China knows that a non-confrontational approach is the best way to attract more countries and solidify the Brics as a loose bloc that advocates for more democratic global governance.
So far, this strategy appears to be working.

Russia
Source: www.valdaiclub.com

The most optimistic trend of the past year has of course been the further development of BRICS. Russia made full use of its chairmanship both to promote its vision of future development in the world and to expand and strengthen its international ties, which once again demonstrated the failure of attempts by unfriendly countries to isolate Russia in the international arena, Konstantin Khudoley writes.

New Year’s tidings are usually accompanied by a rise in optimism among most people — we sum up the results of the past 12 months, make wishes for the future, and hope to achieve great success. This fully applies to the sphere of international relations, although the word “uncertainty” cannot be avoided when defining the current state of affairs. We are experiencing a turning point when international relations are being transformed; some aspects of the passing order have already been consigned to history, but the features of the new system are only just beginning to appear and how and at what pace they will develop in the future remains still far from clear.

First of all, we should mention the end of the era of arms race limitation and arms control. During the Cold War, the USSR and the USA created huge arsenals of weapons, including nuclear ones, which could have repeatedly destroyed all life on our planet. However, at some point, both superpowers realised that an uncontrolled arms race could lead to unpredictable consequences and did not correspond to their fundamental interests. Hence the emergence of a series of multilateral and bilateral treaties on arms limitations, and, in the best years, their reduction. Now this system of treaties is gradually eroding, and this process has already become irreversible in many cases. Of course, these treaties are partly outdated, and life has revealed a number of weak points and shortcomings. However, the main thing is that now in many countries (not only in the largest and most developed ones!) the opinion has prevailed that building up military potential is more in their interests than limiting the arms race. The growth of military spending and the emergence of new weapons programmes will most likely be one of the main trends in global development in the medium and perhaps long term. Self-restraint and compromises, inevitable in any such treaty, do not correspond to this line. Therefore, old treaties will gradually die out, and the emergence of new ones is not yet in sight.

Another important trend is the further fading of the Helsinki process. For almost five decades, the system of pan-European cooperation and security was based on two things — economic interaction (a huge role here was played by the supply of energy resources, especially cheap gas, from Russia to European countries, and the purchase of new technology and equipment), as well as cooperation within the OSCE in many aspects of politics, security, and humanitarian ties. Western sanctions have dealt a serious blow to economic ties, which both sides previously considered mutually beneficial, and the termination of Russian gas transit through Ukraine from January 1, 2025, creates a qualitatively different situation in many ways. This, of course, is not a knockout blow for the Russian economy, as our ill-wishers are trying to present, but Russia’s place in the European gas ring can be filled — at least partially — by others. The losses of the EU, especially of small countries, are also undoubted, since gas from other sources will be more expensive than gas from Russia. The OSCE’s “finest hour” as a platform for important multilateral negotiations has undoubtedly passed away and its activity has been reduced to a minimum by now. However, Russia’s withdrawal from the OSCE, as some politicians and experts are calling for, would not be right. It would be more appropriate to think about revamping the organisation to bring it in line with modern realities.

The Ukraine crisis has been escalating for almost its entire duration, and the danger of it exceeding certain limits remains present. Donald Trump’s statements about his readiness to establish direct contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin initially provided some hope for progress, but no concrete steps have followed. Of course, it takes time to prepare for negotiations of this level, and given that the positions of the United States and Russia on this issue are not just different, but sometimes opposite, the chances of a quick shift for the better are quite slim. In the near future, regardless of whether negotiations begin or not, both Russia and the West will do everything possible to strengthen their positions. Therefore, it is hardly realistic to expect the conflict to end or even partially de-escalate in the near future. At the same time, if no progress for the better occurs in the coming months, then a further aggravation of the situation can be expected in the fall.

