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The recent statements by U.S. President-elect Donald Trump regarding the imposition of tariffs on BRICS countries reflect a broader trend of economic confrontation that extends beyond China. This anticipated return of economic warfare signals a challenging era for developing nations, particularly those within the BRICS alliance, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Trump needs to recognize that the BRICS countries are not attempting to dismantle U.S. hegemony; rather, they aim to address the detrimental effects of the dollar’s overwhelming dominance. Historical context is crucial here: developing nations have repeatedly suffered under U.S. monetary policies, such as rising interest rates that prompted capital flight, exacerbating their economic pressures.

If the U.S. seeks to maintain its dominance, it must reconsider how long it can do so irresponsibly. The BRICS nations’ efforts to establish an alternative currency for trade cooperation arise from a genuine desire to alleviate these economic strains. While launching a BRICS alternative currency still requires a lot of work, the increasing weaponization of the dollar by the U.S. will drive these countries to depend more on their local currencies.

Rather than threatening tariffs, Trump should engage with these countries to propose viable pathways to monetary stability. While Trump’s threats could materialize gradually, he should not assume that his approach will prevail. Economic stability has become an irrevocable priority for developing nations, and the U.S. risks greater losses as confidence erodes. This shift toward protectionist policies could lead other countries to resist U.S. products, undermining U.S. economic interests.

Egypt’s response to Trump’s threats

To understand Egypt’s situation mor, we will start by reporting trade dynamics between the two countries. The volume of trade between Egypt and the United States of America reached $7.3 billion in 2023. Of this, the value of Egyptian exports to the United States amounted to $1.9 billion, while Egyptian imports from the United States totaled $5.4 billion in the same year. Therefore, I do not believe that Trump’s threats will cause much panic in Egypt. The United States could potentially lose the Egyptian market if a trade war breaks out, which would be a greater loss for the U.S. than for Egypt, as the latter can explore alternative markets, especially since the volume of exports to America is not that substantial.

If we examine the nature of the products that dominate the trade relationship between the two countries, we find that ready-made clothing occupies the top position in Egyptian exports to the United States, accounting for 53.1 percent of the total exports. This is followed by plastics and their products in second place, and carpets in third. Meanwhile, oil and medicinal plants rank first among Egyptian imports from the U.S., making up 14.8 percent of the total imports.

Thus, tariffs and trade wars will compel the Egyptian government to seek compensation for its exports by reaching out to other markets. Conversely, the United States stands to lose the Egyptian market if Egypt responds by imposing tariffs on American products of higher value. These trade wars are certainly not preferred by Egypt or any other country, as they are not in anyone’s best interest.

Prior to Trump’s threats, Mr. president Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt recently emphasized at the BRICS Kazan Summit the inadequacies of the current international order in addressing global issues. He advocated for increased cooperation among BRICS nations, highlighting the importance of local currencies in trade agreements.

Regarding Egypt’s response to Trump’s threats, the country has made a significant move by announcing its participation in the “PAPSS” system—an initiative aimed at facilitating trade and financial transactions in local currencies among African countries. This announcement came shortly after Trump’s remarks, highlighting Egypt’s proactive stance. The PAPSS system, managed by the African Export-Import Bank, includes 14 central banks across Africa, with Egypt’s Central Bank becoming the 15th participant. This system enables rapid cross-border payments within 120 seconds and has proven to be a reliable, cost-effective infrastructure for financial transactions.

This reflects a proactive move by Egypt to increase exports to African countries, aiming to compensate for any potential losses from the U.S. market. Official data indicated that Egypt’s exports in the first seven months of 2024 were primarily directed to Arab countries, followed by the European Union, the United States, and then African countries. Egypt’s entry into the PAPSS system currently signals its readiness to enhance trade and improve exports to African nations.

Egypt’s decision to join the PAPSS system at this juncture sends a powerful message: it is too late for the U.S. to impose its old hegemony without expecting a robust response from developing nations. Relying on sanctions and tariffs as tools to deter economic cooperation among BRICS nations is no longer viable. If Trump perceives BRICS as the problem, he is mistaken. The real challenge lies within the gaps and deficiencies in the current international system that these countries seek to address. Developing nations will increasingly turn to local currencies for trade, even in the absence of a unified alternative currency.

Additionally, Trump’s declarations raise legal concerns, as they do not align with the World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations and rules. This begs the question: to what extent will the U.S. appear to disregard international law? Trump’s threats are more of political posturing than actionable policies, but if they come true, they could signify the end of a stable international order capable of managing global competition among countries.

Trump must understand that reckless trade war tactics will affect not only the targeted countries but also empower BRICS to gain political legitimacy and encourage more nations to confront American unilateralism. This shift could result in greater long-term losses for the U.S. Whatever Trump does, the dollar will not hold the same weight as it did in previous decades. This shift is not solely the result of developing countries’ desire to marginalize the dollar but rather stems from the misuse of that dominance by successive American administrations.

In conclusion, the international order has fundamentally changed. The U.S. can no longer expect to engage with countries as it did in previous decades. The evolving power dynamics, compounded by ongoing global disputes, have prompted developing nations to adopt more pragmatic and responsible diplomatic relations. Imposing tariffs will not deter this shift; instead, it may accelerate the move toward economic independence and collaboration among BRICS nations.

Kicking Back the Ladder. The title I’ll give to Trump’s threats

As an Egyptian researcher specializing in international relations, I am certain that the United States, through Trump’s threats, is heading towards the game of kicking the ladder for the second time in its history. The first time was when Western countries, especially America, rose economically thanks to old protectionist policies adopted to encourage industry and production. Then, after they did that and succeeded, they kicked this ladder and fought any country that wanted to impose protectionist policies to achieve the same goal. After countries began to respect economic openness and freedom of trade, now we see Trump wanting to kick this ladder of free market and restore protectionist policies to the entire world. The threat is not only limited to BRICS. America will do that with any country that might want to compete with it. Trump has also threatened Mexico and Canada, so this approach is serious because it may lead, after years or simple decades, to protectionist policies that reach the level of wars.

As a result, the Egyptian state, as is clear from the statements of officials, is aware of the danger of the current situation and the weaponization of the dollar. Therefore, it will, like all developing countries, exert all efforts to enhance trade without protectionist policies and will work to reach different markets to reduce the economic blockade by any country practicing monopoly. This is a great opportunity that Egypt realizes to bring BRICS countries closer together.

The Egyptian response can be summarized in several steps. First, Egypt remains committed to diplomatic negotiations with all countries in various situations. Therefore, I expect Egypt to begin urging President Trump to reconsider his practices of weaponizing the dollar and to uphold the principles of free trade and commitment to WTO rules.

Second, Egypt will continue to seek alternatives by fostering closer ties with various markets within the BRICS organization and establishing more local currency payment agreements with major partners. This strategy aims to mitigate any potential losses if the U.S. president does not adhere to diplomatic dialogue, as evidenced by Egypt’s entry into the PAPSS agreement. Ultimately, Egypt may find itself compelled to impose retaliatory tariffs if Trump follows through on his threats.

Third, Egypt recognizes the dangers of unilateralism in managing international affairs. Consequently, I envision Egypt continuing to work towards long-term security through further engagement with developing countries and emerging markets. It will also encourage more nations to adopt local currencies in bilateral trade agreements. In short, Trump’s threats will drive most countries, including Egypt, to seek alternatives to avoid being coerced in the coming decades.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

In order to transform opportunities into tangible benefits, it is necessary to adopt an approach that combines national and regional strategies, while respecting the cultural and economic specificities of each country. Proactive diplomacy, internal capacity building and adherence to principles of reciprocity and sustainable cooperation will ensure that these alliances are not only based on economic foundations, but also contribute to building a balanced and mutually beneficial partnership, writes Claudio Ruff Escobar, Rector of Bernardo O’Higgins University, Chile.

The BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has undergone a significant transformation, evolving from an emerging economic forum to a strategic bloc with an increasingly central role in the world order. In August 2024, the BRICS expanded its membership by welcoming countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. This expansion illustrates its ambition to counteract the hegemony of traditional Western-dominated blocs and promote a multipolar system that rebalances international relations.

In this context, Bernardo O’Higgins University organized a seminar in November 2024 titled “BRICS: Projections and Challenges for Latin America”. This event brought together ambassadors and experts from China, Russia, Brazil, Chile and Peru, who analysed the growing impact of the BRICS on the region. Discussions focused on economic opportunities, political and logistical challenges, and the potential of BRICS as a credible alternative to traditional economic blocs.

Economic and trade opportunities

South America-BRICS cooperation opens up many opportunities:

Trade diversification: The Chinese and Indian markets, characterised by growing demand for natural resources and food products, represent an opportunity for countries such as Chile and Peru. The latter, rich in strategic minerals such as copper and lithium, could expand their exports under more advantageous conditions thanks to a strengthened collaboration with BRICS.

Infrastructure investments: The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) is a crucial source of financing for infrastructure and sustainable development projects. This would allow South America to improve its connectivity and logistics networks, facilitating its integration into global value chains.

Technology and energy cooperation: The BRICS agenda includes initiatives for technology transfer and investment in renewable energy. Brazil, with its expertise in biofuels, and Chile, with its potential in solar energy, could play strategic roles in these collaborative projects.

Alternative financial systems: The BRICS-promoted de-dollarisation strategy, focused on the use of local or digital currencies in international trade, offers South America greater economic autonomy in the face of fluctuations in global financial markets.

Political, social, and logistical challenges

Despite these promising opportunities, integration within the BRICS involves several major challenges:

Economic and political heterogeneity: The differences in economic development and productive structures between South American countries and BRICS members make it difficult to harmonise interests and define a common agenda.

Commodity dependence: If demand for natural resources remains strong, South America risks becoming stuck in its traditional role as a supplier of raw materials, hampering the diversification and industrialisation of its economies.

Geopolitical tensions: Strategic alliances with actors such as Russia and China could cause friction with historical partners in the region, including the United States and the European Union. Careful diplomatic management will be essential to avoid damaging these relationships.

