Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum

Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Issue 30.2022
2022.07.25 — 2022.07.31
International relations
Foreign policy in the context of BRICS
Business Opportunities in BRICS Countries (Возможности для бизнеса в странах БРИКС) / Russia, July, 2022
Keywords: expert_opinion

Tatiana Bokova, Intern of the Russian National Committee on BRICS Research – special for InfoBRICS

Since 2006, China, Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa have been building and supporting cooperation in various fields, including the business sphere. Small and medium business is a driving force behind economic development, since business is the main factor in the formation of a competitive environment and the development of a market economy. As a consequence, it contributes to a simultaneous increase in employment and improvement of the social environment. The BRICS countries present opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses not only to the BRICS members but also to other nations of the world.

At the fifth summit of the member states in 2013, the BRICS Business Council was founded as an important institution in expanding business cooperation among the BRICS countries in the sectors of investment, trade, and economy. In June, during the BRICS Business Forum, the Beijing Initiative of the BRICS business community was unveiled, aiming to strengthen cooperation and promote global economic recovery. The initiative encouraged the BRICS nations to expand cooperation in trade and investment facilitation, increase transparency in the business environment and deepen exchanges in e-commerce, intellectual property rights, trade in services, micro, small and medium-sized firms, and economic and technical cooperation.

During the online meeting of the BRICS Business Council, a joint statement on building a quality partnership among the BRICS countries was also issued, appealing for efforts to deepen dialogue and expand cooperation. The Chinese party expressed, particularly, its willingness to broaden high-level openness and actively respond to demand from foreign enterprises localized in China to ensure a favorable environment.

Factors such as ease of doing business, property registration, tax legislation, credibility, infrastructure, business registration procedures, and others influence the opportunities for businesses to operate successfully in a particular country. Considering each BRICS member separately, we analyzed and compared doing business opportunities in Russia, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa.


China is, without a doubt, one of the key global economic leaders. Since 2010, China has been the world's second-largest economy. China is ranked 31 among 190 economies in the ease of doing business and, according to the latest World Bank annual ratings.

Business presence in China is possible only with certain types of entities in the country. Among the six forms of enterprises in China, three are the most popular: Representative Office (RO), Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) and Joint Venture (JV). A Representative Office (RO) is an ideal option for companies first enter into China marketplace to lay a foundation for future investment. A RO doesn't demand a registered capital, and has a relatively short establishment processing time (approximately 1-3 months).

A Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) has higher establishment requirements and can conduct a full range of business activities, including sign contracts, collect payments, and issue special tax invoices (Fapiao) in RMB. A Joint Venture (JV) is a limited liability company formed between a foreign company or investor(s) with a Chinese company where the foreign company owns over 25 percent share of the business entity. JV does not represent a merger between two companies, but a new entity that is partly owned by foreign and Chinese partners.

Unlike residents, beginners of foreign businessmen need to take several extra steps on the way of registration of a legal person, lasting from two months to six months:

  • Choose an agency to help with the registration;
  • Select the preferred company scope;
  • Apply for approval to own shares in a Chinese company;
  • Prepare the required documents;
  • Apply for approval with the responsible authorities;
  • Get a business license;\
  • Opening a bank account and depositing the registered capital.

Another issue is the tax system. The tax system in China divides taxation into taxes for corporations and for individuals. There are a number of different taxes applicable in various fields; foreign investors interested in the business environment applicable by the Chinese authorities can also benefit of the provisions of double taxation treaties signed by China, if they are residents of states which have signed such agreements. Foreign companies are also subject to Chinese taxation if they operate through a permanent establishment, or if they derive income from China, even if they do not have an establishment here.


Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America and the fifth largest country by area and population. Brazil ranks 124th in ease of doing business and 176th in firm formation, making it a tough country to start a business.

The most common forms of company are corporations and Limited Liability Companies. Limited Liability Companies are the most common type of legal entities in Brazil, mainly because of the lower costs associated with this type of company and the minimal number of disclosure requirements. It is worth noting that the registration of a foreign company in Brazil requires prior authorization from the Executive Department, and can take about 2-3 months.

The country's tax system is as follows: there is a flat federal tax rate for all legal entities and it is 15% of profit. There is a different system of taxation for individuals and partner organizations. The state tax is 5% of the federal tax. The amount of the value added tax depends on the laws of the state where the company is located (from 17% to 25%). Moreover, there is a certain peculiarity of doing business in Brazil, namely the presence in the company of a trusted legal person and legal manager, who must be a resident of Brazil.


Russia has one of the largest economies in the world and an important domestic market. The country's economic potential attracts foreign investors who want to open a business in Russia. According to the World Bank, compared to China, Russia ranks 28th in the ease of doing business and the same 28th in the ease of setting up a new firm. Although there are now difficulties in the desire of foreign companies to be represented in the Russian market, the government continues to pursue a policy that encourages foreign investment, especially in business areas such as innovation or technology.

