Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru


In the ever-evolving landscape of global geopolitics, Russia and Pakistan are poised to enter a new phase of cooperation, driven by shared interests and mutual respect. Historically marked by a complex interplay of alliances and rivalries, the two countries have now found common ground, particularly in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Ukraine crisis and shifting power dynamics in regions like the South China Sea and the Middle East. This convergence of interests, coupled with the influence of their common ally, China, presents a unique opportunity for both nations to forge a robust partnership across multiple domains.

Convergence of interests and existing cooperation

The convergence of Russian and Pakistani interests is rooted in their shared desire for regional stability, economic growth and enhanced security. Both countries have been vocal in advocating a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan, recognizing that instability in the region could have far-reaching consequences. Pakistan, with its strategic location, has emerged as a key player in the post-Afghanistan withdrawal scenario, while Russia, with its historical ties and strategic interests in Central Asia, seeks to maintain its influence in the region.

The existing cooperation between Russia and Pakistan spans several critical areas, including defense, energy and the economy. The two nations have conducted joint military exercises such as the Druzhba (Friendship) drills, which have strengthened their defense collaboration. Russia has also expressed interest in investing in Pakistan's energy sector, particularly in the construction of the North–South gas pipeline, which would provide a significant boost to Pakistan's energy infrastructure.

Impact of regional platforms: SCO, BRI, BRICS and beyond

Regional platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and BRICS have become crucial for enhancing Russia–Pakistan relations. As members of the SCO, Russia and Pakistan have actively engaged in efforts to combat terrorism, promote regional security and foster economic cooperation. The SCO provides a multilateral framework that enables both countries to collaborate with other regional powers, further cementing their strategic partnership.

The BRI, spearheaded by China, is another critical link connecting Russia and Pakistan. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key component of the BRI, has already deepened economic ties between Pakistan and China. Russia's potential involvement in the BRI can extend these benefits to a broader regional context, linking Eurasia through infrastructure, trade and energy projects that span from Moscow to Islamabad.

Moreover, the BRICS grouping, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, offers another avenue for Russia–Pakistan cooperation. While India is a member of BRICS, Russia and Pakistan can still find common ground within this framework to address global economic challenges, call for a more equitable world order and collaborate on issues like sustainable development and climate change.

These regional alliances not only provide a platform for cooperation but also reinforce the importance of a multipolar world where regional powers like Russia and Pakistan can collaborate on an equal footing. They create opportunities for both nations to diversify their diplomatic and economic partnerships, reducing dependency on any single global power and ensuring a balanced approach to international relations.

Changing geopolitics and the role of China

The changing geopolitical landscape, especially after the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, has created a vacuum that both Russia and Pakistan are keen to address. In this context, China plays a pivotal role as a common friend to both nations. China’s BRI has already fostered closer economic ties between Pakistan and China, and Russia's involvement in the initiative offers further opportunities for trilateral cooperation. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the BRI, could potentially extend to Russia, linking the three nations through a network of infrastructure and trade routes that would enhance connectivity and economic integration.

China's influence in Russia–Pakistan relations cannot be understated. As a rising global power, China's strategic alignment with both Moscow and Islamabad provides a stabilizing factor in their bilateral relations. The shared vision of a multipolar world, where regional powers like Russia and China can counterbalance Western dominance, further strengthens the trilateral relationship.

Impact of India–Pakistan rivalry

The longstanding rivalry between India and Pakistan is a critical factor in shaping Russia–Pakistan relations. Historically, Russia has maintained close ties with India, particularly in the defense sector. However, as global dynamics shift, Russia has shown a willingness to diversify its relations in South Asia. While maintaining its strategic partnership with India, Russia recognizes the importance of engaging with Pakistan as a key regional player.

The India–Pakistan rivalry adds a layer of complexity to Russia's diplomatic balancing act. At the same time, both Russia and Pakistan are keen to ensure that their growing ties do not come at the expense of regional stability. By focusing on areas of mutual interest such as counterterrorism, economic development and regional security, Russia and Pakistan can navigate the challenges posed by their respective relations with India.