Regional fragmentation: Political and economic divergences among South American countries complicate the coordination of a coherent regional strategy, limiting their ability to negotiate collectively with the BRICS.

Infrastructure deficiencies: Gaps in physical and digital connectivity continue to pose a barrier to smooth integration with Asian and African markets.

Geopolitical projections

The accession or strengthening of the participation of South American countries in the BRICS could have significant geopolitical impacts:

Strengthening multipolarism: Integration into the BRICS positions of South America as a key player in the transition to a multipolar global system, thus increasing its influence and strategic room for manoeuvre.

Increased role in international forums: Through the BRICS, countries like Brazil could play a more active role in global discussions on issues such as climate change, the reform of international institutions or the regulation of emerging technologies.

Reducing historical dependence: Diversifying economic relations would allow South America to reduce its dependence on the West and consolidate its relations with dynamic emerging economies.
Risks of intra-regional tensions: The lack of a clear consensus on the role of the BRICS within the region could lead to divisions among South American countries, particularly due to their divergent political orientations and economic priorities.

Strategic policy recommendations

In order to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks associated with BRICS integration, several policy recommendations emerge:

Strengthen regional cohesion: South American countries should prioritise regional integration in order to negotiate collectively and ensure that their interests are fairly represented within the BRICS.
Boost industrialisation: It is essential to use ties with the BRICS to encourage productive transformation and reduce dependence on raw material exports.

Promote energy and technological diversification: Leveraging cooperation with the BRICS to develop renewable energy and advanced technology capabilities is a strategic lever for the future.

Maintaining a diplomatic balance: Relations with the BRICS must be managed in a balanced manner in order to preserve strategic alliances with other global players, thus avoiding excessive dependency.

Investing in infrastructure: Modernising physical and digital infrastructure is essential to effectively integrating South America into global value chains driven by the BRICS.

Conclusion

The seminar organised by Bernardo O’Higgins University highlighted the strategic importance of the BRICS for South America. These relations offer a unique opportunity to redefine the role of the region on the global stage, diversifying its international relations, accessing financing for sustainable development, and consolidating its influence in a multipolar world order.

However, in order to transform these opportunities into tangible benefits, it is necessary to adopt an approach that combines national and regional strategies, while respecting the cultural and economic specificities of each country. Proactive diplomacy, internal capacity building and adherence to principles of reciprocity and sustainable cooperation will ensure that these alliances are not only based on economic foundations, but also contribute to building a balanced and mutually beneficial partnership.

In this context, and by virtue of its academic autonomy, Bernardo O’Higgins University reaffirms its commitment to address and discuss all relevant topics that contribute to enriching the academic debate and shedding light on the strategic challenges of the region and the world. This openness ensures that the institution remains a privileged space for critical reflection and constructive dialogue on major contemporary issues.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

Indonesia’s unique opportunity with BRICS emphasises how it can navigate the new multipolar order while preserving its non-aligned and democratic values. As Indonesia considers joining BRICS, it stands at a crossroads, where aligning with emerging powers could unlock new growth while also challenging its traditional diplomatic principles, taking public benefits and strengthening global collaboration, writes Joko Susilo, a participant in the Valdai – New Generation project.

Indonesia faces both opportunities and challenges in joining BRICS. Its participation in this group could either align with or conflict with its foreign policy and economic objectives. As Indonesia embarks on a new chapter in global relations through BRICS, it will likely experience tensions amid the collaboration and competition among countries. This dynamic is influenced by the ongoing struggle between domestic national interests and international pressures. Indonesia characterises its involvement as active participation in all international forums, reflecting its commitment to an active and independent foreign policy that aligns with its national development agenda. Ultimately, all these interests and tensions come down to pragmatism and realistic decision-making.

We know that one of the emerging and increasingly powerful alternatives to global governance is BRICS. In the coming years, the world post-2025 will see global policies and new forms of governance as the drivers. The initiation of new global institutions is also based on the inability of existing ones to resolve various multidimensional crises globally. On the other hand, polemics have emerged when the consensus of the global forum was not achieved due to the dominant power of a handful of countries and the dominance of privilege in current institutions.

Countries like Indonesia are increasingly drawn to BRICS, particularly following the government transition from President Jokowi to President Prabowo. The new administration is demonstrating a more proactive approach to foreign policy and diplomacy. This shift is highlighted by Prabowo’s inauguration speech and the strategic appointment of Sugiono, a secretary with military experience, as Minister of Foreign Affairs – usually the foreign minister is a bureaucratic career diplomat. Furthermore, Indonesia’s official announcement to join BRICS as a new partner at the 2024 summit in Russia signifies a decisive commitment. This bold move sharply contrasts with Jokowi’s two terms, which were marked by hesitation and a wait-and-see attitude. Embracing BRICS represents a significant step forward for Indonesia on the global stage.

The BRICS-Indonesia Dilemma

However, Indonesia’s attention to being involved in BRICS has prompted public polemics. We need to analyse the challenges and opportunities more comprehensively.

Indeed, Indonesia’s involvement in BRICS as a partner, or in the future as a permanent member, will create economic, political, and multidimensional risks. Economically, by aligning with BRICS, Indonesia could face a shift in trade dependencies, potentially relying more heavily on BRICS economies, some of which (like Russia and South Africa) are prone to economic volatility due to sanctions, inflation, or political unrest. This could disrupt Indonesia’s export and import stability, especially if BRICS faces collective economic setbacks. The legitimacy of BRICS is also insufficient to convince global investors to invest in the country. This differs, for example, from membership in the OECD, which reflects the legitimacy of a country in economic development terms. This will undoubtedly be an obstacle for Indonesia if it wants to pursue economic growth of 8% per year, as promised by President Prabowo. It mitigates market sentiment, investors, and major trading partners that already exist and are dominant in Indonesia, such as Singapore, Japan, and the USA.
There are concerns about how BRICS membership impacts Indonesia’s democratic image and economic stability. Several countries have implemented centralised politics and limited democratic space. This can potentially contradict Indonesia’s status as one of the four largest democratic countries in the world, with characteristics such as open general elections, a decentralised government and local autonomy.

Indonesia risks being drawn into the conflicts of some BRICS countries, either directly or indirectly, due to its membership in the bloc. This could lead to geopolitical instability and other risks. However, it’s important to note that BRICS’ support for Palestinian independence aligns with Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation, a stance that will not only gain solid public legitimacy but also reassure the international community about Indonesia’s commitment to its principles. Indonesia has not yet finished addressing our internal issues, which is why going global is such a new challenge for the country. It’s double homework that faces Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s basic constitution mandates world peace and is oriented towards eliminating all forms of colonialism.

On the other hand, we also need to recognise the prospective benefits and opportunities that BRICS offers Indonesia, like shared national interests, opening new trade access, and strengthening the Global South. These “shared national interests” can include economic growth, geopolitical influence, and the promotion of democratic values.

BRICS can be an option for strengthening and accelerating Indonesia’s economic development. Indonesia’s recovery in 2021 is insufficient to return the country to upper middle-income status. Based on the gross national income (GNI) per capita projection of 4,460 in 2022, in order to get out of the middle-income trap and become a developed country by 2045, Indonesia has only two decades. It requires constant annual economic growth of 7% or higher (Ministry of Development and Planning of Republic Indonesia, 2022). At the same time, in 2025-2035, the momentum that the demographic bonus offers via a productive workforce is limited for Indonesia. A productive workforce and national product output could lead to economic gains if channelled through BRICS. The risk is that if this window of opportunity is missed, it will trigger Indonesia’s surplus workers in a national economy that is still predominantly informal and consumptive. This is a rare opportunity: through BRICS, Indonesia can for example partner and transfer technology with China and Russia, which have successfully industrialised domestically and are strong in terms of formal economic structures.

On October 20, the newly elected President of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, who had previously served as the country's Minister of Defence, will officially take office. Already in the period between the elections and the inauguration, Prabowo has demonstrated a great deal of diplomatic activity. He conducted a series of international visits and meetings, including a visit to Russia this summer, where he had a conversation with Vladimir Putin and a meeting at the Ministry of Defence.

Indonesia can strengthen bilateral economic relations with the BRICS countries as a fellow member. This will positively correlate with widening investment opportunities and access to intense trade flows on both sides. BRICS provides equality regarding contributions between countries. The share of member countries in the New Development Bank (NDB) is equal, at 20%, in line with the hope of policymaking in the form of consensus that has an equal effect on all members, both old and new. Even during a crisis, BRICS members can survive relatively well, and countries are more or less tested when they face a pandemic crisis or economic embargo. This increased economic cooperation could open up new opportunities for Indonesia and strengthen its position in the global economy.
In particular, BRICS priorities are in line with the work program of the “Kabinet Merah Putih” Prabowo government like national priorities for energy and food security, poverty eradication, and human resources development. Joining BRICS could provide strategic partnerships, helping Indonesia reach its growth targets and national development goals.

Last but not least, Indonesia’s membership in BRICS could contribute to the strengthening and solidarity of the Global South. For example, the bilateral economic cooperation between Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China has been growing: Chinese investment in Indonesia in 2013 was USD280 million, and rose significantly to USD8.6 billion by 2023. Southern countries, generally developing countries with small and medium power capabilities, must consolidate their resource potential to mitigate pressure from great powers. As a significant player in the region, Indonesia could play a crucial role in this consolidation, thereby enhancing its influence and counter-balancing Western dominance.

BRICS and Indonesia’s Future

Indonesia has opportunities for realizing its national interests and having broader impact with BRICS. Active involvement in various global forums and institutions has opened up new opportunities and these have opened up new possibilities. At the same time, there will undoubtedly be more intersections between countries with the potential for conflict brought by each member that can be held hostage to other countries’ national interests and decisions. However, this is a challenge that needs to be faced as a group. Indonesia’s potential BRICS membership aligns with its “active and free” foreign policy.