During the registration of a business in Russia, it is necessary to choose a suitable form of company in the country, which means that an investor can open a limited liability company, a joint-stock company or a partnership. As for foreign companies, they can also open a branch or representative office. Each company must be registered with the Russian authorities; branches and representative offices must also be registered with the tax inspectorate for foreign companies.

Compared to China, in Russia it is necessary to follow four steps when starting a business - company name verification and reservation, preparation of Articles of Association, tax registration, and application for special licenses and permits.

Russia's taxation system facilitates foreign investment since these types of companies are treated the same as domestic companies. Every entity is subject to taxation, and corporate taxation is based on residency: Russian resident companies (those that are actually registered in the country or have a place of management here) are taxed on their worldwide income. Non-resident companies are taxed only on the income they receive from their commercial activities in Russia. The corporate tax rate is 20%. In addition, dividends paid to a foreigner are taxed at the rate of 15%.

South Africa

South Africa ranks 84th in ease of doing business and fourth among the BRICS countries. Registering a firm in South Africa allows you to expand your commercial activities from South Africa to the rest of the region. Moreover, South Africa is attractive for business because it has a favorable regulatory environment, a developed financial sector and transport infrastructure, as well as access to advanced information and communication technologies.

Among the preferred forms of companies are the private limited company (assumes a minimum of one director and one founder and makes the business specialized); the public company (there is no minimum share capital requirement compared to other types of businesses); the non-profit company, the company with personal liability and the registration of a free zone company in South Africa (business start-up in one of the free zones of the Republic of South Africa). According to business surveys, the number of processes required to establish a new company or enterprise in South Africa is about 11 steps.

Regarding the tax system of South Africa, a company or closed joint-stock company pays 28% income tax on taxable income for the tax year and 10% secondary tax on the net amount of declared dividends. VAT is an indirect tax on the consumption of goods and services. VAT is levied at a standard rate of 15% when goods and services are supplied by registered suppliers.


India ranks third after China and Russia in ease of doing business, standing at 63rd place. Compared to last year, the country has moved up 14 places in the ranking, which is definitely related to business procedures. For example, not only has India reduced or simplified post-registration procedures such as tax registration, social security registration and licensing procedures, but it has also recently created online platforms to perform these operations, all of which have helped India raise its ranking.

In general, there are two types of strategies for foreign business entry into India: registration of a company; establishment of a representative office or a branch. The most popular legal form for foreigners is a limited company, which requires an initial capital of about USD 2,000 and only one founder. The tax rate for a limited company is 36.59% of all profits.

Registration of Branch Office, Liaison Office or Project Office requires RBI and/or Government approval. This form is particularly popular with companies engaged in importing their products into India and then selling them in the country. The tax rate for a branch of a foreign company will be 41.82% on all profits. However, regardless of the form of organization, a foreign company in India must pay taxes annually on its profits (the rate depends on the chosen form of company organization) and submit to the supervisory authorities an annual registered statement of income of the company.

Company registration in India takes from 3 weeks and requires a minimum paid-up capital of Rs 100.000, a registered local address, a minimum of two shareholders and two company directors. Moreover, registration includes the following steps:

  • Reserving the name;
  • Obtaining a Director Identification Number (DIN);
  • Obtaining a digital signature certificate;
  • Obtaining certificate of company registration in India;
  • Creation of company seal for official documentation;
  • Printing of all company documents;
  • Obtaining a permanent account number;
  • Obtaining a tax account number;
  • Obtaining a certificate from the state/municipal inspector in accordance with the Stores and Establishments Act;
  • Filing an application for GST registration;
  • Obtaining a professional tax certificate from the State Tax Inspectorate;
  • Completion of registration with the National Employees' Insurance Fund.

We have analyzed doing business in the BRICS countries, and have identified business opportunities for foreign companies when they enter the BRICS nations. Thus, the best and easiest country among the BRICS members to do business in many indexes and parameters is Russia, followed by the People's Republic of China, India, South Africa and Brazil.

NATO interested in boycotting Russia-India relations (НАТО заинтересовано в бойкотировании российско-индийских отношений) / Russia, July, 2022
Keywords: political_issues

Lucas Leiroz, researcher in Social Sciences at the Rural Federal University of Rio de Janeiro; geopolitical consultant.

The US seems once again interested in boycotting good relations between Russia and India. Congressmen in Washington are proposing that New Delhi be included in the NATO-Plus group, guaranteeing a series of privileges in military cooperation. Obviously, the military ties between both countries are not recent, but this type of maneuver precisely at the current moment indicates the concern on the part of the US with the rapprochement between India and Russia.

Ro Khanna, Representative of California's 17th Congressional District, proposed to the US Congress that an amendment be made to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to include India as a Major non-NATO ally (MNNA). Khanna hopes that in this way bilateral cooperation would be sufficiently strengthened and the trade in military items would be facilitated, reducing bureaucracy and consolidating an alliance between both powers.