The events currently taking place in connection with the arrival of the new US administration highlight another important trend that may develop in the future. We are talking about the role of major corporations in international relations. They have almost always been present, but now we are witnessing a qualitative shift — Elon Musk, the richest man on our planet, and the business corporations belonging to him are entering the arena of world politics, and clearly claim to play a global role. One can evaluate differently Musk’s attacks against British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, statements in support of the Alternative for Germany party, assistance in the release of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala from arrest in Iran and other actions, but they clearly show the degree of his desire to influence global processes and even the domestic policies of large and developed countries. At the same time, despite his close ties with Donald Trump, Musk retains a significant degree of independence. Apparently, in the future he will continue to play his own game, which in some cases may coincide, and in others not, with the policy of Trump. Regardless of how further events will develop, including the relationship between Trump and Musk, a precedent, as it seems to us, has been created and therefore other big business interests will try to follow Musk.

The most optimistic trend of the past year has of course been the further development of BRICS. Russia made full use of its chairmanship both to promote its vision of future development in the world and to expand and strengthen its international ties, which once again demonstrated the failure of attempts by unfriendly countries to isolate Russia in the international arena. The association has been replenished with new members. The summit in Kazan once again demonstrated that in modern conditions, interested countries, despite their civilisational differences, varying political and socio-economic systems, as well as religious and cultural specifics, can jointly agree on issues of interest to all of them. This is much more in line with today’s realities than the bloc discipline of the Cold War.

This year we celebrate the 80^th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, the defeat of Nazi Germany and its henchmen. One of the results of this was the creation of the UN, which will also celebrate its 80^th anniversary. For many years, the UN played an important, and sometimes key role in maintaining peace. Now the UN faces the difficult task of adapting to the new situation in international relations. This process has clearly dragged on, and the reform of the UN Security Council alone is unlikely to change the situation, even if the current disagreements regarding this issue could be quickly overcome. Certain changes in the nature of the UN’s activities are also necessary, as well as the emergence of new areas in which the UN would become a catalyst for development. The proper strengthening of the authority and influence of the UN, and not attempts to replace it with any other organisation, can become an important factor in the successful development of all mankind.

Greece
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa heads G20, an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 sovereign countries, the European Union, and the African Union, while Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva chairs BRICS+, an association made of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with four new members and 13 partner states in a category mostly from developing countries. At a quick glance, the G20 and BRICS+ are respectively chaired this year 2025 by South Africa and Brazil, both BRICS+ members, which makes it distinctively important development for the changing geopolitical world. In 2025, G20 and BRICS+ agenda features a pivotal role and pledge to continue making concerted strides, either in keen competition for economic revitalization or in close collaboration as development players, in the Global South.

Historically, G20 was created back in 1999 as a group of twenty of the world’s largest economies to deal primarily with multifaceted aspects of existing global economic, trade, health, climate change and political issues. Dissatisfied with the global dominance of the United States and the stack failure of leaders of developing countries, especially in Africa, to raise their economic status to an appreciable levels and improve standards of living for the largely impoverished population, BRIC appeared in 2009, in city of Yekaterinburg, Russia. South Africa ascended in 2010, transforming it into BRICS. As popularly now referred to as BRICS+, its key objective aspiration is to support building a better economic architecture for the Global South. In addition, BRICS+, as a non-western association, operates against western hegemony and uni-polar, rules-based system. Its key priority aims at shaping a more equitable and a more balanced global order while collaborating with developing countries in raising their economic status in the Global South.

An insight into G20 and BRICS+ including its “partner states” category shows the huge economic structure, the natural and human resources necessary for the future of mankind. We have observed several discussions, at highest levels these several years, on intensifying whatever political dialogue and exchange of views, economic collaborations and interactions on bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for developing better conditions in the Global South. Bridging the economic and standards of living gap have been on the agenda for both G20 and BRICS+ during previous years.
Every year, the leaders of G20 members meet to discuss mainly economic and financial matters and coordinate policy on some other issues of mutual interest. Every year, BRICS+ members summit features extensive deliberations on the United States global dominance and hegemony, without adequately addressing economic lapses in the developing Global South. Several summit declarations have adopted in that directions, but remain purely as collective declarations.

