Russia
Source: mid.ru

Press release on the 2025 BRICS+ Counter-Terrorism Conference in Moscow

On 3-4 December 2025 under the auspices of the MFA of Russia Moscow is hosting the 2025 BRICS+ Counter-Terrorism Conference: National and Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies Amid Emerging Security Challenges and Threats.

The conference will bring together representatives of BRICS+ relevant authorities, civil society and academia engaged in extensive studies on counter-terrorism and anti-extremism. Experts from UN, CIS, SCO, and CSTO are also joining the discussions.

The discussion, inter alia, is centered around countering the financing of terrorism, the use of modem information and communication technologies for illegal purposes, combating extremism and attempts to radicalize population. The delegates will separately focus on various theoretical and methodological aspects of the eradication of terrorism, exchange assessments of threats to security at the national, regional and global levels in the context of current geopolitical realities, and share their accumulated experience and effective counter-terrorism practices.

The conference is designed to complement the joint efforts of the association Member countries undertaken within the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) and to further strengthen relevant cooperation on the solid basis of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2020), the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (2021), and the CTWG Position Paper (2024).

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Before he met Xi Jinping in South Korea, Donald Trump declared in his usual bombastic style: “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!” He implied that the meeting was between the world’s two dominant powers, responsible for setting the global agenda.

This G2 hype was misplaced because Trump and Xi were meeting to sort out bilateral issues, not to address wider regional or global ones, stresses Kanwal Sibal, a distinguished Indian diplomat and former Foreign Secretary of India, he served as Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France, and Russia.
On the Chinese side, the rhetoric against the US has been quite harsh in recent months over issues of US tariffs, trade wars, and technology denials. The Chinese retaliated by ceasing to buy soya beans and corn from the US and, more painfully, by imposing strict restrictions and controls on exports of rare earths, including rare earth magnets, whose processing and production China practically monopolises.

Trump may claim that the meeting with Xi was a great success, but the reality is that the issues dividing the two countries have not been resolved durably. Both sides have agreed to suspend the measures they had taken against each other for one year only. They will review whether the agreements are implemented in good faith.

The US has reduced tariffs on China to 47%, rolled back port fees on Chinese ships docking in US ports, and paused for one year the “50 percent ownership rule” for Chinese-owned vessels. Reciprocal countermeasures by China on US vessels have also been suspended.

China has agreed to resume the purchase of soya beans from the US, much to Trump’s relief, as the interests of US farmers in Republican states were being seriously hurt. This had become a political problem for Trump. Interestingly, China has eased restrictions on exports of only 5 of the 12 rare earth elements.

The Trump–Xi meeting was far from a G2 dialogue, especially given the absence of any discussion on Chinese purchases of Russian oil. Trump admitted that he did not raise the issue, despite the US imposing sanctions on two major Russian oil companies — Rosneft and Lukoil — and maintaining the punitive 25% tariffs on India for buying Russian oil. Clearly, Trump judged that he would not get any positive response from China. Trump discussed the Ukraine conflict with Xi, but without pressing China to stop buying Russian oil. The argument that purchasing Russian oil helps finance Russia’s military operations in Ukraine — an argument used against India — does not apply to China. A true G2 would have involved some meeting of minds on the Ukraine issue, too, at Russia’s expense, but this did not happen.

Any G2 would also require a US–China understanding on the future of Taiwan. But Trump said that the Taiwan issue was not discussed with Xi.

Russia, which is also a Pacific power, will not accept a US–China G2. Russia wants to develop its eastern regions, and as it does so, it will fortify its defensive presence in the Pacific. The Arctic route, which Russia dominates and China eyes, gives Russia a strategic advantage, quite apart from its military capabilities, including the recent testing of highly advanced missiles.

India, too — with its rising economic profile, growing military capacities, and ambitions for a bigger role in global governance — will not accept a G2. The logic of a G2 would involve the US and China agreeing to subordinate India’s role in Asia and beyond to their own overriding interests. India has repeatedly stated its support for multipolarity, with the caveat that Asia must be multipolar as a prerequisite.

The agenda of BRICS, the SCO, and the IBSA forum (India–Brazil–South Africa) is geared toward multipolarity. The issues of UN reform — especially of the UN Security Council — and reform of international financial institutions revolve around more equitable distribution of power within the international system, and a greater say for developing countries in global governance. This entails an erosion of traditional Western hegemony, including that of the US.

