Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

To assess the foreign policy preferences of potential BRICS partners, it is interesting to look at their voting in the UN General Assembly. It is clear that their results should not be taken as absolutes, and the real political practice of states is not limited to voting results and is not determined by them. But these votes are also symbolically quite important, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.

The 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan was the first after the expansion of BRICS; the decision had been announced a year earlier in South Africa. In the time interval between the summits, a number of countries made statements about their interest in BRICS and their intention to join the group. Therefore, the topic of expansion was in the public media before the Kazan summit. At the same time, before the meeting in Kazan, the official representatives of a number of BRICS member countries, including Russia, made statements that at this stage it was decided to take a break from further expansion. As a result, at the summit in Kazan it was announced that BRICS was forming a circle of BRICS partner states, and that invitations would be sent to a number of countries to join them.

Their list was not officially published, but immediately after the summit, there was information in the media that invitations to become BRICS partners could have been sent to 13 countries: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

At the end of December 2024, the aide to the President of Russia, Yuri Ushakov, said that invitations to become BRICS partners have been accepted by the leaders of 9 countries: Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan. All of them are included in the informal list that appeared immediately after the summit. Four countries from that list (Algeria, Vietnam, Nigeria and Turkey) were not included in this official confirmation. Also at the end of December, the representative of Brazil (the country holding the BRICS presidency in 2025) stated that the final list of BRICS partners would be officially announced in early 2025.

To assess the foreign policy preferences of potential BRICS partners, it is interesting to look at their voting in the UN General Assembly. It is clear that their results should not be taken as absolutes, and the real political practice of states is not limited to voting results and is not determined by them. But these votes are also symbolically quite important. Earlier, we already addressed the practice of voting in the UN General Assembly among the “old” and new BRICS members.

In the period 2022-24, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions against two BRICS members - Russia and Iran. Let's see how potential partner countries voted on them.

The following resolutions were adopted on Russia in 2022-24. At the 11th UNGA Emergency Special Session:

• ES-11/1 of March 2, 2022. The first resolution after the start of the conflict. Characterizing the actions of the Russian Federation as "aggression against Ukraine";
• ES-11/2 of March 24, 2022. Humanitarian consequences of the conflict;
• ES-11/3 of April 7, 2022. Suspension of the Russian Federation's membership in the UN Human Rights Council;
• ES-11/4 of October 12, 2022. Territorial integrity of Ukraine (after referendums on the accession of four new entities to the Russian Federation);
• ES-11/5 of November 14, 2022. Compensation for damage and reparations to Ukraine;
• ES-11/6 of February 23, 2023. Principles of the UN Charter underlying the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Adopted on the anniversary of the conflict.

In addition to these, the following resolutions were adopted at ordinary sessions of the UN General Assembly:

• on human rights in Crimea and the new territories: 77/229 December 15. 2022; 78/221 of December 19, 2023 and 79/184 December 17, 2024;
• on the Zaporizhzhya NPP: 78/316 of July 11, 2024.

Regarding Iran, since 1985, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions on human rights in this country almost every year. In the last three years, the following resolutions have been adopted: 77/228 of December 2022; 78/220 of December 19, 2023 and 79/183 of December 17, 2024.

Here we see a sufficient difference in approaches to Russia. Russia is supported, first of all, by two countries: these are Belarus and Cuba. Then there is a group of countries that abstain in most cases, but sometimes can support Russia. These are Algeria, Bolivia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uganda has always abstained. The next group of countries opposed Russia in about a third of cases. These are Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Thailand. Turkey stands out here, having voted for all 10 anti-Russian resolutions. Moreover, Turkey was the only country here that spoke out for the resolution after being invited to become a BRICS partner.

The situation is different with Iran. The level of its support is higher. None of the 13 countries voted for anti-Iranian resolutions during the same period of 2022-24. Six countries have always supported Iran (Belarus, Bolivia, Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia, Uzbekistan). Two countries (Algeria and Kazakhstan) either supported Iran or abstained. Five countries (Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda) always abstained or did not vote. This situation correlates to a sufficient degree with the results of voting on these resolutions by BRICS members. With regard to anti-Russian resolutions, there was also a difference in approaches. And with regard to Iran, there was also more open solidarity with this state on the part of the “old” BRICS members. But, again, we should not exaggerate these votes and their impact on real relations within BRICS, which, according to the declarations of BRICS summits, are defined as a strategic partnership.

