Russia
Source: tass.com

"The BRICS issue takes its place in Yaounde's foreign policy planning, given the close and diverse ties the republic has with China, India, South Africa, Egypt, Brazil and, of course, Russia," Georgy Todua noted

NAIROBI, March 18. /TASS/. Cameroon is watching with interest the cooperation within BRICS, Russian Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea Georgy Todua said in an interview with TASS.

"BRICS is becoming an increasingly more prestigious international organization. Cameroon closely follows the transformations that are taking place in the world, changes in the international architecture and economic models of development. In this regard, the BRICS issue takes its place in Yaounde's foreign policy planning, given the close and diverse ties the republic has with China, India, South Africa, Egypt, Brazil and, of course, Russia," he said.

BRICS has gone through two waves of expansion since its founding in 2006. In 2011, South Africa joined the original members Brazil, Russia, India and China. In August 2023, six more countries - Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE - were invited to join, but Argentina in late December declined to join.

Russia
Source: tass.com

"We are ready to pay efforts in order to open a new page in consolidation and development of the Global South, jointly with other BRICS nations," Zhang Hanhui said

MOSCOW, March 21. /TASS/. Beijing will provide all possible support to Moscow's activities within the framework of the BRICS group of nations, Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui told TASS in an interview.

"We will provide all possible support to Russia's actions in its capacity of the BRICS president, and we are ready to pay efforts in order to open a new page in consolidation and development of the Global South, jointly with other BRICS nations," he said.

China and Russia, both being responsible major powers, will "jointly promote the creation of an equal and structured multipolar world, and promote inclusive economic globalization that will benefit everyone," the Chinese diplomat said.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

Pakistan's intellectual and political circles regard BRICS as an essential platform for advancing the nation's strategic and economic interests globally. Achieving this goal, however, demands meticulous navigation of geopolitical challenges, particularly with India, and crafting a persuasive argument for Pakistan's inclusion in BRICS.

In the shifting global economic and geopolitical environment, the BRICS group—comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—stands out as a symbol of a diversifying global power structure, challenging the traditional dominance of Western economies. This alliance of burgeoning economies signals a move towards a global order that is fairer and more inclusive, aiming to amplify the voices of developing nations.

Within this context, Pakistan regards its potential membership in BRICS with a blend of hopeful anticipation and strategic prudence, acknowledging the opportunities as well as the challenges that this affiliation could bring. Pakistan's application for membership in the latter half of 2023 underscores its sincere interest in joining BRICS, driven by both strategic considerations and practical benefits. This ambition enjoys widespread support across Pakistan's intellectual and political domains, underscoring a unified stance towards becoming part of this influential group.

Pakistani analysts typically see BRICS as a counterpoint to Western economic supremacy, notably that of the G7, valuing the consortium's focus on cooperative economic growth, sustainable development, and the sovereignty of political systems. China's significant role within BRICS and its close alliance with Pakistan fosters a positive outlook towards the group, suggesting that membership could yield substantial benefits such as access to the New Development Bank (NDB), an uptick in foreign investment, and a bolstered diplomatic stance. Nonetheless, these experts also advise caution due to the geopolitical intricacies involved, particularly tensions with India, a major player in BRICS.

Furthermore, under Russia's 2024 presidency of BRICS, Pakistani scholars view this period as a strategic window to advance their membership bid, while acknowledging the need for careful diplomatic navigation and the adjustment of national policies to align with BRICS' goals and member expectations. However, a minority voice within the expert community raises concerns about the potential repercussions of aligning too closely with a bloc seen as opposing Western alliances, pondering the impact on Pakistan's relationships with powers like the United States and the European Union.

Contrastingly, political leaders in Pakistan downplay these concerns, arguing that BRICS membership aligns with Pakistan's Comprehensive National Security Policy (NSP) and supports the country's shift towards geo-economic strategies without entangling it in global bloc politics. They cite Pakistan's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a precedent that has yielded strategic and diplomatic benefits, reinforcing the argument for pursuing BRICS membership.