Talk that the US now wants to concentrate on hemispheric defence and extricate itself from obligations in other parts of the world, including Europe, is not in line with Trumpian ambitions to “Make America Great Again,” nor with threats to resume nuclear testing and to force Europe, Japan, South Korea, and others to heavily invest in the US — a demand they will only accept if the US remains committed to their security.

Multipolarity does not imply that all poles will be equal in power or influence. Power differentials will remain. Rather, it means that the US and China — as a so-called G2 — will not be able to impose decisions on issues of global importance solely on the basis of their bilateral understandings.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

India is set to benefit from a proposed grain exchange among BRICS, which is seen as an alternative to CME, the US based futures trading platform. Simultaneously Brazil has been pushing its proposal for creation of a multilateral stockpile of grains within BRICS to reduce external market reliance, ‘The Hindu Business Line’ writes.

The US decision to hike import tariff to use it as a weapon so that other countries accept its terms for any bilateral trade agreement, has revived activities within BRICS to meet the deadline of the roll out of the Russian and Brazillian proposals, at least on pilot basis, sources said.

In September, during visit of Russian deputy prime minister Dmitri Patrushev to New Delhi, he discussed with India’s prime minister Narendra Modi about the grain exchange plan as Russia is keen to see a roll out of pilot next year and a full fledged launch in 2027, sources said.

Russian officials have been pointing out to their BRICS partners about alleged biases on platforms like Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which owns CBOT and NYMEX, and a BRICS exchange can save them $2.5 billion annually, the sources said.

Russia has proposed that such a platform can start with wheat, corn and barley, but oilseeds, legumes, rice, soybeans could be added later. It has stressed that if created, the exchange will align with WTO.

On the other hand, Brazil has been pushing India, which has some reservations, to agree to its plan for the BRICS Food Security Reserve “to bolster collective resilience against global supply disruptions, price volatility, and climate shocks”.

As pilot programmes have been proposed for select commodities, to be funded by the New Development Bank (NDB), with a full implementation targeted during 2026–2028, the grain reserve issue may come up at BRICS ministerial meeting on New Investment Platform scheduled October 30, the sources said.

“After the tariff hike, exports of BRICS to the US have started receiving the impact and significant drop in agri commodities shipments will further push these countries work together,” said an expert. However, the recent decision of China to again stop export of fertilisers has sent a wrong message within the BRICS, the expert added.

Launched during Brazil’s 2025 BRICS chairmanship, the grain reserve proposal complements the Russia’s Grain Exchange proposal by focusing on physical reserves. It was endorsed in the April 2025 joint ministerial declaration, positioning BRICS as a leader in food sovereignty.

BRICS (with expanded membership of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and UAE), accounts for nearly 45 per cent of global grain production and 25 per cent of exports, and trade potential within BRICS estimated at over $1 trillion per year. Sources said that Brazil, a top exporter of soybeans and corn, has conveyed that it is well positioned to maintain the reserve to address vulnerabilities such as India’s import dependency within the block.


read more in our Telegram-channel https://t.me/The_International_Affairs

Italy
Source: www.renewablematter.eu

BRICS at a crossroads: mutual recognition or Article 6? Between national ETS (emissions trading schemes) and voluntary credits, intra-BRICS cooperation can redesign the economy of emissions, challenging Western leadership in climate diplomacy

Relatively little attention was paid in the Western media to the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, in 2024. Within the course of that summit, the BRICS Partnership on Carbon Markets was launched through a memorandum of understanding between member countries. The final Kazan declaration referred to the partnership as a platform for discussing “potential intra-BRICS cooperation on carbon markets to exchange views on potential cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement among the BRICS countries.”

A number of press agencies reported the news, adding that the memorandum would serve as the basis for developing a joint credit generation programme, though this was never confirmed in the official texts.

