Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum

Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Issue 34.2024
2024.08.19 — 2024.08.25
Investment and Finance
Investment and finance in BRICS
Belarus and Azerbaijan: Optimizing Confidence for BRICS membership (Беларусь и Азербайджан: оптимизация доверия для членства в БРИКС) / Belgium, August, 2024
Keywords: cooperation, expert_opinion
2024-08-24
Belgium
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

Russia today is taking another pivotal moment in its history, (with a series of many landmark issues) under its presidency of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), referred to as informal association, consistently forging collaborative relations with developing countries. With geopolitical situation heightening, spotifying challenges predominately remain on the association’s track. But the evolving developments are positive and promising, particularly increasing number of countries expressing the desire to join BRICS. It shows an interesting and indelible sign which reflects the necessity for the world’s re-configuration. This factor indicates the urgent yawning action for a multifaceted change, a new global architecture embracing geopolitics, the economy and security as well as socio-cultural and humanitarian spheres.

Noticeably, Latin American countries and also in Asian and African regions are carving to join BRICS. There are many reasons including the sovereign desire by like-minded countries to deepen their cooperation with BRICS with a proper sense of respect. In addition, BRICS follows an open-door vision, and stronly committed to the fact that the principles governing this format – mutual respect, balance of interests and a consensus-based approach – are very appealing. In the former Soviet space, Belarus and Azerbaijan have recently expressed their sanonymized interest to leverage unto BRICS platform.

“Azerbaijan has filed an official application for joining BRICS,” Azerbaijan’s news agency quoted Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, Aykhan Hajizada. Baku’s intention to join BRICS was reflected in a joint declaration on strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and China, which was signed on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana in early July. Apart from that, Azerbaijani parliament speaker, Sakhiba Gafarova, said at a plenary session of the 10th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in St. Petersburg on July 11 that her country wanted to be a full-fledged BRICS member.

Russia and Belarus have formed a Union State. Late July, and even long before that, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has publicly reiterated that Minsk had been invited to the BRICS summit, due in Kazan in October. Lukashenko, who has announced his resignation in 2025, irreversibly promised Belarus ascension into BRICS. In this regard, Lukashenko instructed the Foreign Ministry to draw up a plan of Belarusian participation and bilateral meetings on that platform. That however, Belarus sees BRICS as a basis for economic development and is ready to join integration processes within the framework of the informal association. “We are interested in getting involved in integration processes in that space. BRICS is another footing to help us maintain balance and economic stability,” BelTA agency quoted Lukashenko as emphatically asserted.
Belarus and Azerbaijan are former Soviet republics, with common historical background despite the stark indications of disparity in approach to current politics and economic development, much still remains uniquely common in cultural practice and in the society. Undoubtedly, both the older and current generations have comprehensive understanding of Soviet history and culture. Therefore, Belarus and Azerbaijan governments and their state institutions such as the cabinet, legislative and judiciary, would endorse aligning to BRICS, and contribute towards shaping a new post-Soviet space within the framework of emerging new geopolitical reality.

As the majority of countries around the world face new, modern-day challenges, so it has become necessary to create conditions to combat Western and European threats to political and economic stability. The need to amplify their collective voices or positions in strengthening partnerships as illustrated by BRICS agenda which is very broad. The agenda is in line with the general motto adopted by Russia’s BRICS chairmanship, relating to the widest range of issues, including politics, security, economy, finance and on education, sports and humanitarian ties.

China and India Factors

While China and India have historically warm multiple ties with Russia, and even from Soviet times, both as BRICS members maintain closer economic partnerships with the Western world. China has comparatively more presence than India in Belarus and Azerbaijan, but future prospects exist for extensive collaborating through BRICS. Within its calculated strategy, China has a large footprint in the region, thanks to its Belt and Road Initiative. But that aside, Belarus and Azerbaijan can still secure economic partnerships and harness their modern technology and scientific innovations. Furthermore, public-private partnerships are crucial mechanism for mobilizing the necessary resources and expertise for development.

In terms of influence and economic presence, China is indiscriminately deepening its trading and investment relations across the entire former Soviet region, and the Eurasian Economic Union, using its own version of – not confrontation – but it deemed acceptable as ‘mutual cooperation’ and polycentricity. The 29th meeting between prime ministers of Russia and China (BRICS stalwart supporters of multi-polarity) reviewed economic cooperation, took cognizance of the huge untapped economic potentials generally in the Eurasian region, and specifically in the Russian Federation.
On August 21-22, Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Minsk and held talks with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko which resulted sign agreements on investment and on a free trade area in the services sector. In addition Belarus would host an industrial zone for China’s new quality productive forces concept based on technologies, innovations and high-quality human potential. This reflects the absolute possibility for Chinese technologies to enter the Belarusian market in large numbers as the core mid-term task for the two countries’ governments, until 2030. The new agreement will enable Belarus to increase exports of its services to China by at least 12%-15% within the next five years, while investment in Belarus will grow by at least 30%, according to reports.

