Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

It remains unclear whether a new round of BRICS enlargement will occur or not. Should this happen, the BRICS leaders would utilize their own criteria, which are not public. It is likely that a decision will be reached by consensus, implying that the interests of all BRICS members would be considered, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.

In 2024, the enlarged BRICS group started its operations. In the autumn, Russia will host the inaugural summit of this alliance. From time to time, media reports have indicated that the expansion of BRICS is not expected to end there, and that perhaps new decisions in this regard will be taken either at the Russian summit or at a later date.

In this regard, the issue of internal consolidation within BRICS after enlargement is of additional interest. We have already addressed it earlier. In that article, we examined this topic in the context of voting by new and "old" BRICS members on anti-Russian resolutions at the UN General Assembly. If we take the seven UNGA resolutions approved by that time and adopted after February 24, 2022, then, let us recall, the situation was as follows. Russia itself voted against all 7 times. Of the "old" BRICS members, China was against 3 times, and abstained in other cases. India and South Africa abstained throughout, while Brazil voted in favour of the resolutions four times and abstained from three. Of the six countries that were invited to BRICS in the summer of 2023, Iran and Ethiopia were against 3 times. On the contrary, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia voted in favour 4 times, and Argentina was in favour of the resolutions all 7 times.

Thus, Argentina stood out sharply, both in these resolutions and in others also discussed in the aforementioned text. Therefore, in the context of achieving the internal consolidation of the expanded BRICS (and from the point of view of Moscow, it is clear that a pro-Russian consolidation and solidarity are desirable), the refusal of the new Argentine president to join BRICS has, perhaps, a positive significance. The fact that a country that was so sharply at odds with Russia on key issues will not be a plus in BRICS for Moscow, but a minus. By the same logic, Saudi Arabia's ambivalent statements at the beginning of the year regarding its membership in BRICS can also be viewed not as a minus, but as a plus.

In this same context, it is of interest to consider candidates for the possible future expansion of BRICS. At the previous summit of the association in South Africa, the criteria for admitting new members were not publicly announced. At the same time, it was said that the leaders of the countries developed these criteria for themselves. The only thing to note is that prior to the summit, media reports suggested that a potential criterion for inclusion could be a population of over 100 million, however, it is difficult to determine whether this was merely speculation or not. Nevertheless, four of the six countries invited had populations below this threshold. Iran's population is approximately 84 million, Argentina's is 46 million, Saudi Arabia's is 32 million, and the United Arab Emirates has 9 million inhabitants. Therefore, it appears that the actual criteria were flexible. Nevertheless, one thing can be inferred with a high degree of certainty: decisions were likely made through consensus. One point indicative of this is the publication of various shortlists for potential expansion candidates in the media prior to the event. These were presumably also speculative or expert estimates. Nonetheless, five of the invited countries were included in one or more of these shortlists. In fact, the inclusion of only one additional state was a near-complete surprise for the general public. This was Ethiopia. It is worth noting that, along with Iran, Ethiopia has been the most supportive of Russia in the General Assembly of the United Nations among these six countries. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, actively participated in the second Russia-Africa Summit last summer.

If we extend this hypothetical scenario to a possible future expansion of BRICS, then we can assume that the consideration of factors such as solidarity with Russia may be taken into account in the selection process for new members.

With regard to the outcome of the vote at the UN General Assembly, the seven resolutions mentioned above correspond to six resolutions (ES-11/1 to ES-11/6), adopted in 2022 and 2023 during the 11th special emergency session of the General Assembly dedicated to the situation in Russia and Ukraine. Additionally, resolution 77/229 was adopted at the regular annual session of the Assembly in December 2022, concerning human rights in Crimea. Since then, the UN General Assembly has adopted another resolution – Resolution No. 78/221, dated December 19, 2023 – which is dedicated to human rights in Crimea and the new territories of Russia. This resolution was not voted on at a special emergency session of the General Assembly, which had not met since the first anniversary of the conflict, but rather at the regular annual session of the Assembly at the end of December, where a block of resolutions on human rights in various countries is usually debated.

