Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum
Issue 10.2022
2022.03.07 — 2022.03.13
International relations
Foreign policy in the context of BRICS
Russia continues contacts within BRICS, SCO despite situation around Ukraine (Россия продолжает контакты в рамках БРИКС и ШОС, несмотря на ситуацию вокруг Украины) / Russia, March, 2022
Keywords: political_issues

At the same time, Sergey Ryabkov criticized the actions of the West, which, in his opinion, "obscure" positive agenda with Russia's involvement

MOSCOW, March 12. /TASS/. Events in Ukraine do not cancel Russia's contacts through the BRICS and SCO, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said in an interview with Channel One on Saturday.

"Events within these formats [BRICS and SCO] are underway, no one has canceled the schedules and calendars of meetings, various kinds of contacts, practical work, including projects that implemented through these associations," he said.

At the same time, Ryabkov criticized the actions of the West, which, in his opinion, "obscure" positive agenda with Russia's involvement. "Western colleagues are great masters in obscuring the positive agenda with their wave of negativity, which they are trying to bring down on those who stand guard over the multipolar world order," Ryabkov added.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a televised address on February 24 that in response to a request by the heads of the Donbass republics he had made a decision to carry out a special military operation in order to protect people "who have been suffering from abuse and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years." The Russian leader stressed that Moscow had no plans of occupying Ukrainian territories.

China, South Korea may become main partners on AZRF projects, expert says (Китай и Южная Корея могут стать основными партнерами по проектам АЗРФ, считает эксперт) / Russia, March, 2022
Keywords: expert_opinion

Alexander Vorotnikov also noted that it is necessary to get BRICS countries involved in the implementation of projects in the Russian Arctic

MOSCOW, March 9. /TASS/. China and South Korea may become main partners in the implementation of scientific projects in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). The countries should be involved in research at Snezhinka (Snowflake) international arctic stations (IAS) in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region and the Murmansk Region, Deputy Director General of the Arctic Development Project Office (PORA) and Associate Professor at the Public Administration and Public Policy Department of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (RANEPA) Alexander Vorotnikov told TASS on Wednesday.

Earlier, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Alexey Chekunkov said that Russia would continue intensive work on the development of the Arctic despite the fact that seven countries of the Arctic Council refused to participate in sessions chaired by Russia.

The expert also noted that it is necessary to get BRICS countries involved in the implementation of projects in the Russian Arctic. "If the current acting international participants of the project confirm their rejection of the project or sabotage it, it is quite realistic to get the participants from the BRICS countries involved," he explained.

Russia's State Commission for Arctic Development announced its decision to construct two Snezhinka stations in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region and the Murmansk Region.

The Snezhinka IAS is envisioned to become a fully autonomous facility powered by renewable energy sources and hydrogen without any diesel fuel.

The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that brings together eight countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. In 2021, the two-year presidency passed from Iceland to Russia.

Memories of Falklands War still inspire today's geopolitics (Воспоминания о Фолклендской войне до сих пор вдохновляют сегодняшнюю геополитику) / Russia, March, 2022
Keywords: expert_opinion, political_issues

Uriel Araujo, researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts.

The Falkland Islands (referred to as Malvinas in Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese) are once again generating tensions, and the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires have been expressing their dissatisfaction with both the United Kingdom and neighboring Brazil.

Last Friday Argentina demanded the UK resume flights with stopovers in Río Gallegos (Argentina) - they were unilaterally interrupted in March 2020 due to the pandemic. They favored communication with the Malvinas archipelago, and allowed the relatives of those who died in the 1982 Falklands war to visit the graves of the Argentine soldiers in Darwin Cemetery. A few weeks ago, the Argentine ambassador to Brazil, Daniel Scioli, also expressed his "concern" to the Foreign Ministry of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro about the significant increase in "military flights from the UK between Brazilian territory and the Malvinas Islands."

The Brazilian government officially backs Buenos Aires' claims over the island's territory, but this gesture seems to be a kind of signal to the UK. It is unprecedented: even the Brazilian military dictatorship, which Bolsonaro admires, supported Argentina.

On January 5, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement reaffirming that the Malvinas were "illegally occupied" on 3 January 1833 by British forces who "expelled the Argentine authorities legitimately established there". On February 12 there was also an incident when Argentina denounced the passage of an American nuclear-powered submarine - the USS Greeneville - in the South Atlantic sea, near the Falklands. It counted with the support of a British airplane.