India has good relations in Belarus and Azerbaijan. India’s interest included science & technology cooperation. It continues, at present time, seeking investment and resources through Belarusian route for developing smart cities, improving the manufacturing sector and increasing skill development especially in the pharmaceutical industry. China and India are both active in Russia. Mutual trade between Russia and China is developing successfully, and the two governments are working well towards this, Russian President Vladimir Putin has noted in Kremlin reports. According to the government office, bilateral trade blossomed up to $240.1 billion in June 2024.

Russia’s BRICS Diplomacy

For now, though, after years of declining Russia’s influence in many parts of the world, Moscow is steadily rising up. And at least, being a member of BRICS plays much supportive role. Russia’s presidency of the association has witnessed stern position against increasingly Western ‘domineering powers’ in recent years, and more recently pressurizing countries to back sanctions against Russia for the invasion in Ukraine. Several BRICS documents and communiques contained anti-Western positions, mostly against United States’ hegemony and neo-colonial character. As an association of states, BRICS is guided in its efforts by the principles of mutual respect and consensus, which rules out any attempts to dictate one’s will or impose any totalitarian administrative and oversight practices. Reiterating here that BRICS offers a good opportunity for discussing international matters, including the emergence of a new world order with better justice for all, and making efforts to strengthen cooperation between BRICS and the countries of the Global South and East, while enhancing their international role.

BRICS under Russia’s 2024 directorship has advanced steps to introduce its currency and a financial settlement and payment system platforms primarily targeting de-dollarization process. Coordinated by the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) which was established in 2015, these existing measures would, most probably, lead to drastic reduction in the use and over-dependence of the dollar as world-wide currency. In the economic sphere, the BRICS countries have been discussing ways to promote sustainable development, to support the multilateral trading system, and to improve the global financial architecture.

In spite of the above, Vice Chairman of BRICS Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sameep Shastri, and several state officials have indicated that BRICS member states are no longer attaching much importance to the dollar, one single currency, and are now successfully using national currencies. This, in the first step, underscored the assertions that Western countries are the strongest economies in the world. Therefore in the ultimate analysis, the economic power is steadily, or rather rapidly, shifting from the West to the Global South.

Challenges and Future Prospects

According to authentic estimates, more than 30 countries have applied to join BRICS, which now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE — and in a collective pursuit of an uncomfortable non-aligned policy. Experts have, however, pointed to strong relations beyond ‘non-alignment’ and beyond the confines of BRICS. As many countries express desire to join BRICS, to incorporate their unique non-aligned political and economic values, so also in parallel dimension are challenges and, worse the competitiveness by key Western players and multinational organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World bank. BRICS is simply anti-Western association and has it own principles. The question over Belarus and Azerbaijan here also brings into focus Eurasian regional security. We know that Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, following the collapse of the Soviet era. Now the SCO, being the successor to the Shanghai Five including China and Russia. In June 2017, it expanded to eight states, with India and Pakistan. Iran joined the group in July 2023, and Belarus in July 2024. Several countries are engaged as observers or dialogue partners.

With China, Iran, India and Russia in BRICS, they share the same security interest. Moreso, Azarbaijan and Belarus becoming BRICS members will fortify the SCO operations in the region. Our analytical studies further show unfolding remarkable opportunities with BRICS member countries for the next new members such as Azerbaijan and Belarus. Azerbaijan has an observer status according to Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aykhan Hajizada. Azerbaijan will probably become a full member of the SCO in a little while, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said during his meeting with President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on July 3 in Astana.
The floodgates for new members have since been opened: The association now includes the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, two of the world’s biggest oil producers, and accounts for well over a quarter of the world’s GDP. Azerbaijan is also an oil producer in the region, and it could also serve as a smooth conduit for Russia to access global markets.

Judging from the above discussion, and subsequent findings from several reports also offer logical implications if Azerbaijan and Belarus are accepted into BRICS. It provides solid conditions for building up common capabilities and approaches in the fight for economic power. This may likely entice Armenia and Kazakhstan also to take similar steps to become members of BRICS, whose economic benefits are enormous. For some reasons, BRICS could be a counterweight against U.S. economic hegemony in the global economic system. BRICS, which traces its name to a Goldman Sachs report in 2001, has long struggled to find an economic or geopolitical purpose, as its member countries have little in common besides being large and non-Western. The BRICS association was created in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining in 2011. On January 1, 2024, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia became full members of the group. Russia is chairing the association this year. The main event, presentation of outstanding practical results, 2024 for BRICS during the summit on October 22-24, with a planned venue in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan.

Blocking Russian Payments: to Be or Not to Be for Financial Multipolarity? (Блокировка российских платежей: быть или не быть финансовой многополярности?) / Russia, August, 2024
Keywords: economic_challenges, expert_opinion
2024-08-19
Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The signing in December 2023 of the U.S. President’s decree imposing secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions found to be supporting Russia’s military-industrial base made international settlements between Russian companies and their counterparties in “friendly” nations much more difficult. The precedent of discrimination against Russian clients was set as early as February 2024 by a number of leading banks in Turkey, the UAE, India, China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Citing security concerns, they took to declining requests to open accounts for Russian legal entities, suspending transfers, increasing payment processing times, rejecting or returning funds and screening Russian partners for cooperation with the Russian defense industry and inclusion in sanctions lists. In July, Bloomberg reported new problems faced by several Russian exporters when making payments in yuan. Along with that, there were reports about the suspension of transactions made by Russian residents with cards issued by some Russian banks that use the Chinese payment system UnionPay.