This has been a part of the Assembly's agenda for many years; the year prior, Resolution No. 77/229 on the same topic was adopted. This year, resolutions on human rights in Iran and Syria have been adopted in conjunction with the resolution on Crimea. This current resolution takes a more severe and condemning stance towards Russia than last year's resolution. It is also larger in length (the Russian text of the current resolution on the UN website is 17 pages, compared to 14 pages a year ago). Unlike last year's resolution, this one focuses not only on Crimea and Sevastopol but also on newly acquired territories. If we consider the voting results for Resolution No. 78/221, we can see that 78 countries supported it, 15 countries were against it, and 79 countries abstained. It is worth noting that the number of countries in favour, 78, is the lowest among all eight resolutions that have been adopted by the General Assembly since the beginning of the current conflict.

The year prior, 82 countries voted in favour of a previous resolution regarding human rights in Crimea. At the emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, the number of votes for resolutions ranged from 93 to 143. The number against (15) is not the highest among these resolutions. One year prior, there were 29 votes against a resolution on Crimea and 24 against a resolution ES-11/3 suspending Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council. For other resolutions, the number against ranged from 5 to 14. Furthermore, this latest resolution has received the highest number of abstentions – 79, compared to the previous range of 32-73, as well as the highest number of states that did not vote – 21, compared to the previous range of 10-19. Therefore, we can observe a certain increase in apathy among non-Western countries with regard to this conflict. The voting results among African nations are particularly illuminating in this regard. While between 10 and 30 African countries supported the six resolutions from the emergency meeting, and five other states backed the prior resolution on Crimea, only three African nations have now supported the current resolution. These are Cape Verde, the Seychelles, and Sierra Leone.

Five nations have now opposed the resolution: Burundi, Zimbabwe, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. All other nations either abstained from voting or did not participate, including the three African countries that previously supported all seven resolutions. Liberia, Malawi, and Chad, who previously supported all previous resolutions, have now opted not to support the current one.

Based on these findings, it is clear that the last year's Russia-Africa summit was worthwhile. Accordingly, among the African countries (excluding the BRICS members), in relation to these eight resolutions, the countries that showed the strongest solidarity with Russia and never voted "for" were: Eritrea (on seven occasions), Mali (on five occasions), Zimbabwe (on four occasions), Burundi, the Sudan, and the Central African Republic (on two occasions each), Algeria and the Republic of Congo (on one occasion each), and Burkina Faso, Guinea, Cameroon, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda (never voted). This could constitute a possible Russian "long list" of African candidates for future expansion of BRICS. For other regions of the world, the following situation prevails. In Asia, outside the former Soviet Union (excluding BRICS members), North Korea and Syria have voted against all resolutions (8 times in each case), Vietnam and Laos have voted 1 time each, Mongolia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have abstained. It should be noted that Myanmar's current government's authority is not recognized by the UN General Assembly, and opposition representatives of the former government voted.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, Moscow's nominal supporters included Nicaragua (6 votes against), Cuba (4 votes against), Bolivia and El Salvador, which abstained or did not vote at all. Venezuela has been suspended from voting at the UN General Assembly due to non-payment of membership fees.

Lastly, in the former Soviet space, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have all voted against resolutions, while Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have abstained or not voted. It is evident that this pro-Russian "long list" is merely hypothetical. It remains unclear whether a new round of BRICS enlargement will occur or not. Should this happen, the BRICS leaders would utilize their own criteria, which are, I reiterate, not public. It is likely that a decision will be reached by consensus, implying that the interests of all BRICS members would be considered. This, naturally, might not align with Russia's stance. However, if we correctly interpret Ethiopia's example, then solidarity with Russia could play a role in future enlargements. This factor might be significant for strengthening internal cohesion within BRICS (although only in the context of our subjective understanding of Moscow's possible official stance in this process). Should there be a new BRICS expansion, it would be interesting to observe who from our "long list" would be among the invitees.