The main economic activities in the islands are fishing, tourism and sheep farming. Oil exploration, licensed by the Government of the archipelago, remains controversial as a result of maritime disputes with Argentina. The Falklands, based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 370 km (200 nautical miles) from its coastal baselines - it overlaps with Argentina's own EEZ. The islands' government is a self-governing British Overseas Territory, with a Governor appointed by the British Queen.

In 1982 there was a ten-week undeclared war between London and Buenos Aires over the islands. It ended with Argentine surrender. At the time the Brazilian military government allowed Argentine airplanes to refuel in its territory and, although Brazil at the time was ruled by a military anti-communist regime, it even helped Soviet support operations for Argentina during the conflict.

Both Buenos Aires and London claim sovereignty over the Falklands. The latter does so based on the continuous British administration of the archipelago since 1833, while Buenos Aires claims it acquired the islands from Spain when Argentina achieved its independence (in 1816). In 1833, England sent two naval vessels to the Malvinas. This event is interpreted by the Argentine as a usurpation, while the British see it as a reassertion of sovereignty. The troops however left the area without formal government.

In the twentieth century, the Malvinas faced significant population decline, with many young residents seeking job opportunities overseas. And, in recent years, the population decline was reduced mostly thanks to immigrants from the UK, as well as from Saint Helena and Chile.

The official and predominant language in the archipelago is English, but Spanish is also employed and South American Gauchos (once a majority) have also influenced the local dialect and culture.

In February, Argentine President Alberto Fernández began an international tour to Russia, China and Barbados. In Russia, Fernández expressed Argentine desire to join the BRICS group and received support from Vladimir Putin. Days later, in China, the same topic was discussed with President Xi Jinping, who also signaled a favorable position regarding Argentine entry into the bloc. It is noteworthy that the path to possible inclusion in the BRICS has been Russia and China, and not neighboring Brazil. This is yet another signal of Brazilian-Argentine deteriorated bilateral relations, and the issue of the Malvinas also plays a part in this situation.

It would be wrong to frame the issue of the Falklands within Argentine nationalism or a mere dispute over fishing rights. The Malvinas issue is part of the geopolitics of the western portion of the South Atlantic Sea. Only two regional players occupy most of the continent's Atlantic coast: Brazil and Argentina. Meanwhile, Washington and London control a chain of islands that are located in the center of the South Atlantic Ocean (between America and Africa), and these two powers also exercise naval control over this zone. Thus, the "Malvinas issue" is actually part of a larger dispute over a vast ocean full of resources. The Falkland Islands also have great geostrategic importance due to the connection they establish with Antarctica. Moreover, the Strait of Magellan and the Beagle and Drake channels enable Atlantic-Pacific interoceanic communication and are essential for monitoring global trade.

The Falklands War is a kind of geopolitical trauma in South America, with a South Atlantic mostly controlled by London, which is the local hegemon there - it controls access to Antarctica and the Indian Ocean. The Sandwich Islands, as well as the islands of Saint Helena, Gouch, South Georgia, and others are all ruled by Queen Elizabeth. With the independence of Brazil, the islands of Martim Vaz and neighboring Trindade became Brazilian. In 1890, the British occupied Trindade, but abandoned it after a bilateral agreement mediated by Portugal. The return of Trindade to Brazil through diplomatic means avoided a serious problem, but such was not the case with the Malvinas.

The 1982 Falklands War short-circuited the Monroe Doctrine and the Brazilian own "National Security Doctrine". The very concept of the "Blue Amazon", the Brazilian exclusive economic zone, developed partly out of these events and they still resonate today. For example, in 2019, Brazilian Colonel Leandro Freitas Ribeiro argued (in his Naval War School dissertation) that the country needs a nuclear submarine to defend its Blue Amazon, based on the experience of the Malvinas war.

Brazil's goal today is to develop the first nuclear submarine in the Southern Hemisphere. According to an Economist October 2021 piece, the South American country could in fact achieve it before Australia, notwithstanding AUKUS. This would of course not please the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). Brasilia and Moscow in fact advanced on their nuclear cooperation talks when Bolsonaro and Putin met in February. By 2010, Buenos Aires also had similar plans regarding the development of nuclear propulsion for its Navy's vessels, and it even tried to participate in the Brazilian project, which did not happen. The 1982 war operates as a kind of a background to all these developments. Bolsonaro's somewhat erratic foreign policy would in fact benefit a great deal from improving bilateral relations with Argentina within BRICS. A possible Lula electoral victory in October could boost the BRICS group again.