Indonesia’s move to join BRICS embodies an active free foreign policy, which does not mean joining a certain camp but actively participating in all forums.

The evolution of the world order has depended mainly on countries’ roles beyond their borders and approaches to global governance. Amid all the diversity of political interests and diversification of ideologies, every country is encouraged to become an active nation-state. This reality has also marked a paradigm shift from unipolar to multipolar in the new global order. This has the same nuance as the fundamental principles of Indonesian diplomacy, namely “free and active politics” and non-alignment, which have deep historical roots. History records that Indonesia has practically implemented a multipolar approach, for example, when initiating the Asia-Africa Conference and ASEAN. So, Indonesia should be able to adapt to this condition.

Indonesia must also be more sensitive because the world order will depend on and be influenced by three main aspects: political-economic factors, power, and institutions. These power factors are influenced by the balance between dominant global powers, the US, China, and Russia, and the ability of new global powers, such as India, Turkey and Brazil to consolidate influence and become independent centres of power or poles in the new global balance of power (see Valdai Club Report, 2024).

At the same time, these inter-state relations have implications for forming new coalitions and have become institutional factors. These institutional factors include the ability of non-great Western powers to serve as the institutional basis for a new world order among the “global majority” countries and the ability of the elite leaders of global power to reach a consensus on a new institutional framework. The world’s future will change with the increase in meaningful participation and representation of developing countries and emerging economic powers in international organisations and their contribution to global economic development.

Indonesia’s unique opportunity with BRICS emphasises how it can navigate this new multipolar order while preserving its non-aligned and democratic values. In my opinion, Indonesia can be a strong leader with a strong economy in ASEAN by joining BRICS. As Indonesia considers joining BRICS, it stands at a crossroads, where aligning with emerging powers could unlock new growth while also challenging its traditional diplomatic principles, taking public benefits and strengthening global collaboration.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

Eurasia is inextricably linked with the main processes affecting the globe. BRICS, in turn, is a platform for developing strategies to achieve a new, more just world order. It is precisely this order, where the possibility of forceful dominance of a narrow group of states is minimised, that seems most suitable for the arrangement of Eurasia, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.

Russia’s current policy in Greater Eurasia is a product of the interaction of two processes that are important for its national economy and international position. First, it is part of a large-scale “pivot to the East” – Moscow’s foreign policy and foreign economic strategy, adopted in the early 2010s. The main objective of the “pivot” has been to expand the system of trade and economic ties, primarily with Asian countries, in a context where the West, primarily the European Union, occupied a dominant position among Russia’s external partners. The political riskiness of this state of affairs became obvious to Moscow during the contradictions with the EU that preceded the “pivot”, related to its expansion to the East, as well as pressure from Brussels during negotiations on Russia’s accession to the WTO.

However, another thing was no less important – by the end of the 2000s the Asian countries had begun to show convincing signs that they were coping with the coming global economic upheavals better than Europe. Amid the global economic crisis of 2008-2011, most Asian countries demonstrated a confident position and, moreover, growing demand for goods that served as the bulk of Russian exports. Consumption and the middle class were growing in Asia, which meant that Russia could view previously secondary markets as important in the long term. Recognition of this at the level of state policy was an important achievement, since it fundamentally altered the nature of Russia’s foreign relations. Moreover, it served as confirmation of Moscow’s ability to make unconventional decisions – a turn to the East, which no one in Europe could seriously expect from Russia.

The gradual expansion of ties with China made the development of the Far East an important task. Now the investments made there are paying off due to the scale of trade going through Pacific Russia in the context of the economic war being waged by the United States and the European Union. In other words, the “pivot to the East” was Russia’s natural reaction to new opportunities, not an “escape from Europe”: Russian policy in Asia proved to be advantageous. Thus, Russia’s aspirations to integrate with the Greater Eurasian space were directly related to its security considerations, which were subject to the most serious challenge from the West, but were not conditioned by them.

The 15th Asian Conference of the Valdai Club was held in Kuala Lumpur on December 9-10, 2024. The event was organized in partnership with the Bait Al-Amanah Foundation (Malaysia), the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Japan) and the Institute for Strategic Analysis and Policy Research (INSAP, Malaysia). It was attended by over 100 experts, including high-ranking guests – Malaysian Foreign Minister Dato’ Seri Utama Haji Mohamad Bin Haji Hasan and Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrey Rudenko.

Second, Russia’s policy towards Greater Eurasia inevitably reflects the state of the conflict in relations between Russia and the West, which after February 2022 turned into a hybrid military confrontation.

The entire Eurasian space with the exception of Europe is a zone where Russia is surrounded by friendly states that do not make fighting against it a goal of their foreign policy.

Even in the Far East, Japan and South Korea are obviously burdened by the task of confronting Moscow that the United States persistently imposes on them. In Asia, only two states – Japan and Singapore – initiated sanctions against Russia after the start of the armed confrontation in Ukraine. All other countries in the region pursue either a friendly or benevolently neutral policy towards it, which is limited only by the ability of the United States to harm them as punishment for their ties with Russia.

The Central Asian space has begun to play a significant role in ensuring Russia’s foreign economic ties in conditions where some traditional partners in the West have been cut off. At the same time, the impact of the conflict in Eastern Europe on Russian policy in Greater Eurasia is twofold. On the one hand, it strengthens Russia’s desire to develop a space that is friendly to it. This is manifested, in particular, in more intensive contacts with its Eurasian neighbours, even in comparison with what was achieved in the previous decade. In other words, against the backdrop of the conflict with the West, the construction of Greater Eurasia has not only come to reflect general political intentions, but is also practical, reflecting real material interests.

However, on the other hand, the military and political confrontation around Ukraine has created some uncertainty among Russia’s partners in Eurasia and a desire to slow down the political processes of rapprochement until the balance of power in relations between Moscow and the West becomes more definite. Moreover, as we understand, almost all countries of Greater Eurasia are states of the World Majority and link their future with the development resources that the modern form of globalisation offers them. Russia’s immediate neighbours in Central Asia and its partners in Southeast Asia are also under pressure from the rivalry of the great world powers: Russia and the West, as well as China and the United States. This creates a fair degree of uncertainty about the future, which can hardly be compensated for by the benefits of their current neutral position. They certainly fear negative consequences in the unlikely event of Russia’s weakening, but they are no less conceptually unprepared for the United States to weaken its presence as an external balancer for Moscow and, especially, Beijing. There are also concerns in both parts of Greater Eurasia that the intensification of Sino-American contradictions will provoke the West to engage in subversive activities and foment internal conflicts. This is especially true for the countries of Central Asia, where the emergence of civil unrest could become a serious security challenge for Russia and China.

If the states of Greater Eurasia do not have classical factors of international cooperation at their disposal, then it is very likely that they can be replaced by those common goals that not only meet their current interests, but are also the most historically rooted, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev. The basis for the gradual formation of a community of states of Greater Eurasia will be the opportunity to obtain within it what the countries of this region most strive for – resources for solving national development tasks as the basis for stability and survival of the state. This is the second part of the author’s reflections on the possible foundations of international cooperation in Greater Eurasia.

Against this backdrop, Russia in 2024 focused on strengthening ties with individual states in Greater Eurasia and the global dimension of its foreign policy through the BRICS group. Meanwhile, initiatives with regional Eurasian importance were put on the backburner and were seen in these two contexts. Rapprochement with China and India, which are now considered the two most formidable Eurasian powers, along with Russia itself, also continued. All these foreign policy initiatives combined integration motives – strengthening trade and economic ties, but also dealt with the issues of security, since it is cooperation and mutual benefit that are in this case the most reliable guarantees of stable political relations. Particular attention was paid, as we have seen, to relations with the Central Asian states, which are linked to Russia geographically, economically and through human contacts. State visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan confirmed a fairly high level of bilateral relations with these countries, now reinforced by the growth of trade and Russian investment in the region.

The second dimension of Russia’s Eurasian policy in 2024 is BRICS and the opportunities provided by Moscow’s presidency in the group during the year. It is not at all surprising that the October BRICS summit in Kazan became an important event in strengthening the Eurasian agenda: due to its geographical position in the world, Eurasia is inextricably linked with the main processes affecting the globe. BRICS, in turn, is a platform for developing strategies to achieve a new, more just world order. It is precisely this order, where the possibility of forceful dominance of a narrow group of states is minimised, that seems most suitable for the arrangement of Eurasia. Thus, Russia’s global policy in 2024 also worked towards the construction of Greater Eurasia.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

The next Trump administration might end up boosting prospects of a BRICS currency in his roughshod attempt to reassert American primacy. A ham-fisted approach to bilateral relations with major rising powers, meanwhile, will likely only strengthen their resolve to band together and collectively undermine any US-led global order, writes ‘The Asia Times’.

Not only India but other non-Western powers such Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia will also likely not only join the BRICS but also more actively contribute to new “de-dollarization” initiatives.

In recent years, America has tried to solicit international support and has been gradually building a new coalition to “de-risk” from China, particularly in high-tech items such as high-end semiconductors and the equipment used to make them.

But Trump’s likely unilateralist policies, including high blanket tariffs, could encourage rising powers, especially those in BRICS, to double down on efforts to “de-risk” from the US, paving the way for a new global order altogether.

To be sure, de-dollarization is complicated and largely still aspirational. For instance, India has struggled to effectuate its more narrow, bilateral non-dollar-denominated trade with key partners such as Russia.

Amid a historic boom in India’s import of heavily discounted Russian oil, Moscow is accumulating US$1 billion every month that it struggles to use due to both Western sanctions and India’s capital control measures.

Leading Russia experts have warned that Russia’s mass of “frozen funds” will likely “reach tens of billions of dollars,” and that the “situation is aggravated by India’s historically high aggregate trade deficit, which reduces the possibilities of clearing settlements with third countries.”

In the past, similar problems also emerged amid a boom in non-dollar-denominated trade between Iran, another BRICS member that is also heavily sanctioned by the West, and major oil customers such as India and China.

