Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: What would be your comment regarding the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ participation in the Kazan BRICS Summit? What did the summit participants say about the possibility of reforming the United Nations?

Maria Zakharova: UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres attended the BRICS Plus/Outreach meeting as a guest speaker. In his remarks, he shared his vision of the UN’s role in the rapidly changing world considering the emergence of a more democratic and fair multipolar world order.

He also shared his assessment regarding the Pact for the Future. Adopted on September 22, 2024, in New York, it sets forth the UN Secretary-General’s vision for reforming the United Nations and the multilateral cooperation framework as a whole. You may also know that Russia and several other countries have voiced their reservations regarding several provisions contained in this instrument by arguing that they are designed to dilute the UN’s intergovernmental operating mode. We also questioned what we view as excessive, totally unnatural and unworkable references to the human rights agenda within the UN, efforts to impose nuclear disarmament without taking into consideration the security factor, and making human rights and gender-related matters an integral part of the development agenda.

President Vladimir Putin had a bilateral meeting with the Secretary-General on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit to discuss, among other things, the situation in Ukraine and in the Middle East, as well as opportunities for facilitating the commercial navigation in the Black Sea.

I believe that it is quite natural to invite representatives from various international organisations, including the United Nations Secretary-General, to attend major international events focusing on peace, development, equality and which are guided by the principles set forth in the UN Charter, especially when these events go beyond regional affairs or a specific international topic, or simply bring together a few countries. I think that this is quite natural. This is the way to develop international relations, and we have been making this point throughout our chairmanship. I believe that the BRICS agenda took centre stage and had all the attention, even if the media did not fail to notice the talks with the UN Secretary-General.

Of course, these developments were marred by efforts by the officials from Bankovaya Street to create an outrageous scandal by presenting all kinds of ultimatums to the UN Secretary-General and telling him where he can or cannot travel. That said, let those marginal terrorists headed by Vladimir Zelensky, who is basically a junky, make these statements, since no one pays any attention anymore.

As for the second part of your question, considering the emergence of a more democratic multipolar world order, the United Nations would not be able to adapt to this new environment without a radical reform of its system and the Security Council as its key body. It is obvious that the Security Council must be more representative, and we have been raising concerns about the underrepresentation of certain continents among its members. In its current form, the collective West dominates the Security Council, which does not reflect the present-day reality. And this goes beyond the current situation. The way Western countries operate within the Security Council is corrupt and distorted since they do not represent specific countries. Instead, they represent countries which are bound by commitments as NATO members. This collective, NATO-based approach makes it impossible for them to take different positions. This is also something worth taking into consideration.

At the same time, it is not the purpose of BRICS to focus on discussing UN reform. This is not why this platform was created. The summit’s agenda revolves around promoting economic and humanitarian cooperation among the participating countries. This topic was also mentioned, since one of the objectives for BRICS is to promote peace based on international law and principles set forth in the UN Charter in order to build a world order with greater justice for all.

There is no consensus regarding the modalities or ways of reforming the UN Security Council. Those who took part in the BRICS Summit hold different views on this matter. Specifically, Brazil and India, together with Germany and Japan, are part of the so-called G4 group – it calls for an immediate increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council in order to gain permanent seats. Russia supports its Brazilian and Indian partners in their aspirations and views them as important and respected representatives of the Global South. China has adopted a similar position and spoke out in favour of expanding the Security Council only by adding countries of the Global South and East. Ethiopia represents the African Union in this debate – it has been calling for offering African countries at least two permanent seats and two additional seats on top of the three non-permanent seats African countries already have, while leaving it up to the African Union to choose its candidates. Ethiopia also wants to end veto powers, while enabling new permanent members to use them on the same terms as the current P5 members until this happens. This is the approach they have.

Most of the participants in the BRICS Summit have expressed their solidarity with Russia by agreeing that we need to exercise extreme caution and care when dealing with the sensitive and multi-faceted issue of reforming the UN system by taking on board the opinions of all the parties involved in intergovernmental talks on reforming the Security Council.

In this context, the only possible path forward consists of carrying on with our efforts to better align the approaches of various member states without setting any artificial deadlines. In its final version, the reform must enjoy maximum support. Achieving a consensus on this matter would be the best possible option. That said, we cannot draft any specific proposals before agreeing on the basic framework for this reform.

Once again, I would like to refer to experts, specialists, including from Russia, as well as government officials and the leadership of our country who, just like doctors, have been guided by the Do No Harm principle when dealing with UN Security Council reform. This reform should not harm the UN. On the contrary, it must enhance the UN’s performance instead of making the issues it already has worse. We must focus on making things better rather than undermining the UN’s work. There have been all kinds of attempts to do this, both positive and negative. Our past experience must guide us when working on this matter.