Russia
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

Tension between China and India threatens to paralyse BRICS – the association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While struggling to expand and make influence on the global stage, China and India have locked horns over issues in their bilateral relations, ranging from border security to trade conflicts and information war.

The latest strains began in early May and culminated in hand-to-hand fighting in the Galwan Valley, a remote stretch of the 3,380-kilometre (2,100-mile) Line of Actual Control – the border established following a war between India and China in 1962 that resulted in an uneasy truce.

Punsara Amarasinghe, a former research fellow at the Faculty of Law, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and now a PhD candidate in international law at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy, argues that this tension is rather ironic given that in the past the two countries shared many civilisational values and both were victims of Western colonialism.

When India gained independence in 1947 from the British, its first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru built a rapport with Communist China by accepting the government of Mao Zedong with great anticipation that both China and India would become the stalwarts in the global campaign against Western imperialism. For example, it was Nehru's idea that China should be granted a place in the non-aligned movement despite some of the opposition from some members at the famous Bandung Conference in 1955.

However, the comity between the two nations was short lived as China claimed the territory near Arunachal Pradesh whereas India adhered to the line of control known as the McMahon Line established by the British under the 1914 Simla Convention with the consent of Tibet. From the 1950s onwards, China showed its interest over the Aksai Chin area albeit its cordial relations with Nehru's India. This long dispute finally ended in military escalation in 1962, and became known as the Sino-Indian War.

While acknowledging that there are some other issues that have marred their relationship apart from the current border conflict, Amarasinghe told this article author that "both China and India have longed for global governance as emerging powers, and particularly, the influence expanded by China in South Asia has rapidly increased India's doubt on China's presence. Secondly, China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative project has literally encircled India geopolitically, creating a plethora of doubts about India's state apparatus."

He added that the notion of nuclear weapon strategies and India's affinity with the USA are the biggest dilemmas that China has persistently had in dealing with India. Moreover, India has been the sanctuary for Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama.

As to the fundamental question of whether all these issues put together could possibly reappear in future, Amarasinghe emphasized: "Having looked at the trajectories of the history of Indo-China conflict, one can ascertain that the India-China issue has always been imbued with a question of power. Both states are yearning for global governance. Yet India is ahead of the curve as the world largest democracy and a state with one of the strongest soft powers, making the Indian narrative stronger, whereas Beijing is known for its autocracy."

On the other hand, he reminded, "we should not forget that the pact signed between China and India in 1996 clearly says that two states cannot use firearms in a border dispute escalation. However, there have been a number of events that have shown the acts of aggression in the Indo-China border conflict. The Chinese efforts of building a road in the Doklam area near the border created a tense situation in 2017. Three years after that event, the conflict erupted again."

China's Foreign Ministry stipulated measures that would be implemented in order to normalise the situation and prevent future armed conflicts. "The sides welcomed the developments of relations between defence agencies and the external affairs ministries, agreed to support such consultations in the future, and implement agreements that were reached by the two sides during the talks between the border troops commanders, as well complete as soon as possible the process of frontline troop withdrawal," read a ministry statement.

The Foreign Ministry noted that the sides also reached an agreement to implement measures in order to "prevent the reoccurrence of incidents which may influence the situation and peace in the border region."

"The relationship of China and India underwent various trials and their progress towards modern development was not always swift. As had been recently demonstrated correctly, and at the same time incorrectly, by the recent incident in the western sector of the China-India border in the Galwan River valley, China will continue to assert its territorial sovereignty as well as peace and tranquillity in the border region," according to the statement.

The sides expressed readiness to respect the agreements achieved previously by the heads of state, pay specific attention to the issue of state borders and prevent "disagreements from becoming conflicts." The sides also confirmed their adherence to the earlier agreements on the state border and expressed readiness to implement measures to normalise the situation in the border region.

Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry is certainly not new, but today it has multifaceted implications for developments in the South Asian region and most possibly for BRICS. For example, in email discussions, Dr. Zhu Ming of the Institute for Global Governance Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), noted that while there have been several disagreements between China and India, some have been resolved within the framework of international law but others have remained without comprehensive solutions.

Within the context of geopolitical alliances and emerging challenges, Tahama Asadis, a graduate of Strategic Studies from the National Defence University in Islamabad, noted the changing alliances and power equilibrium among the United States, China, India and Pakistan that bear key implications for inter-state rivalry and the consequent crisis dynamics in South Asia.

China has so far been successful in influencing South Asia because of many factors. One of the major reasons is that China has managed to project itself as a neighbour that would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, least of all, in the internal affairs of its friends and partners. In the light of its 'Good Neighbour Policy', China's increased diplomatic and economic engagements in South Asia are aimed to enhancing its strategic influence in the region.

Professor Ian Taylor at the University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom explained that he did not see any long-term future for the BRICS as a coherent grouping on the world stage. According to Taylor, China-India rivalry (as exemplified by border clashes) shows how shallow the alliance is. Furthermore, Brasilia has its own "Brazilian Trump" who sees alliance with the West as the way forward, not with other "developing countries".

Originally, BRIC was a four-member alliance until South Africa officially became a member in December 2010, after formally being invited by China to join and subsequently being accepted by the founding BRIC countries. The group was renamed BRICS – with the "S" standing for South Africa – to reflect the group's expanded membership. South Africa is a staunch member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

"South Africa is in terminal decline and was only admitted to the BRICS for politically expedient-politically correct reasons. Its membership actually damaged the group's credibility. And of course, China will resist to the very end the notion that India be admitted to the UN Security Council as a Permanent Member," Taylor explained, adding that so much for the vaunted "South-South solidarity" that the BRICS was supposed to represent and what all the noise was about when it was launched.

Zhu Ming holds conservative not so negative views on the future of BRICS amid India-China conflicts, giving two reasons. The first and most important is that Beijing is still keeping a low profile on this conflict. For instance, Chinese local media coverage of this conflict is still quite low, and Beijing has not revealed losses on the Chinese side in order not to form the impression of too huge a gap in losses between two sides as to humiliate the Indian side. "Just imagine, if two people were fighting, the situation would be extremely hard to turn back to normal very soon. But if one side could keep relatively calm, the situation would be more optimistic."

Secondly, the disputed land is not worthy of a war between the two countries. "However, the rising nationalist mood of India is a bit troublesome. BRICS is not nothing to New Delhi, it will not be a good option for India to quit BRICS. Since BRICS was formed jointly by five powers, China does not own BRICS," he told this article author, adding, "it is a bit early to judge the prospects of BRICS. It is quite possible that the global and BRICS health governance system could be another rising cooperation field within the BRICS group after the forthcoming BRICS summit."

"While there are no official claims from the Kremlin that Putin was brokering any negotiation between the two to reconcile the border dispute, if Russia can make a good move in meddling with the Indo-China border conflict, I assume it will work to a greater extent. Given the history of Russia's dominant role in South Asia since its Soviet past, Moscow has a greater capacity to play the role of mediator. Besides that, BRICS is a platform for emerging powers and its capacity cannot be discarded as a regional political talk shop. Thus, I believe BRICS would create some steps for a more amicable solution," Amarasinghe concluded on an optimistic note.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Senior Research Fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, noted in her article headlined "China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS" published by the East Asia Forum that China has been the leading proponent of expanding BRICS to BRICS+. The main reason for expansion was to make BRICS more representative of the developing world and give it a stronger voice on the global stage.

But the six countries invited to join — which has become five after Argentina's withdrawal — are quite heterogenous. Some are net creditors (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while others are net debtors and in a very weak financial position. Half of them are large exporters of fossil fuels (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). Ethiopia and Egypt stand out as members from Africa, a continent that has become increasingly important for China's and India's foreign policy, according to Garcia-Herrero.