To sum it up, the Falkland Islands remain an important topic in the South American continent. They are part of a larger geopolitical dispute in the South Atlantic sea and we will be hearing a lot more about them.

Source: InfoBrics
SIMON DAVID TAYLOR: Brics ban on unilateral action violated by invasion in Ukraine (САЙМОН ДЭВИД ТЕЙЛОР: Запрет БРИКС на односторонние действия нарушен вторжением в Украину) / South Africa, March, 2022
Keywords: political_issues, expert_opinion
South Africa

Recent days have seen a number of justified criticisms of the government's stance (or lack thereof) on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Questions have been raised about SA's abstention from a UN General Assembly vote condemning Russia's actions. Much has also been made of Kenya's impassioned speech at the UN Security Council in contrast to SA's muted tone or plain silence

As much as we may want the government to do the right thing, we also need to understand the constraints on SA's diplomatic choices and where they came from, if for no other reason than to change them. Whereas Kenya is free to make emphatic condemnations, SA has a long-established partnership with Russia that makes diplomatic engagements far more complicated.

There are unique aspects of the situation in Ukraine that ought to be noted, as it is distinct compared to other forms of military conflict across the world. Most of these are different forms of internal conflicts, with a variety of external backers: Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria and Israel-Palestine. Vladimir Putin previously sent forces to support separatists in Georgia (2008) and Crimea in Ukraine (2015). As grievous as these actions were, they were nonetheless limited in scope. The action in Ukraine is categorically different, constituting a formal invasion of a sovereign state with the express intent of conquering it.

While there are justified comparisons to the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia is acting unilaterally, without any pretext of gaining UN permission, which in itself is a substantive failure of a permanent and veto-power member of the Security Council. Putin is setting a dangerous precedent and SA needs to respond accordingly that this cannot become the norm. There is also a great deal to be said and further researched about the more nefarious ways Putin's regime has undermined democratic governments around the world, including through party funding — and not only in the US.

However, the more obvious constraint is SA's membership of the Brics bloc and the history of this multilateral partnership. We must consider the origins of Brics to fully grasp SA's situation. The bloc was formed in the early 2000s to strengthen the relationships between rising powers that were opposed to US actions in the Middle East. When SA opposed the US invasion of Iraq the country was labelled a "rogue democracy", so joining forces with other Global South democracies served to strengthen those states. Brazil and India were already willing partners in the form of the India, Brazil, SA Dialogue Forum. Formalising relationships between non-Western powers would allow for greater degrees of action and freedom for smaller powers to choose their own diplomacy without fear of losing development assistance.

In the US drive to invade Iraq a great deal of financial, economic and diplomatic pressure was placed on many nations to fall in line. While France and Germany could afford to stand up to US aggression, it was not so easy for others. Aid was withheld, trade deals were put on hold and many other forms of aggressive diplomacy were visited upon states that did not contribute to or support the "Coalition of the Willing".

This was the foundational rationale for Brics. At the time of its formation Brazil, India and SA were liberal democracies. Russia's democratic status, though questionable, was no more authoritarian than many other states. While China is a one-party totalitarian state, for the longest time the Chinese Communist Party nonetheless practised internal democracy with regular changes in leadership.

The result is that while the two biggest powers in the Brics bloc were not liberal democracies, all parties could still hold conversations and understand each other ideologically. Such was the foundation for a partnership united in opposition to Western imperialism.

Importantly, all the Brics powers to a greater or lesser extent have long been opposed to the West's policy of regime change. Across Latin America, Africa and Asia, Western powers backed coups and brutal dictatorships throughout the Cold War. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq could easily be seen as continuations of this bloody history. During the Cold War the Non-Aligned Movement tried to oppose such interventions but always lacked the necessary power. A post-Soviet Russia and a more capitalist and open China had the potential to bring change to the international system.

Since then, the grouping has sought to establish formal institutions, such as a development bank, to enable other states to ease themselves away from the dominant financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) and their disastrous structural adjustment programmes and other neoliberal perils, furthering the ability of states to choose their own way in the international system.