The obvious reason for another demarche of the “allies” was the June expansion by the Biden administration of the list of sanctioned individuals and legal entities both in Russia and abroad. The targets of secondary sanctions now include financial institutions in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, whose activities are somehow connected with supporting the Russian military-industrial sector. The new sanctions list also features branches of leading Russian banks located in Beijing, Mumbai, New Delhi and Hong Kong. It seems that banking hiccups for Russian counterparties are becoming an unhealthy practice of “friendly” nations as a protective measure against secondary sanctions. Meanwhile, the blocking of Russia’s international settlements may have ambiguous grounds. A more comprehensive analysis of the motives behind the tightening of sanctions is required to understand them and identify potential solutions.

Who is to blame?

It can be argued that the main reason for today’s geopolitical tensions in the world is the persistent desire of the Western bloc led by the United States to maintain its dominance in the financial and innovative development of the global economy. By extending secondary sanctions to foreign financial institutions, the White House administration is trying to derail Russia’s efforts to build an alternative financial infrastructure together with “friendly” nations, which would be independent of Western institutions. This move seems more than justified given the growing weight of the Global Majority countries in the real sector of the world economy. Meanwhile, the coalition of developed nations seeks to keep emerging economies in a dependent and subordinate position as suppliers of raw materials and manufactured goods, while preventing their participation in the management of international financial flows. This clash of interests is fundamentally impossible to resolve due to several specific features inherent in the functioning of the system of international relations at the present stage.

First, the loss of functionality of and trust in global institutions (WTO, IMF, UN Security Council, UN International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court) as a mechanism of checks and balances for resolving conflict situations on a multilateral basis. The inefficiency of global regulators is evident in the rise of trade, currency and sanctions wars, increased military spending and more direct armed conflicts, the escalation of pandemic and cybersecurity threats and the aggravation of climate, energy and food risks.

Second, the absence of a clear center of gravity consolidating ideologically close developing nations into a single geopolitical bloc. The countries of the collective West recognize the U.S. as an undisputed leader, whose actions are unconditionally supported by them, even if they are at odds with the norms of international law and sustainable development goals. This position stems from a lingering sense of civilizational superiority of the white race, which for centuries served as a justification for the global colonial system. But even in modern times, the neocolonial perspective on international relations persists in the Western worldview, as reflected in the politically correct division of countries into developed and developing ones. In contrast, the Global Majority countries strive for a more equal, fair, multipolar world not dominated by any single pole of power. This may also explain the absence of a clear leader among the developing countries that could promote a coordinated political agenda at the global level. At the same time, China’s aspirations for world leadership in the economic, scientific and technological realms are evident.

Third, the lack of effective leverage over the rapacious financial appetites of the hegemon in the world economy due to the U.S. control over the key institutions of the global financial architecture. The U.S. holds a blocking stake in international monetary and financial organizations—the IMF and the World Bank Group—which set the rules of the game in the global financial system. All commodity prices, which de facto serve as tangible security for the dollar emission (as gold once did), are denominated in the U.S. dollar. Stock pricing in strategic commodity markets is subject to occasional manipulations, which generate surplus profits for U.S. investment funds and losses for developing economies heavily dependent on exports of raw materials. The Big Three U.S. rating agencies still control 95% of the global credit rating market. This has a direct impact on the cost of raising financial resources in the international capital market. The lower the cost of borrowed resources, the stronger the financial advantage and capacity for acquisitions. Institutional monopolization of global financial intermediation functions puts U.S. business in a privileged position in the system of global corporate control. For example, 14 out of the world’s 20 largest asset management companies come from the U.S. These firms are majority shareholders of the most well-capitalized corporations such as Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia—the world leaders in creating global digital and information technologies. Another indication of this financial dominance is that in the fiscal year 2023, U.S. corporations accounted for 38% of the total profits generated by the world’s 500 largest companies.

Fourth, the deep integration of the international settlement system into the structures of the global banking system. Despite continuous financial innovations, international settlements are still carried out through a network of interbank correspondent accounts. Tracking electronic payments through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) makes it extremely vulnerable to outside interference. The dominance of the dollar and U.S. banks across all segments of the global financial market in the absence of a global alternative to SWIFT gives the U.S. an unprecedented level of financial power to disconnect individual banks from the global financial system, freeze foreign exchange reserves and deny borrowers access to international debt and equity financing.

Fifth, the digitalization of global finance. The rise of financial technology (Fintech) is increasing tensions in international settlements rather than easing them. The digitalization of financial services makes it possible to scale up existing financial intermediation processes while simultaneously exacerbating price volatility and weakening centralized control over the actions of market players due to the widespread use of distributed ledger technology (whose origins, again, trace back to American developers). To streamline financial transactions, major U.S. banks are now actively using cloud services from vendors such as Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform. Meanwhile, the integration of top U.S. financial institutions with tech giants may give rise to a new generation of global financiers, even more insatiable and uncompromising in their choice of methods and means for maximizing profits.

What to do?