The political stance in Pakistan towards BRICS is multifaceted, acknowledging the economic and diplomatic upsides of membership while recognising the hurdles, especially those posed by India's opposition and the need for closer alignment with the economic and political norms of BRICS countries. Pakistani experts highlight how the country's economic sectors, such as agriculture, textiles, and IT, could synergise with BRICS, fostering mutual growth. They also point to Pakistan's strategic geographic positioning as a nexus for South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, enhancing regional connectivity and economic collaboration, which aligns with BRICS' goals for a diversified and interconnected 'Global South'.

Moreover, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is presented as a prime example of Pakistan's capability to engage in significant infrastructure and development projects, mirroring the collaborative spirit of BRICS. However, the journey towards BRICS membership is approached with caution; analysts emphasise the need for strategic and diplomatic efforts to overcome challenges, notably the delicate relationship with India, one of the original BRICS nations.

In consolidating these viewpoints, it is clear that Pakistan's intellectual and political circles regard BRICS as an essential platform for advancing the nation's strategic and economic interests globally. Achieving this goal, however, demands meticulous navigation of geopolitical challenges, particularly with India, and crafting a persuasive argument for Pakistan's inclusion in BRICS.

Conclusion:

Emphasising Pakistan's suitability for BRICS membership is essential, especially when considering the characteristics of countries which have recently been admitted to the group or are under consideration. Pakistan distinguishes itself by providing a blend of strategic, economic, and geopolitical strengths that closely resonate with BRICS' foundational goals.

Integrating Pakistan into BRICS would broaden the group's geographic diversity and amplify its negotiating power internationally. Positioned at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Pakistan offers critical connectivity for trade and energy pathways, essential to the BRICS nations' economic aspirations. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) underscores Pakistan's capacity for large-scale, cross-national projects in infrastructure and development, mirroring BRICS' commitment to fostering regional connections and collective progress.

Pakistan's economy, with its mix of agricultural, industrial, and emerging technological sectors, provides extensive opportunities for cooperation with BRICS countries. Pakistan's dedication to multilateralism and active role in global forums complement BRICS' mission to reshape international governance.

When comparing Pakistan with newer BRICS members, it becomes evident that Pakistan not only equals, but in many cases exceeds, their offerings in terms of economic collaboration and strategic benefits. This positions Pakistan as an exemplary candidate for BRICS, ready to significantly enhance the consortium's objectives and draw from the group's collective support and strength.

This inclusion would represent a pivotal moment for Pakistan's diplomatic and economic policies and signify a broader impact for BRICS, demonstrating its growing role and inclusivity in global affairs.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org


The increasing number of developing economies lining up to join the BRICS bloc raises questions on whether this appeal is transitory or based on long-term fundamental factors. At this stage one would struggle to come up with a unifying theme in the pattern of economic policies pursued by BRICS that would serve as a point of attraction for other developing economies – some of the individual economic policies that may be considered potentially as elements of BRICS soft power could be China's success in poverty-reduction or the current activism of Brazil in advancing stronger environmental standards. In contrast to the large economies, both developing and advanced small economies appear to be increasingly active in emulating each other's success in the economic policy domain with one of the focal points of such imitation being the Swiss economic model. The gravity pull of Switzerland's "soft power" has been reflected in the patterns of economic policies pursued across the globe in various continents and regions of the world economy.

In Latin America one of the prime examples of Swiss-like economic models is Uruguay that is often referred to as the "Switzerland of South America". Like Switzerland, Uruguay has one of the highest GDP per capita levels in its region, with significant emphasis placed on human capital development, most notably education. Uruguay is also actively working to position itself as a key regional hub for wealth management, with elements similar to the Swiss banking model being replicated for the benefit of greater dynamism of the financial sector and services as a driver of GDP[1]. According to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the two countries cooperate in multilateral organizations in a range of areas, including in the environmental sphere. These linkages between Switzerland and Uruguay are further reinforced by historical ties as Uruguay became a popular destination for Swiss migrants in the 19^th century: "In 1862 and 1863, farmers from the German-speaking part of Switzerland founded the 'Nueva Helvecia' community, bringing cheese-making and other agricultural innovations to Uruguay. Migrants from Ticino became successful architects, artists and sportspeople in Uruguay"[2].