Potential of bilateral cooperation

The potential for cooperation between Russia and Pakistan is vast, encompassing a wide range of sectors:

Diplomatic and Political Cooperation: Both nations can work together on regional and international platforms, advocating multilateralism, conflict resolution and respect for international law. Their shared stance on such key issues as the importance of the United Nations and the need for a multipolar world can strengthen their political alliance.

Economic and Trade Relations: With the establishment of innovative transaction settlement mechanisms, as discussed by Pakistan's high-level committee on Russia, both countries can significantly boost bilateral trade. Exploring opportunities in agriculture, industry and infrastructure development will further solidify economic ties.

Science and Technology (S&T): Collaboration in science and technology, particularly in space exploration, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, can propel both nations to new heights of innovation and competitiveness.

Education and Cultural Exchange: Expanding educational exchanges and cultural ties can foster mutual understanding and strengthen people-to-people connections, laying the foundation for a long-lasting partnership.

Defense Cooperation: Building on existing military collaboration, Russia and Pakistan can explore joint defense production, training programs and intelligence sharing to enhance their security capabilities.

Energy and Industrial Cooperation: Russia's expertise in energy, combined with Pakistan's growing demand, creates opportunities for cooperation in oil and gas exploration, renewable energy projects and industrial development.

Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen relations

Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to strengthening relations with Russia through various diplomatic and strategic initiatives. The establishment of a high-level committee on Russia, headed by Minister for Planning, Development, and Special Initiatives Ahsan Iqbal, is a testament to Pakistan's proactive approach. This committee is working on developing a comprehensive roadmap for engagement with Russia, including innovative ways to facilitate trade and business transactions despite international sanctions.

Additionally, Pakistan's efforts to expand rail connectivity through the Pakistan–Iran–Turkey route and explore multi-gauge options highlight its ambition to enhance regional connectivity, with potential benefits for Russia–Pakistan trade.

The future of Russia-Pakistan relations

As global power dynamics continue to shift, Russia and Pakistan have a unique opportunity to redefine their relations. The Ukraine crisis, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and tensions in the South China Sea have underscored the need for new alliances and partnerships that prioritize regional stability and economic growth. With China as a common ally, Russia and Pakistan can work together to navigate these challenges and seize opportunities for cooperation.

The true potential of Russia–Pakistan relations lies in their ability to adapt to changing geopolitical realities while maintaining a focus on shared interests. By deepening their cooperation across diplomatic, political, economic and security dimensions, Russia and Pakistan can emerge as strong partners in a multipolar world, contributing to regional and global stability.

• The future of Russia–Pakistan relations is sure to be bright, marked by a convergence of interests, strategic cooperation and a shared vision for regional stability. With careful diplomacy and proactive engagement, both nations can unlock the full potential of their partnership, paving the way for a new era of bilateral relations.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

We are fast passing the peak era of global Western power and influence. The “collapse of the West” is too sensationalist. But there is a transition underway from an era of unbridled Western global influence to one of contested Western influence, ‘Foreign Policy’ stresses. New centers of power are emerging as a new generation in the Global South looks beyond Washington and former European colonizers.

In 2024, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), an acronym coined in the early 2000s for these emerging economies, expanded to BRICS+ as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates accepted their invitations to join the club. Western countries were not invited to the annual BRICS summits, where Chinese officials spoke portentously about a new era dawning.

Western skeptics rolled their eyes at this, arguing the BRICS nations’ marriages of convenience hardly competed with the West’s deeper bonds. I would not dismiss these developments as a failing fad. Significant chunks of the world have already started acting as if the West is ceasing to be the dominant force it once was.

We are fast passing the peak era of global Western power and influence. The “collapse of the West” is too sensationalist. But there is a transition underway from an era of unbridled Western global influence to one of contested Western influence.

This need not spell the West’s doom. Nevertheless, there will be changes. Even the greatest skeptics of China’s continuing economic ascent, or of Russia’s long-term prospects as an imperial state, or of the viability of the BRICS+ project, have to concede one thing. For the Western countries to perpetuate their global leadership roles in the coming decades, they must adapt to changing realities. In demographics, share of global wealth, cultural prestige, and other critically important indicators of civilizational power, a grand transition is underway. Although we cannot yet predict precisely where it is headed, some observations are already becoming clearer.