The BRICS countries are considered the foremost geopolitical rival to the G7 bloc of leading advanced economies, implementing competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the BRICS pay, the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication and the BRICS basket reserve currency. But in practical reality, China has large control and uses the platform to widen its economic influence. Most of the growth in trade has been China-centric, with contribution from the rest of BRICS remaining quite flat until recently. Russia, with its limited economic impact, only remains as an excellent public relations organizer for BRICS.

The BRICS members are known for their significant influence on regional affairs, and all are members of the G20. Since its establishment in 2009, the BRICS nations have met annually at several summits, with South Africa having hosted the most recent 15th BRICS Summit in August 2023. Currently, Russia is heading the rotating in 2024 and plans to push forward significant issues, particularly the association's expansion and transforming it into anti-Western coalition. Reports indicate about 40 countries, majority in Africa and Asia have expressed readiness to join BRICS from the Global South. The association has three areas of strategic partnership: policy and security, economy and finance, and cultural and educational cooperation.

Between now and until October when Kazan will host the 16th summit, Moscow has scheduled various activities including BRICS Games, BRICS Foreign Ministers, BRICS Academic and BRICS Parliamentary meetings, these aim at showcasing BRICS geopolitical influence and increasing coalition for building a fairer, better and multipolar world. It also operates on the basis of on non-interference and equality with the hope of ensuring members get mutual economic benefits in the world. BRICS has received both praise and criticism from academics, researchers, politicians and geopolitical analysts and writers around the world.

The origins of BRICS — a bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and, as of 2024, new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — can be traced back to a 2001 publication by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill titled 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs'. O'Neill argued that Brazil, Russia, India and China were poised to play an increasingly significant role in the global economy. BRIC was officially launched in 2009 and was renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined, and Russia will make history by admitting largest ever in 2024.

The founding countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China held the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, with South Africa joining the association a year later. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined on 1 January 2024 The five BRICS countries together represent over 3.1 billion people, or about 41 percent of the world population. The five nations had a combined nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18.6 trillion dollars and an estimated 4.46 trillion dollars in combined foreign reserves.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Colleagues,

Today, we are holding the 8th meeting of the United Russia Party General Council's Commission on International Cooperation and Support for Compatriots Abroad.

We welcome the participation of other parliamentary parties, which has now become customary and helps us consolidate our efforts on the foreign front.

Today, we will review several agenda items. I propose beginning with a brief overview of the results of the presidential election voting that was held abroad. The Foreign Ministry acted as its main organiser.

The interest in voting was overwhelming, which was confirmed by high turnout as well as the large number of journalists, public figures and representatives from compatriot organisations who observed the elections.

The electoral process took place amid the hybrid war against Russia unleashed by the collective West. In the run-up to the election, this confrontation became particularly fierce. Our detractors widely used various techniques to exert pressure, blackmail and intimidate voters. They sought to thwart the elections and to question their legitimacy and legal purity. The significant reduction of our diplomatic presence in most Western countries, both in terms of the number of diplomats and the number of diplomatic missions, which was undertaken at the request of Western governments over the past two years, further complicated the voting process. Many consulates general have been closed, including in places densely populated by Russian citizens, which certainly affected the organisational side of the voting process. Our multiple requests to open additional polling stations in order to compensate for the closure of consular offices were turned down.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry and its foreign missions have coped with the task. Hundreds of thousands of Russians got the chance to exercise their constitutional right. Polling stations were opened in popular tourist destinations, specialist communities at major industrial facilities, and in the areas of deployment of Russian peacekeepers, military and members of the security forces.

Elections were held at all 288 foreign-based polling stations. In all, almost 400,000 people took part in the voting, which is about twice as many as during the parliamentary elections in 2021.

Numerous international observers monitored the voting process in Russia, including Donbass and Novorossiya. They did not spot any violations that could affect the election outcome. In total, the CEC accredited more than 1,500 representatives from almost 120 countries and 14 international organisations.