It is obvious that within the established global electronic payment infrastructure, which is directly linked to the banking system, evading sanctions will become increasingly difficult. In this regard, participants in international transactions are actively exploring the potential of using cryptocurrencies to make secure payments. Cryptocurrencies undoubtedly offer an interesting avenue for developing a decentralized system of international settlements, but only as a transaction-recording technology or a digital financial asset. At the same time, cryptocurrencies lack such basic functions of money as a measure and store of value. In the former case—because their value is measured in fiat currencies (mainly the U.S. dollar), and in the latter case—because of their extreme volatility. In addition to the risk of rapid depreciation, cryptocurrencies are not immune to default and liquidity risks, as crypto services and exchanges may also be subject to sanctions. The same risks apply to stablecoins.
Overall, it should be recognized that the primary function of cryptocurrency is to serve as a speculative financial asset and a method of conducting financial transactions outside of government control. Therefore, as long as there are sovereign states, it is unlikely that non-sovereign digital currencies will play any significant role in the monetary system, and even less likely that they will be widely used in international settlements, thus limiting the role of the dollar. Neither the U.S. government nor the Federal Reserve sees the advantages of cryptocurrencies over fiat money. So cryptocurrencies are unlikely to replace the dollar as a reserve asset either.

On the other hand, cryptocurrency poses a unique challenge to the current financial system, where regulators have lost control over money circulation. Global income is concentrated in wealthy countries—the issuers of reserve currencies that have exhausted the possibilities for productive investment of the savings of the rest of the world. As a result, excess capital is mainly used for consumption and speculation rather than investment, exacerbating the global debt problem and social polarization between the core and periphery of the world economy. To regain control over money circulation, central banks are actively exploring distributed ledger technology to issue their own digital currencies. However, this prospect is also highly uncertain due to the still poorly understood risks associated with cyber-financial systems, which operate on the root domain name servers of international entities such as ICANN, IANA and VeriSign with strong American dominance. In light of this, the use of digital currencies in international settlements requires the development of proprietary software and server infrastructure to secure digital platforms against the risks of transaction tracking by “unfriendly” states. However, this effort simultaneously introduces intractable “side effects” related to cybersecurity, compatibility of technologies, standards and protocols for digital currency circulation, as well as legal regulation of multiplatform systems at the international level.

BRICS development horizons

A comprehensive analysis of the causes and consequences of the sanctions on Russia spawns more questions than answers. Nevertheless, the problem of Russia’s international financial isolation is only a special case in the generally dysfunctional global financial system. The fundamental flaw of today’s currency standard lies in the contradiction between the globalization of the market and the national form of its regulation. This discrepancy is most evident in the use of the U.S. national currency for international transactions. To gain access to dollar liquidity, all other countries must continuously adapt their macroeconomic and monetary policies, as well as the production and export structures to the interests of the country that issues the key reserve and investment asset. In serving as a link between the U.S. monetary system and the national monetary systems of other countries, the dollar acts as a channel through which the problems of U.S. domestic socio-economic development are transmitted to the global level, spurring imbalances, periodic bursting of financial bubbles and debt crises.

To resolve this contradiction and improve the efficiency of the global financial system, abandoning the use of national currencies in international settlements in favor of common monetary units as objects of supranational foreign exchange regulation has long been overdue. As geopolitical tensions continue to rise and regionalization processes accelerate, this development seems quite reasonable. Especially because the public demand for common currencies has existed for decades. This is evidenced by dozens of currency unions, both existing and potential, in the world economy (see the figure below).

Despite some degree of integration within existing regional currency unions and occasional initiatives to create new groupings, there is no clear progress in this area today. This stagnation is caused not so much by economic reasons as by political factors.

It is no secret that the key to the historical ascent of the U.S. to the pinnacle of the world economy was the political unification of the separate North American states into a single federal state. So the political union emerged in the U.S. much earlier than the monetary union, whose origin is directly linked to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. The ability to form a unified state demonstrates a deep understanding among Americans of the economic benefits of running a single economy versus a politically fragmented one.

The situation looks different in other regions. For example, the euro, the single European currency, has failed to create a meaningful counterweight to the U.S. dollar in the global financial arena. The reason for this “fiasco” lies not so much in the difference in economic potentials as in Europe’s political disunity. The euro is the currency of 20 sovereign states that have relinquished their national currencies as symbols of political, economic and financial sovereignty. Meanwhile, many of the 20 member states of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union pursue their own political, economic and financial ambitions, viewing fellow members as competitors. Hence the serious imbalances in the development of individual eurozone members such as Germany and Greece. To address these gaps, Europe lacks the equivalent of the unified fiscal, banking and exchange policies that are at play in the U.S. As a result, eurozone countries are chronically dependent on the capital markets of London and New York, while the European Central Bank, as the issuer of the single European currency, is reliant on the Federal Reserve’s dollar swap lines. Given these challenges, the euro model can hardly serve as a prototype for creating common monetary units in regional currency unions.

Thus, none of the existing projects of supranational monetary cooperation represents a serious alternative to the dollar-centric financial system. It is important to note that the U.S. spared no investment to make this system convenient for all international participants. That is why the U.S. played a major role in establishing the Bretton Woods institutions, where it remains the largest shareholder. In addition, despite growing opportunism within the U.S. establishment, Washington continues to provide core funding for the most important UN institutions, as well as for high-profile research centers, expert commissions and professional associations, regulatory and supervisory bodies servicing international markets for goods and services. Maintaining this global infrastructure requires enormous and sustained financial injections, involving all other countries besides the U.S., even those under its sanctions. Collectively, these investments ensure the inviolability of the dollar standard.