The tactics that once worked for the Western countries in perpetuating their influence, such as relying on the combined economic help of the G-7 countries to decisively influence world affairs, or assuming that the Western countries and their allies represent the peak of modernity for others to aspire toward, are simply not going to suffice under changed circumstances.

The world is facing real epochal change as more centers of meaningful power and influence multiply outside of the West’s reach. This includes rivals such as Russia and China, but also ostensible Western partners like India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, which cannot be assumed as remaining in thrall to Western power. For the West, it will not be enough merely to endure these changes; it needs to actively maneuver to preserve its global influence.

Some Westerners would like to gain inspiration from the world wars and the Cold War, where the Western democracies toiled against opposing forces before emerging triumphant, validated and expanded. These are poor analogies for the evolving era of Westlessness, which draws its historical focus from troubled past relations between Western and non-Western peoples.

Post-colonial resentments can take on new meanings in a less-Western era. They have arisen not only from memories of subjugation in the last century, but by holding subsidiary status in world affairs after independence. To take a specific example, France has struggled to preserve its influence in West Africa in recent years, as locals have enthusiastically pushed out the former colonizer in countries such as Mali and Niger.

More generally, several Western governments have endured global criticism for supporting Israel during its war in Gaza, following the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas. This criticism sometimes used the language of “resisting settler colonialism” to criticize Israel and those backing it in the United States and other Western states.

Those wishing to silence such criticism should be warned. The diversity of voices shaping world affairs is only going to heighten in the future. When South Africa brought a case against Israel’s conduct of this war to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, attracting support from numerous other states, we were glimpsing into the future of world affairs…

There are events, and then there are trends in world affairs. Too many observers fixate on the former; taking time to appreciate the latter is becoming increasingly vital.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Threshold effects in BRICS expansion

We have extensively covered the BRICS expansion as well as its key implications for the world economy, most notably from the viewpoint of which categories of countries would benefit the most from the enlargement of the BRICS core. One aspect, however, of this expansion that has not received sufficient attention in the discussions was the rise in the consolidated share of the expanded BRICS grouping in international organizations such as the IMF. In fact, if a higher degree of coordination were to be attained by BRICS in Bretton Woods institutions, their consolidated voting power would surpass key thresholds rendering the bloc more influential and effective on the international arena.

A look at the current distribution of voting shares in the IMF suggests that the total for the BRICS-5 core before the latest expansion amounts to 14.15%, with the respective individual shares amounting to 6.08% for China, 2.63% for India, 2.59% for Russia, 2.22% for Brazil and 0.63% for South Africa[1]. The cumulative total for this group of countries is just short of the 15% threshold that provides the grouping with material capability to affect Fund’s decisions. This is because in IMF decision-making “an 85 percent majority is required for the most important decisions, such as admission of new members, increases in quotas, allocations of Special Drawing Rights, and amendments to the Articles of Agreement”[2].

With the 2023-2024 BRICS expansion the BRICS total share in the IMF increases by 3.76 percentage points to 17.91% with Saudi Arabia’s 2.01% as part of the expanded BRICS total. Even without Saudi Arabia the BRICS total increases by 1.75 percentage points on account of Egypt’s 0.43%, Iran’s 0.74%, UAE’s 0.49% and Ethiopia’s 0.09%. The total for BRICS 9 economies then increases to 15.9% – still well above the 15% threshold. 

At this stage the only IMF country member that has a voting share of more than 15% is the US with its 16.5%. The next 4 largest Western economies from Europe – the United Kingdom (4.03), France (4.03%), Germany (5.31%) and Italy (3.02% – command a collective share of 16.39% – also well above the 15% threshold. Another possible configuration of alliances that comes close to the 15% threshold is the “ASEAN+” alliance that includes apart from the ASEAN members proper, economies such as Japan (6.14%), South Korea and Australia.