Nevertheless, the world’s most populous nation continues to maintain robust ties with Russia, a major source of armaments and hydrocarbon goods throughout the past decades.

Indian private refiner Reliance (RELI.NS) secured a massive deal with Russia’s state oil firm Rosneft (ROSN.MM). The 10-year agreement, amounting to a whopping 0.5% of the entire global supply, is worth roughly $13 billion a year.

The new deal notably accounts for roughly half of Rosneft’s seaborne oil exports, making Indian markets a leading customer.

Eager to maintain American primacy, Trump warned over his social media platform (Truth Social) that partner nations could “face 100 per cent tariffs, and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful US economy” unless they commit to “neither create a new BRICS currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US Dollar.”

Harkening back to his “Make America Great Again” foreign policy mantra, the incoming US president warned any backers of a BRICS currency: “They can go find another ‘sucker.’ There is no chance that the BRICS will replace the US dollar in international trade, and any country that tries should wave goodbye to America.”

“Whenever the West bashes us, we gain credibility in Moscow,” an informed source in New Delhi told this writer, underscoring India’s preference to play the superpowers off one another while maintaining simultaneous strong ties with both Washington and Moscow.

Given India’s economic momentum and its emerging centrality to global growth, it’s foreign policy leanings will be instrumental to any global de-dollarization drive.

Currently, the US dollar accounts for more than half of the world’s trade invoices and more than 80% of all international currency transactions. However, Trump’s policies could inadvertently contribute to the gradual decline of US dollar use in coming years.

On the one hand, it remains to be seen how the next US administration will deal with outstanding bilateral issues with friendly BRICS members such as India.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has welcomed the end of an American-led unipolar world and, accordingly, has pivoted to the BRICS and China, which he has described as a springboard for the creation of a more multipolar order.

For his part, Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, has reversed his predecessor Joko Widodo’s policy by actively seeking membership in the BRICS. By joining the bloc, these new rising powers seek to bolster ties with Beijing, a major investor and trade partner, as well as express certain discontent with the US-led order.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: Talks are the top priority, no question about it. Many opinions are heard coming from the diplomatic circles, experts, and other sources. To put it in plain terms, they are trying hard to see both of us make peace. The question is, though, who are we supposed to talk to in Kiev? President-elect Trump’s presumptive special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg has come up with an initiative. What’s your take on the situation?

Sergey Lavrov: Much has been said on this subject. President Putin has repeatedly addressed this issue, including during the Direct Line and during the Valdai International Discussion Club meeting before that, as well as other events.

Empty talk is not an option for us. Everything we have heard so far was rhetoric about the need to come up with some kind of a ceasefire. However, not much is done to hide the fact that the purpose of a ceasefire is to buy time and to flood Ukraine with weapons, to help it get back in shape, to carry out additional mobilisation, and so on.

Ceasefire is a road leading nowhere. We need binding legal agreements that will lay out the conditions for ensuring Russia’s security and the legitimate security interests of our neighbours. However, they should exist in an international legal context that would preclude chances of violating these agreements. These agreements must address Ukraine crisis’ root causes. The two main ones include, first, the violation of the commitments not to expand NATO to the east and the aggressive absorption by NATO of the geopolitical space all the way up to our borders. This is what they had in store for Ukraine. They keep talking about it to this day. The second root cause includes the Kiev regime’s absolutely racist actions following the coup. The extermination of everything Russian, including language, mass media, culture, and even the use of the Russian language in everyday life, was officially greenlighted and then codified into law. Of course, that includes outlawing the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

We are told that Russia is allegedly putting forward preliminary conditions. In fact, these are not preconditions, but demands to act in line with previous agreements. As it turns out, they lied to us when they assured us that NATO would not expand eastward. They lied to us when they emphasised their commitment to a settlement based on the UN Charter fully forgetting that this Charter stipulates more than the principle of territorial integrity and also includes the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. It took the General Assembly quite a while to consider the relationship between these principles before it resolved by consensus in its wisdom that the territorial integrity of all states whose governments abide by the principle of self-determination and, therefore, represent the entire population living within the borders of the territory in question must be respected.

How can Kiev’s Nazi regime represent the interests of the residents of Crimea, Donbass, or Novorossiya, whom it declared terrorists right after the coup and launched a military “anti-terrorist operation” against them?

China and Brazil’s initiatives on Ukraine crisis put accent on the need to abide by the UN Charter. The principle of territorial integrity is mentioned from time to time. We are talking to our Chinese and Brazilian friends, as well as other countries that work with us in promoting the well-intentioned initiative that the UN Charter has many more facets to it than just the principle of territorial integrity. The principle of self-determination of peoples is no less important. If it were not for it, there would likely be issues with decolonising African and other peoples. This principle laid the international legal groundwork for decolonisation which echoed the African peoples’ unwillingness and impossibility to live under the colonisers’ rule.

By the same token, the residents of Crimea, Donbass and Novorossiya are unwilling and unable to live under the Nazi rule in Kiev. So, the principle of self-determination of the peoples is coming into force. They have one the self-determination part. The residents of Crimea did so in 2014, and Donbass and Novorossiya in 2022. These realities have been included in our Constitution.

If we want to have a serious conversation, we need to treat the principles of the UN Charter not selectively, but consistently in their entirety and interrelation without, of course, forgetting the much-beloved-by-the-West principle of respect for human rights. They did not come up with it. It is laid down in the UN Charter. The very first article of the Charter states that everyone must respect human rights regardless of gender, race, language, and religion. Russian language has been legally exterminated in Ukraine. The religion - the Canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church - has been banned, too. So, I believe everyone who is sincerely willing to help identify ways to settle the crisis cannot ignore its root causes.

As a reminder, in his global security initiative dedicated to all kinds of conflicts and principles underlying their resolution which he advanced in February 2023, President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping highlighted in the text of this document the importance of identifying and addressing the root causes of any conflict in order to resolve it.

You mentioned Keith Kellogg who was “announced” President Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine. He recently stated that they had seen an attempt by Russia and Ukraine to reach an agreement within the framework of the Minsk process, which failed. So let’s not repeat it, he said. Of course, Mr Kellogg has yet to delve deeper into the Ukraine file, but the Minsk agreements were not an attempt, but duly signed documents guaranteed by an additional declaration made by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany, which said that Euro-Atlantic security would take into account the interests of all countries, and that efforts to create a common space from the Atlantic to the Pacific would be revivified. It said a lot of things. None of what was included in that declaration, as well as in the Minsk Document itself regarding the Ukrainian regime’s obligations, has been implemented. However, that document was agreed upon, signed at the top level and unanimously approved by the UN Security Council.

Perhaps, Mr Kellogg needs to take a closer look into that. The Minsk agreements were not an attempt. It was about a UN Security Council resolution that was trampled on with the encouragement coming from the United States. President Poroshenko who signed the document on behalf of Ukraine and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande admitted two years ago that they were not going to act upon them. They needed to buy time to flood Ukraine with weapons. These same ideas remain floating in the air, but they are much less binding than the Minsk agreements. They pursue the same goal, though, which is to buy time for the Nazi regime.
As President Putin said, we are willing to consider serious and concrete proposals. It is probably too early to speculate and to guess on the coffee grounds. I hope that the Trump Administration, including Mr Kellogg, will look into the root causes of the conflict.

We remain open to consultations. If someone finds it hard to understand where we stand, even though we made it clear on many occasions, we are ready to reiterate our position. We are open to talks, if they focus on the substance and the root causes and the principles mentioned by President Vladimir Putin in his speech at the Foreign Ministry in June. Importantly, they do not constitute preliminary conditions of any sort. They represent a demand to fulfill what everyone signed up to when adopting the Charter of the United Nations.

Question: In a recent interview, you said that the environment turns toxic as soon as anyone sees an American or a European talking to you. Europeans actually run away when they see you. Given this attitude from Western politicians, is it even possible to resolve any serious international issues? Is diplomacy still active in international affairs, as a foreign policy tool?

Sergey Lavrov: We could continue lamenting our Western colleagues’ new methods in foreign affairs, but it will get us nowhere. They have made a political decision to isolate Russia in every sense. In addition, they have been making insane demands on other countries: they are to avoid any Russian representatives, to stop visiting them or receiving visits from them, and to sever trade ties with Russia while buying more expensive energy resources at a loss. These are the new methods of Western diplomacy, which has been reduced to threats, sanctions, punishments and blackmail.
Josep Borrell, who stepped down as EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy some time ago, recently admitted – unburdened by official duties – that the West has failed to isolate Russia. The European Union has promised to help Kiev for as long as needed, but they cannot do it indefinitely, he added. Speaking about sanctions, he bluntly said that China has replaced Europe and the G7 as Russia’s trade and economic partner. I do not think that Josep Borrell had that “epiphany” last week. Everyone has known all along that Western sanctions were harming the populations of the countries that apply them.

When America was hit by a hurricane, President Biden failed to notice it at first, but later travelled to the affected area, where the victims were paid ridiculous compensations of $700 per person. That sparked mass protests against the government’s treatment of its own citizens while sending over $150 billion to Ukraine over the last couple of years. France suffered a crop failure, an agricultural crisis, and farmers’ protests. German industry actually collapsed.

It is up to them to decide what to do. The Americans prefer to get rid of competitors; it is their policy. Now they are “taking out” Russia, and beginning to do the same with regard to China. They are restricting the export of certain US-made microelectronic chips to China, trying to contain the country’s technological growth. However, the Chinese people, like the Russian people, will continue to do what they deem necessary for their development. But the methods [the Americans are using] are perfectly clear.

In addition to Russia and China, Europe has also to a large extent fallen victim to the US policy of eliminating any competition. We see this. We are ready (we have repeatedly stated this) to talk to any Western representatives who are willing to have an equal dialogue, find a balance of interests, and make mutually beneficial arrangements. Several European countries are already willing to talk on an equal footing, such as Hungary and Slovakia. Other EU members are also slowly beginning to ask for confidential talks. So far, few dare to do this openly.