Today this situation is dramatically different. Putin's Russia no longer pays lip-service to democracy, having changed the constitution to stay in power indefinitely. In China, President Xi Jinping similarly changed the political structure to become a de facto dictator for life. Moreover, India and Brazil have elected right-wing populist regimes that are in many ways hostile to the democratic norms SA still holds dear. Brazil's president Jair Bolsonaro at times has been openly hostile towards Brics, and China in particular.

It may well be right for SA to condemn Russia's aggression against Ukraine, but doing so will have consequences. Russia has been an important partner in the development of Brics, and it might be time to end that partnership. SA is also not the only partner involved, so any action would require consultation with the other members. Moreover, as the grouping is still in its institutional infancy, Brics does not have formal dispute mechanisms for handling members that act unilaterally, despite unilateral action being the very antithesis of the Brics "philosophy".

Perhaps the best and most forceful action SA can take beyond symbolic gestures would be to call for an emergency meeting of Brics members. Putin's actions are evidently contrary to the central ethos of the bloc, which is supposed to value diplomacy, negotiation and multilateral action. Moreover, SA's foreign policy since 1994 has consistently stressed multilateralism and negotiation to resolve conflict. If Russia's justifications for its actions truly concern Western imperialism, the other Brics members ought to have been included in diplomatic efforts prior to military action.

By failing to consult before invading Ukraine Putin has catastrophically undermined the partnership built over the last two decades. SA should work with Brazil, India and China to present their dissatisfaction with Putin's disregard for their relationship and urge him to recall his forces and continue diplomatic efforts. Were Putin to acquiesce and include Brics in such negotiations the partnership could be rescued, perhaps even strengthened. However, if such intercession is dismissed with contempt, SA and the other members must take a serious look at the feasibility of continuing any partnership. What would be the benefit of a continued commitment to a grouping whose prominent members violate its raison d'être?

Putin's actions have not been those of a friend, much less a partner, and it is time the SA government accepted that fact.

• Dr Taylor, a former senior foreign service officer in the department of international relations & co-operation, is founder of Ana Nzinga Research.

The alliance of Brazil, Russia, India and China is strained |Opinion (Союз Бразилии, России, Индии и Китая натянут | Мнение) / USA, March, 2022
Keywords: political_issues, expert_opinion

In 2001, Goldman Sachs identified Brazil, Russia, India, and China as strategically significant middle-income countries on the cusp of membership among fully developed nations. The quartet validated the BRIC label in 2006, with the first of ongoing meetings to identify common political, economic and strategic interests. In 2010, the suite of nations welcomed South Africa to the group.

While the BRICS designation was novel, the idea of nations on the brink of full development went back at least a century. In the mid- to late-19th century, Egypt, Japan, Argentina and Hungary aspired to the designation of "civilized nation." Not surprisingly, war and international crises laid bare the feasibility of those prospects.

For Egypt, the Suez Canal represented the latest in starchitect infrastructure; however, mounting debts submerged national sovereignty in British colonial oversight until 1956. Argentina's pampas-based bounty of beef and wheat eventually gave place to the ravages of populist handouts pedaled politically by Juan and Eva Peron. Hungary boasted continental Europe's first totally electrified metro system in Budapest in 1896, only to succumb to defeat by association with the Central Powers after World War I.

Only Japan, which defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, as well as the Russians in 1905, seizing Port Arthur from czarist control, was recognized as "civilized" by the Europeans and Americans. The Japanese squandered their fortunes, however, in World War II. Nevertheless, a half century of industrial development under the Meiji emperor in the late 19th century set the stage for economic recovery under the aegis of the United States beginning in 1945.

Ultimately, transitioning to developed nation status proved difficult then and often depended on decisions involving other countries. These were sometimes short-term decisions made with long-term consequences.

During the current Russian assault on Ukraine, a United Nations' resolution condemning the unprovoked attack called to account the intent of the BRICS alliance. China, India and South Africa abstained from condemning the Russians. Brazil went along with the resolution, but only with the great reluctance of President Jair Bolsonaro, keen to keep the flow of fertilizer and other energy inputs across the Atlantic.

At first glance, this should give reason for pause. The BRICS nations constitute more than 3 billion of the earth's inhabitants and account for approximately 25% of global economic production ($19.8 trillion, 2018).

A deeper look, however, reveals weaknesses and cracks in this alliance, whose actions have at best been neutral, if not openly antagonistic, toward the United States and Europe.