"I have worked on trying to add India as the sixth country to that [in addition to Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Israel, and South Korea], and that would facilitate and make it easier to have this growing Defense Partnership and make sure that we're moving India towards more of a Defense Security alignment with the United States and Russia (…) The reason it's in the interests of the United States is we need a strong partnership with India. Defence partnership, a strategic partnership, especially because we are two democratic nations and with the rise of China and with the rise of Putin this alliance is critical for the United States", he said.

Although his proposal is being resumed and re-discussed at the moment, it must be mentioned that the bill had already been submitted for evaluation two years ago. The fact that the bill was not a topic of great discussion at the time and that it has returned to the public sphere precisely now indicates that the rapprochement between Russia and India and New Delhi's insubordination to Western sanctions are worrying Washington.

It is also interesting to note that as an Indian American himself, Khanna has been prominent in US politics for his struggle to improve the ties between his country and his family's nation. It was also Khanna who submitted a proposal to the House of Representatives for India to be "allowed" to bypass some of the recently imposed sanctions against Russia, under the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). India's purchase of S-400 missile defense systems from Russia was on the verge of significantly deteriorating bilateral US-India diplomacy, but some US congressmen and government's officials have been working in order to maintain stability - and in this sense Khanna's proposal was approved on 14 July.

In fact, both the act to protect India from the sanctions applied to trade with Russia and the possible appointment of New Delhi to NATO Plus are measures whose central objective is the same: to try, through diplomatic means, to reverse the scenario of rapprochement between India and Russia. With this, it is hoped to form an intercontinental alliance in which the US and India will be strategic partners against their "common enemies". Washington is realizing that it cannot "dissuade" India but must offer diplomatic goodwill gestures to try to gain advantages in this scenario.

The main problem with this American strategy is that it is wrong in its own narrative. There is no such thing as a "Russian-Chinese moment that threatens the US-India alliance," as Khanna puts it. What exists is a moment of transition to a multipolar geopolitical order, absolutely decentralized and marked by multiple strategic partnerships focused solely on pragmatism. Not only have Russia and China come closer, but India has actively participated in this process, both with its participation in trade with Russia and in BRICS' projects and by significantly reducing its tensions with China. Therefore, any strategy whose rhetorical center is the notion that it is possible to form an "US-India alliance" against a "Russian-Chinese alliance" will fail.

Another point to be criticized is that the US continues to ignore the Indian diplomatic tradition, whose pragmatic principles do not allow any policy of automatic alignment. New Delhi will continue to negotiate what interests it with any country that offers favorable conditions. The Indian State sees itself as a regional power, heir to a civilization of thousands of years and ready to play an international leading role. This Indian (geo)political mentality will not change regardless of the prevailing global scenario. So, even if eventually India become a MNNA, this will not change the sovereigntist stance of the Indian government.

In this sense, if the US really wants to get closer to India, it must not just "liberate" it from sanctions or place it in a group of "NATO's external allies" (which does not even include a collective security pact). On the contrary, the US must respect Indian sovereignty and the right of New Delhi to maintain multiple simultaneous partnerships and a non-aligned position on the global arena.

You can follow Lucas on Twitter.

Integration along the North–South Axis: Opportunities for Coupling (Интеграция по оси Север-Юг: возможности для объединения) / Russia, July, 2022
Keywords: expert_opinion, political_issues

We build too many walls and not enough bridges.
Isaac Newton

Global economy is currently going through a period of rising integration, with the new platforms emerging that assume transcontinental scale, becoming the principal source of global markets opening up. However, in spite of the positive effects that such new platforms have in store for the openness of global economy, this process also entails intensifying competition between and polarization of these blocs along the North–South axis. In 2022, this opposition was increasingly noted between BRICS and G7, the leading blocs of the Global South and the Global North. Amid these conditions, it is very important to design mechanisms for interaction and cooperation between platforms representing developed and developing nations—already at the early formative stages of large-scale blocs.

Growing North–South competition

For developed nations, coupling the platforms of the Global North with those of the Global South is not so much a matter of assisting the developing world—it is more a matter of maintaining and stepping up the pace of their own economic growth in competition with the Global South since "catching-up development" of developing countries helps them grow faster than developed nations. The principal potential for growth of the global economy rests with the developing world. Moreover, these countries harbor the greatest potential for reducing tariff barriers as part of forming their integration platforms. This prompts increasing competition for platforms in the most dynamic regions of the developing world, as is exemplified by the exacerbating competition between the U.S. and China in Asia-Pacific.

The nations of ASEAN make the acute competition between Beijing and Washington particularly obvious. This regional bloc exhibits one of the best dynamics, both in its pace of economic growth and in building a ramified network of economic alliances in global economy. Besides, ASEAN is a hub of innovations and new integration areas—largely, due to economic agreements on digital economy, with Singapore as the acknowledged leader. With ASEAN states increasingly involved in economic cooperation both with developed nations (such as interactions along the ASEAN-EU axis) and developing economies (Cambodia as an ASEAN representative taking part in the 2022 BRICS+ summit), this regional integration may become the pivotal factor in coupling integration projects of the North and the South.