South Africa
Source: www.iol.co.za

Can 2025 shock South Africa’s Left into cohesion, or is it too late?With the Democratic Alliance (DA) holding significant influence and neoliberal policies shaping its direction, the GNU has become a symbol of recolonisation, undermining the very ideals that once inspired South Africa’s liberation movements.

In 2024, South Africa’s fragile political landscape unravelled under the weight of the Government of National Unity (GNU). Far from the stabilising force it was claimed to be, the GNU has exposed the depths of neoliberal encroachment on the country’s sovereignty. With the Democratic Alliance (DA) holding significant influence and neoliberal policies shaping its direction, the GNU has become a symbol of recolonisation, undermining the very ideals that once inspired South Africa’s liberation movements. For the African National Congress (ANC), it is a complete capitulation to global capital’s demands.

Touted as a rainbow coalition, the GNU consolidates power for neoliberal interests under the pretence of inclusivity and governance. The privatisation of Eskom epitomises this betrayal, placing the nation’s critical infrastructure in private hands while deepening inequality. This move, framed as a pragmatic solution to South Africa’s energy crisis, is a clear indication of how the GNU serves foreign interests. Western financial institutions and US-aligned development agencies have embedded their agendas into the country’s economic policies, reframing domination as stability.

The ANC’s role in enabling this is undeniable. It has long since traded its revolutionary aspirations for the management of neoliberal governance. For some, this outcome is not surprising; the ANC’s history of compromise, from its negotiations during the transition to democracy, has always suggested a party more comfortable with moderating than dismantling existing power structures. The GNU simply formalises the ANC’s transformation into a custodian of global capital, a party now indistinguishable from the forces it once sought to overthrow.

The fractured state of South Africa’s left, which should be at the forefront of resisting the GNU, compounds this crisis. Instead of uniting against the neoliberal recolonisation of the country, the left remains deeply divided. The Economic Freedom Fighters’ (EFF) decision to attack Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP) is a tragic reminder of the factionalism that undermines any collective resistance. At a time when the left should be advancing a unified alternative, internal conflicts dominate the political space.

The MKP, established in 2023, is an attempt to reclaim the revolutionary principles that the ANC has long abandoned. Rooted in the legacy of the original uMkhonto we Sizwe, the MKP advocates for radical land reform, collective ownership, and a realignment with BRICS to challenge Western dominance. Its unapologetically Africanist agenda has made it a target—not just of neoliberal forces but also of the EFF, which has inexplicably chosen to alienate rather than ally with the MKP.
Julius Malema's media attacks on the MKP reflect a disturbing pivot for the EFF. Once a party at the forefront of radical transformation, the EFF has shifted toward populist pragmatism, prioritising incremental gains over systemic change. This drift has alienated sections of its base that saw it as the vanguard of African nationalism. Many EFF heavyweights have joined MKP as a result of this shift. Malema’s woundedness has culminated in his public campaign against the MKP. More than a political misstep; it reveals the extent to which personal ambitions and factional rivalries have taken precedence over shared ideological goals. This is a failure that has weakened the broader left at a time when it cannot afford such fractures.

BRICS offers a potential, albeit complex, avenue for cohesion within the African nationalist left. As an alliance that challenges the dominance of US-led global capitalism, BRICS could serve as a counterweight to the neoliberal order. For the MKP, alignment with BRICS represents a rejection of Western interference and a commitment to building a multipolar world. Through partnerships with countries like China, Russia, and Brazil, BRICS provides a platform for reimagining economic sovereignty and development outside the constraints of Western financial institutions.