Question: The UN resolution on resolving the Middle East issue that was passed 80 years ago has not been fulfilled to date. What tools does BRICS have for addressing problems of the Middle East?

Maria Zakharova: Much has been said about BRICS today.

The situation in the Middle East became a key issue of the BRICS summit, held in Kazan on October 22-24, 2024. Summit discussions confirmed the similarity of BRICS countries’ approaches, their concern over the aggravated regional situation, as well as the special role of BRICS in searching for collective solutions to regional challenges.

The Kazan Declaration, passed following the summit, formalises general assessments. For example, the document expresses concern over the subsequent escalation of the conflict in the Gaza Strip that can increase tensions and extremism and can cause extremely deleterious consequences at regional and global levels. BRICS leaders urged all concerned parties to honour the norms of international law, to display maximum restraint and to avoid actions and provocative statements that lead to escalation.

BRICS countries advance principles for peacefully resolving disputes by diplomatic methods, through mediation, comprehensive dialogue and consultations on the basis of coordination and cooperation.
Additionally, BRICS countries provide assistance through their mediatory efforts. For example, our country delivers humanitarian aid to people, specifically the Gaza Strip’s residents, in need of everything. We regularly provide updates on the volume of humanitarian aid and its content.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: Türkiye has expressed its intention to join BRICS. What is your take on how this process will go and what its result will be? How might Türkiye’s full membership affect the group? And what is Moscow’s perspective on Türkiye’s accession?

Sergey Lavrov: We welcome Türkiye’s interest in strengthening ties with BRICS. This reflects the appeal of the group that is based on respect for the UN Charter, openness, pragmatism, and non-directedness against third parties.

We support the expansion of BRICS relations with countries of the Global Majority, particularly those committed to upholding multilateral approaches, pursuing a sovereign foreign policy, and refraining from participating in unilateral sanctions.

During the summit in Kazan, a decision was made to strengthen the current composition of BRICS by including partner countries in the group. I am confident that Türkiye can make a meaningful contribution to the ongoing development of BRICS. The parameters for Türkiye’s participation in the group will be determined by consensus, respecting the sovereign choices of all BRICS countries and Türkiye itself.

Question: A year has passed since the Israeli attacks on Gaza began, and tensions in the region have escalated significantly due to Israeli attacks on Lebanon. Who will intervene to stop the aggression by the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu? Will Russia take the lead in efforts to stop Israel? In this context, what stance will Russia adopt in case of a potential military intervention by the US and Israel in Iran?

Sergey Lavrov: The failure to settle the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict has sparked a new wave of violence, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of innocent Palestinians in Gaza. The number of casualties in Lebanon reaches thousands. More and more countries are becoming embroiled in this escalating confrontation.

Russia has condemned Israel for killing political leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as high-ranking Iranian military officials. We asked the UN Security Council to give its assessment of these deeds, but this initiative was blocked by opposition from Western members of the Council.

We urge all parties to refrain from actions that could further escalate violence and lead to a situation beyond control. There will be no winners in this conflict.

The way to normalise the situation lies in halting the bloodshed and creating conditions for a political resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on universal international legal principles. This includes the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Only this solution can guarantee lasting peace in the Middle East.

Question: Türkiye at the top level has reaffirmed its intention to help resolve the Ukrainian crisis and indicated its readiness to make every effort to revive the Dolmabahce process. In this context, what are your thoughts on Türkiye’s role as a mediator and host for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in the near future? How do you evaluate the country’s initiatives to resolve the crisis?

Sergey Lavrov: We appreciate Türkiye’s efforts to help resolve the Ukrainian crisis. The Türkish government played a crucial role by offering the Istanbul platform for consultations with representatives from Kiev in the spring of 2022 and facilitating the grain deal. However, the Istanbul negotiations were ultimately undermined by the Anglo-Saxons, who prevented Vladimir Zelensky from reaching agreements that could have stopped hostilities and ensured the balance of interests of all parties involved.

Russia is open to achieving a political settlement, but this should not merely lead to a temporary ceasefire; it must lead to a resolution of the conflict by eliminating its root causes. These include NATO’s eastward expansion, the creation of threats to Russia’s essential security interests, and the Kiev regime’s infringement on the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine.