G20 and BRICS+ agenda in 2025?

As geopolitical situation heightens, G20 and BRICS+ are championing its a fresh version of governance reforms in their ways, and further reviewing the current operations of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the World Bank for developing countries in the Global South. Despite these common goals, G20 and BRICS+ still have the main points of discontention. BRICS+ shares, in its declarations, dissatisfaction over over-exploitation of resources in and rules-based approach towards developing world.

In the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation’s media release in January 2025, titled “The G20 is made up of 13 Engagement Groups”, stated that “South Africa fully supports the approach of strengthening partnerships and expanding dialogue with a wide range of actors; including States, international organizations and civil society; to collectively shape the G20’s approach to issues requiring international cooperation.” (South Africa’s chairmanship of G20, Jan. 2025)

It further recognizes the significant strides made by the Brazilian G20 presidency (2024) in enhancing the G20 as a site of democratic global engagement. The South African presidency will continue this trajectory. In South Africa’s G20 presidency, further modalities will be developed to involve a wide range of stakeholders throughout the year, particularly on priority initiatives. Until the G20 Leaders’ Summit in November 2025, South Africa is expected to bring together representatives of the existing engagement groups and other segments of civil society that may offer meaningful contributions to the G20.

For the BRICS+ agenda, focus is placed on the need to reform the current international financial architecture to meet the global financial challenges. As already explained, the measures are to facilitate the development of the economy, international trade, and the achievement of the sustainable development goals. In addition to the financial architecture, BRICS+ has agreed to discuss and study the feasibility of establishment of an independent cross-border settlement and depositary infrastructure, an initiative to complement the existing financial market infrastructure, as well as independent reinsurance capacity and the possibility of expanding innovative financial practices and approaches for projects and programmes, including finding acceptable mechanisms of financing in local currencies.

BRICS+ has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining a strong and effective Global Financial Safety Net with a quota-based and adequately resourced IMF at its centre. On G20, BRICS+ recognized the importance of the continued and productive functioning of the G20, based on consensus with a focus on result-oriented outcomes. In other words, both would play complimentary role in the global economy, and appreciating efforts with a focus on development trends in the Global South.

South Africa Driving Development Goals

In accepting G20 chairmanship early December in Cape Town, South Africa explicitly indicated a number of practical ways forward in consolidating G20 on the world stage as it strives to gain additional significant momentum in 2025. South Africa, however, insisted that G20’s relations have to be compatible with development gaols of the Global South. The main argument here is that the G20 comprises many of the world’s largest developing and developed economies. Therefore, G20 has to play a critical role in influencing policies and foster economic stability to have a direct impact on the lives of all members of the global community.

It has a wide agenda that now includes trade sustainable development, health, agriculture, energy, the environment, climate change and anti-corruption. These agenda initiatives are not only to drive economic progress but also to accelerate and support long-term investment opportunities across the continents especially in Africa. The outlook for global economic growth remains unpredictable, and many economies carry the burden of unsustainable levels of debt. Geopolitical instability, conflict and war are causing further hardship and suffering. Across the world, billions of people are affected by under-development, inequality, poverty, hunger and unemployment.

Strengthening Economic Partnership

Working together with G20 members and building partnerships across society is one the surest pathways to confront the development challenges. Exploring the development pathways, without any geopolitical discrimination but with caution, to achieve more rapid, inclusive and economic growth for future generations. The G20 provides us with a platform to pursue these collective goals. South Africa has adopted the theme ‘Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability’ for its G20 Presidency. Through solidarity, we can create an inclusive future that advances the interests of people at the greatest risk of being left behind.