As for its weaknesses, the five BRICS countries are anything but diversified industrialized economies (except in the case of China). None of the countries find themselves among the top 50 nations in the United Nations' 2020 Human Development Index. Russia ranks as the 52nd most developed nation; Brazil at 74th; China at 75th; South Africa at 114th (based on the 2019 survey, numbers were not available for the 2020 index); and India at 131st.

Aside from China, most of these nations rose to economic prominence during the late 2000s based on the surge in value of petroleum and soybeans, among other commodities. The proof was visible to visitors to these countries, including this author. Brazil was called "Belindia" (Belgium, plus India) because of the disparities in wealth and poverty side by side; India's infrastructure development stalled miserably; and South Africa succumbed to fresh allegations of corruption, racial unrest and economic uncertainty.

The qualitative cracks seem even deeper when we look at the friction between countries within the alliance. While India genuflects to its source of military hardware — Russia — by abstaining from casting blame for the Ukrainian assault, it remains miles apart politically and diplomatically from China. India and China share a volatile border riven by military crisis since 1962. Would Indian acquiescence to Russia for short-term gains (and possibly cheap oil) simultaneously thrust the Chinese and Indians into genuine geo-political embrace?

Add to this the unsettling dependence of India on China for consumer goods, as chronicled in Ananth Krishnan's eye-opening "India's China Challenge: A Journey through China's Rise" (Harper Collins India, 2020).

Or we might pivot to the deepening relationship between Russia and China, newly invigorated in a highly visible photo-op between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping before the opening of the 2022 Beijing Olympics. While the two nations share complementary positions vis-à-vis energy production and consumption, Johnathan E. Hillman meticulously catalogs, in "The Emperor's New Road: China and the Project of the Century" (Oxford, 2020), how territorial ambitions past and future between the two countries, particularly as they relate to relations with Central Asian countries, might fracture Sino-Russian rapprochement.

Thus, while the outcome of Russia's unprovoked aggression remains to be seen, it is doubtful, based on the historical difficulty of the path to full economic development, as evidenced in the last century, as well as by fissures in existing relations within the BRICS alliance, that temporary efforts to benefit from acute global shifts will deepen long-term ties between its members or catapult any of them into diversified economic powers.

Evan Ward is an associate professor of history at Brigham Young University, where he teaches courses on world history.

What are some challenges BRICS countries face amid Russia-Ukraine war? (С какими вызовами сталкиваются страны БРИКС в условиях российско-украинской войны?) / India, March, 2022
Keywords: political_issues, expert_opinion


  • In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, there was little to no condemnation from BRICS
  • In February, only Brazil voted yes on a UN General Assembly resolution that called on Russia to end its military operations in Ukraine
  • Russian banks have been removed from the SWIFT system
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BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – may be characterized as that combination of newly industrialized countries and powers, that may be too significant to be ignored by the West. They account for a combined total of nearly 42 per cent of earth's population and about 27 per cent of the planet's land surface. Considering this, any effort to uplift humanity as a whole might be amiss if they choose to ignore this group.

A little history

While the concept was in the works years before, the first official BRIC summit was held in June 2009. In 2011, the five countries spoke out in unison condemning the West for airstrikes in Libya.

In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, there was little to no condemnation from the group. In fact, they abstained from a vote at the UN General Assembly that condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea.

Back then, on Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop's suggestion that Russia be banned from a G20 meeting, BRICS foreign ministers retorted in unison. "The custodianship of the G20 belongs to all Member States equally," their statement reminded her.

In February too, only Brazil voted yes on a UN General Assembly resolution that called on Russia to end it military operations in Ukraine. The others abstained. Mind, most of the BRICS countries are facing separatist movements at home.

Challenges BRICS countries face amid Russia-Ukraine conflict

The BRICS bank aka the New Development Bank (NDB) has put on hold transactions in Russia. Efforts by the West include the removal of Russian banks from the SWIFT system. As intended, this is likely going to isolate Russia from international trade and will probably be one of the biggest challenges for BRICS countries.

Reportedly, a Chinese bank with a branch in Moscow has seen an influx of Russian companies wanting to open new bank accounts. FESCO Transportations Group, a logistics and transport company, announced that will accept payment in yuan.

India is also allegedly exploring alternative payment mechanisms. One option being supposedly looked at was setting up Russian firms with rupee accounts. The country has a massive agricultural sector and needs Russian fertilizer.