The EU has a tough discipline policy. The new head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, dictates to everyone what they should or should not do. We will see how effectively the Brussels bureaucracy, which is already being compared to a more stringent version of the Soviet authoritarian system, will be able to convince the member states that it knows better, when it comes to their populations’ sentiments and needs.

Question: China and Russia have been seeking to consolidate the Global Majority and enable the Global South to combine its efforts. During the BRICS Summit in Kazan, our media corporation, together with VGTRK, held a roundtable discussion for BRICS media representatives, during which all the participants spoke out in favour of creating a mechanism for accessing unbiased and truthful information. In 2025, China will be hosting the SCO Summit. Together, our two countries will mark 80 years of Victory over Nazism. What kind of steps, in your opinion, should the countries of the Global South, China and Russia take, including in the media sector, to preserve the post-World War II international order and ensure peace across the world?

Sergey Lavrov: It is our understanding, and there is a broad recognition that Russia and China have a real stabilising effect on international relations.

Let me illustrate the positive bearing Beijing and Moscow have on the international landscape by referring to the way we have been working together within BRICS. Countries representing various continents, civilisations, religions, and cultures work together within this framework. Nevertheless, in their efforts they act in accordance with the agreements we regularly sign within BRICS. It would not be an exaggeration to say that these agreements cover human activities and undertakings in all their aspects, including military and political matters, security, economics, culture, and education.

BRICS has become extremely popular. There were delegations representing 35 countries at the Kazan Summit, as well as heads of six multilateral organisations, including the United Nations. This high level of attendance demonstrates how important this structure has become and that there is a growing interest for forging closer ties with BRICS on the part of other organisations of the Global South and East which have been seeking to assert their independence in international affairs.

I strongly believe that sustainable development of the multipolar world is impossible without establishing interaction between these associations of a new type, where there are no “superiors” and “subordinates”, no “bosses”, no orders that must be obeyed, as is the case in the European Union and NATO.

Hopefully, there will be room in this multipolar world order for our Western colleagues. They will not disappear from our planet. That said, the way they will position themselves, and the way they will overcome the mental shock of losing their dominance after enjoying it for five centuries – all this will depend on their political culture, the way they view their status in present-day reality, and whether they are able to act accordingly while respecting the legitimate interests and achievements of other countries, including the BRICS countries.

As for the BRICS media dimension, we believe that there is a need to be more effective, in a good way, of course, in explaining the principles underpinning BRICS. There have been too many rumours and planted fakes about this group in the West for making the countries of the Global South across Africa, Asia and Latin America wary of working with BRICS.

Promoting media cooperation is also instrumental for reinforcing the group’s standing and enabling the Global South to play a bigger role in universal structures in general, including the United Nations, APEC, SCO, the Group of Twenty, and other formats. Russia and China have been working in tandem in all these frameworks and play a consolidating role in the way we have been treating the countries of the Global South.

You have mentioned the upcoming anniversary of Victory in World War II. Our two countries, China and Russia, have suffered more than any other countries from Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. The leaders of our two countries have agreed to mark the upcoming anniversaries in a worthy manner. We will be celebrating the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and in World War II in Europe on May 9, 2025, while on September 3, 2025, we will mark 80 years of Victory in World War II in the Far East.

I strongly believe that the BRICS media-related structures and other frameworks in which Russia works with China will be effective and proactive in covering these events.

We are looking forward to further strengthening media cooperation within BRICS. In September 2024, Moscow hosted a Media Summit as part of its chairmanship. Held by TASS News Agency and supported by China, it brought together representatives from 60 media outlets and 45 countries. In October 2024, there was the roundtable you have mentioned, titled BRICS Media Dialogue, held at Kazan University. I am certain that we must have regular events of this kind and that we need more of them.

This paves the way for alternative media platforms for people in the Global South and East, as well as those in the West who are interested in learning the truth about what is happening outside of the EU and NATO perimeter. In fact, there have been more and more people of this kind lately.

Question: Moscow has consistently maintained that it is ready for negotiations. A few minutes ago, you also reaffirmed this. President Vladimir Putin said at the news conference that Moscow was ready to negotiate with legitimate authorities, while Vladimir Zelensky has no legitimacy. With whom are we to negotiate in this case? How does Moscow see the completion of the special military operation?

Sergey Lavrov: Regarding the Ukrainian regime’s legitimacy, President Putin made it perfectly clear during his Direct Line that the Ukrainians should act as they see fit in their country, to bring the situation in Kiev into line with the Ukrainian constitution. If they want their president to have legitimate authority, that potential president should go through elections.

As it is, only the Verkhovna Rada and its chair maintain legitimacy under the Ukrainian constitution, Putin explained. But it is premature to talk about this. Before they set up a negotiating team of the Kiev regime, the root causes of this crisis need to be addressed. We want these causes eliminated. As long as they are in place, there can be no agreement.

I have discussed these root causes in detail, and I hope that anyone who is interested in advancing the negotiations knows what I am talking about. Again, these are not preconditions. These are the steps that all parties to this process and conflict should have taken long ago, in accordance with the commitments they had made, including under the principles of the UN Charter, which must be applied in their entirety and interconnectedness.

With this understanding, we are open to any serious proposals. I hope everyone realises that we will not agree to a temporary ceasefire only to resume the conflict later.

We insist on the need to end this conflict in a sustainable and legally impeccable settlement by eliminating its root causes. I trust that all interested parties will become increasingly convinced that this approach has no alternative.

Question: Moscow also claims to be negotiating with the new forces currently in control in Syria. What is your assessment of these talks? How do you see the future relations between Moscow and Damascus?

Sergey Lavrov: We have never recalled our diplomats from Damascus. Our Embassy continues to operate in Syria, as do many others.

We maintain communication with the new Syrian authorities through our diplomatic mission. We are discussing hands-on issues related to ensuring the safety of Russian citizens and the safe operation of our embassy. We are interested in dialogue on other aspects of our bilateral relations and the regional agenda, and are ready to talk.

As President Vladimir Putin has emphasised, we are open to contacts with all major political groups that are active in Syria. We have been maintaining these contacts for quite some time now. We were in touch with most of them even before the recent events.

I must note that the head of the new Syrian government, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has recently talked to the BBC. In his interview, he described Syria’s ties with Russia as long-standing and strategic. We share that approach. We have much in common with our Syrian friends.

We have made a great contribution to liberating Syria from colonial dependence, and training local personnel. Tens of thousands of Syrians received education at Russian universities. As many as 5,000 Syrian citizens are students here now. We are ready to expand educational cooperation.

I hope that, once the new Syrian government structure stabilises, we will be able to resume economic and investment cooperation with the new leaders where we left off, as we have made certain achievements on that track in the past years.

This is not an easy process. It is a transitional period, which will be followed by elections, as was announced. Substantial preparations should be made, and a framework for the election campaign has to be agreed upon. All leading countries have emphasised the need for this process to be inclusive, meaning that all political, ethnic and religious groups in Syria have to be represented.

Again, this is not an easy process, but we are ready to help, including through the UN Security Council and the Astana format, where Russia – along with Turkiye and Iran, and with support from the majority of Arab countries – is ready to play a role in consolidating all processes in Syria and organising the elections so as to ensure that the results are recognised by all and are beyond dispute.

We have discussed this with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Lebanon. Each of these countries has reaffirmed its interest in preventing Syria from repeating the path of the Libyan state after NATO destroyed it – that country still needs to be put back together piece by piece. This has not been very successful so far.

It is important what role Syria’s neighbours will play. We have heard Turkish President Erdogan’s statement. We understand the legitimate concerns of the Turkish leadership and people about security along the border with Syria, where they have seen repeated incidents involving terrorist groups that are causing unrest there.

These legitimate security concerns must be addressed while preserving Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity. Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed the same approach. We support that.

It is important to address the problems in eastern Syria, where the Americans have illegally occupied a significant part of the territory that holds major oil fields and the most fertile soil. They are extracting and exporting the country’s resources, directing the proceeds to support US-created separatist groups in eastern Syria. This must certainly be addressed. Syria must not be allowed to fall apart, even though some would like just that.

It is important that Israel understand its responsibility for the collective effort and refrain from ensuring its own security at the expense of others. This principle, the indivisibility of security, was enunciated a long time ago. One cannot expect to destroy all military facilities in a neighbouring country and then live in peace and harmony until the end of time. This is like “sowing the wind” that will come back to those who do this in a storm of consequences.

Question: Latin America and Russia have long been connected by profound historical, cultural, and human bonds. What tangible measures will Russia undertake in the coming year and beyond to fortify these connections? What priorities does Russian policy hold for the Latin American region?

Sergey Lavrov: You are absolutely correct. The relationship between Russia and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean has traditionally been amicable. Russians and Latin Americans have long shared a mutual affinity. This mutual respect is also evident in their appreciation of global culture and each other’s cultural heritage, which strongly unites our peoples.

We receive signals from the overwhelming majority of Latin American countries expressing their interest in strengthening and expanding their partnership with the Russian Federation. We are actively engaging in dialogue and cooperation on political matters, through diplomatic channels on economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The interaction between our countries’ regions and even municipalities is improving.

This is a multifaceted structure of interaction. We are prepared to deepen it to the fullest extent possible, developing it as much as the Latin American countries themselves desire.

Our relations are grounded in equality, mutual benefit, and respect. There is no ideology or doctrine involved, such as the Monroe Doctrine or any other.

We have observed that the Biden administration, during its tenure over the past four years, has on several occasions, through its official representatives, expressed concern over Russia’s delegations visiting Nicaragua or Venezuela, suggesting that this poses risks to US security.

But honestly, have you no shame? Everyone is well aware of the security risks posed by the United States, which maintains several hundred military bases in over 100 countries, yet forbids any relations with the Russian Federation. This is an unproductive approach. I hope the new administration in Washington will come to realise this.