Under South Africa’s leadership, the G20 leaders have to work seriously with African Union and European Union, through this year, until its final summit which will take place in Johannesburg in November 2025. South Africa’s presidency, for the first time an African country has presided over the G20, in line with above-mentioned theme, there is the necessity to strengthen and advance consistent efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

Africa’s Noticeable Challenges

Until today, Africa faces multitude of challenges. The continent, comprising 55 States, was declared as politically independent in 1963 and yet is confronted with challenges of an excellent model of governance and exemplary leadership. Basic tenets of transfers as stipulated within framework of constitutions are usually marked by conflicts, opposition groups are frequently banned from operating in the country. This is further simply compounded by economic under-development which impact heavily on living standards of majority of the population across the Africa. Despite huge untapped natural resources, tackling the economy requires finances which many African countries lack primarily due to inability to design national priority actions. Urban-rural development disparities have taken its characteristic shape in many geographic parts of Africa.

The local African, multilateral financial institutions, development banks and the private sector need to scale up, with a fairer and appropriate lending conditions to ensure debt sustainability for low-income countries. In fact, Africa still needs more investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education and finance for sustaining many other development needs, and as well as to consider extending debt relief to developing economies. These are challenges for G20 and BRICS+ to champion their critical positions as engines for growth and development in Africa, and Global South.

In 2025, there is unshakeable (amplified) hope that both South Africa’s G20 directorship and Brazil’s BRICS+ chairmanship, focus would be on pursuing remarkable progress on cross-cutting development issues throughout Africa and across Global South.

Logical Expectations

In this fast-changing landscape characterized by forging new alliances, the practical implementation of the Russia’s initiatives, against the backdrop of escalated tensions, fostering cooperation not confrontation, will rather help effectively in addressing challenges. One more significant point is that there may be important linkages emerging between BRICS+ and G20. Undoubtedly, Brazil in 2025 is likely to base its priorities on some of the themes that were pursued in 2024 during its chairmanship in G20.

BRICS and G20, critical over global political developments and economic growth, but both could complement efforts as partners in tackling existing challenges, coordinate approaches and strategies. Particularly, Africa, as part of the developing Global South, has increasingly become the subject of deliberations at high-level summits and conferences, noting that more 60% of its population still wallow in abject poverty. Understanding the puzzling paradox that Africa has huge untapped natural resources and adequate human capital to engage in development. Often asked rhetorical question why ‘the Asian tigers’ developed while ‘the African lions’ declined these past several years. South Africa, as the current G20 president, has to set the platform this 2025 for practical dialogue at G20, which includes BRICS members, to adopt collective towards Africa’s development goals including those in energy, industrialization, infrastructure and agriculture.

Logical Conclusion

As we mark the end of this first quarter century in 2025, it behoves on individual leaders, states and their stakeholders to act rather than engage in persistent criticisms and trading geopolitical rhetoric. On one hand, BRICS+ bloc is rapidly evolving as an alternative platform for global cooperation. For substantive continuity, BRICS+ apparently has to ensure that the initiatives raised during Russia’s presidency, and previous summits, members and the “partner states” maintain unwavering commitment towards their realization.

But on the other hand, G20 has to readjust and adapt its collective approach towards diverse perspectives, reform its models of operations to compliment and support development initiatives of the Global South. While appreciating in the final summary that G20 and BRICS+ platforms are created for driving global development and expected optimal economic growth, and further to engage in tackling challenges in order to register visible impact, it is highly necessary to emphasize the importance of trust and collaboration. Moreover, the geopolitical implications are already known. But this, as a whole, becomes ultimately the greatest interest in their current deliberations. It is really a defining moment for Africa, and in general, for the Global South. Both G20 and BRICS+ have to subsequently demonstrate strategic steps in actualizing the aspirations as we move forward into the future.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

The drastic changes in the landscape of the global economy that set in starting from January of 2025 with the coming of the new US administration create new challenges for the Global South, including the BRICS+ grouping. The re-configuration of global alliances, growing protectionism and a rise in uncertainty will all generate strong headwinds for globalization, with developing economies likely to increasingly seek solutions in greater South-South economic cooperation. In the coming years, with liberalization impulses fading in the advanced economies, it may be the developing world that may take on the role of the main engine of a revitalized effort at globalization. If this is to be the new paradigm in the global economy, the BRICS will need to explore new modalities in the BRICS+ outreach format, expanding its scope to encompass global organizations and institutions.