The 2024 memorandum of understanding subsequently resurfaced in the final declaration of the 17th BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro in 2025. In it, the focus shifted to possible “cooperative approaches” within BRICS under the Paris Agreement, wording that would seem to refer directly to the establishment of a structured framework for work under Article 6.2 or 6.4 of the Agreement.
Regrettably, the text of the 2024 protocol is not available for consultation. Whether that document referred to voluntary or compliance carbon markets (as in the case of ETS systems), at national or international level, or to all the possibilities mentioned, cannot be determined. However, its survival from one summit to the next suggests a political capital investment that should not be underestimated today, considering the recent structural and methodological developments under Article 6 of Paris and the simultaneous expansion of compliance and voluntary credit and quota trading systems in the countries in question.

With the imminent implementation of European and British border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM), a growing number of countries around the world have rapidly developed ad hoc national regulations to establish industrial emissions trading schemes (ETS), often accompanied – and this is the main innovation – by voluntary national markets for credits. At the start of COP30, eight out of 11 BRICS countries (the five founders plus Egypt, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia) had a voluntary market already in place, and two (Ethiopia and the Emirates) were making their final regulatory preparations.
But how should we interpret these developments? Firstly, not all BRICS countries are new to the carbon credit sector. In August 2025, Brazil, China, India and Indonesia accounted for over a third of all carbon credit projects registered worldwide, generating 36% of the credits traded on the market over the years. China and Brazil were also the countries most involved, at the time, in the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. Other BRICS countries are instead entering the sector for the first time, jumping at the potential financial opportunity now that many industrialised countries (including the European Union) seem to be reopening their domestic demand for foreign credits.

The main difference between the various BRICS carbon markets lies in their openness or not to foreign methodologies and registries. Some countries, such as South Africa and Brazil, have developed or are developing standards for converting credits registered with large private registries such as Verra or Gold Standard into national credits. Others, primarily China, do not accept international standards and registries. In particular, China does not accept projects developed by foreign actors or outside its national territory in its system, and this could simultaneously represent a safeguard for investments, capital and returns, but also a significant limitation to intra-BRICS cooperation. Finally, credit prices vary greatly from one market to another, ranging from $14 per credit in Beijing to less than $3 in Indonesia.

For any potential intra-BRICS partnership to work, it would have to start with mutual recognition of registers and standards (at least for certain selected types of credits); safety corridors for prices, which vary so much from one economy to another; and agreed-upon rules regarding the entry of foreign actors into the national market.

COP29 and the subsequent work of the Supervisory Body of Article 6.4 provided the group with an alternative to the difficult path of mutual recognition, technically very complex to implement: Article 6 itself. The BRICS countries might define their own minimum rules for mutual engagement, the lowest common denominator, within the framework of Article 6, and then sign bilateral agreements (Article 6.2) or build multilateral partnerships (Article 6.4), now that such a framework exists.

The launch at COP30 of the Open Coalition for Carbon Market Integration initiative, led by Brazil and focused on harmonising standards between different systems, comes right at the crossroads: these countries now face a decisive choice between complex adjustments towards greater interoperability and a clear investment in the multilateral system (already developed and more transparent) under the aegis of the UN.

Canada
Source: www.visualcapitalist.com

Key Takeaways

• The eleven BRICS nations are forecast to see average growth of 3.8% in 2025 and 3.7% in 2026.
• Average growth across G7 countries is expected to be 1% this year, rising moderately to 1.1% next year, particularly due to slower growth in Europe.

Today, BRICS countries represent half of the global population, a coalition with growing economic heft.

Unlike many Western powers, many BRICS countries are seeing rapid GDP growth driven by significant investment, trade, and demographic change. In an increasingly multipolar world, this group is exerting more influence as it expands.

This graphic compares real GDP growth projections of BRICS vs G7 countries, based on data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook October Update.

BRICS vs G7 Real GDP Growth

Below, we show GDP growth forecasts for BRICS nations in 2025 and 2026:

As we can see, India is projected to see one of the fastest growth rates across the bloc, at 6.6% in 2025 and 6.2% in 2026.

In China, 4.8% growth is forecast for 2025 as the country strengthens trade across Asia, Europe, and Africa. Like India, growth is forecast to decline in 2026.

On average, BRICS growth will exceed G7 rates by more than threefold in both 2025 and 2026—a stark contrast visible in the table below.


With just 1% average growth for G7 countries, many countries are facing headwinds of aging populations and trade uncertainty.