Vladimir Putin won a landslide victory with over 87 percent of the vote. His victory was widely covered by the media in the Global Majority countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Dozens of foreign leaders from these continents personally congratulated the Russian President on re-election.

I would also like to discuss Russia's current BRICS chairmanship. We aim at achieving tangible results. The action plan envisages active work in three main areas, including politics and security, the economy and finance, and cultural and humanitarian contacts. In light of the accession of five new members to our association on January 1, the key priority now is to ensure the new members' harmonious integration into the strategic partnership architecture and to preserve the effective operation of all existing BRICS mechanisms. The first Sherpa meeting was held in Moscow in late January - early February. The new recruits reiterated their firm commitment to be actively involved and to take part in the common work across the agenda.

The participants in the BRICS Summit in August 2023 decided to start coordinating criteria for a new category of the association's state partners. Now they are actively working on this. They will coordinate the main recommendations at the BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in Nizhny Novgorod in June and submit them for approval at the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan in October. In addition to working on the partner states category, the BRICS members are going to deepen dialogue with friendly countries in the BRICS Plus/BRICS Outreach format. They are planning to involve our associates in the EAEU, CIS, CSTO and the SCO by using this format.

One of the main foreign policy goals of BRICS is to enhance coordination with its partners at multilateral venues, primarily in the UN, the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter and in the G20 where the number of participants exceeded that of the G7 after the expansion of BRICS.

BRICS concentrates on ensuring favourable conditions for promoting the socio-economic, investment, technological and human potential of its member countries. We will continue implementing for this purpose the Strategy of BRICS Economic Partnership through to 2025 and the Innovation Cooperation Plan for 2021-2024.

We are interested in enhancing the role of the BRICS states in the currency, financial and trade systems, developing interbank cooperation, expanding the use of their national currencies in mutual trade and pooling efforts in creating a rating agency and the association's exchange. The BRICS countries are actively discussing these plans, in part, based on the instructions given at the past year's summit in Johannesburg. This work is becoming an increasing concern for the US and its allies. They understand that in case of success – and we will achieve success – it will call into doubt the mechanisms of globalisation of which the West is in charge now. The West has created and promoted them as mechanisms allegedly aimed at ensuring equitable and competitive participation of all states in the world economic processes for the benefit of humanity. The West has started to shamelessly abuse these mechanisms, using them for suppressing competitors and punishing those who do not accept its neocolonial policy.

BRICS has focused its attention on deepening cooperation in science, innovations, healthcare and humanitarian projects. The first session of the BRICS Working Group on Nuclear Medicine held in Moscow in February is one of the first practical results achieved during our chairmanship. A meeting of experts on launching an integrated early warning system for mass infectious disease risks took place in March of this year.

We plan to hold open BRICS Sports Games in Kazan in June. As of today, we expect over 5,000 athletes from 60 states to attend them.

I would like to note in the same context that the BRICS countries are also going to take part in the Friendship Games in Moscow and Yekaterinburg in September. We are also planning to hold the Intervision international song contest and participate in a new project of awarding a global cinema prize with emphasis on Eurasia.

I would like to note that the BRICS parliamentary dimension is being filled with new content. The first meeting of the chairs of international affairs committees took place on April 11-12 of this year. It became an important stage in the preparations for the 10th BRICS Parliamentary Forum that will take place in St Petersburg on July 11-12.

Of course, we always bear in mind the party aspect. Our political parties continue their interaction. They have accumulated substantial positive experience. We are planning to hold an international interparty forum in the BRICS Plus/BRICS Outreach format that will take place in Vladivostok in June-July at the initiative of United Russia. We welcome the plan of holding it in an expanded format with the participation of our CIS partners. We can use this opportunity for further strengthening ties with the World Majority countries.