It should be noted that there are no comparable “investments” in any of the existing currency unions, let alone potential ones, including the BRICS grouping, which aspires to a parity role in the global financial system. The existing BRICS financial initiatives, such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the use of national currencies and payment systems for international settlements are too dependent on the dollar and the U.S.-centric financial architecture, making them largely ineffective. Other obstacles to creating a full-fledged BRICS financial system include a lack of trust among BRICS members and an unfavorable balance of payments.

Despite the problems cited above, the BRICS grouping is possibly the only association capable of seriously challenging the unipolar financial system. Overcoming dependence on the U.S. dollar and Western financial institutions seems contingent on creating a fully self-sufficient BRICS interregional financial architecture. It should include banks, stock exchanges, rating agencies, benchmarks for commodity prices and interest rates, auditing, legal and information standards, essentially mirroring all the elements that currently underpin the dollar’s hegemony. The key difference is that this entire architecture would service a common monetary unit that would simultaneously belong to all BRICS members and none individually, i.e. without granting unilateral advantages and privileges, as is the case with the U.S. dollar.

A BRICS interregional currency is a prerequisite for financial multipolarity. However, the successful launch of this megaproject requires carefully designed principles of issuance, supply, distribution and circulation of common liquidity. This must incorporate the latest advances in financial technology and macroprudential regulation, while also considering the civilizational and structural differences among BRICS economies. Achieving this monumental task will clearly require much more resources than those currently available. Yet delaying serious and consistent efforts in this area may push future unproductive costs to an unaffordable level.

Political Events
Political events in the public life of BRICS
Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow, August 21, 2024 (Брифинг официального представителя МИД России Марии Захаровой, Москва, 21 августа 2024 г.) / Russia, August, 2024
Keywords: brics+, mofa, speech
2024-08-21
Russia
Source: mid.ru

Outcomes of Russia’s BRICS chairmanship in the first half of 2024

The year 2024 is a special year for us with Russia acting as BRICS chair. Our chairmanship has entered a decisive phase. More than 130 events have been held at various levels across the three main cooperation areas, including politics and security, the economy and finance, and cultural and humanitarian contacts.

A number of specialised meetings have been held as part of the political bloc, primarily, the meeting of the BRICS foreign ministers in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10-11. An extended session with the participation of representatives from the Global South and the Global East countries, as well as the countries chairing regional organizations, including Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Laos, Mauritania, Thailand, Türkiye, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Vietnam, was held as part of the meeting.

On July 12, Moscow hosted consultations between the heads of information departments of the foreign ministries from our respective countries. Prospects for deepening cooperation with an eye towards strengthening the high standing of BRICS and popularising it came under review.

Coordination between the BRICS countries at international forums, primarily at the UN, continues to make strides. The joint theme-driven statement by the BRICS delegations on the sidelines of the sixth session of the UN Environment Assembly (Nairobi, February 26-March 1) offers a good example.
The BRICS Council on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (April and June), the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group (April and June), the BRICS Working Group on ICT Security (April), and the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) ( July 22-24) were actively engaged in work on other tracks. A position paper containing recommendations for expanding cooperation on these matters was agreed upon following the CTWG meeting.

An international inter-party BRICS and Partner Countries- format forum with the participation of the political forces of the BRICS countries and developing countries was held in Vladivostok on June 17-18.

The 10th BRICS Parliamentary Forum took place in St Petersburg on July 11-12. Its extended sessions were attended by representatives from the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly member states and Chairman of the Interparliamentary Union and Speaker of the Parliament of Tanzania Tulia Ackson. The event revealed great interest in further strengthening the parliamentary component of cooperation within the association. A Protocol to the Memorandum of Understanding on the BRICS Parliamentary Forum was signed and a joint declaration was adopted.

In the economic sphere, the BRICS countries are discussing ways to promote sustainable development, to support the multilateral trading system, and to improve the global financial architecture.

A number of ministerial meetings were held, including meetings of the ministers of tourism (June 20-21), sports (June 22-23), environment (June 28), youth (July 25), economy and trade (July 26), industry (August 16), as well as meetings of the presidents of supreme courts (June 19), senior officials from the prosecution services (June 18-19), heads of space agencies (May 23-24) and heads of emergencies agencies (July 10-11).

Pursuant to the decisions of the 2023 Johannesburg BRICS Summit, the BRICS countries are working on ways to create financial facilities for mutual settlements that are immune to external risks and to increase the share of national currencies in trade and investment transactions. In particular, these issues were discussed at the meetings of BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors on the sidelines of G20 events.

The BRICS Committee of Senior Energy Officials met in February and July to discuss promising areas of cooperation in conventional energy areas and initiatives on energy security and technology cooperation, including the exchange of best practices.

The first meeting of the BRICS Contact Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development initiated by the Russian Chairmanship was held in early April, and its participants confirmed interest in establishing the BRICS Climate Research Platform spearheaded by Russia.