Thus far, the BRICS+ format mostly focused on the invitation of the leaders of individual countries and regional blocs from the Global South to BRICS+ summits, with no invitation being extended to global organizations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank to participate in the BRICS+ outreach meetings. At the same time, the BRICS summit declarations have traditionally contained statements of support for such multilateral organizations. The BRICS 2024 summit declaration expresses support to the WTO (article 9) and in article 11 it proclaims: “We reaffirm our commitment to maintaining a strong and effective Global Financial Safety Net with a quota-based and adequately resourced IMF at its center”[1]. Article 7 of the 2024 BRICS summit declaration refers to the support for the initiatives of the G20. Such references and statements have become a tradition and have been made in the past BRICS summits as well. Given the significant changes in the world economy in 2025, the BRICS outreach should not be limited exclusively to individual developing economies and could also open up to regional blocs (MERCOSUR, ASEAN) and global organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions.

There may be various modalities associated with the participation of the global institutions in BRICS outreach activities. One possibility is for the heads of these global organizations to be invited to the BRICS+ summit that has become the focal part of BRICS annual outreach to the international community. Another possibility would be to create a separate track – let’s call it BRICS++ – that is reserved expressly for discussions with global institutions as well as with the regional blocs and development institutions from the developed world. Whatever format is preferred by BRICS in the coming years, there is substantial scope for building communication lines between BRICS and global institutions as well as forums such as the G20. 

Among the themes that may be discussed with the IMF could be the cooperation between the RFAs in which BRICS economies are members and the Fund – in fact there are regular consultations between the IMF and the main RFAs on the sidelines of the IMF/World Bank Annual meetings. Other themes may include the SDR mechanism and the expansion of its role in the global economy; discussions on the reinforcement of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), including the role that may be played by the development institutions of the Global South in anti-crisis measures to counter global downturns and recessions. This may be a good setting to try to revitalize the role of the BRICS CRA that may coordinate such discussions between the Fund and BRICS during BRICS outreach meetings.

There are also multiple issues that may be discussed between the New Development Bank (NDB) and the World Bank – indeed both are members of the same platform of co-financing green projects (platform created in 2023 during the Annual meetings). Discussions on the joint financing of priority projects in the developing world, roadmaps of cooperation in addressing the infrastructure and digital gaps in developing countries may all feature in the agenda of such meetings during the annual BRICS outreach activities.

Finally, the WTO could also be invited for discussions in BRICS outreach summits on the role of the Global South in the global trade agenda. This would provide the WTO with much needed support at a time of escalating protectionist pressures, while the developing world could benefit from a greater focus on devising a roadmap for liberalizing South-South trade. Thus far, South-South trade liberalization is largely absent in the policy agenda of the BRICS+ group.

Overall, the current juncture opens new possibilities for the developing countries to increase their role in rendering the world economy more open and dynamic. In the past several years, the BRICS has been in expansion mode to include new members and create a “partnership belt” of allies. Working together with global and regional institutions, the BRICS could build a strong enough momentum for the growth in South-South trade, while further shifting the focus for the bloc towards boosting pragmatic economic cooperation. 

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

[1] https://dirco.gov.za/xvi-brics-summit-kazan-declaration-strengthening-multilateralism-for-just-global-development-and-security-kazan-russian-federation-23-october-2024/

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Formally – and it might be said finally – Indonesia has been admitted to the BRICS group of nations. Founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, China and India, BRICS has expanded rapidly as a global counter to the G7 group of major economies as a forum for developing countries, writes Christopher Hale, a writer, Southeast Asia expert.

BRICS now encompasses Iran, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates. Indonesia is a vast archipelago of thousands of islands and the richest and most populous nation in South-east Asia. Its foreign ministry spokesman told the German news channel Deutsche Welle that joining BRICS was a way to strengthen ‘south-south co-operation’ and the ‘aspirations of Global South countries’. Russia and China, the big players in BRICS, have warmly welcomed Indonesia into the club.