At the same time, we should note that the acute North–South competition could require certain consistency on the part of developing countries in their strategy of forming integration platforms. So far, integration in the developing world is significantly fragmented as compared to similar processes across the developed nations. "Deficiency of integration" is particularly noticeable in Eurasia, where several states remain outside the perimeter of key regional integration blocs or international organizations, such as the WTO. Given this, developing countries should primarily gear up for building a common platform within the Global South, achieving this over the next few years. The 2022 BRICS+ summit held as part of China's BRICS presidency became an important step to attain this goal. This summit was attended by representatives of the largest integrations of the developing world, which creates premises for further steps toward a broader cooperation platform.

A common platform for countries of the Global South will significantly increase capabilities of developing countries for building more active and equal platforms of interaction with developed nations. The weightier the trade alliance formed by developing nations, the more countries of the Global North will lose in consequence of trade restrictions against the Global South. With little progress attained by the developing world toward such common platforms, developed nations will most likely interact with individual regions and blocs of the developing world on the basis of conditionality. In this case, developing nations that are building a number of global alliances should prioritize their own platforms while building interactions with integrations of the developed nations later on.

While following a certain sequence in building economic alliances, developing countries may significantly increase the openness of their regional blocs—both for other developing nations and for integrations formed by developed economies. Simultaneously, integration blocs of the Global North should be as open to mutual connections as platforms of the Global South. So far, such a connection is in evidence; on the contrary, we stand witness to growing polarization and competition between the platforms established. For instance, such platforms as Global Gateway or G7's Build Back Better World (B3W) are positioned as competitors of the Belt and Road Initiative. After the G7 summit of 2022, leading developed nations announced they would be earmarking up to USD 600 bn. to implement connection projects in developing countries. This funding is less than the existing funding in the Belt and Road Initiative, and it does not stipulate mechanisms for coupling with the relevant initiatives of the Global South.

New formats: R20 and BRICS++

Importantly, integration platforms that incorporate both developed and developing states are also emerging amid growing global economic competition for integration platforms. Such groups may serve as bridges between the North and the South. This primarily applies to such largest integration groups as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and such forums as G20. Yet, for these venues to play their role in connecting the platforms of the North and the South, they need additional mechanisms of inclusivity. For the RCEP, these could be provisions on admitting new states and on interacting with other regional groups.

G20 could achieve greater inclusivity through a platform for interactions between regional groups, of which G20 states are members. The Valdai Club proposed this format in 2018, dubbing it R20 (the Regional 20). With a platform for interaction between regional blocs in place, it would be possible to significantly expand cooperation between the global economic heavyweights and smaller economies, which are regional partners of the largest states. Moreover, extending G20's format of interaction to the regional partners of the group would overcome one of its key problems and limitations—namely, insufficient representation and lack of legitimacy in empowering all constituent nations of the global economy. It is also important that the R20 format would allow for a more efficient coordination of global and regional anti-crisis steps, providing a better venue for interactions between the regional projects of the North and the South.

On the other hand, the BRICS+ platform, which is currently formed by the Global South, does not so far envisage mechanisms for interacting and connecting with developed states. If BRICS+ opts to develop along the lines of admitting only developing G20 states to its core, that will not provide an impetus for developing the BRICS+ format toward the required inclusivity and will not be conducive to meaningful connections between the platforms of the North and the South. If BRICS+ gears its development toward G20, this trend may also undermine the focus of developing countries on their own agenda and on their own platforms of integration. The very G20 platform, despite several achievements in advancing the global agenda, is still far from being properly inclusive and efficient in coordinating the anti-crisis steps taken by the global economy's largest states.

A more promising course apparently lies in creating a special format for interactions between developed and developing states within BRICS++. Such a format could include interactions between BRICS+ and individual developed states or developed states' regional groups, including the EU or EFTA. The perimeter of the BRICS++ format could also include joint blocs and forums of the North and the South, for instance, the RCEP. Additionally, along with regional integration blocs, BRICS++ could also include North–South interactions within regional and global development institutions. Ultimately, BRICS++ could acquire a global scale by connecting projects of developed and developing states and becoming a platform for a new stage in globalizing the world economy. This platform could become an important addition to global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and such forums as G20 where developed states thus far largely play a dominant role.

India's and Africa's key role

India and South Africa may play an important role in developing the North–South ties and in the evolution of BRICS+ toward greater openness and inclusivity. Representing the developing world in such projects as the emerging system of economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, India may also become a key factor in connecting the platforms of the North and the South. India could also be instrumental to security dialog between the nations of BRICS and the developed states that are members of the QUAD [1].