At a meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture held on June 28, the Russian initiative to create a grain trade platform was presented for consideration by the partners. It is designed to help ensure food security of the BRICS countries and, more broadly, the developing countries.

Special focus goes to strengthening BRICS healthcare partnership: the first meeting of the BRICS Working Group on Nuclear Medicine was held in Moscow on February 13, and an expert meeting on launching a Comprehensive Early Warning System for the Risks of Mass Infectious Diseases in BRICS Countries was held on March 27. On June 20-21, the first BRICS Nuclear Medicine Forum was held in St Petersburg. On July 18-19, Rospotrebnadzor held an international conference, Bio-Threats and Pathogens. BRICS Response.

Other significant results include an agreement reached during the first meeting of transport ministers on June 6 to launch a regular interaction mechanism in transport. The first meeting of the heads of geological services from the BRICS countries (July 15-17) discussed prospects for forming the BRICS Geological Platform.

As is customary, cultural and humanitarian cooperation was highlighted. The BRICS International Film Festival (April 19-23), the Academic Forum (May 22-24), the Civic Forum (July 3-4) and many other events with the participation of experts, civil society representatives from our countries, and cultural figures have taken place on this track.

On June 12-23, Kazan hosted the open-format BRICS Sports Games for the first time with the participation of athletes from nearly 90 countries. The sports programme included 27 sports.
The BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22-24 will be the high point of the Russia Year in BRICS. We plan to continue the tradition of holding an expanded BRICS Plus/ Outreach format meeting with the participation of top officials from the leading developing countries.

We expect that, with the active support of our partners, the Russian chairmanship will be marked by outstanding practical results and will make a significant contribution to strengthening the position of BRICS in the international arena.

The 6th BRICS Plus Forum of Young Diplomats

On August 27-31, 2024, Ufa will be hosting the 6th BRICS Young Diplomats Forum. The forum, The Role of Youth Diplomacy in Strengthening Multilateralism for Fairness in Global Development and Security, will be held as part of the Action Plan of Russia’s BRICS Chairmanship.

Organised by the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Council of Young Diplomats, Roscongress Foundation and the Government of Bashkortostan, the event is designed to promote youth cooperation, friendship, and trust between the countries of the Global South and East and the peoples living there.
The participants will benefit from a rich business and cultural programme of the event. During the sessions, they will have profound discussions on international cultural, humanitarian and youth cooperation within BRICS, the group’s role in the global political, financial and economic system, the global security architecture and the evolution of multipolarity.

About 110 delegates from 30-plus countries are expected to attend.

The event will include meetings with senior officials from the Foreign Ministry and the government of Bashkortostan, prominent politicians, economic experts and public figures, winners of the BRICS Olympiads and Games, as well as opportunities to explore the history and culture of this unique region of Russia.

On the last day of the Forum, an official ceremony will be held to admit new members to the International Association of Young Diplomats, established in 2017 at the initiative of the Foreign Ministry’s Council of Young Diplomats. The association aims to strengthen cooperation among young activists of the foreign ministries around the world, and includes more than 150 diplomats.

BRICS Solutions Awards

As part of Russia’s BRICS Chairmanship in 2024, the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, the National Technology Initiative Platform and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation are holding BRICS Solutions Awards – a contest of technological solutions and best practices in various fields among the BRICS countries. The first contest took place in 2020 in the country chairing BRICS, and has been an annual event since.

The purpose of the competition is to develop a system of independent and multipolar cooperation. To do this, it is essential to create, improve and implement new technologies that meet the needs and interests of the BRICS countries.

Participants are to submit their projects in eight categories: New Industry and Energy, Biotechnology and National Health, Sky, Space and Communication Technologies, Artificial Intelligence and Digital Services, Climate and Environmental Technologies, Platforms and End-to-End Solutions for Government and Public Administration, Competencies and Personnel Development, Cognitive Technologies and Creative Economy.

Applications have already been received from Brazil, Egypt, India, China, and South Africa. The New Industry and Energy category seems to be of interest to the majority of contestants, followed by Platforms and End-to-End Solutions for Government and Public Administration.

Applications are accepted until August 30, 2024 at bricsawards.tech. Finalists and winners will be invited to a ceremony at the BRICS Business Forum, which will be held in Moscow in October 2024. The information on the winning projects will be available at the contest organisers and partners’ resources.

Uzbekistan’s intention to join BRICS

The Foreign Ministry has been monitoring statements by various countries expressing their desire to join BRICS and take part in its activities. We are receiving many questions to this effect, and there were quite a few statements on this topic as well.

We treat the sovereign desire by like-minded countries to deepen their cooperation with BRICS with a proper sense of respect. This forms the gist of our position on this matter, and we have openly stated that on numerous occasions.

Committed to strengthening its ties with the representatives of the Global Majority, BRICS follows an open-door vision. As of today, more than 30 countries have expressed interest in forging system-wide ties with BRICS, which offers a vivid example of the fact that the principles governing this format – mutual respect, balance of interests and a consensus-based approach – are very appealing.