We have ambitious plans for the coming year. We are planning a number of reciprocal visits, developing our relations not only bilaterally but also with regional structures such as CELAC, ALBA, SICA, MERCOSUR, CARICOM, and many others.

We proceed with the expectation that the year will be fruitful in terms of activities, especially given that in the coming months, we will celebrate a “parade” of anniversaries marking the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and various Latin American states: in March 2025 with Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, in April 2025 with Guatemala, in June 2025 with Ecuador and Colombia, in September 2025 with Cuba and Honduras, in October 2025 with Argentina, and in December 2025 with Mexico. Each of these anniversaries will be commemorated with due dignity. We are planning exhibitions, conferences, meetings of public figures, as well as youth and cultural events. These will allow us to outline new perspectives for our relations.

In 2025, we will establish a fully-fledged Embassy in the Dominican Republic. In June 2025, we will be delighted to welcome Latin American guests to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where there is traditionally a Latin American section.

In June 2024, Bolivian President Luis Arce was the chief guest at the annual International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg. This marked the first occasion a representative from the Latin American region participated in such a capacity.

I would also like to highlight other forums taking place in Russia that will be of interest to our Latin American friends, such as the Eastern Economic Forum, Russian Energy Week, the St. Petersburg International United Cultures Forum, and many others.

Despite the coronavirus pandemic and the sanctions war instigated by the West, our trade with Latin America remains stable and sustainable in recent years. Our main trading partners are Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile. We are keen on expanding our trade and investment relationships with Nicaragua and Venezuela, which are severely impacted by the illegal sanctions imposed by the United States.

We are implementing bilateral projects with several countries in various fields, including high technology. We are interested in countries of the continent strengthening their contacts with the EAEU. Currently, Cuba is the only extra-regional observer in the Eurasian Economic Union. I mentioned cooperation in the educational, humanitarian, cultural, and sports areas, and we are eager to develop these at the fastest pace possible.

Presently, we have nearly 5,000 Latin American university students studying on Russian state scholarships. We know that in some Latin American countries, competitions are held to secure such scholarships, with up to 10 applicants for each scholarship. This is gratifying, and we will increase the annual quotas.

A unique aspect of our cooperation is that 27 out of the 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have agreements with Russia on visa-free travel for our citizens. This is record-high in percentage terms compared to other parts of the world. Russian tourists visit Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, explore the sights in Peru, Mexico, Guatemala, partake in the Carnival of Brazil, and enjoy football in Latin America, all without visas. These attractions draw tourists and boost tourist traffic.

Next year will present a new opportunity to make concerted efforts to develop multilateral interaction. In September 2025, we will host Intervision, an international song competition. Over 25 countries have already expressed interest in participating, including several Latin American nations.

We welcome and embrace tourists from Latin American countries, eager to showcase Moscow, St. Petersburg, Baikal, Kamchatka, Sochi, Suzdal, and Altai. We have many picturesque locales and historical monuments. There is a form of tourism that involves taking a journey on the Trans-Siberian Railway across Russia to the Pacific Ocean, offering an at-a-glance view of the entire country.
Question: With the Trump Administration to return to the White House soon, Russia hopes to build more pragmatic relations with the United States. However, many officials from the incoming US administration have issued threats to many of Russia’s friends and allies in the Global South. In what ways can this affect Russia-US relations?

Sergey Lavrov: We have no illusions or hopes with regard to what the US administration, which is now working on staffing issues, will do when it takes office on January 20, 2025. Let’s not speculate on a particular president making certain things better, or someone else moving into the White House having us try different things. Let’s not engage in guesswork and wait for the new administration to finalise its policy instead.

We are fully aware that the United States relies on a bipartisan consensus with regard to Russia. This is not a friendly, but, to put it bluntly, Russophobic consensus. Regardless of party affiliation, the ruling elite will leave no stone unturned in order to weaken Russia as a competitor. I already touched on this issue earlier during this news conference. The United States seeks to weaken any competitor, be it Russia, China, or Europe. They have long proclaimed the principle that no country around the world may be stronger than the United States. Clearly, life is tougher than statements or declarations, but in order to realise the inevitability of adopting different behaviour, the United States still has a long way to go. It needs to observe how the situation is actually developing, and to feel the pinch of the multipolar world realities.

So far, Russia is listed as an “adversary” in the US doctrinal documents. Some representatives of the current administration even called it “enemy.” It is also labeled as an “immediate existential threat.” China comes second as a “challenge.” The United States remains consistent in its actions.

Nevertheless, we sense signals coming from Donald Trump’s team that show interest in resuming the dialogue, which is absolutely reasonable and normal.

Always, even when relations between countries are marked by hostility, diplomacy is there to maintain the dialogue, to make sure both parties know what message the other side is trying to get across. This is what diplomacy is all about. Diplomats communicate even during wartime. If the signals coming from the new team in Washington to resume the dialogue interrupted by Washington after the special military operation started are serious, we will respond to them. However, the dialogue was interrupted by the Americans, so it is up to them to take the first step.

We are waiting for the Trump Administration to make public its official policy towards Russia. If Washington takes our legitimate interests into account, the dialogue will be productive rather than meaningless. If they are not taken into account, everything will remain as it is.

With regard to the threats uttered by the incoming administration to the Global South and Global East that you mentioned, such as raising tariffs, or punishing those of them that will use currencies other than the US dollar, or non-US dollar-denominated payment platforms, we are not surprised. As I mentioned earlier, putting pressure on competitors and deriving unilateral benefits has always been the distinction of the US policy. This is nothing new. The policy of interfering in the domestic affairs of sovereign states has long been the hallmark of Washington’s methods and it will continue unabated. We must be prepared to handle it.

However, the reality must make the United States realise the actual trends and real processes defining the modern world, and the fact that diktat can no longer be the instrument of choice when it comes to international relations.

Question (retranslated from French): Yesterday, on December 25, approximately a dozen missiles were launched towards Ukraine. Why did this occur on a day that is sacred to hundreds of millions of Christians – Christmas? Are you not concerned about how this was perceived globally?

Sergey Lavrov: Regarding the ongoing hostilities within the framework of our special military operation, or more accurately, within the context of the war that the West, including France, has declared against the Russian Federation and is waging through the Ukrainian regime. I trust that you, as a member of the journalistic profession, have not only observed the events surrounding the actions of our Armed Forces on December 25, this year, but also follow the historical context of the issue, accompanying all these processes, analysing and grasping the epistemology of the problem and its developmental trajectory.

I do not wish to dwell excessively on this subject. We have repeatedly voiced our disapproval concerning the supply of Western long-range missiles to the Kiev regime, including the French SCALP, the American ATACMS, and the British Storm Shadow. We have cautioned that the transfer of lethal weaponry would merely escalate the situation and that the Kiev regime is incapable of adhering to the conventions of warfare and international humanitarian law. If you monitor the information that might be “hushed up” in Europe, it is readily accessible in our country on television, social networks, and the internet. There are daily drone strikes or your Western missiles against overtly civilian targets. Civilians are being killed. Ambulances, schools, hospitals, markets, and other civilian sites are being attacked.

None of the Western nations providing arms to the Nazi regime in Kiev has ever admonished it against such blatant violations of international humanitarian law and the rules of warfare. As long as such conduct by the Kiev regime persists (and it is not merely encouraged but directed by the West, including France), we shall respond. But not in the manner the Kiev regime does at your instigation. We are targeting exclusively military installations, facilities of the military-industrial complex, and other sites associated with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On December 20 of this year, when ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles struck civilian targets in the Russian Federation, we retaliated with precision weapons against the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) control centre, the Luch design bureau in Kiev, which is responsible for the design and production of Neptun missile systems, cruise missiles and multiple launch rocket systems, as well as the positions of the American Patriot SAM system. All targets were successfully hit. We are striking at the “points” from which our territories and civilian sites are being shelled, leading to civilian casualties.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin has stated that we select targets within Ukraine based solely on threats to the Russian Federation. These may include military facilities and defence industry enterprises. The decision-making centres in Kiev could very well be such targets. It is not in our practice to target civilian sites. These are the tactics of the Nazis in Kiev, supported by the West, and those who supply them with weapons to devastate purely civilian infrastructure and harm civilians.

Question (retranslated from French): In December of this year, French President Emmanuel Macron facilitated a meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Zelensky in Paris. Do you believe that the American President might support Kiev more than he indicated during his campaign? What are your thoughts on this meeting initiated by France?

Sergey Lavrov: We have grown accustomed to the numerous initiatives that France frequently announces, conducting various meetings and conferences. I recall that in December 2015, French President François Hollande unexpectedly declared the urgent need to convene a conference on Libya. Participants attended, discussions took place for a day and a half, and subsequently, everyone seemingly “forgot” about it. Nonetheless, the conference was elegantly broadcast on French television.

Our French colleagues indeed have a penchant for playing a proactive role in addressing various issues. We welcome this enthusiasm, though I am uncertain about the outcomes of such “initiatives” and the sincerity of their intentions to play a constructive role.

I will refrain from delving into specifics to avoid any indiscretions. On several occasions, through confidential channels, we have received messages from our French counterparts offering assistance in establishing a dialogue regarding the Ukrainian issue, excluding Ukraine itself. This approach contravenes the principle repeatedly emphasised by the West: “not a word about Ukraine without Ukraine.” We are open to communication – we are prepared to listen. However, simultaneously, France emerges as the principal advocate for deploying “peacekeeping troops” to Ukraine, it trains combat units of the Ukrainian armed forces on its own soil, and it explicitly states the necessity of continuing to “pound” Russia to ensure Ukraine enters negotiations from a position of strength. Such contradictory behaviour does not inspire confidence in the initiatives of our French colleagues.

Regarding the meeting associated with the opening ceremony of Notre Dame de Paris, I observed no encouraging signals “in the picture.” It seems to me that the focal point of this meeting was indeed the “picture,” as two politicians and a Nazi racist were photographed against the backdrop of the cathedral.