As for BRICS+, this format could give India an opportunity to advance its own platforms and projects, including North–South transportation corridor projects in addition to China's initiatives aligned along the West–East axis. For India, BRICS+ could serve as an instrument of influencing the further development of BRICS (including China's) ties with other states of the Global South. Without being actively involved in shaping the development agenda of BRICS+, India loses an important tool for advancing its national interests in building common platforms of the Global South. In this context, it is important that, instead of abandoning BRICS+ as such, India should formulate its own concept and vision of this platform.

India could also make interactions within BRICS+ more pragmatic economic affairs by developing cooperation between BRICS New Development Bank and other regional development institutions (NDB+), and the same applies to expanding the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement's (CRA+) mandate and enhancing its role. BRICS++ may also carry major opportunities for India that could use its accumulated political capital in its relations with the leading developed states with a view to connecting developed states' key projects (B3W, Global Gateway) and the global South.

Africa can play a no less important role in BRICS+ and in connecting the platforms of the North and the South. Among all the pan-continental blocs of the developing world, Africa was the first to create a continent-wide free trade area, and this platform can play a key role in the "integration of integrations" with developing states of Asia and Latin America. Connecting such integration projects as the African Union (Africa), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the expanded Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO+) could serve as the foundation of a common platform of the Global South. Here, Africa is the key link in the "integration of integrations" in the Global South since it already has a number of agreements with other regional blocs in the developing world. Particularly, the African Union and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) held their first summit in September 2021.

Given that Africa exhibits a high concentration of such global issues as the food problem, the energy problem, and the debt problem, Africa could also become the region where joint projects run by the development institutions of the North and the South overlap. Transportation connection projects, developing the "green agenda" element of sustainable development, and combating pandemics could become important areas of interaction between development institutions of developed and developing countries. The African Union can also play a more significant role in transforming the global economic architecture in the format of interacting regional integration blocs. In this regard, close attention should be paid to increasing the African Union's representation in global international organizations along with the established representation of leading regional blocs formed by developed states. As Africa's key regional platform, the AU should become a systemic participant in G20 discussions along with the EU.

In July 2022, the African Union marks its 20th anniversary. Over this time, much has been achieved in advancing the interests of African states in international forums and multilateral economic organizations. The African Union, of all the Global South regions, achieved significant results in consolidating the pan-continental agenda and in building interactions with regional blocs formed by developed states (primarily the EU) and by the developing world. In 2023, South Africa will assume presidency in BRICS, and in 2025, the chairmanship in G20. It is possible that in the nearest future, it is Africa and the African Union that will be able to play the key role in transforming the global agenda of the North and the South along the lines of resolving global problems and building greater interactions between developed and developing states.


Today, there is both a need and a possibility to couple integrations of the North and the South. However, it requires new mechanisms of cooperation within global forums such as G20, including cooperation between regional integration blocs of the North and the South. Besides, it is necessary to transform the largest regional blocs along the lines of greater openness to "integration of integrations" and the possibility of connections with other regional blocs. Countries of the Global South should be more active in creating common platforms for economic cooperation. In the last few years, developing countries' prerequisites for creating such mega-platforms have significantly improved. The developing world inaugurating a common integration project will, in turn, see more favorable conditions for constructive cooperation between—and connection of—the platforms of developed and developing states. As of yet, integrations of the Global South are far from the degree of connectedness and structuredness typical of developed states' integration projects. As the "integration gap" in the global South is overcome, this space will form conditions for stable and balanced connections between platforms of developed and developing states. The African Union and India (by being more actively involved in shaping the agenda of BRICS+ and BRICS++) may play the key role in these processes.

1. Andrey Kortunov analyzed the prospects of building security interactions between BRICS states:

Declaration of the Eighth BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Meeting (Декларация восьмой встречи министров труда и занятости стран БРИКС) / China, July, 2022
Keywords: concluded_agreements

Declaration of the Eighth BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' MeetingJuly 14th, 2022, China Introduction

1. We, the Ministers of Labour and Employment from the Federative Republicof Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met virtually on July 14th, 2022 for theEighth BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Meeting, to share respectivepolicy development, and discuss and agree on how to address labour and employment challenges commonly faced by BRICS countries.

2. We note with concern that the global labour market is still under the shadowof the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with current and future challenges causedbyclimate change, technological transition and demographic shifts, etc. These createasevere barrier to achieving the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals andahuman-centered inclusive recovery. We are grateful to the BRICS Network of Labour Research Institutes for their research on "Employment and Income Support intheContext of the COVID-19 Crisis" and will continue to work together to address thesechallenges.

3. We acknowledge that a broad consensus on labour, employment and social security has been reached at the BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' meetingssince their inception in 2015. It provided efficient solutions for the considerationof the BRICS leaders and contributed positively to improving people's well-being intheBRICS countries, boosting productive employment and facilitating the realizationof decent work for all. We reaffirm that we will fulfill the commitments made at previous Labour and Employment Ministers' meetings, continue practical cooperation, exchanges and mutual learning in the field of labour and employment as well as social protection, and promote an inclusive, sustainable and resilient recovery of the labour markets in our five countries.