New participants joined this association on January 1, 2024, and in this context we are paying special attention to ensuring that they organically integrate in all the strategic partnership mechanisms while enabling BRICS to keep moving forward at the same pace and effectively promote our cooperation.
In keeping with the resolutions as adopted by the BRICS leaders in Johannesburg on August 22-24, 2023, we are coordinating modalities for creating a new category for state partners and compiling a list of potential candidates for this status. The BRICS leaders will hear a report on these efforts at the Kazan Summit on October 22-24, 2024.

Let me remind you that the agenda of the Kazan Summit includes an expanded session in the outreach / BRICS-plus format, and senior government officials from the leading developing countries will be invited to attend it. It is our hope that this event offers a good opportunity for discussing urgent international matters, including the emergence of a new world order with better justice for all, and efforts to strengthen cooperation between BRICS and the countries of the Global South and East, while enhancing their international role.

I would like to set this vision against bloc-based discipline, mindset and framework. Why is there so much setting these two visions apart? As an association of states, BRICS is guided in its efforts by the principles of mutual respect and consensus, which rules out any attempts to dictate one’s will or impose any totalitarian administrative and oversight practices. That said, there is a different kind of approach to international relations.

Question: What does Moscow think about Azerbaijan’s decision to apply for joining BRICS?

Maria Zakharova: I started my introductory remarks during this briefing by summing up the outcomes of an important part of Russia’s BRICS chairmanship, as we are entering its final stage and preparing for its culminating event, the Kazan Summit.

In particular, I talked in general terms about how Russia and the entire BRICS family view the multiple requests we have been receiving for joining our association or working with it.
World of Work
SOCIAL POLICY, TRADE UNIONS, ACTIONS
Nizhny Novgorod Hosts 8th BRICS Industry Ministers’ Meeting (В Нижнем Новгороде прошла 8-я встреча министров промышленности стран БРИКС) / Russia, August, 2024
Keywords: summit, top_level_meeting
2024-08-19
Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

The 8th BRICS Industry Ministers’ Meeting took place in Nizhny Novgorod on 16 August 2024. The meeting was attended by Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov, Ethiopian Minister of Industry Melaku Alebel, Acting Brazilian Minister of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services Marcio Rosa, UAE Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry and Advanced Technology Omar Suwaina Alsuwaidi, Chinese Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology Xin Guobin, Iranian Deputy Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade Mohammad Mousavi, Economic Adviser on Industrial Policy of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry Agrim Kaushal, Acting Deputy Director for Industrial Development of the South African Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Competition Thandi Simise, Egyptian Deputy Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia Ahmed Riad, Member of the Board (Minister) for Industry and Agriculture of the Eurasian Economic Commission Goar Barseghyan, UNIDO Deputy Director General and Managing Director of the Directorate for Technical Cooperation and Sustainable Industrial Development Zou Ciyong, and Nizhny Novgorod Region Governor Gleb Nikitin.

The meeting was held in an expanded format for the first time, which provided additional opportunities for a constructive dialogue about all issues on the international industrial agenda.

“The expansion of BRICS is a natural process in the establishment of a new multipolar world order. Today, the countries of our group account for almost 34% of the globe’s territory and more than 45% of the world’s population. According to the World Bank, in 2023, BRICS made a 36% contribution to global GDP in purchasing power parity, while the share of G7 countries decreased to 29%. Our mutual trade is actively developing. Russia’s total trade turnover with BRICS countries in 2023, i.e., even before the association expanded, grew by almost 28% and approached the mark of USD 300 billion,” Alikhanov said.

Cooperation as part of the BRICS New Industrial Revolution Partnership is a promising area of collaboration among BRICS countries. Agreements have been reached on the substantive preparation of initiatives in the chemical industry, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, the mining sector and metallurgy, and smart manufacturing and robotics.

“It’s worth noting a number of other formats of our cooperation. In particular, the initiative to create a BRICS Industrial Competence Centre based on UNIDO. This work has been underway for several years. Today, we are already at the finish line. The necessary documentation has been drafted and a special project team has been formed within UNIDO, which will be responsible for the centre’s activities. Russia, China, and India have already officially confirmed their readiness to issue the first tranches to finance joint work,” Alikhanov said.

In addition, the heads of the attending delegations visited the expositions of the BRICS Forum of Creative Territories and Manufacturers of High-Tech Industrial Products. The stand of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade presented the Promobot M13 six-axis collaborative manipulator, the X4+KZ innovative energy-saving transformer, Geropharm insulins, the latest generation RC10 collaborative robot, and others.

The Roscongress Foundation manages the events of Russia’s BRICS Chairship.
China’s poverty reduction experience can inspire Thailand (Опыт Китая в борьбе с бедностью может вдохновить Таиланд) / China, August, 2024
Keywords: economic_challenges, expert_opinion, social_issues
2024-08-20
China
Source: www.globaltimes.cn

Editor's Note:
When attending a press conference on Sunday, Thailand's new Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who was sworn in that day, emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong and enduring relationship between Thailand and China. "We hope to do more with China," she noted. With China and Thailand mutually exempting visas and Thailand applying to join BRICS, cooperation between the two countries continues to deepen. Global Times (GT) reporter Qian Jiayin interviewed Korn Dabbaransi (Dabbaransi), former deputy prime minister of Thailand and current president of the Thai-Chinese Friendship Association, to discuss what the driving force behind China-Thailand friendly relations is and what positive impacts cooperation between the two countries can bring.