The progression of the revision of the country shares in the IMF has been slow at best and for the developing economies to secure a qualitatively greater role in international organizations there is a need to explore more inclusive and extensive platforms of cooperation. With respect to the IMF, there may be scope to explore the benefits of formats such as BRICS+ that are based on the aggregation of votes of the members of BRICS+ regional integration arrangements. Indeed, according to the estimates of Arapova and Lissovolik (2021) the cumulative voting share of BRICS+ economies in the IMF on the basis of a platform for regional integration arrangements rises to over 21% under the current distribution of voting shares in the Fund[3].   

Overall, the expanded BRICS-10 may raise its collective weight in international organizations to levels that will enable the bloc to wield greater influence in the decision-making process in international economic organizations. There is an even more promising venue for BRICS in consolidating and increasing the collective weight of the Global South – this is the BRICS+ format that brings together the votes of core BRICS economies as well as their regional partners. Such a strategy may notably strengthen the capability of developing economies in advancing the reforms of international institutions such as the WTO as well as the distribution of votes on organizations such as the IMF. Creating Global South alliances in international organizations on the basis of BRICS+ rather than only BRICS core may create a wide enough platform to materially affect the pace and the direction of the reform of global economic governance.    

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

[1] https://www.imf.org/en/About/executive-board/members-quotas
[2] https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781589066250/C9.xml#:~:text=Voting%20Majorities&text=An%2085%20percent%20majority%20is,to%20the%20Articles%20of%20Agreement.
[3] https://www.dlsu.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/pdf/research/journals/apssr/2021-December-vol21-4/14-the-brics-plus-cooperation-in-international-organizations-prospects-for-reshaping-the-global-agenda.pdf

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Brazil’s fiscal challenge: pathways to stability

The rekindling of recessionary fears across global markets in recent periods highlighted the notable risks inherent in the current global macro landscape and the speed with which deteriorating market sentiment can affect emerging markets. As markets gauge the moves from the Fed that is expected to finally start cutting rates in September, many developing economies would be well advised to focus on narrowing their fiscal gaps and keeping a lid on their public debt rather than setting high hopes on Fed decisions. In Latin America some of the largest economies in the region such as Brazil, Colombia and Argentina are striving to rein in fiscal deficits and arrest the growth in public debt dynamics. In most of these cases, including in the case of Brazil, cuts in fiscal spending will need to be complemented by a broader array of systemic measures that favour budget discipline, improved coordination between monetary and fiscal policy and adherence to economic policy rules.

The latest fiscal figures for July published by the Central Bank of Brazil show a primary deficit for the public sector of 21.3 billion reais, which is in line with the average monthly deficit in the past 12 months[1]. The primary deficit of the central government amounted to 8.6 billion reais, notably below the average for the past 12-month period, but the bulk of the deterioration in July came from the deficit of the regional budgets of 11 billion reais despite the surplus of more than 22 billion reais in the year up to July. As a result, the consolidated public sector nominal deficit increased to more than 10% of GDP compared to 9.9% of GDP in June 2024. According to Finance Minister Fernando Haddad the July fiscal figures were in line with this year’s target. The market took a more pessimistic view as the public sector primary deficit in July was notably higher than analysts’ expectations, with exchange depreciation after the release of July fiscal figures triggering forex interventions from Brazil’s Central Bank.

In the face of high budget gaps the Brazilian government has advanced the goal of eliminating the primary fiscal deficit (net of interest payments) by the end of this year, with the tolerance band of plus/minus 0.25% of GDP. The growing realization of the need for greater fiscal austerity has been reflected in recent statements by President Lula and the Chief of Staff Rui Costa. In particular, President Lula spoke out against new spending proposals and called on the government to focus on implementing the already announced spending commitments, while Rui Costa declared that budget cuts in Brazil were necessary in light of President’s commitment to fiscal responsibility[2]. In a sign of greater fiscal conservatism, Haddad noted that with signs of labour market overheating, there was a need to adjust social programs.