Notably, Germany is forecast to see one of the world’s slowest GDP growth rates in 2025, rising just 0.2%. However, it is set to pick up to 0.9% in 2026—a trend mirrored in several other G7 nations.

Canada
Source: asiatimes.com

BRICS New Development Bank fueling Indonesia’s green energy dream

NDB provides Indonesia a welcome new alternative to Western-led lenders to finance its clean energy ambitions

Indonesia’s recent decision to join the New Development Bank (NDB) may not have dominated international headlines, yet it marks a turning point in the world’s fourth-most-populous country’s energy future.
This partnership could decide how Indonesia finances, builds and implements its ambitious clean energy transformation plan while presenting a model for the Global South to emulate.

President Prabowo Subianto has set a bold, green target: 100% of the nation’s electricity to come from renewable energy sources within a decade or sooner. The vision is inspiring but also daunting.
Coal and gas currently account for around 80% of Indonesia’s electricity generation. Replacing these fossil fuels with solar, wind, hydro and geothermal power will demand not only decisive policy but also access to affordable financing. The NDB offers precisely that opportunity.
Created by the BRICS nations — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — the NDB was designed to serve as a development bank for the Global South. Its purpose is simple but profound: to fund infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging economies on fairer, more flexible terms than those offered by traditional Western-led, multilateral lending institutions.

For Indonesia, this could be transformative. Low-interest, long-term loans can support projects that commercial banks typically eschew. Such favorable financing is critical for a vast archipelago like Indonesia, where connecting renewable energy across thousands of islands requires not only power plants but also transmission lines, smart grids and storage systems. A modern grid is the backbone of any successful energy transition.

Turkey
Source: www.dailysabah.com

Between QUAD and BRICS: India’s test of tactical ambiguity

by Ishaal Zehra Nov 05, 2025 - 12:05 am GMT+3

U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepare to shake hands as they attend a joint press conference at the White House, Washington, U.S., Feb. 13, 2025. (Reuters Photo)

India struggles to balance QUAD and BRICS as global blocs harden

As global blocs harden, India faces the biggest foreign policy challenge – balancing the democracies of the QUAD and the revisionists of BRICS, while facing growing American pressure on trade, technology and security narratives.

Washington’s latest sanctions on Russia’s oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil, are prompting Indian refiners to scale back imports. The decision signals more than a tactical shift; it underscores how external pressures are reshaping New Delhi’s strategic calculus.

Since U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term in office began, the White House has begun translating alignment into leverage, weaponizing tariffs, visa regimes and even historical narratives to enforce loyalty. The economic screws are tightening with 50% duties imposed on Indian exports and threats of fresh hikes over the continuing purchase of discounted Russian oil. H-1B visa restrictions, meanwhile, are a strike at the heart of India’s tech workforce. Even Trump’s subtle jabs, such as repeated reminders of India’s Rafael losses in its war with Pakistan, carry both political and psychological weight.

For New Delhi, the message is clear: Strategic ambiguity now carries a cost.

India’s diplomacy has long thrived on ambiguity, engaging rival powers without committing to either side, but that luxury is eroding fast. As Washington and Beijing sharpen their global rivalries, India’s simultaneous membership in the QUAD and BRICS risks turning from leverage to a test of endurance.

On one side lies the QUAD – a coalition of like-minded countries with a strong Indo-Pacific focus; on the other lies BRICS – a larger, flexible platform for emerging powers advocating multipolarity, giving India a platform to champion the Global South and push for United Nations and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms. Balancing rival forums once showcased India’s strategic finesse; it now exposes the limits of the country’s autonomy. The question facing New Delhi is whether it can continue to serve both without sacrificing strategic clarity or becoming hostage to one camp over the other.

QUAD vs. BRICS

India’s engagement with the QUAD (comprising the U.S., Australia, Japan and India) illustrates its evolving Indo-Pacific strategy. The partnership provides valuable access to advanced technologies, joint military exercises and strategic coordination against China’s expanding influence. Yet, close observation of India’s engagement with the QUAD reveals a critical caveat: New Delhi is reluctant to turn it into a formal military alliance, wary of commitments that could compromise its strategic autonomy. This duality enables deeper technological, maritime and defense cooperation, but constrains it by maintaining policy flexibility vis-a-vis China and Russia.