In the MENA region, the UAE has also declared itself to be a follower of the Swiss model, with the country's AI and Digital Economy Minister Al Olama Minister declaring in a 2022 interview to CNN that his country was striving to become the "Switzerland of the Middle East"[3]: "From a diplomacy perspective, we are trying to become the Switzerland of the Middle East. What that entails is we work with everyone, we ensure that we provide value for everyone as well"[4]. Furthermore, in 2024 UAE's Minister of Economy Abdulla bin Touq referred to his country as the new "Swiss" of the Gulf that is "striving to be an ally to both old and new trade partners in an age marked by "friend-shoring"[5].

In South-East Asia another case of a country pursuing Swiss-inspired economic policies is Singapore. The country's founding father Lee Kuan Yew explored the models of small countries surrounded by large economies to "observe the methods used to ensure their survival", with three of these success cases considered inspirational: Israel, Finland and Switzerland.[6] As noted by researchers from Singapore Gillian Koh and Yvonne Guo, "Switzerland has long served as a model for Singapore. In 1984, then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong promised that Singaporeans would achieve a "Swiss standard of living" by 1999. Indeed, the similarities between both countries have inspired Singapore to see Switzerland as a model of how to grow the economy and develop a world-class workforce. Both countries are small, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic, with one of the highest percentages of foreign inhabitants of any country in the world. They are resource-poor, and have had to rely on ingenuity, talent and constant reinvention to remain at the top of their game"[7].

There are number of core features that may be associated with the Swiss economic model, of which one of the key is the emphasis on "human capital development". Neutrality on the international arena creates favourable conditions for positioning the economy as a "safe haven" and focusing efforts on economic modernization at the expense of defense spending. The development of the financial sector, most notably the wealth management segment, is a way to capitalize on the high standard of living and the "safe haven" status of the economy in the region. Economic openness, including through the conclusion of FTAs across the world economy, strengthens the capability of producers to export goods and services abroad. Overall, the Swiss model creates a framework where all of the main drivers of GDP growth – consumption (high standard of living), investment (capital inflows), government spending ("peace dividend") and net exports – reinforce each other to generate a competitive economic system.

Of the above features, one that is key in the midst of rampant global protectionism is the creation of trade alliances to facilitate export growth. Switzerland together with its EFTA partners is among the most active in the world in concluding trade alliances, including with other regional integration blocs. Similarly, nearly all of the economies inspired by Switzerland are seeking to conclude trade agreements via their respective regional trade arrangements as well as individually. In Latin America Uruguay has been an active proponent of the MERCOSUR-EU trade deal[8]. At the same time, it has also pushed for the conclusion of a bilateral FTA with China independently from the rest of the MERCOSUR peers[9]. A similar pattern is observed with respect to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that has participated in the regional liberalization initiatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), while also increasingly attempting to conclude economic agreements (in the form of comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs)) bilaterally with economies such as Indonesia, Turkey and India[10]. Singapore is very much in the same vein securing bilateral digital economic accords (DEAs) with the likes of Australia, the UK and others while also working together with ASEAN partners on a common framework of free-trade and liberalization vis-à-vis other blocs and regions.