There is a lot of discussion of mutually beneficial partnerships in an uncertain geopolitical order, but look beyond the usual diplomatic flimflam and some interesting questions bubble to the surface. One is why Indonesia resisted BRICS membership for so long. The former president Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo attended BRICS gatherings, but insisted that he would not ‘rush into joining’. There was doubt among his advisors about the economic benefits that membership would bring, but more pressing was a problem that has dominated Indonesian politics since independence. According to the commentator Radityo Dharmaputra, Widodo’s hesitancy was all about optics: ‘The image of Indonesia being seen as part of the China-Russia world would be a problem.’

At the end of the Second World War, Indonesians fought a bitter and violent war to secure independence from the Dutch. Indonesia has sometimes been called ‘the impossible nation’ – its modern form cobbled together from the colonial territories of the Dutch East Indies. It comprises 17,000 islands spread across the Pacific and Indian oceans; its people speak hundreds of different languages and dialects; the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, but Indonesia consists of 1,300 ethnic groups with at least 95 per cent native to the archipelago. Minority migrant groups, such as Chinese, Arab and Indian, make up the remainder. Despite this astonishing diversity, Indonesia has proven remarkably resilient as a nation state – or, in the words of that expert on all matters Indonesian, Benedict Anderson, an ‘imagined community’.

Indonesia owes much to its first president, Sukarno, who rode the dizzying riptides of diversity unleashed after the nation’s violent birth with charismatic political virtuosity. Sukarno was firmly committed to non-alignment: a movement forged at the Bandung or Asian-African Conference in 1955 at the overheating peak of the Cold War. The core idea of non-alignment was that countries of what used to be called the developing world should shun alliances with the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR wrestling for global control. Instead, non-aligned countries emerging from the decaying old empires in Asia and Africa should join together to support national self-determination. One of the key figures in the non-alignment movement was neither African nor Asian. In 1961, the non-aligned nations met again, this time in Belgrade, under the leadership of Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito.

As the Cold War engulfed South-east Asia in the 1960s and the United States committed its huge military arsenal to halting the spread of Communism, Sukarno’s non-aligned status came under intense pressure from every side. The Americans feared the power of the huge Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, and suspected that Sukarno was reaching out to Communist China. In 1965, the United States covertly assisted factions in the Indonesian army to liquidate the PKI and, eventually, to remove Sukarno from power. The new president, Suharto, a pragmatic army general, in effect re-aligned Indonesia with the United States. Suharto is remembered today as the ‘Father of Development’. Indonesia became richer and so did Suharto – but at the cost of ubiquitous corruption and authoritarianism. Suharto was eventually toppled from power in 1998 after years of student led protests. Seen in this deeper perspective, it is unsurprising that Indonesian leaders would be wary of any kind of global alignment. Non-alignment is built into the convoluted DNA strands of this vast nation.
Indonesians love ghost stories, and it was perhaps the unquiet spirit of Indonesia’s first president who whispered caution in the ear of ‘Joko’ Widodo. But Widodo is no longer in power. His successor Prabowo Subianto is in the mould of Suharto: an army officer with blood on his hands. He was commander of one of the special forces, or Kopassus units, sent by Suharto to crush the independence movement in East Timor in 1983. In 1998, Prabowo organised paramilitary campaigns against students and activists demonstrating against the Suharto government. After he was discharged from the miliary, Probowo and his brother Hashim made fortunes from a succession of business ventures. He was Suharto reborn. Despite his wealth, it took Probowo three expensive attempts to become president, eventually ousting Joko Widodo in 2024.

Of course, alignment with the BRICS nations is not the same as embracing any of the former superpowers of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to contest that the two most powerful BRICS nations, the Russian Federation and Communist China, are seeking friends. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia is a pariah nation for western nations; following the armed conflicts involving its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah in Gaza and Lebanon, Iran too is viewed by western nations as a terrorist sponsor tarred with the brush of Islamist extremism.