The key concern for the markets is that the persistence in Brazil’s fiscal deficits is feeding into higher debt levels. According to the figures of the Central Bank, the General Government Gross Debt (GGGD) – comprising the Federal government, INSS, and state and municipal governments – reached 77.8% of GDP (BRL 8.7 trillion) in June 2024, growing by 1.1 p.p. of GDP compared with May 2024 and marking a new two-year high. The Public Sector Net Debt (PSND) reached 62.2% of GDP (BRL 6.9 trillion) in June, also increasing compared to the preceding month.

The elevated levels of Brazil’s debt render the debt dynamics critical for financial markets in assessing the credibility of the country’s macroeconomic policy. Earlier this year the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis (DSA) pointed to continued growth in the debt-to GDP ratio with increases of 2 percentage points from 2023 to 2024 and 7.2 percentage points from 2023 to 2029[3]. At the same time the estimates of Brazil’s Central Bank suggest that debt dynamics is quite sensitive to interest rates, with a 1 percentage point decrease in the Selic rate generating a 0.4-0.5 percentage point reduction in the levels of Public Sector Net Debt (PSND) and General Government Gross Debt (GGGD). The conclusion then may be that “credibility effects” and the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy may prove crucial in attaining macroeconomic stability and, as argued by Finance Minister Haddad, balancing public accounts could make interest rates fall and spur growth in the country’s economy[4].

Source: Banco Central do Brasil

As the fiscal deficit in Brazil is yet to be brought down to sustainable levels, on the monetary policy side the Central Bank is hardening its rhetoric after keeping the benchmark Selic interest rate unchanged at 10.5% in July for the second time in a row. This is due to inflation accelerating since June 2024 after declines since 2022 – inflation is up from 4.2% in June to 4.5% in July – and the worsening inflation expectations (the market consensus expects an inflation rate of 4.25% in 2024 up by 0.25 percentage points from the start of July)[5]. Exchange rate volatility engendered by disappointing fiscal figures is certainly not helping to bring back inflation closer to the 3% target (albeit with a band of plus/minus 1.5 percentage points). The Brazilian currency is down nearly 14% so far in 2024- one of the worst results across major economies. The Central Bank is not excluding the possibility of a rate hike at the upcoming policy meeting on September 17-18 despite the Fed’s preparations to embark on lowering rates later this year.

In view of the above macroeconomic developments, there is a range of measures that could be undertaken by Brazil’s government to stabilize the fiscal dynamics. One possibility is to target higher tax receipts – in fact recent statements from the Deputy Finance Minister Dario Durigan suggest that taxes may be introduced on big tech in Brazil. Ad hoc tax increases or new taxes on corporates may prove self-defeating however as the tax base could shrink and business activity quickly may well prioritize locations with a more favourable tax regime. The bulk of the fiscal adjustment will need to be borne on the expenditure side and this seems to be the focus of the markets in gauging the credibility of Brazil’s fiscal policy.

In pursuing the path of cutting outlays, the government will need to optimize the composition of fiscal spending – a factor that will largely determine the success of its fiscal adjustment measures. In other words, while the quantitative scale of the fiscal adjustment matters, the qualitative element of the composition of spending cuts may prove to be no less important. There may hence be a need to conduct an inventory of the efficiency of state programs and projects in order to determine the segments of inefficiencies whose reduction would not adversely affect growth.

Existing academic literature suggests that the composition of fiscal spending is key in the success of fiscal adjustments[6] and consolidations based on spending cuts is more likely to enhance growth than tax-based measures[7]. Across various expenditure categories social programs (as stated by President Lula) will need to be largely protected, with more of the onus of adjustment falling then on categories such as red tape/bureaucracy and inefficient infrastructure projects. These measures will need to be coordinated with the adjustments in spending at the regional level and combined with well-targeted optimization of existing tax breaks and state benefits.

More broadly, however, the attitude of the markets will be affected not only by the incoming stats on Brazil’s primary fiscal balance and expenditure cuts, but also by some of the key underlying themes related to Brazil’s budget process. The latter relates to issues such as the commitment of the authorities to fiscal targets/fiscal rules and the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy between the Central Bank and the government. Another systemic credibility factor concerns the relations between the government and the Congress. The stance of the legislature will be crucial in allowing the government to implement some of the key priority policies designed to rein in the fiscal deficit.