4. The theme of BRICS China Chairmanship is "Foster High-quality BRICSPartnership, Usher in a New Era for Global Development". We will focus onpromoting green jobs for sustainable development, developing skills for a resilient recovery and protecting workers' rights in new forms of employment, and proposeBRICS solutions. Promoting Green Jobs for Sustainable Development

5. With the growing prominence of climate change, a major global issuerelevant to human survival and development, countries around the world have takenaction to explore green growth and low-carbon development paths for sustainability. BRICS countries have formulated green growth and sustainable development strategies and emission reduction targets, and actively explored ways to promote green jobs with some initial results achieved and useful experiences gained.

6. However, BRICS countries are facing many challenges in promoting greenjobs. Further efforts towards a better definition, measurement and statistical analysisof green jobs can build on existing tools such as the ILO Guidelines concerningastatistical definition of employment in the environmental sector. Mechanisms for jointly promoting green jobs across sectors and institutions need to be improved. Thelack of skills that would enable workers to leverage the green transition is prominent, the pressure of job loss in green transformation cannot be ignored, and the impact of COVID-19 and other factors on slowing down the development of green jobs is still persistent.

7. We acknowledge that promoting green jobs is an imperative for addressingclimate change, accelerating the transformation of economic development models andfacilitating green growth, low-carbon and sustainable development. It can helpincrease both the quantity and quality of jobs. We will act to acquire a deeper understanding of green jobs, adopt policy measures for employment and humanresources development that meet the needs of green growth, low-carbonandsustainable development together with other government agencies and social partners. This would help take advantage of the triple benefits of mitigating and adaptingtoclimate change with a just transition for all, developing the economy and boostingemployment.

8. We recognize that the necessary work to promote green jobs and a just transition for all is to be strengthened. To that end, we will strengthen researchandconduct case studies on green jobs and just transition in key industries and sectors. We will engage our Labour Research Institutes in this endeavor.

9. To address the skills' gap in green low-carbon economy, we will buildandimprove skills development and lifelong learning systems. We will also support innovative solutions in mobilizing sustainable public and private resources, andpromote shared responsibility and coordination among multi-faceted partners andadiverse range of industries. In this way, government departments, vocational institutions, businesses, professional associations and social partners, and traininginstitutions can work hand in hand and facilitate the green transition.

10. We acknowledge the guiding role of exploring and building a greenoccupational classification system in promoting green jobs. We will further developthe formulation and application of standards for green occupations, facilitate the greenoccupational system to gradually set and finetune the competency-based learningoutcomes and curricula at universities and colleges, vocational and traininginstitutions. At the same time, we will guide, develop and regulate newgreenjobsemerging in the process of green transformation in a well-planned way to create morejobs opportunities for green growth and sustainable development.

11. We will continue to promote inclusive development and green recovery. While adopting policy measures on employment and climate change, BRICScountries need to pay attention to industrial sectors and regions under the pressure of employment in the green transformation, in particular people who have lost their jobs or face difficulties in securing employment. To meet these challenges, we will actively provide employment services, respond to unemployment issues in a prudent way, and realize an equitable transformation.

12. We will make efforts to promote decent work in green and low-carbonindustries, further prevent, control and eliminate occupational health hazards, andincentivize improvement of their working environment, equipment and facilities. Wewill strive to align green jobs with poverty alleviation via the green economy. Jobs inecological conservation will be created for the benefit of people in less-developedareas with a huge demand for environmental protection and restoration, and thus helppoor people achieve green jobs and poverty alleviation.

13. We support the deepening of BRICS cooperation on green jobs, with a focuson relevant training, sharing training resources in areas of strengths among BRICSmembers, and jointly conducting training programs for teachers and trainingproviders. Skills Development for a Resilient Recovery

14. We recognize that skills mismatch is the most serious challenge facingtoday's labour markets. The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated labour disparities, with women, youth, people with disabilities, migrant workers, workers in the informal economy, and low-skilled workers being disproportionately affected.

15. Skills are the core and most basic labour factor linking technological innovation with production practices, and play an important role in promotingeconomic growth and social progress. In the face of the future changes and practical needs of the world of work, we will strive to integrate skills development policieswith policies on employment, population and economic development, strengthenthesystem of skills development and lifelong learning, foster skills development ecosystems, and create opportunities to drive economic recovery, create qualityemployment, and contribute to inclusive and sustainable growth.

16. We will advocate greater inter-ministerial coordination as well asgovernment policy support to encourage companies to increase investment in skillsdevelopment, expand apprenticeship programs, improve the quality and scope of work-based learning, and promote sustainable business development. At the sametime, we will strengthen social dialogue and increase the participation of social partners in skills standard setting, curriculum development, and skills demandforecasting.

17. We note that digitization and technological innovation have a profoundimpact on the labour market, and BRICS countries also need to prepare for greater automation in the coming years and strengthen the upskilling and reskillingof workers. We will develop basic digital skills to improve digital literacy for all.