In conclusion, there are important qualitative features that distinguish the Swiss economic model and make it appealing to other small and open economies across the globe. A platform for such small economies across continents may take the value appeal of superior economic policies to a global level. The attraction of large developing economies within the BRICS circle thus far mostly resides in the possibility of offering alternative tracks of modernization and greater global stature for developing economies, but in terms of qualitative economic policies the BRICS are yet to make their mark. Could it be the use of macroeconomic policy rules, leadership in investments into AI and "human capital" or the creation of new types of platforms of economic cooperation – the field of development economics is wide open for the BRICS to make their choice. The latter will determine the longer term economic appeal of the bloc to the Global South and the broader international community. With economies inspired by the Swiss model such as the UAE joining the BRICS and Uruguay becoming a member of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), there may be gateways for high-quality economic policies to be taken on board by the BRICS bloc.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

Interest in elaborating the issue of financial settlements has been declared. Despite the differences in the motivation of the BRICS member countries, the very task of developing a settlement system within the BRICS and with third countries seems to be useful for them to one degree or another. The question is how sustainable will the work on the new financial infrastructure be and what results will it lead to?

The creation of new financial mechanisms through BRICS is one of the most promising fields for the development of the association. In the final declaration of the BRICS countries after the 2023 Summit, financial policy was given quite a lot of attention. In particular, it was stated that the BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF) needs to prepare a report on payment mechanisms, including those based on cross-border payment systems. The desirability of using national currencies in trade and financial transactions, both within the BRICS and with trading partners in third countries was emphasised. There was also support for strengthening correspondent banking relations between the BRICS countries for settlements in national currencies. The finance ministers and heads of central banks of the BRICS countries were instructed to work on this issue for the next summit; that is, they will have to report on the results within the framework of the Russian Chairmanship and the BRICS Summit in Kazan. Also noteworthy are statements about the important role of the BRICS New Development Bank in the implementation of joint investment initiatives, about establishment of the Network of research centres of the BRICS countries in the field of finance, about the use of unilateral restrictive measures (sanctions), as well as support for open world trade being the fundamental role of the WTO.

The 2023 Summit Declaration, like earlier BRICS documents, avoided confrontational language. In particular, the idea of settlements in national currencies was not proposed as a counterbalance to the existing system of global payments, which is characterised by the domination of the US dollar. Despite the concern about sanctions, attention to the topic of settlements did not focus on countering these measures, much less circumventing them. However, even such restrained formulations reflect the new realities of international relations — in a turbulent world, one should think about risk control and at least consider the possibility of diversifying financial transactions. Moreover, in recent years the US weaponization of the dollar through the use of financial sanctions has been gaining momentum.

The BRICS clearly distinguishes a group of countries for which the issue of financial settlements is directly related to national security. First and foremost, this relates to Russia, against which a significant amount of financial and trade sanctions has been imposed by the United States and its allies. It is Russia today that is most interested in diversifying global finance. Long-term stakeholders include China. So far, sanctions against China are incomparable with restrictions against Russia. In addition, we are talking mainly about American export controls in the field of high technology, and not about financial sanctions. The latter have so far been used only against a small group of Chinese officials in connection with human rights issues.

However, an escalation of the rivalry between Beijing and Washington is a very likely scenario. It can be seen in the US National Security Strategy and in numerous anti-Chinese bills in the US Congress.

The possible victory of the Republican candidate in the US elections may well lead to a tougher American policy towards China. Given this scenario of exacerbation, the politicisation of finance in the form of sanctions is also likely.

Among the new members of the association, the interested parties include Iran, which has been under US sanctions for more than 40 years and is effectively excluded from the world of global finance, with its dominance of dollar payments. The remaining countries which were in BRICS prior to this year (India, Brazil and South Africa), and most of the new ones (Egypt, Ethiopia and the UAE), are still closely integrated into the existing US-centric payment system. The diversification of such a system is hardly an urgent task for them. However, they may be interested in new mechanisms in the event of the further intensification of competition between the United States and China, in the event of a collapse of the existing system, or in the event of a deterioration in bilateral relations with Washington.

In other words, interest in elaborating the issue of financial settlements has been declared. Despite the differences in the motivation of the BRICS member countries, the very task of developing a settlement system within the BRICS and with third countries seems to be useful for them to one degree or another. The question is how sustainable will the work on the new financial infrastructure be and what results will it lead to? It is necessary to soberly assess the complexity of the task, as well as the difficulties that will arise along the way of its implementation.