Perhaps this is what troubled the hesitant former president. Like Sukarno, Tito and the other architects of non-alignment during the Cold War that burned hot in South-east Asia, Widodo feared the embrace of the Bear and the Dragon. Subianto Probowo, the army veteran and business titan moulded in the Suharto years of ‘development’, looks toward a horizon, it would seem, of golden opportunity as a member of the new global club.

South Africa
Source: www.iol.co.za

US President Donald Trump said he will impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries if they create a new currency.

"The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar, while we stand by and watch, is over. We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile countries that they will neither create a new BRICS currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US Dollar or, they will face 100% Tariffs and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful US economy," Trump said on Truth Social.

He said there is no chance that the US dollar could be replaced in international trade.
"They can go find another sucker Nation. There is no chance that BRICS will replace the US Dollar in International Trade, or anywhere else, and any country that tries should say hello to tariffs, and goodbye to America!" Trump wrote.

Earlier reports said the BRICS countries discussed the possibility of expanding settlements in national currencies and creating a common currency within the bloc, but no final decisions were made on the issue.

BRICS is an interstate association created in 2006 by Russia, China, India and Brazil. South Africa joined in 2011. Since the beginning of 2024, a number of other countries have joined BRICS.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Whether in the fourth industrial revolution semantics of Klaus Schwab or Beijing’s concept of “new productive forces”, major powers agree on one thing: competition in the 21st century to gain a geopolitical advantage is about commanding enough capital and scientific potential to win the tech race for new economic domains.

The emerging domains include the Arctic, cyberspace, outer space, the oceans and renewed competition for Africa. In this sense, US President Donald Trump’s threats to annex Greenland elicit chuckles but are an important geopolitical signal, writes ‘The South China Morning Post’.

Likewise, the US’ massive investment in SpaceX – in the form of substantive government contracts – shows the importance of the new domains. Meanwhile, Russia and China are working together towards a base on the Moon. It’s worth it – new domains promise critical economic benefits and powerful capabilities to pressure competitors.

Integrating AI into physical infrastructure provides a productivity gain akin to the breakthrough of the steam engine. It’s no surprise that Chinese Premier Li Qiang has called AI an engine for new productive forces, while Russian President Vladimir Putin sees having independent AI technology as a prerequisite for sovereignty.

Russian drones are increasingly using AI targeting on the war front and the government is rolling out regional investment programmes focused on AI integration in productive industry.

This is where the power of blocs comes in. Advances in new domains are so capital intensive, and require so much investment with no immediate return, that having a broad economic base is a prerequisite. A larger, more diverse bloc can propel great powers by expanding access to markets and resources.

As nations chase new domains, it is also a test of resilience: how long can a country go before it has to choose between guns and bread? It is not necessarily important to have access to a few hi-tech markets but, rather, a broad spectrum of countries at different levels of development that can feed into a larger economy.

BRICS, with its collaborative and flexible framework, gives its leading members – Russia and China – a significant advantage over the increasingly defensive and restrictive West. The bloc, now consisting of 10 members, has consistently pushed for tech sharing. At last year’s Kazan summit, it focused on encouraging states to “participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information”.

Within BRICS, Russia and China are leading the way with their AI collaboration. Putin recently ordered Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, to work more closely with China. This compares with the US, where defence interests are increasingly being taken up by venture capitalists, with some controversy.

Putin understands that security requires a resilient economy so he is creating a whole new sector by marrying finance with tech and national interest. The China-Russia AI ecosystem promises to be a model that will be copied.

Meanwhile, America is moving away from global cooperation towards tech restrictions. Domestically, the US benefits from venture capital working hand in glove in the national interest to create markets and solutions that can be used for geopolitical gains in new domains. But, externally, the US is trying to use its domestic capacity as a political tool, which will backfire in the long term.

As one of its final acts, the Biden administration introduced more export restrictions on AI chips. If we look at the 18 exempted countries on the map, it clearly demarcates the limits of American power. In effect, the US is admitting that three-quarters of the world outside Europe and Japan prefer China and that this is a geopolitically “punishable” offence.