Maria Zakharova: In conclusion to the topic raised by the French journalist, I would like to direct his attention to the fact that precisely a fortnight ago, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban announced on his social media page that Vladimir Zelensky had rejected his proposal for a Christmas truce.

Question: Speaking about plans for 2025, NATO representative Patrick Turner said the alliance will expand its presence in Ukraine. The alliance’s presence in Ukraine tripled in 2024, he said, and plans are in place to expand it even more next year. What can you say about the bloc’s plans to expand its presence in Ukraine? Should we expect Moscow come up with an official response to these expansion plans?

Sergey Lavrov: NATO is primarily about the United States. US intelligence services, such as the CIA and others, have been present in Ukraine long before the coup broke out. After the coup, they have set camp there. They occupied a whole floor, perhaps even two floors, in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) building. The Kiev regime has lost independence after the putsch. No one has any doubt about it. Ukraine is run by Anglo-Saxons and some other NATO and EU countries.

With regard to the reports that you mentioned, the NATO Representation was set up in Ukraine. This position was created by the decision of the Washington summit in July. According to our information, this “mission” has 50 employees on staff. Twenty more are expected to join it next year. Perhaps, this is what the information you mentioned was all about. There is nothing consequential about this event. Nevertheless, it is just another fact that shows that Washington and its allies are laying their hands on Ukraine and tightening the existing control over all spheres of life of that country, including its security and defence sectors. No doubt, the West encourages Zelensky to act in a way that is beneficial to them.

Look how they openly and brazenly told Ukraine to bring the conscription age down to 18 years, not hiding the fact that it benefitted primarily the United States. US Senator Lindsey Graham, who visited Ukraine and took a picture with Vladimir Zelensky, minced no words in stating that Ukraine possesses a large amount of riches, primarily rare-earth minerals. According to him, Ukraine is “the richest country in all of Europe for rare-earth minerals” and Russia must not “take over the place.” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is known for still publicly advocating the necessity of war in Ukraine (as he put it) citing financial and economic benefits for the United States. Many fertile lands and mineral deposits of Ukraine have been bought by US corporations quite a long time ago, and this is not a secret.

Everything that we are saying with regard to the Ukraine crisis, everything that President Vladimir Putin has outlined as principles for settling it based on eliminating its root causes, and relying solely on international law and existing West and Ukraine’s commitments, remains in full our non-alternative position.

Question: What is the future of the Astana-format talks, considering that they were highly effective in coordination with all Syrian parties?

Sergey Lavrov: With regard to Syria and the role of the Astana format, I have touched on this subject earlier. It was created following a special nationwide conference of Syrian political and ethno-confessional forces. We have held over 20 meetings as part of the Astana format. The last time we met was in Doha on December 7 just prior to the Syrian events. We had the chance to discuss the situation with my colleagues from Türkiye and Iran with the involvement of UN Secretary-General Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. We continue to exchange assessments and opinions to this day.
Türkiye, Iran and Russia believe this format can be useful at this point as well, especially so since the Arab countries - Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan - have traditionally participated in its work as observers. The Gulf monarchies are interested as well. We said we were willing to help. The Turks and Iranians did the same. Arab countries, which have established contacts with the new authorities in Damascus, are aware of our capabilities. Ahmed al-Sharaa said our relations were long-standing and strategic, so I think the new Syrian authorities will be able to see what the Astana format can do specifically to help the processes currently underway in Syria.

We have had close ties with the Syrian people since the Soviet times. Back then, our country strongly supported the Syrians’ push to get rid of French colonialism. All ensuing years we have contributed to building the foundations of the economy, industry, and the social sphere of the Syrian Arab Republic. We are clear about the fact that the Syrian people are interested in establishing good relations with all “external players” without exception. We believe that this is the right thing to do. That is one of the key factors that will guarantee unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Syrian state. We are ready to contribute to that in every possible way.

Clearly, Ahmed al-Sharaa and his associates are under great pressure from the West. The Americans and Europeans have stepped up their activities. Their goal is not to preserve the unity of all ethno-political forces in Syria, but to secure as much influence and territory for themselves as possible.

As for Western egoism, the new head of Eurodiplomacy, Kaja Kallas, made a statement that said it all when she asked Syria to drop cooperation with Russia. Estonia, the “most important power” of all, said, through its foreign minister, that it will not support the new authorities in Damascus unless they “kick out” Russian military bases from Syria. Can you imagine how “scary” that is? This kind of diplomatic rudeness has become customary. The Ukrainian authorities act the same insulting everyone who does not sing along, and so do our European neighbours. I hope real life will teach them a lesson and they will start respecting the interests of all countries without exception and stop giving the world their neo-colonial attitude.
We will keep working.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Russia’s BRICS chairmanship outcomes

This year was unique for BRICS. It was marked by new members joining it and went under the motto, “Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security.”

Our chairmanship took place against the backdrop of escalated tensions in international relations and irreversible changes across the international system. However, despite these challenges, the BRICS role as a sustainable and sought-after format for multilateral interaction, and a core foundation of a new, fairer world order based on the sovereign equality of states and consideration of each other’s interests was confirmed. Our strategic partnership showed that BRICS is not a confrontation tool, but a cooperation space designed to address global challenges, and is based on respect for the right of each country to determine its own future.

During the year, 250 meetings were held in various Russian cities, including over 30 ministerial-level meetings which reviewed practically all areas of cooperation between BRICS countries. The year of Russia’s BRICS chairmanship came as an important step towards strengthening coordination in the international arena on matters of global governance and financial system, and combatting common challenges facing our countries. We have laid the foundation for continued consolidation of the association by expanding interaction with partner countries and Global South and Global East countries. The practical implementation of the Russian chairmanship’s initiatives will foster cooperation and help effectively address global challenges.

The Kazan summit in October 22-24 came as the high point of Russia’s BRICS chairmanship. Without exaggeration, it was a significant international political event not only in 2024, but also in the first quarter of the 21st century. The summit was attended by 41 foreign delegations (35 countries and six heads of international organisations, such as the CIS, the SCO, the EAEU, the Union State, the New Development Bank, and the UN). The summit resulted in adopting the substantive Kazan Declaration, which reaffirmed the fundamental commitment to strengthening BRICS strategic partnership, reflected the commitment to improving the effectiveness of global governance institutions and the role of developing countries in making key decisions. A common position on the unacceptability of imposing illegitimate sanctions in violation of international law and restrictive and politically-driven trade practices was put on record.

The World Majority countries welcomed the Kazan summit with great enthusiasm and provided clear assessments. The summit is seen as a landslide common success. The BRICS countries have convincingly demonstrated the absolute untenability of unilateral restrictions and the futility of attempts to impose international isolation on our country.

The BRICS ministerial meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, including an expanded session with the participation of the countries from the Global South and Global East, was an important event of the first half of Russia’s BRICS chairmanship. The foreign ministers discussed the multipolar international order, regional crises, and measures to counter the newly arisen challenges and threats, which fact was included in the final joint statement.

Great emphasis in 2024 was placed on harmonious integration of new BRICS members such as Egypt, Iran, the UAE, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, into BRICS interaction. Almost all of them energetically joined the work, showed constructive approaches to cooperation, and supported our flagship initiatives.

Developing partner country category modalities and agreeing on the list of presumptive candidates approved by the BRICS leaders at the Kazan Summit came as a great success. As was earlier announced, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan have confirmed their bid to join BRICS in this capacity. All of the above countries are regional players of high standing, strive to pursue independent international policies, and advocate mutually beneficial and equitable practical cooperation. We look forward to receiving feedback from four more countries soon.

During Russia’s Chairmanship, we adopted a substantial package of agreements on countering corruption and other criminal offences, fighting cross-border crime, terrorism, extremism, and the trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors. There has been progress on Russian initiatives aimed at making financial systems more transparent, minimising risks and threats in countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism, strengthening public-private partnerships, as well as youth engagement. We continued working on creating a register of BRICS contact points for the exchange of information on computer attacks and incidents. We adopted documents for strengthening international cooperation on fighting corruption and repatriating assets and proceeds from corruption, as well as raising awareness on corruption-related matters. The participants agreed a position paper on countering terrorism which sets forth the main tracks for interagency interactions in the immediate future.

There was also the adoption of a statement by BRICS Heads of Space Agencies on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Russia put forward a proposal to develop an international framework for ensuring safety in space and creating the BRICS Space Council.

As part of its BRICS Chairmanship, Russia put forward several initiatives for strengthening economic cooperation on a wide range of matters among the participating countries. In particular, this included making supply and value chains more resilient, countering protectionist practices, promoting e-commerce, and establishing contacts between special economic zones. In addition to this, there was an initiative to establish an investment arbitration centre within BRICS in order to better protect mutual investment and devise a reliable mechanism for settling investment-related disputes. We are currently exploring opportunities for drafting a convention governing investment in order to streamline investment protection mechanisms and attract more investors.

BRICS countries coordinated their approaches to implementing the BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative. A feasibility study has been carried out for assessing the possibility of setting up the BRICS Clear single depositary and clearing infrastructure. Efforts are underway to establish a BRICS re-insurance company. There was also support for projects dealing with investment and technology platforms.

Russia suggested creating a BRICS Grain Exchange as part of its efforts to promote food security. It could help in setting justified and predictable price indicators for agricultural products and commodities.

A Framework for Climate and Sustainable Development has been adopted on the sidelines of the BRICS Climate Agenda in Modern Conditions Forum. It is designed to help BRICS countries fight climate change without undermining their economies. It was also Russia’s initiative to have the BRICS Contact Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development adopt a Memorandum of Understanding on BRICS Partnership on Carbon Markets. Once this partnership is launched, BRICS countries will be able to share their best practices in creating carbon markets and work together on climate projects, including with carbon units.

Improving transport connectivity within BRICS is a key priority. An effort to establish regular dialogue on transport and create a permanent BRICS logistics platform is expected to enable the participating countries to discuss various projects in this sector, including reviewing transport routes and establishing a re-insurance pool for ensuring reliability in the transport sector.