On the flip side, there may be opportunities too. Indian steel mills are reportedly stepping up to the plate literally, to plug the supply void left by Russia. India is the second-biggest steel producer in the world, Russia the fifth. The demand it is experiencing in the sector is coming from all over the globe including Europe, the Middle East and Africa.


Deepening a West versus East divide is perhaps in the best interest of none. Especially so in a nuclear-armed world. It isn't like the West and Russia have zero common objectives. Prolonged disruption to the international economic system is going to hurt many others than just Russia.

Also, a lot of debate might be raised. Will this make the BRICS countries further question the custodianship of the West? Will this push Putin and Russia toward China? Could it lead to "de-dollarization"?

Wang Yi: Global governance has entered its Asia period (Ван И: глобальное управление вступило в азиатский период) / China, March, 2022
Keywords: Wang_Yi, quotation, global_governance

China looks forward to seeing emerging markets and developing countries playing a bigger and more active role in global governance in the future, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a news conference on Monday.

China, which is the rotating chair of the BRICS (an acronym denoting the national economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), will host the 14th summit of the bloc this year.

Wang said China will deepen BRICS' cooperation around the board, and inspire hope and confidence for a joint effort by all countries to beat the pandemic and promote global recovery.

The fields of collaboration will include vaccines against COVID-19, public health, economy and commerce, green development, poverty alleviation and other fields, he said.

China will also enhance strategic collaboration with emerging markets and developing countries, Wang said, adding numerous summits and high-level meetings are set to take place in Asia this year. "Global governance has entered its Asia period," Wang said. China hopes emerging economies and developing countries turn from being "followers" to "forerunners" and even "pacesetters" in global governance.

"Together, we can play a more active role and speak with a bigger voice," he said.

Investment and Finance
Investment and finance in BRICS
New Development Bank Still Discussing Impact of Halting Russia Transactions (Новый банк развития все еще обсуждает последствия прекращения операций с Россией) / South Africa, March, 2022
Keywords: ndb, political_issues
South Africa

The bank, which was originally set up in 2013 to provide services to Brics members, which includes Russia, has joined others in withdrawing services to Russia.

Senior members of the New Development Bank are still discussing the impact of their move to stop transactions with Russia.

The bank was originally set up in 2013 to provide services to Brics members, which includes Russia.

The bank has joined others in withdrawing services to Russia.

The bank's decision to stop all new transactions with Russia has presented many questions for the Brics block.

In their announcement, the bank made no mention of the war but did say that the decision was in line with its articles of agreement.

Article 2 makes it very clear that the bank's resources may only be used for infrastructure and sustainable development projects.

And article 36 gives the bank's president, Brazil's Marcos Troyjo, the power to wave those banking privileges if using them would impede the course of justice.

Eyewitness News

World of Work
eng (rus) / country, March, 2022
Source: link

Russian-Brazilian School Opened in Rio de Janeiro (В Рио-де-Жанейро открылась российско-бразильская школа) / Russia, March, 2022
Keywords: social_issues

The first Russian-Brazilian school was opened in the municipality of Belford-Roxo, near Rio de Janeiro. The solemn ceremony took place in the presence of local authorities and Russian diplomats.

"I would like to emphasize that a school of this format is the first educational institution not only in the state of Rio de Janeiro, but throughout Brazil, created with the participation of the Russian Federation," said Consul-General of the Russian Federation in Rio de Janeiro, Vladimir Tokmakov.

It is noted that the choice in favor of the educational center named after Lieutenant Otavio Pinheiro did not fall by chance. Such an intercultural dialogue was the choice of the leadership of the educational institution, it was not imposed by the authorities. At the same time, the students themselves showed interest in the project of Russian-Brazilian classes.

"Students will have an incomparable opportunity to get to know our country, its rich culture and history, and start learning the Russian language. At the moment, there is a recruitment of Russian language teachers from among the graduates of the universities of Rio de Janeiro, the implementation of the competition is carried out by the Secretariat (Ministry) of Education of the state," Tokmakov said.

About seventy high school students have already begun to study various disciplines related to Russia. Brazilian schoolchildren will learn the Russian language, get acquainted with the history, geography and culture of our country.

It should be noted that the project of the Russian-Brazilian cultural school is supported by the Department of Oriental and Slavic Languages of the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (PFUR).

Recall that earlier in the city of Duque de Caxias, the state of Rio de Janeiro, the bilingual Portuguese-Chinese school of Carlos Chagas opened its doors.

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