Washington’s logic is that the reduction of access to AI chips should influence regimes to align more closely with the US. If these nations did not have an alternative framework ready, the White House would be right.

With Trump now in power, the US is likely to prioritise bilateral relationships over bloc-building. This will cement BRICS’ advantage as there are no comparable Western alternatives.

The US with Europe and a few other nations ossifying on one side, against an agile global majority, led by example from Russia and China. Openness gave the US an advantage in the Cold War. Now,
openness is on the side of China and Russia.

The US may think its leading economy and recent innovations give it the upper hand in the new domains. In the short term, that is the case. Pressing bilateral advantages can give the illusion of power by delaying competitors, for example, with the US tech bans targeting China or US sanctions on Russia’s economy.

But, in the long term, the bilateral hammer is not enough. The long term is about access and scale. In this sense, the US is making a strategic mistake – while Moscow and Beijing’s commitment to multilateralism is a gift that keeps on giving.

South Africa
Source: www.iol.co.za

Young drama theatre actors from BRICS+ countries will undergo training at one of the best theatre universities in Russia.

The InteRussia fellowship programme is implemented by ANO "Mezhdunarodniki" together with the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, the Russian Institute of Theatre Arts – GITIS, and TV BRICS with financial support from the Presidential Grant Foundation.

The InteRussia fellowship in the field of theatre arts will take place from 24 August to 4 October, and applications for participation can be submitted from 27 January to 1 June. The programme is intended for young professionals from 21 to 35 years old: senior students of theatre schools, educational institutions for acting, professional actors.

Young people from Argentina, Brazil, China, South Africa, India, Iran, and other BRICS+ countries are expected to come to Moscow.

"TV BRICS has a wide network of partners in the field of culture and education in the BRICS+ countries, who show a high interest in Russia and its creative achievements. Today, universities in Brazil, India, South Africa, Iran, including members of the BRICS Network University, as well as a number of film festivals cooperate with the international media network.

“In 2024, with the participation of TV BRICS, the first theatre arts InteRussia fellowship was held. The introduction of foreign guests to the traditions of Russian theatre was very successful, as TV BRICS described in its documentary ‘Worthy of Applause: New Roles for BRICS+ Actors’. We are happy to continue this large-scale information and communication project aimed at strengthening international humanitarian cooperation" Daria Ivankova, Director of International Cooperation Department of TV BRICS.

The fellowship of theatre actors from foreign countries will be held on the basis of the Russian Institute of Theatre Arts.

GITIS teachers will conduct trainings on acting and stage movement, tell the history of Russian theatre and the creative path of the famous director and teacher Konstantin Stanislavsky, his system and students. Fellowship participants will also visit performances of Moscow theatres.

"GITIS has a great experience of cooperation with foreign actors and directors, and today we have students from almost 30 countries, but even for us the ‘BRICS+ School’ proposed by the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was a very bold experiment: young actors from seven countries came to learn about Stanislavsky's system in the birthplace of the theatrical genius, to present the results of the theatre laboratory together and on one stage in 28 days.

“Stanislavsky's theatrical language united representatives of different countries, continents, different religions, speaking different languages. We are very grateful to the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund for their trust, excitement and inspiration! We are ready to continue!"

The InteRussia fellowship programme was launched in 2021 by the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. The project's mission is to strengthen and deepen scientific, social, and cultural ties, creating conditions for constructive dialogue between young specialists from Russia and foreign countries.

InteRussia fellowship in the field of theatre art has proven to be in demand – interest from BRICS countries was even higher than we expected. This year we are modernising the programme: its duration will be extended by two weeks, which will give participants more opportunities for in-depth study of Russian theatre methods, practical work with teachers from GITIS and strengthening professional contacts.

The expanded format will provide not only new knowledge, but also an opportunity to build strong ties, which is especially important for international theatre interaction", said Sergey OrlovDeputy Executive Director of the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund.

In 2024, with the participation of TV BRICS, InteRussia fellowships were held for young drama theatre artists from the BRICS countries and energy professionals from Latin America.