Russia focused on efforts to expand the Energy Research Platform, which is expected to streamline cooperation for ensuring global energy security.

There was also the first meeting of the heads of geological services. The initiative to establish a Geological Platform is in the discussion phase.

The proposal to establish a BRICS platform for precious metals was just as important. It will help us expand our cooperation in a sector that has vital importance for our financial markets.

Other instrumental steps included developing the International Competition Law and Policy Centre. Its mission consists of launching an interstate platform for promoting fair competition among the participating countries.

Our work in healthcare included the creation of an Integrated Early Warning System for Preventing the Risk of Mass Infectious Diseases to enhance the BRICS countries’ potential for promptly detecting and responding to healthcare challenges. We paid special attention to the problem of resistance to anti-microbial drugs. In addition, our countries’ medical communities will have an opportunity to publish their initiatives and the results of their research in the BRICS Health Journal, the first issue of which was published during Russia’s chairmanship in 2024. The first meeting of the BRICS Working Group on Nuclear Medicine and the first BRICS International Forum on Nuclear Medicine were held this year.

One of the main goals is to enhance the efficiency of research and promote cooperation in this sphere. In particular, joint research projects have been implemented within the framework of 13 BRICS working groups in a broad range of research areas, from astronomy to materials science. They will soon be complemented with projects on humanities, such as history, sociology, political science and linguistics.

The BRICS Young Scientists Forum and the BRICS Young Innovator Prize have been convened on the sidelines of the 4th Young Scientists Congress to promote international scientific and technological cooperation and to attract more young scientists to addressing current national tasks. The BRICS Young Innovator Prize selected best projects that can contribute to the development of global science and the economy. This year’s winners are scientists from Brazil, China and Russia.

The BRICS Media Summit held this year was attended by the heads of the leading media outlets from the group’s states and other countries. They discussed the role of the BRICS media community in strengthening stability in the multipolar world and the technological aspects of the BRICS countries’ information cooperation.

The BRICS Sports Games were held in an open format for the first time. That landmark event was held in Kazan and was attended by athletes from over 80 countries. Russia, which held BRICS Chairmanship this year, has proposed drafting an interstate programme for the further development of the games. The inaugural International Blind Football Tournament was attended by professional teams from the BRICS nations and other countries.

The development of cultural and humanitarian cooperation was promoted at the BRICS Film Festival and the BRICS Culture Festival. The relevant ministries approved the establishment of an Alliance of Folk Dance and an Association of Film Schools. The first BRICS Creative Innovation Forum has been held this year for the first time as well.

Our expert community convened the BRICS Academic Forum, the BRICS Civil Forum and a number of other events attended by civil society members. It has been decided to establish the BRICS Civil Council as a permanent platform for interaction between the BRICS countries’ civil societies. Active efforts helped ensure young people’s engagement in the BRICS agenda at the BRICS Youth Summit, the BRICS International Youth Camp and the BRICS Young Diplomats Forum.

On January 1, 2025, Russia will hand BRICS Chairmanship over to Brazil, whose main theme will be Strengthening Cooperation in the Global South for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.
We wish Brazil every success and hope that the discussion and implementation of the numerous initiatives advanced during Russia’s Chairmanship will be continued.

Greece
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

As an economic and political alliance now comprising 11 members, BRICS offers strategic momentum to harness artificial intelligence (AI) as a catalyst for economic growth and reducing global inequalities. With collective economic growth reaching approximately 40% of the world’s GDP, BRICS presents an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen Indonesia’s position in the global economy.

As one of the new BRICS partners alongside Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Cuba, Malaysia, Uganda, and Uzbekistan starting January 1, 2025, Indonesia has immense potential to leverage this network to accelerate the implementation of its national AI strategy. Initially formed by five core countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—BRICS envisioned strengthening economic and geopolitical cooperation among developing nations. With the addition of six new members in 2024 (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), BRICS further establishes itself as a major economic and geopolitical force focused on empowering the Global South.

In this context, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs Meutya Hafid emphasized five priorities in Indonesia’s national AI strategy: healthcare services, bureaucratic reform, talent education, smart city development, and food security. These priorities align with BRICS’ goals of fostering inclusive development, providing Indonesia with opportunities to learn from and collaborate with BRICS members in achieving sustainable technological transformation.

AI serves as a key driver of future economic growth due to its ability to accelerate innovation, enhance efficiency, and add value across sectors. Moreover, the development and mastery of AI pertain to national sovereignty, ensuring that adopted technologies align with the nation’s values and can be optimally utilized for its benefit. Furthermore, engagement with BRICS is crucial to balancing the dominance of Western AI technologies, providing Indonesia with strategic alternative access to safeguard its national interests. This is particularly relevant amidst the ongoing AI technology race between China and the United States, especially in the semiconductor sector, which forms the foundation of AI development. Simultaneously, Indonesia is advancing toward OECD membership, adding a strategic dimension to its efforts to strengthen technology governance and attract high-quality investments. In this context, Indonesia’s partnership with BRICS offers a strategic momentum to bolster its position amidst global competition.

Strategic Collaboration Opportunities
Strengthening AI Infrastructure

Indonesia can leverage China’s experience in building large-scale data centers and developing 5G technology to support AI. However, according to data from the Ministry of Communication and Digital (Komdigi), 5G network coverage in Indonesia only reaches 2.9% of total residential areas, compared to 98.51% for 2G, 5.73% for 3G, and 97.16% for 4G. Yet, 5G is crucial for innovation and AI development, particularly to support fast and stable connectivity in strategic sectors such as healthcare, education, and agriculture. Beyond 5G, other infrastructure developments like the Internet of Things (IoT) are also priorities to accelerate automation in agriculture and manufacturing. Decentralized data centers can enhance local data processing efficiency, while cloud computing and edge computing offer flexibility for various AI applications. Countries like China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have significant potential as investors in Indonesia’s AI infrastructure sector, given their strong commitment to digital technology development. Additionally, investments from BRICS nations can be directed toward accelerating digital infrastructure development, particularly in underserved areas, to directly benefit communities.

Ecosystem for Research and Innovation

Cross-national research collaborations, such as with institutions in India—a global technology hub—can accelerate AI technology development in Indonesia. This collaboration allows Indonesia to utilize cutting-edge technology to address domestic challenges like poverty alleviation, improving digital literacy, and accelerating development in underprivileged regions. In the Global South context, one of BRICS’ strengths lies in its commitment to empowering developing countries. These nations face unique challenges compared to developed countries, requiring AI technologies that amplify human resource competencies, expedite reskilling processes effectively, and make them accessible to all. The primary focus of research and innovation should also include AI development for poverty alleviation and enhancing digital and AI literacy, especially for populations with low education levels.

Enhancing Human Resource Capacity

Collaborations with universities and training institutions within BRICS can introduce exchange programs and AI skill certifications for Indonesian workers. By learning from South Africa, Indonesia can adopt inclusive and relevant AI education models for younger generations. China, which has the world’s largest vocational education system with over 10,000 schools and colleges and 30 million students, serves as an inspiring model. Annually, this system produces about 10 million high-quality technical workers, providing strong support for economic and social development while boosting national competitiveness. Additionally, vocational universities in China, totaling 51 institutions, offer a three-dimensional talent training system that integrates vocational and general education, providing diverse success pathways. This approach can inspire Indonesia to accelerate the development of AI-based competencies ready for global competition.

AI Applications in Priority Sectors

Brazil’s experience using AI to enhance agricultural efficiency can be adapted to bolster Indonesia’s food security. Challenges in Indonesia’s agricultural sector include low productivity due to limited land and predominantly small-scale farmers, as well as inefficient supply chains. AI technologies can address these issues through distribution optimization, more accurate yield predictions, and improved land management. In healthcare, Indonesia faces challenges such as an imbalance between the number of doctors and the population, as well as uneven distribution. Hospital facilities are also concentrated in major cities, leaving many remote areas on scattered islands underserved. India and China offer examples of how AI-based healthcare technology can expand access to medical services at lower costs while reaching wider communities. Such technologies are highly relevant for Indonesia to address healthcare disparities nationwide.

AI Governance and Regulations

Harmonizing AI policies with BRICS nations can enhance transparent and ethical governance. For instance, Russia’s AI regulatory standards are relevant to Indonesia as they emphasize data sovereignty, cybersecurity protection, and technology certification tailored to strategic national needs. This approach differs from regulations in developed countries like the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), which focus more on consumer data protection and competition in the technology market. While EU regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), prioritize individual privacy, and US policies emphasize market-driven innovation, Russia’s approach is more applicable to developing nations like Indonesia due to its focus on sovereignty and strategic national needs. Nevertheless, Indonesia must develop its own AI regulations tailored to its specific needs and characteristics. This requires a comprehensive approach that considers social, economic, and political contexts to ensure that the regulations support innovation, protect privacy, and empower society.

Indonesia’s Role on the Global Stage

As a new member, Indonesia can lead strategic discussions within BRICS regarding AI utilization for sustainable development. With six new members in 2024, BRICS now encompasses over 46% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP, solidifying its position as a major economic power. By leveraging AI to achieve Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) goals, Indonesia can strengthen its role as an advocate for inclusive and sustainable AI development, particularly in the Global South. This position is also vital to tapping into the vast consumer market potential and fostering closer economic cooperation within BRICS.

Conclusion

The BRICS network provides a strategic platform for Indonesia to accelerate the implementation of its national AI strategy. With the economic scale, demographics, and geopolitical commitments of BRICS, Indonesia has the opportunity to become a key player in technological transformation that not only strengthens national competitiveness but also supports inclusive development for society. This aligns with President Prabowo’s vision for Indonesia to play a significant role on the global stage by maintaining good relations with all global alliances. By leveraging collaboration opportunities in infrastructure, research, human resources, and governance, Indonesia can realize its vision while solidifying its position as a technology leader in the region and the world. Strategic partnerships will ensure that AI becomes not only an economic advancement tool but also a means for inclusive and sustainable development.