The ANC’s engagement with BRICS, however, is riddled with contradictions. While it publicly aligns with BRICS’s multipolar ambitions, its policies remain closely tied to Western capital. This duality undermines the potential of BRICS to function as a transformative force in South Africa’s political economy. By remaining entangled with Western financial systems, the ANC dilutes the power of BRICS as an alternative framework for sovereignty and development. The MKP, in contrast, has embraced BRICS as central to its vision of breaking free from the neoliberal constraints imposed by the West.

The potential for BRICS to unify the African nationalist left lies in its ability to provide a shared economic and political strategy that transcends regional and ideological divisions. Through BRICS, African nations could collaborate on projects that centre land reform, infrastructure development, and resource nationalisation—all core tenets of the MKP’s platform. Yet, for BRICS to be more than an abstract hope, its members must commit to realising its multipolar vision. South Africa’s current leadership, locked in the neoliberal constraints of the GNU, lacks the ideological clarity to fully leverage the potential of BRICS.

The influence of South Africa's Western-serving 'left' further complicates these dynamics. Through its dominance of NGOs, think tanks, and faux progressive media platforms, the Western 'left' has positioned itself as a gatekeeper in African politics. It strategically marginalises radical movements like the MKP, portraying them as impractical or extremist while prioritising reformist poverty alleviation projects that perpetuate dependency on Western aid. The MKP’s alignment with BRICS challenges the intellectual and financial dominance of the Western 'left', making it a target for delegitimisation within global 'progressive' narratives.

The GNU has entrenched these fractures within the African left, leaving unity as a distant goal. While grassroots mobilisation offers some hope, the path to cohesion remains fraught. Movements rooted in ubuntu and collective action must reclaim the Africanist ideals sidelined by neoliberalism. The MKP’s commitment to radical transformation could serve as a rallying point, but this would require the EFF and ANC to engage in meaningful dialogue. For the EFF, this means abandoning factionalism and recommitting to African nationalism. For the ANC, it requires confronting its entanglements with Western financial systems and rediscovering whatever revolutionary spirit it might still possess.
As 2025 begins, South Africa stands at a critical crossroads. The GNU has entrenched neoliberal policies, deepened inequality, and eroded sovereignty. Without a cohesive left, the DA’s dominance will continue unchecked, and the ANC will remain complicit in the country’s recolonisation. The EFF’s attacks on the MKP have weakened the left’s prospects for unity but also highlight the urgency of overcoming these divisions. BRICS, despite its complexities, could offer a framework for solidarity within the African nationalist left, but only if its potential is embraced with conviction.

The future of South Africa depends on the left’s ability to reject Western dominance, rebuild solidarity, and reclaim its revolutionary purpose. If these opportunities are not seized, recolonisation will no longer be an abstract threat but a lived reality. BRICS could provide the cohesion necessary to counter the neoliberal order, but it remains to be seen whether South Africa’s fractured left can rise to the challenge.

* Gillian Schutte is a film-maker, and a well-known social justice and race-justice activist and public intellectual.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

USA
Source: www.project-syndicate.org

Following the addition of new members to the BRICS, some observers believe that the group has a good chance of becoming the new lodestar of global politics and international affairs. But the organization is neither representative enough nor sufficiently united to lead others.

CAMBRIDGE – One question that 2025 may begin to answer is whether the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) is becoming the new center of power in world politics. Now that the group has added new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates) and come to represent 45% of the world population, some believe that it is consolidating the (misleadingly named) “Global South” and posing a serious challenge to American and Western power. But I remain skeptical of such claims.

When Jim O’Neill (then the chief economist at Goldman Sachs) coined the “BRIC” acronym in 2001, his aim was simply to identify the four emerging economies that were most likely to dominate global economic growth by 2050. But the label soon acquired a political valence. It became an informal diplomatic grouping at the 2006 United Nations General Assembly, and then a formal organization with the first BRIC Summit in 2009. Hosted in Russia, the focus then – as it is now – was on advancing a multipolar world order. At the end of the following year, the group got its “S” when South Africa joined.

A Wall Street asset class evolved into an international organization partly because it aligned with Russia’s and China’s own aspirations to lead the developing world. The BRICS 16th summit in Russia in October 2024 was the first to include its new members (Saudi Arabia has not yet decided whether to accept the group’s invitation to join, and Argentina’s new government declined). Some 36 national leaders attended, as did representatives from many international organizations, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and Turkey used the occasion to present its own application for membership.