Overall, the current dynamics in Brazil’s fiscal-monetary mix characterized by fiscal deficits exerting pressure on the exchange rate as well as stoking inflation and higher interest rates could result in a vicious circle leading to higher debt levels. Under these circumstances, a best-case scenario would be an “expansionary fiscal consolidation”, whereby the authorities deliver consistent fiscal performance of lower budget deficits that reduces the pressure from the markets and creates scope for the monetary authorities to start cutting rates. The positive “credibility effect” could then deliver improved growth performance via lower rates and higher investment, with the appreciation of the exchange rate also having scope under this scenario to deliver its anti-inflationary impulse.

An “expansionary fiscal consolidation” would not be altogether impossible – there is evidence of such scenarios playing out with positive growth effects precisely in periods when so much is riding on credibility issues being effectively addressed by the government through fiscal adjustment. One such example is the Danish fiscal consolidation of the early 1980s that was followed by an expansion in output on the back of the decline in interest rates and improved credibility in the authorities’ policy stance[8]. Supportive monetary and structural policies (including via trade liberalization) in such episodes are also key in keeping a lid on inflation and public debt levels, while creating space for economic growth.

And while technically the government may deliver improvements in the monthly streams of figures on the country’s fiscal balances, the systemic issues of its coordination/relations with the monetary authorities and the legislature will be a more difficult matter to resolve in the near term and hence likely an ongoing concern for the financial markets. As is all too often the case across EM, there is not much leeway and time for the policy-makers in Brazil to deliver the difficult decisions given the policy coordination difficulties and the nearing of the October municipal elections.

[1] https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/statistics/fiscalstatistics
[2] https://www.yahoo.com/news/budget-cuts-brazil-necessary-lula-131344168.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAEnqDnWSwRqE2DPbBbe2ubLFH6E5UXQgckk_sYUneNsDtIWlsEPUwkSIyVFD8Bzj59T8TgfKs7-ShyNs6eZ_Ne_aO9CSC0l25T5NgrmJXKVl6Nlm46kBjfz_3RkjBnHnSPlgyr6jf7Qe0ExfJgCGzDsSjwmQDLcDScYeutte5n2L
[3] https://valorinternational.globo.com/economy/news/2024/04/18/imf-projects-increase-in-brazils-gross-debt-at-least-until-2029.ghtml; https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/07/11/Brazil-2024-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-551705
[4] https://www.xm.com/research/markets/forex/reuters/fiscal-expansion-not-good-for-brazil-at-the-moment-haddad-says-53879656
[5] https://brazilian.report/liveblog/politics-insider/2024/08/26/inflation-expectation-rise-year-end/
[6] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp675.pdf
[7] https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/dicereport204-data4.pdf
[8]https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/109114219902700604?download=true&journalCode=pfrb
Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics
Image by JoeBamz via Pixabay

Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

The 6th BRICS+ Young Diplomats Forum is being held in Ufa on 27–31 August 2024 as part of the plan of events for Russia’s BRICS chairship.

The theme of the Forum is ‘The Role of Youth Diplomacy in Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security’. The event, which is being organized by the Young Diplomats Council of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the assistance of the Roscongress Foundation and the government of the Republic of Bashkortostan, aims to strengthen youth cooperation, friendship, and trust between the countries of the Global South.

The delegates can expect an eventful business and cultural programme. The working sessions will primarily focus on international cultural, humanitarian, and youth cooperation in the BRICS space, the association’s role in the global political, financial, and economic system, the global security architecture, and the creation of a multipolar world.

Roughly 110 delegates from over 30 countries are expected to take part in the Forum.
The event will include meetings with the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Republic of Bashkortostan, prominent politicians, economic experts, public figures, and winners of the Olympics and BRICS Games, as well as an introduction to the history and culture of the Republic of Bashkortostan with its unique nature.

An official ceremony will be held on the last day of the Forum to accept new members into the International Association of Young Diplomats, which was created on an initiative from the Young Diplomats Council of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017 in order to intensify interaction among youth activists from different foreign ministries around the world and currently unites more than 150 diplomats.

Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

The 4th BRICS International Youth Camp took place in Ulyanovsk on 21–25 August 2024. The camp marked a continuation of the dialogue on education, information technologies, sports, and culture that was held at the BRICS Youth Summit. The theme of the camp this year was ‘Designing Public Spaces’.

The main goal of the 25 young leaders from BRICS countries in attendance was to create art objects that display the picturesque landscapes of the Ulyanovsk Region. The participants attended training sessions, panel discussions, and thematic lectures, and also went on excursions to tourist sites in the Ulyanovsk Region, including Undoria Geopark.

“This is the first time we have held a camp with such a group. Many of the kids were nervous because they had never taken part in BRICS events before. Our job was to give them as much information as possible about BRICS and why the values of a multipolar world, solidarity, and justice are so important,” Camp Director and Deputy Director of the Ulyanovsk Region’s Creative Industries Fund Diana Kovela said.

The camp participants were divided into three international groups that each worked with its own specific focus. The teams included artists, craftsmen, and sculptors. Their work resulted in a presentation of art objects, which will subsequently be installed at Undoria Geopark and the Undorovsky Paleontological Museum.

The first group created an interactive art object called ‘Revival of the Past’, which is a prototype of an ammonite made of tree stumps and glass.

The second team worked on a project called ‘Marine Heritage’, which features the tails of an ichthyosaur growing out of the ground and consists of metal frames filled with wooden rods and branches, which will be used to decorate the Undorovsky eco-trail in the near future.

The third team created a model of an ichthyosaur that the campers painted and dubbed ‘BRICSosaur’, which is now vying to become a new symbol of both the geological heritage of the Ulyanovsk Region and the entire movement for international youth cooperation among BRICS countries.

The BRICS International Youth Camp was organized by the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs together with the Russia-BRICS Project Office for International Youth Cooperation, the Creative Industries Fund of the Ulyanovsk Region, and the Ulyanovsk Region government. The camp was part of the plan of events of Russia’s BRICS chairship in 2024, which are being managed by the Roscongress Foundation.

Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

On 3 September 2024 a regular meeting of the BRICS Working Group on Competition Research in Food Markets will be held in Johannesburg as part of Russia`s BRICS Chairship.

The meeting on the margins of the 18th Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, organized by the Competition Commission of South Africa from 3-5 September 2024 in Johannesburg (South Africa).

The co-chairs of the BRICS Working Group for the Research of Competition Issues in Food Markets are the FAS Russia and the Competition Commission of South Africa.

The meeting of the BRICS Working Group for the Research of Competition Issues in Food Markets will give participants the opportunity to discuss the most pressing issues of food security and competition policy in this area; factors that have a negative impact on the state of competition in the agricultural market of the BRICS countries and partner countries, as well as the role of international cooperation in addressing issues of competition in the agricultural sector.

The event is planned to engage representatives of BRICS competition authorities, involving other foreign countries, interregional and international organizations.

The Roscongress Foundation manages the events of Russia’s BRICS Chairship.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

In December 2015, I posted in my blog about the huge potential of the BRICS in developing cooperation for the development of inclusive economies and societies devoid of the neocolonialist new world order dictate that seems to be still imposed on most developing nations. In that article, I stated, “we have hope – the development of the BRICS coalition and partnership building with developing nations”. Russia was also holding the Presidency of BRICS at that time.

The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025, or BRICS Strategy states, “We express our commitment to sustainable development in three dimensions - economic, social and environmental - in a balanced and integrative manner. All our citizens, in all parts of respective territories, including remote areas, deserve to fully enjoy the benefits of sustainable development. We reiterate the importance of the implementation of the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development and call for redoubled efforts for its timely implementation.” 11th BRICS Summit Brasilia Declaration.

The BRICS countries overtook the G7 countries share of the world’s total gross domestic product (GDP) in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2018. By 2024, the difference had increased even further, the BRICS is now holding a total 35% of the world’s GDP compared to 30% by the G7 countries. BRICS nations comprise 40% of the world’s population and are known for their significant influence in regional matters. All of them are members of the G20. Furthermore, all these member nations of BRICS also acknowledge the importance of accessible and quality of education for improving life and work conditions in pursuit of inclusive economic development. They all seek to develop robust and inclusive economies and societies.