In conclusion, I would like to say that we are also planning to discuss the work on taking the inventory of international treaties and organisations in which Russia is taking part. We have conducted this work for several years. At this point, we need advice from the party and MPs to understand the relevance of these or other documents or structures.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: Brandon Weichert, a former congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst said that the United States could "go from a superpower to a middle power in terminal decline overnight" due to the growing influence of BRICS . American economists missed the development of the association from a "cool-sounding acronym" to a monstrous competitor. He also noted that "by carrying the debt load that the United States has been carrying – and constantly piling more – all while using the dollar's dominant position as a cudgel against other great powers, Washington has set the conditions to turn the small BRICS bloc into something truly monstrous over the next several decades." What do you think of these words?

Maria Zakharova: I think the most important point is the phobia of US experts who develop or write about developing the logic of this US "deep state" claiming its own dominance. Phobia. What are they afraid of? What's the big deal about free competition? There's nothing wrong with it. It's a norm. Especially for liberal democracies, at least based on the political concepts they postulate. And certainly not for market economies. Competition is not just an "alpha" or an "omega," it is the oxygen, the nourishment, the natural habitat. So what are they afraid of? The secret is simple. It is that they are afraid of losing their imaginary, self-appropriated sense of being the only leaders. That is the fear. People, countries, institutions that are not infected with this bacillus of exclusivity treat competition all right. It is a driving force for them, a motor. But not for those who believe that they are so exceptional that neither international law, nor legislation, nor morals, ethics or morality apply to them. From their point of view, they are entitled to anything, that is the way it has historically been and that is the way it should remain.

The development of the BRICS naturally fits into the framework of modern global developments and is in line with the trends of multipolarity. Interaction within this association, based on the principles of mutual respect, equality, openness and consensus, fully meets the aspirations of the world majority countries. Representatives of the Global South and East see it as a symbol of multilateralism, a platform where their voices will be heard.

One of the important priorities of Russia's BRICS chairmanship this year is to raise the association's profile in world affairs and to enhance its capacity to promote a more democratic and fair system of international relations through joint efforts. All BRICS members, both the founding countries and the newcomers who joined the BRICS on January 1, 2024, consistently advocate balanced development and security on the basis of international law and sovereign equality of states, and oppose illegitimate sanctions bypassing the UN Security Council.

BRICS cooperation in the economy is rapidly developing. This is quite understandable, because in recent years the share of the BRICS countries in the world GDP in purchasing power parity terms has increased significantly, and with the accession of new members, the aggregate potential of the association has become even stronger. In the new configuration, the BRICS has significant oil and other resources and accounts for about a quarter of the world's exports of goods. The increased trade requires search for new formats of cooperation in finances as well. The relevant work is being carried out by the specialised agencies in the BRICS countries.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: This year, Russia will host a BRICS summit. What challenges, goals and prospects are we facing now?

Sergey Lavrov: We have a busy agenda – 250 events.

As for challenges, we must ensure a smooth integration of new members into our team. The number of members has doubled. Over the long years of its existence, BRICS has developed traditions, procedures and understandings, including a culture of consensus and mutual support. We have many working structures. These new members will participate not only in ministerial meetings and summits but also in sectoral events related to IT, agriculture, and banking. This is a brief response to your question.

One of the goals is to follow the instruction given at the previous summit to our finance ministers (as I've already mentioned) and central banks to draft recommendations on alternative payment platforms. This will be important for safeguarding economic ties and prospects (and we have solid prospects and many plans) from arbitrary actions by the West, which is undermining the trust in the global economic and financial system that it once created, supposedly for the benefit of all humanity.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

I welcome the organisers, participants and guests of the BRICS Film Festival.

Films represent the entire range of civilisations and societies in the association. This diversity keeps in the spirit of BRICS: an open multilateral organisation, where equal member states are seeking effective solutions to today's topical problems and national development together.

Your Film Festival serves as a great illustration of constructive dialogue and mutual enrichment of cultures. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this undertaking in today's conditions. I am confident that it will succeed and become an unforgettable event in the life of Moscow, and also reimage the cultural component of Russia's chairmanship in BRICS.

I wish you successful work together, great and unforgettable impressions, and all the best.