The 2024 summit focused on fostering ties across the Global South and building a multipolar world, with Russian President Vladimir Putin using the occasion to demonstrate his global diplomatic relevance despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

With more countries showing an interest in joining, it looks like the BRICS could indeed present itself as a leader of the resistance to the US-dominated international order. Some even see it as the successor to the Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement, whose members refused to choose between the United States and the Soviet Union. But while NAM had a shared interest in resisting the US, it did not have Russia and China as founding members.

In any case, the BRICS is unlikely to succeed in formally organizing the “Global South.” Not only do its largest and most important members – China, India, and Russia – all lie north of the equator, but the three are competing for leadership.

Russia and China do have a common interest in countering what they see as an American threat, and they have declared an “alliance without limits.” But such slogans mask major differences in their strategic perspectives. While Russia took vast swaths of territory from China in the nineteenth century, when the Qing dynasty was weak, China’s economy is now ten times the size of Russia’s. Both countries are vying for influence in Central Asia, and China is uneasy about Russia’s recruitment of its neighbor North Korea to fight in Ukraine.

An even more important limit on the BRICS as an organization is the rivalry between China and India, which is now the world’s most populous country. Although China is much wealthier than India, it is experiencing demographic decline (like Russia), while India’s population and workforce continue to grow.

Moreover, China and India share a disputed boundary in the Himalayas – where their forces have clashed repeatedly – and the situation is further complicated by China’s traditional friendship with Pakistan. In fact, an abiding concern about China is one reason why India participates in the BRICS in the first place. While it avoids formal alliances, it has also stepped up its participation in “the Quad” (which includes the US, Japan, and Australia) for the same reason.

Rather than making the BRICS stronger, the admission of new members merely imports more rivalries. Egypt and Ethiopia are locked in a dispute over a dam that Ethiopia is building on the Nile River, and Iran has long-standing disputes with the UAE and prospective member Saudi Arabia. Far from making the BRICS more effective, these new intra-organizational rivalries will hamper its efforts. The Group of 77 developing countries has even more members, and it is chronically limited by internal divisions.

At their 2024 summit, BRICS+ discussed matters such as economic and security cooperation, promotion of cultural exchanges, and joint development projects focused on infrastructure and sustainability. But such talk usually does not yield significant results. In 2014, the group established the New Development Bank, which is headquartered in Shanghai; but the institution has had only modest results to date.

Likewise, the group’s stated intention of avoiding the dollar and clearing more of its members’ bilateral trade in their own currencies has made only limited headway. Any serious attempt to replace the dollar as a global reserve currency would require China to back the renminbi with deep, flexible capital markets and the rule of law – and those conditions are nowhere close to being met.
So, what is the BRICS good for? As a means of escaping diplomatic isolation, it is certainly useful to Russia. As a diplomatic device for projecting leadership of the developing world, it also has been useful to China. As a channel through which to counterbalance China, it has its uses for India. And as a modest stage for touting national development, it has sometimes been useful to Brazil and South Africa. But do these functions make it a new fulcrum of world politics? I think not.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

On January 6^th, 2025 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil (a country that holds the chairmanship in the BRICS this year) declared that Indonesia has joined the BRICS bloc as a full-fledged member[1]. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China has officially congratulated Indonesia on becoming a member of the BRICS grouping[2]. China also noted the active role played by Indonesia in the development of the BRICS+ format that served as a key driver of subsequent BRICS expansion and outreach to the broader community of Global South nations. Both Brazil’s and China’s statements referred to the importance of Indonesia in the closer cooperation of the economies of the Global South. Indonesia, being the fourth largest economy in the world by population is also a member of the G20 and is in the top-20 of the world’s largest countries by GDP.

The expansion in the BRICS core that took place in 2023 during the BRICS summit in South Africa was put on hold in 2024 as the BRICS economies focused on the creation of the new partnership belt. Indonesia became one of the BRICS partner countries from the start of 2025, but in less than a week its earlier request to join BRICS as a full-fledged member was granted, with Indonesia thus becoming the tenth economy to join the grouping.