18. The Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on skills development, and despite its abatement, many people are still unable to attend face-to-face training. As remote and hybrid learning is not widespread enough, many people are missingout on training opportunities. We will support and encourage the innovation inand improvement of training methods, promote remote, mobile or hybrid learning models, and expand the coverage of skills development.

19. We will take action to rethink how to develop skills in the context of asevere skills mismatch. We will support measures to forecast skills demand, improveoccupational standards, innovate in education and training methods, raise awarenessabout training solutions and career guidance, reform the way skills are evaluated, andinvest in the life-long learning of teachers and training facilitators.

20. Improving the job availability and job quality for vulnerable groups inthelabour market has been a focus of BRICS countries' skills development policies. For workers in rural and disadvantaged areas, skills development is one of the major interventions to improve their employability and increase their income. We support targeted skills development policies, and precise and effective interventions toimprove the accessibility and quality of skills development in rural and disadvantagedareas.

21. Vocational skills competitions play an important role in enhancingtheattractiveness and recognition of vocational and technical education. Therefore, wewill take action to establish local, regional and national vocational skills competitionsystems suited to national conditions and characteristics, strengthen publicityandsocietal promotion of vocational skills competitions, and raise awareness of youngpeople about diversified learning solutions to acquire skills and provide quality career guidance to build careers accordingly.

22. We support the formulation and implementation of policies and programsfor promoting skills development and lifelong learning systems that will drive thedevelopment of the green and digital economies towards a just transition.

23. We encourage the strengthening of cooperation in skills development andwill explore the development of a system for mutual recognition of skills amongBRICS countries. Protecting Workers' Rights in New Forms of Employment

24. Digital technology, especially mobile Internet technology, has given rise tonew forms of employment represented in particular by digital labour platforms. Thecontinued ravages of Covid-19 have further accelerated the proliferation of newformsof employment in various industries. This has brought unprecedented opportunities toBRICS countries, but also posed new challenges to the protection of workers' rights.

25. We recall the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work in 2019, and remain committed to the BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Declarations, including that on governance in the future of work (China, 2017), future of workinthe digital economy (Russia, 2020), and the role of gig and platformworkers inthelabour market (India, 2021). We will continue to promote the human-centeredapproach to shape the future of work and protecting the rights of workers innewforms of employment.

26. We remain committed to exploring ways to promote decent workfor workers in new forms of employment. In this regard it is essential that we extend - 5 - social protection to them and continue to improve public employment services. Tothis end, we have reached consensus and adopted a guidance (Annex) for further discussions.

27. We recognize the role played by tripartite mechanism and active social dialogue in new forms of employment. Protecting the rights of workers requires thejoint efforts of the government, trade unions and employers' organizations. Wewelcome the participation of social partners in the formulation and implementationof policies to protect the rights of workers in new forms of employment.

28. We welcome initiatives of the BRICS Network of Labour ResearchInstitutes to continue in-depth studies on protecting the rights of workers innewforms of employment. We will maintain regular and close contact with relevant international organizations when necessary, and share advanced legislativeexperiences and good practices on the protection of workers' rights in newforms of employment with other countries.

29. We welcome the ILO's continued cooperation and further discussions withits constituents, including BRICS countries, and other international organizationsabout international labour standards on the protection of workers' rights in newformsof employment. The Way Forward

30. We will act in line with this Declaration as a response to the call of theBRICS leaders as a demonstration of our confidence and determination to achieveahuman-centered recovery and as a reference for our five countries to work together for stronger, healthier and sustainable global development.

31. We appreciate our social partners for their valuable contributioninaddressing the challenges facing the world of work. We will further strengthen social dialogue, listen more to the views of our social partners, and promote inclusivedevelopment of the labour market.

32. We thank the ILO and the ISSA for their technical support for the 2022BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Meeting and will continue to workclosely with them.

33. We thank China's Presidency for organizing the Eighth BRICS Labour andEmployment Ministers' Meeting and meetings of the Employment Working Group, and look forward to our next meeting in 2023 under the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa.

Annex The BRICS Guidance on Protecting the Rights of Workers in New Forms of Employment

1. We note that digital technology, especially mobile Internet technology, hasgiven rise to new forms of employment represented by digital labour platforms. Thecontinued ravages of Covid-19 have further accelerated the proliferation of newformsof employment in various industries. We observe that the emergence and rapid growthof new forms of employment is changing the future of work.

2. We agree that, for BRICS countries, new forms of employment have brought opportunities, met the needs of employers and employees, and become an important means to create new jobs. The new forms of employment also provide opportunitiesto young people, women, people with disabilities, elderly, migrants, the low-skilledand the long-term unemployed among others to earn relatively higher incomes, contributing to the inclusive growth of the BRICS economies. We are also aware that the rapid development of new forms of employment poses new challenges totheprotection of workers' rights.