These difficulties include, first of all, the very nature of BRICS. So far, we are only talking about unification, and not about a full-fledged organisation, with a permanent secretariat and a system of institutions. To some extent, the absence of a rigid institutional structure is an advantage of BRICS. It gives it freedom to manoeuvre, frees its members from excessive obligations, and prevents ossification in the form of international bureaucrats and structures. The experience of the UN shows that it is difficult to reform such structures; their efficiency is not always particularly high, and over time the functionaries form a kind of semi-closed club. At the same time, any deep integration, sooner or later, requires an institutional framework.

The big question is whether BRICS is ready for such institutionalisation today. In the field of financial settlements, the answer is more likely than not to be no. For now, we are talking about developing the very approach to such integration. At first, it can be targeted, focused on narrow tasks or areas. It does not have to cover the entire association — we can talk about settlements between individual countries, whose experience can then be scaled to the entire association. In any case, it is too early to talk about specific steps implying the institutionalisation of BRICS in this area, given the fact that the strategy for creating a settlement system has not yet been fully developed.

The second limitation is that the BRICS countries' economies are still quite closely integrated into American-centric financial settlements. The severance of such ties will be painful for most of them. They will not force the abandonment of the US dollar in settlements. This also applies to China, which seeks to keep its rivalry with the United States under control. A telling indicator is that the BRICS New Development Bank also uses US dollars. Obviously, the bank will avoid transactions with persons who are under US blocking sanctions, fearing US secondary sanctions. The threat of such sanctions is also perceived as a risk by banks in the BRICS countries, especially following the December 2023 amendments to Executive Order 14024. The amendments give the US Treasury the authority to impose blocking financial sanctions on foreign banks involved in transactions with the Russian military-industrial complex or in transactions in goods from US export control lists.

Banks in what Moscow considers friendly countries had previously been cautious in transactions with Russia, but now their caution has increased. Payments in national currencies do not completely solve the problem, since US authorities may require reporting on bank transactions. This reporting on payments in national currencies can be used to put pressure on banks. If the financial institutions fail to provide it, they risk inviting sanctions. In other words, even if we assume that payments in national currencies will start working tomorrow, they will not provide banks with a final solution to the problem of secondary US sanctions. They will continue to exercise caution and overcompliance. The risks of secondary sanctions also arise for banks in connection with Iran's membership in BRICS. In itself, the presence of such a large regional player within BRICS strengthens its political potential. But it complicates potential financial settlement projects within the association.

The third problem is relations between countries within the BRICS. Any deep integration of financial settlements will require a high level of trust between member countries. However, there are contradictions between them that complicate the technical implementation of large-scale projects when it comes to settlements. For example, it will be difficult to link payments to the currency of one or another BRICS member. In theory, such a currency could be the Chinese yuan, given the size of the Chinese economy. However, the big question is how politically acceptable this will be, for example, for India.

That is, it is too early to talk about an analogue of the American dollar in BRICS in the form of the currency of one of the member countries?

The question is whether China itself is ready to internationalize the yuan to the extent that the US dollar has today.

The fourth problem is the unbalanced and fragmented balance of payments when making payments in national currencies. This problem arises, for example, in trade relations between Russia and India, where the Russian side has a surplus of Indian rupees due to a significant excess of Russian exports over Indian imports. The problem is solvable. Indian business is increasingly interested in the Russian market. Options for investing rupees in the Indian economy are being explored. However, similar problems may arise in relations between other BRICS members. Algorithms for overcoming them are needed.

Of course, these obstacles are not a reason to close the issue of settlements. Moreover, they are an incentive to search for possible solutions. Taking into account the characteristics of BRICS, including its high flexibility due to weak institutionalisation and attractiveness for developing countries despite ongoing disagreements between several of them, when it comes to the desire to diversify payments while maintaining dollar transactions, the first steps will inevitably be tentative and cautious. Such steps could include, for example, the creation of a system of settlements for transactions within the entire association in those sectors that are not affected by sanctions or are excluded from them under certain exceptions. We are talking, first of all, about medicine and pharmaceuticals, food and other humanitarian transactions.