There are several implications of Indonesia’s entry into BRICS in the beginning of 2025 for the world economy. Firstly, Indonesia’s membership translates into BRICS expanding into one of the most dynamic regions of the world economy, namely Southeast Asia – before 2025 this was essentially the only major region of the Global South without BRICS core membership.

Another consequence of Indonesia’s accession is the possibility of closer relations between BRICS and ASEAN – in fact, within the partnership belt ASEAN has the highest number of members compared to other regions and integration blocs from the Global South. With Thailand and Malaysia accepting invitations to join BRICS as members of the partnership belt, further momentum to join BRICS may come from the other heavyweights in the ASEAN regional bloc. Closer linkages between ASEAN and BRICS have been among the main focus themes in the research of BRICS+ Analytics in the past several years[3][4][5].

With Indonesia joining BRICS, we expect ASEAN’s economic agenda to receive greater prominence in the priorities advanced by BRICS. In particular, more focus may be placed on issues pertaining to trade liberalization and cooperation among the regional blocs of the BRICS core economies. At this stage, there is still no clear road-map for either of these two tracks of economic cooperation within the BRICS+ circle. As we argued previously, closer ties between ASEAN and BRICS may render the latter more open to building linkages with advanced economies, their regional blocs and development institutions.

Indonesia’s membership in the BRICS takes the bloc’s share in the world’s population to nearly 47% and to more than 50% if the partnership circle of BRICS economies is included. Within the G20, Indonesia’s accession raises BRICS core representation in the global G20 platform to 6 economies, translating into a majority of the non-Western economies (10 national economies as well as the African Union as a regional bloc). It also further increases the share of BRICS in international economic organizations such as the IMF, where the BRICS core economies together with the partnership belt have more than 15% of the vote.

For Indonesia, BRICS membership will provide a platform for advancing its key development priorities across the Global South. It will also strengthen the country’s regional role by providing it with opportunities to advance ASEAN priorities within the BRICS development agenda. Closer economic linkages with BRICS economies will also create more scope for trade and investment diversification with partners from the Global South through boosting South-South economic cooperation.

In the end, as we expected in our preview of Brazil’s BRICS chairmanship for 2025[6], BRICS continues to be in expansion mode after the approval of the entry of new members during the BRICS 2023 summit in South Africa. Further news-flow on BRICS expansion later this year will concern the composition of the BRICS partnership belt and further trajectories of the bloc’s enlargement that may be unveiled during the BRICS summit in Brazil later this year.

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Brazil's government said in a statement on Monday that Indonesia is formally joining BRICS as a full member, further expanding the group of major emerging economies that also includes Russia, India, China and South Africa, Reuters reports.

Indonesia, the world's fourth most-populous nation, had previously expressed its desire to join the group as a means of strengthening emerging countries and furthering the interests of the so-called Global South.

Brazil, which holds the bloc's presidency in 2025, said the member states approved Indonesia's entry by consensus as part of an expansion push initially approved at the bloc's 2023 summit in Johannesburg.

The South American nation noted that Indonesia's bid got the green light from the bloc in 2023 but the Asian country asked to join following the presidential election held last year. President Prabowo Subianto took office in October.

"Indonesia shares with the other members of the group support for the reform of global governance institutions, and contributes positively to the deepening of cooperation in the Global South," the Brazilian government said.

Earlier, both Malaysia and Thailand announced that they had formally applied for BRICS membership. Malaysia’s Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli said that the country’s application was “centered on building economic partnerships, strengthening trade ties, and expanding our growth potential.”

Back in May, 2024 Thai government spokesperson Chai Wacharonke said that BRICS membership would “benefit Thailand in many dimensions, including enhancing the country’s role in the international arena and increasing its opportunities to co-create a new world order,” according to the Bangkok Post.

Indonesia and three Southeast Asian neighbors – Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand –were among 13 nations that joined yesterday as partner countries, the others being Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. The BRICS group also includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

The economies of the current BRICS member states collectively make up about 28 percent of the global economy.