Many in New Delhi were quick to note the QUAD’s silence following the outbreak of the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. Probably because with emerging “SQUAD” (Australia, Japan, Philippines, U.S.) taking the lead on maritime deterrence, the original “QUAD” seems to be drifting from hard defense toward softer technology and public-goods agendas, leaving India somewhat peripheral.

On the other side, as Washington tightens the screws, BRICS offers India an alternative stage that amplifies its voice among emerging powers. For India, BRICS offers a voice in global governance reform, a stage for multilateralism beyond Western-dominated institutions, and a space to assert itself among major emerging powers.

Yet the bloc’s recent expansion, adding Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, has tilted it heavily toward Beijing’s orbit. The increasing dominance of China in its internal dynamics poses challenges to India’s objectives and maneuverability. Russia’s increasing economic dependence on China is also deepening this imbalance. For India, the challenge is ensuring its vision for the Global South isn’t overshadowed by China’s.

Balancing act: Risks, rewards

As bloc politics hardens, each defense deal, energy purchase and U.N. vote carries more geopolitical symbolism. India’s room for maneuver is shrinking: the U.S. demands alignment, China dominates the alternative, and Russia’s dependence leaves little room to maneuver.

Hence, India needs a clear and broader strategic-economic plan backing both multilateral engagements, one that offers India some flexibility through diversification, at least for the time being. However, the risk of over-extension is real. In the long term, India has to ultimately adapt to the shifting security architecture of the Indo-Pacific.

Looking ahead, India’s foreign policy is poised to change from equidistant neutrality to more selective alignment, pursuing autonomy while deepening ties with both the West and the Global South. Achieving this balance, however, will require a recalibration of India's domestic strategy on multiple fronts.

One, India needs to strengthen its economic fundamentals – expanding domestic manufacturing and energy diversification to reduce vulnerability to U.S. tariffs. Two, it needs to reduce reliance on Moscow for defense. Three, it needs to leverage its growing partnerships in the Gulf, Africa and ASEAN to broaden its strategic options and reinforce its position in the changing world order. However, this will be quite challenging for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, especially as he struggles to restore his strongman image that has taken a severe hit by Trump’s assertive diplomacy.

India is entering a new phase of global positioning where strategic autonomy can no longer mean equal distance. It must mean selective proximity, an autonomous actor pursuing a hybrid path. Without recalibration, India could find itself increasingly aloof in the Indo-Pacific’s new security order.
The question is, will India recalibrate in the Indo-Pacific’s evolving security order? The answer is yes, but selectively. However, success will depend on the execution of its domestic policies and its ability to adapt to global dynamics, which seems distant.

Switzerland
Source: unctad.org

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This report was prepared by UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the context of technical assistance to the 2025 Brazilian Chairship of BRICS to support the work and deliberations of the Contact Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development (CGCCSD), with a particular focus on Priority 4: “Synergizing Trade and Climate Goals in BRICS Cooperation.” 

The report does not represent the views of the member States of the BRICS. 11 countries, 28% of global GDP

The BRICS includes 11 countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. BRICS countries accounted for nearly half of the world’s population and 28% of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023.

The report examines indicators and methodologies to assess the development implications of trade-related climate measures on BRICS countries.
Based on this analysis, a set of policy options is suggested to increase countries’ resilience, maximize positive spillovers (including new trade diversification opportunities), and minimize adverse effects, while promoting policy coherence between trade and climate objectives at national, BRICS, and multilateral levels.

Key recommendations

1. Targeted measures to enhance the resilience of affected sectors (national and international level)

• Increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity grid and as an energy source for sectors targeted by trade-related climate measures
• Explore international climate financing initiatives to unlock funding for low-emission and resilient infrastructure, and technology acquisition and deployment
• Couple green growth and decarbonization objectives with policies to increase productive capacity, strategically promoting industrial, agricultural, and forestry sectors that could attract investment

2. Tools to maximize positive spillovers while minimizing adverse effects

• Use ex ante impact assessment models and indicators to help capture the potential impact of trade-related climate measures
• Support affordable access to technology and research cooperation through South-South cooperation 

3. Measures to support BRICS international cooperation

• Strengthen the capacity of civil servants and institutions in sustainable industrial policymaking and delivery
• Develop and include green and just transition principles and policy coherence considerations