3. We recall the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work in 2019, andremain committed to the BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Declarations, including that on governance in the future of work (China, 2017), future of workinthe digital economy (Russia, 2020), and the role of gig and platformworkers inthelabour market (India, 2021). We will continue to promote the human-centeredapproach to shape the future of work and protect the rights of workers in newforms of employment.

4. We recognize that multiple contractual arrangements exist simultaneouslyfor workers in new forms of employment. We will strive to make the classificationof employment status clear, accurate and consistent and emphasize the need to respect the rights of people working through digital platforms and provide themwithappropriate protections.

5. We reaffirm the principles of decent work and fair labour practice andtheneed to promote equal access to various job opportunities brought about by digital technologies for workers in new forms of employment.

6. We recognize that workers in new forms of employment shall enjoyanadequate amount of rest to maintain their physical and mental health well-being.

7. We will support the improvement of national standards for occupational safety and health protection and encourage training and education for workers andenterprises to minimize occupational injuries that workers in newforms of employment may face in the course of their work.

8. We will take into account the unique challenges of social security for workersin new forms of employment and improve our respective countries' social security systems, in an effort to provide access to social security for all workers.

9. We support trade unions' efforts and encourage social dialogue, includingcollective bargaining and tripartite cooperation to improve working conditions for new forms of employment, based on the characteristics of the industry as per national circumstances.

10. We recognize the positive role of a corporate culture of care and support for workers and encourage employers to create such culture for workers in newforms of employment. We also support companies to improve transparency and fairness of their platform algorithms and democratic participation as an important way to protect workers in new forms of employment.

11. We strive to provide advisory services on labour policies among others, for workers and enterprises involved in new forms of employment, and employment services for all types of workers engaged in new forms of employment duringtheprocess of digital transformation.

12. We welcome relevant government departments domestically to strengthencommunication, share data resources, innovate in collaborative governance modelsand increase the level and capacity of digital governance to enable more efficient protection of workers' rights in new forms of employment.

13. We will promote mediation and arbitration of relevant labour disputes inthelight of our national conditions so as to protect the rights of workers in newforms of employment.

14. We support exploring national statistical methods for collecting data onworkers in new forms of employment and their working conditions, so as to provideguidance for future policy-making related to them.

15. We welcome initiatives of the BRICS Network of Labour ResearchInstitutes to continue in-depth studies on protecting the rights of workers innewforms of employment. We will maintain regular and close contact with relevant international organizations when necessary, and share advanced legislativeexperiences and good practices on the protection of workers' rights in newforms of employment with other countries.

16. We welcome the ILO's continued cooperation and further discussions withits constituents, including BRICS countries, and other international organizationsabout international labour standards on the protection of workers' rights in newformsof employment.
BRICS nation could be third party ensuring safety of ships with Ukraine's grain — expert (Страна БРИКС может быть третьей стороной, обеспечивающей безопасность судов с украинским зерном, — эксперт) / Russia, July, 2022
Keywords: political_issues, economic_challenges

"This country cannot be from the list of unfriendly states that impose or support sanctions against Russia," Andrey Bystritsky said

MOSCOW, July 25./TASS/. One of the BRICS nations could be a third country ensuring the safety of shipping Ukrainian grain in the Black Sea, Chairman of the Board of the Valdai Discussion Club's Development and Support Foundation Andrey Bystritsky told TASS on Monday.

A third party, which will be determined later, will ensure the security of ships with Ukrainian grain in the Black Sea, along with Russia and Turkey, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Sunday.

"We managed to reach an agreement in Istanbul: Ukraine demines ports and lets ships take to sea, while Russia, Turkey and one more party, which will be determined later, escort the ships to the Bosporus," he said at a meeting with the ambassadors of the Arab League nations.

"This country cannot be from the list of unfriendly states that impose or support sanctions against Russia," Bystritsky said. "It is clear that these are not European Union or NATO member countries, or, for example, Australia and New Zealand. This country must be non-aligned in the full sense of this word, independent, having weight on the international arena, having enough resources and personal qualities of its leaders not to turn a blind eye to possible violations and behave in accordance with the agreed rules," the expert said.

"For example, it could be one of the BRICS countries or one of the African states, although quite unexpected options are also possible," Bystritsky added.

In any case, the candidate must be able to negotiate and suit all the parties: Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN. "There should be a consensus on this issue," he added.

Besides, it should be a maritime power with its own fleet, the expert went on to say. "A land-based country like Serbia, which, in principle, could well be considered as one of the candidates, will hardly qualify," he explained.

A package of documents aimed at resolving the issue of food and fertilizer supplies to global markets was signed in Istanbul on July 22. Under a Russia-UN memorandum, the United Nations will engage in efforts to lift anti-Russian restrictions preventing the export of agricultural products and fertilizers. Another document creates a mechanism to export grain from Ukraine-controlled Black Sea ports. Agreements between Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and the UN provide for the establishment of a four-party coordination center whose representatives will inspect grain ships in order to prevent arms smuggling and false flag operations.

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