Why should Special Needs Peoples’ inclusion be part of BRICS Strategy and Beyond?

According to the United Nations, there are over 1.2 billion special needs people. China has 85 million people with disabilities, or 6.5% of the population, China has enacted more than 60 laws and regulations aimed at safeguarding the rights of individuals with disabilities, encompassing those with visual, auditory, linguistic, physical, intellectual, psychological, and multiple disabilities. A new World Bank Report on disabled persons in India, has observed that there is growing evidence that people with disabilities comprise between 5% and 8% of the Indian population or around 55 – 90 million individuals. While in Brazil, nearly 18.6 million persons or 8.9% aged 2 years and over in Brazil have some type of disability.

Moreover, the national disability prevalence rate is 7.5% of the population in South Africa. Disability is more prevalent among females compared to males (8,3% and 6,5% respectively). Disability International state that, Russian official statistics indicate that there are least 13 million people or 9% of the population living with disabilities in Russia. Thus we are looking at nearly 200 million special needs people who as citizens of BRICS nations should be part of the BRICS strategy for economic social development process. These figures do not include the numbers of Special Needs People in new member countries of BRICS Plus.

How can Russia during its Presidency make a difference for Special Needs People’s inclusion in the BRICS Strategy and Beyond?

Russia has approximately 32% or 2.5 million people with disabilities who are of working age and employed. Special Needs People often face steep challenges that stop them from being employed. During the BRICS Presidency, showcasing Russian special needs employment process as good practice, information sharing on policy supported by constituional rights can be useful for others to also learn. For example, how to break barriers that stifle special needs peoples employment inclusion.

The National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation states that the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Art.39) guarantees social security at the expense of the State in case of disableness. The goal of the state policy in the field of social protection of disabled people in the Russian Federation is provision of equal rights for the disabled in realization of civil, economic, political and other rights and freedoms as well as provision of measures of social support with a view of overcoming and compensation for the limited ability to perform daily living tasks.

The NHRI states that since the ratification of the Convention, the legislative and executive branches of the Russian authorities have done a lot to bring domestic law and its implementation into line with the Convention. Thus in addition to the already existing notion of “rehabilitation” the legislation introduced a new term of “habilitation” which was defined as a set of measures to enable the disabled to engage in social, professional, educational and daily activities by developing new abilities which they had lacked before (NHRI, 2018). Support for people with disabilities is provided in the following areas:
- medical rehabilitation;
- vocational guidance;
- social adaptation;
- physical training and wellness promotion.

Kick-Starting A Dialogue Processes at the Kazan BRICS Summit 2024

During Russia's presidency of BRICS, we hope that leading organisations like the RIAC with Russian Universities, civil society organisations, and the private sector, and in collaboration with the Government will consider initiating a dialogue process for Special Needs Peoples inclusion in the BRICS Strategy 2025 and beyond. We hope that during the 16^th BRICS summit in Kazan this October 2024, RIAC can facilitate an opportunity for such an exploratory dialogue. We suggest that this dialogue can be utilised to explore the possibility of adopting policy and action initiatives. It also will allow exploration and promotion of existing Special Needs inclusion policies as good practice without imposition on BRICS member states. Furthermore, it could kick-start a process opportunity of a gradual overflow to BRICS Plus and non-BRICS nations globally.

I believe that discussion can facilitate at the very least create awareness, with an optimal potential to formulate a BRICS nations-driven vanguard special needs people inclusion policy and practice. Additionally, ideas can be gathered from inputs at the dialogue. Simultaneously, buy-in and partnership development can be harnessed with possible implementation process models suggested for initiative roll-out in various countries - BRICS and BRICS future member nations.

From small steps of staging the kick-start of this proposed dialogue at the Kazan BRICS summit this October 2024, we hope to realisation better inclusion of Special Needs People in the coming years. Thus, BRICS can bring to the world a new effort to facilitate a commitment to inclusive Special Needs People inclusion.