A second avenue for future efforts could be the testing of payments in national currencies between individual countries. Here, Russia could gain much experience, since it is Russia that is using them to the greatest extent even now, taking into account the significant volume of sanctions.

The third avenue is the creation of a network of BRICS banks working on common settlement projects. At the same time, we are not necessarily talking about large and leading banks. The pioneers can be small financial institutions, whose experience can later be scaled up by large banks.

The fourth avenue is the expansion of expert cooperation between the research institutions of the BRICS countries in close connection with the work of their financial institutions. In particular, a joint examination of the risk of sanctions, their perception by banks, and a common but flexible approach to risk control are required.

The fifth avenue is expanding the capabilities of the BRICS New Development Bank. Finally, taking into account the already accumulated experience of investment, raising funds, interaction between regulators and business, both within the association and outside it. Through the BRICS New Development Bank, it will be possible to test certain new payment mechanisms between member countries.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the Russian part of the BRICS Business Council Sergey Katyrin mentioned in an interview that as of 2024, there are ten official BRICS member countries, namely, Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, the UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Is Argentina's membership still pending, or has it withdrawn its application?

Maria Zakharova: In December 2023, President of Argentina Javier Milei sent personal messages to all heads of state of the current BRICS members, informing them that the Argentinian government has revised the previous administration's decision to join BRICS.

Should Buenos Aires reconsider its decision and approaches us again, we will be open to considering their application, taking into account the opinion of all BRICS members.

Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

March 20, 2024 On 23-26 March the 22nd Spirit of Fire International Debut Film Festival will be held in Khanty-Mansiysk as part of the plan of Russia's BRICS Chairship in 2024. This year's festival will feature the best films by directors from Russia and 10 other countries. The theme of the festival is 'The Special Language of National Cinema in BRICS'.

A number of business sessions and educational events have been planned as part of the official programme of the 22nd Spirit of Fire International Debut Film Festival. The educational programme will focus on practical lessons as well as on quality theoretical training. Lectures will include forward-looking development trends and successful practices from Russia's regional and the national filmmaking of India and China.

The business programme discussions will focus on film industry development, education, and cultural exchange. Participants will include Russian and international industry leaders, media managers, and public figures, who will discuss the unique development of the film industry within BRICS, issues surrounding joint film production, the promotion of content, the practice of mutual film screenings, the creation of professional staff exchange programmes, problems facing national film distribution, and measures that can be taken to preserve heritage and national identity.

Partivipants invited for the discussions include Cultural Attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Russia Masoud Ahmadvand, Director and Actor Behrouz Shoaybi, Governor of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area – Yugra Natalia Komarova, General Director of Central Partnership Vadim Vereshchagin, Director and General Producer of PROFIT Igor Tolstunov, General Producer of KION Online Cinema Igor Mishin, Director of the Department of Cinematography and Digital Development of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation Dmitry Davidenko, Head of Distribution and Marketing of India's National Film Development Corporation Deepti Chawla, Owner and Founder of Abu Dhabi Art Hub Ahmed Saleh Al Yafei, Rector of the S.A.Gerasimov All-Russian State Institute of Cinematography Vladimir Malyshev, and Screenwriter Andrey Zolotarev among others.

The programme partner is VKontakte, the main social network and streaming service of the event.

The festival has enjoyed the unwavering support of the government of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area – Yugra since 2002. Film director Emir Kusturica has served as president of the festival since 2022.

The Spirit of Fire cultural and educational programme was prepared with the assistance of the general partner, Gazprom Neft, which has been supporting the festival for 18 years now.

The Roscongress Foundation manages the events of Russia's BRICS Chairship and will be serving as communication partner for the festival.