GT: Next year will mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of China-Thailand diplomatic relations. People often say "China and Thailand are one family" when referring to the relationship between the two countries. Why do you think this phrase is used to describe the relationship between the two countries?

Dabbaransi: Friendly exchanges between China and Thailand began over 1,000 years ago. Back then, the Tai Lue people from Sipsongpanna (now Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Southwest China's Yunnan Province) migrated by the Mekong River to a place now known as Chiang Rai next to Chiang Mai. After 300 years in Chiang Rai, they moved to establish the Kingdom of Thailand in Sukhothai, then on to Ayutthaya, Thonburi and eventually Bangkok. The Kingdom of Thailand was established in Sukhothai over 780 years ago. Since then, ethnic Chinese people have been living in Thailand and intermarrying with the locals. Due to this history, Thai and Chinese still have this deep sense of being one family.

GT: You first visited China in 1975 and witnessed the country's economic development. How do you evaluate China's development in the past few decades? In your opinion, what development experiences from China can inspire Thailand?

Dabbaransi: In 1975, during my first visit to China, I was a member of the first government delegation from Thailand to China as a secretary to the foreign minister. This visit gave me the opportunity to look around the city of Beijing, and study the culture, the government and the economy of China for the first time in my life. In the past 49 years and 159 visits to China, I have accumulated so many personal meetings with leaders of the Chinese government.

From my own personal observation, the most important turning point of China was in 1978. That was when Deng Xiaoping announced the new national policy. The private sector was allowed to establish itself in the business sector. Also, foreign investors and foreign technology were welcome in China. After reform and opening-up was declared, the economy and GDP of China surged like never before.

Shenzhen is an example that I have witnessed. I was invited to visit Shenzhen in 1978. There was no airport in Shenzhen then, and we had to go by train from Guangzhou. I still remember that Shenzhen was completely empty. We were asking ourselves: Why did the Chinese leader want us to come to Shenzhen? Finally, 40 years later I found the answer.

After Deng, the Chinese leaders also adhered to the policy of reform and opening-up. This also helped China implement poverty alleviation plans. When President Xi Jinping invited friends from around the world to attend the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China in Beijing in 2021, he proudly announced the success of the poverty alleviation program in China.

I have to admit that, as a Thai, the successful poverty alleviation experience in China is worth learning from, and can inspire us all.

GT: Since the mutual visa exemption agreement between China and Thailand took effect in March, the exchange of tourists between the two countries has been steadily increasing. How do you view the "two-way efforts" of tourists between China and Thailand? With the increased convenience of people-to-people exchanges between the two countries, what impact does it have on cultural exchanges?

Dabbaransi: I'm very happy because the mutual visa-free policy can further strengthen the friendly relationship between both sides. It has become so natural for the people of our two countries to capitalize on the visa-free opportunity to enhance trade and travel traffic. Exchange programs on culture and education have dramatically increased in both quality and quantity.

The visa-free status has also helped Thailand's economy. This agreement allows Chinese tourists to come to Thailand in a more convenient manner. For China, this policy will also encourage Thai tourists to visit China and increase China's tourism and related industry revenue. Trade and investment statistics between China and Thailand will also experience an upsurge.

GT: Thailand has become the first Southeast Asian country to apply to join the BRICS. Previously, Thailand expressed a desire to become a member of the BRICS on multiple occasions. What qualities of BRICS does Thailand find attractive?

Dabbaransi: For Thailand, peace must come first before we can move on to other agendas. One can never reach prosperity unless your country is at peace. Within the family of BRICS, peace seems to be the common platform for all BRICS members, especially China. This coincides with Thai policy.

I have to emphasize, within the BRICS group, China is closest to us geographically. Some of the concepts proposed by China in its development are quite in line with the policy of Thailand. Especially since China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has become clear to me what China was trying to say to the world. The BRI is a Belt of Peace and a Road of Prosperity. And that's why we believe that once we join BRICS, and become a member, it will be mutually beneficial for BRICS and Thailand. 

Thailand's application to join the BRICS family will clearly show our ASEAN neighbors that Thailand simply seeks to be a part of a peaceful group of nations. I also heard that other members of ASEAN are also moving in the same direction as Thailand.

GT: Thailand is a participating country in the BRI and has officially applied to join the BRICS organization. Despite this, some Western countries consistently criticize these collaborations. Why do you think the West is badmouthing cooperation among developing countries? How does increased cooperation among Global South countries affect the current international order?

Dabbaransi: Thailand is a small, developing country. We still need time to raise our economic standards for the well-being of our people. In Thailand, we see that in order for our country to have a bright future in the international arena, we need to have friendly cooperation with our friends in the international network. And as I said earlier, there must be peace first before we can achieve any kind of economic prosperity.

The countries in ASEAN have been working together on this friendly and peaceful cooperation since 1967. I have attended ASEAN meetings many times, representing my country. The harmony of the meetings has always been very friendly, cooperative and constructive. I believe the friendly harmony of ASEAN would blend well into the BRICS family. After all, peace is the key factor that holds all of us together. Furthermore, I see this peaceful harmony of ASEAN and BRICS families will send a loud and clear message to the rest of the world.
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