At the moment, our opponents do not appear to want peace. Ukraine’s reaction to President Vladimir Putin’s peace initiative proposed in June was an invasion of the Kursk Region by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, along with airstrikes on targets in other border areas. Washington and its allies continue to provide extensive support to Kiev, discuss the possibility of using Western long-range missiles for strikes deep into Russian territory. Vladimir Zelensky has not revoked his order prohibiting negotiations with Moscow. Given these circumstances, it seems unlikely that any country, including Türkiye, will succeed in mediation efforts.

Regrettably, Ankara continues its military-technical cooperation with the Kiev regime. Türkish weapons are being used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to kill Russian soldiers and civilians, which is perplexing in light of the Türkish leadership’s statements of readiness to offer mediation services.

Question: Türkiye also remains in close contact with Moscow on the normalisation of relations with Syria. Although Ankara has repeatedly expressed its point of view regarding the meeting with Assad, Damascus puts forward preconditions for negotiations, such as the “withdrawal of Turkish troops from the region.” How do you assess this attitude of Damascus and the possibility of normalisation?

Sergey Lavrov: The normalisation of Syrian-Turkish relations is of great importance for sustainable stabilisation in Syria and strengthening security in the entire Middle East.

Russia is taking consistent efforts to help bridge the gap between Damascus and Ankara. My colleagues from Türkiye and Iran and I discussed this issue during the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Astana process guarantor countries on September 27 in New York.

Last year, several meetings were held in Moscow between the foreign ministries, defence ministries, and special services as part of the Russia-Iran-Syria- Türkiye quadripartite format. Topics of particular interest have been identified, including the return of Syrian refugees, the fight against terrorism, and border security.

The differences in the positions of Damascus and Ankara have led to a pause in the negotiation process. The Syrian government believes that first it is necessary to settle the issue of withdrawing the Turkish military contingent from Syria. Overall, Türkiye confirms its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, but suggests returning to the issue of the withdrawal of its troops later.

We will actively promote re-launching the negotiation process as soon as possible, because both capitals signal that they are quite interested in resuming the dialogue.

Question: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that serious steps can be taken with Russia on the Sinop NPP. Is there any progress on this issue? Will this step be taken in Sinop after the Akkuyu NPP?

How does the West’s embargo against Russia affect the country’s economy? At what stage is trade with Türkiye today? What would you say about the course of economic relations between Türkiye and Russia?

Sergey Lavrov: The Turkish authorities have to decide on what foundation and with whose assistance the Sinop NPP construction project will be implemented. If we manage to agree on the parameters of Russia’s participation, then we believe that both parties will benefit from this. We have a successful example of cooperation: the construction of the Akkuyu NPP.

Russia has adapted to the sanctions pressure and is developing successfully. In terms of GDP at purchasing power parity, we have become the fourth in the world and the first in Europe. The growth of the Russian economy this year should be about 3.9 percent. We have the lowest unemployment rate among the largest economies in the world: 2.4 percent.

The United States is trying to restrict the opportunities of our foreign partners interested in trade with Russia. Unfortunately, Türkiye is no exception. The prospects for our practical cooperation depend on whether experts will be able to find mutually acceptable solutions in the near future.

Question: Presidential election will be held in the United States in November. During the election campaign, Russia often becomes the centre of attention. Which presidential candidate would Moscow prefer to see in the White House? Donald Trump or Kamala Harris?

Sergey Lavrov: We have no preferences. In the past, the Trump administration was the one that introduced the greatest number of anti-Russia sanctions compared with its predecessors. Under the current president, who has spun the spring of Russophobia in the United States to the limit, our countries are balancing on the brink of a direct military clash.

Whoever wins the election, we can see no possibility of the United States changing its Russophobic course. For our part, we will be ready for dialogue if and when the Americans demonstrate serious intentions to negotiate honestly, based on respect for each other’s interests and the principle of reciprocity.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

The not so simple twists of fate always allow certain cities to make their mark in History in ineffable ways. Yalta. Bretton Woods. Bandung – a 1955 de-colonization staple. And now Kazan, stresses Pepe Escobar, a well-known geopolitical analyst, writer and journalist.

The BRICS summit in Kazan, capital of Tatarstan, under the Russian presidency was historic in more ways than one – followed with riveting attention by the whole Global Majority and with perplexity by a great deal of the declining Western order.

It did not change the world – not yet. But Kazan should be seen as the departing station of a high-speed train journey towards the emerging multi-nodal new order. The metaphor was also spatial: the pavilions at the Kazan Expo center “station” holding the summit simultaneously connected to the airport and to the aero-express train to the city.

The rippling effects of BRICS 2024 in Kazan will be perceived for weeks, months and years ahead. Let’s start with the breakthroughs.

1.The Kazan Declaration. That is no less than a detailed diplomatic manifesto. Yet because BRICS is not a revolutionary agent – as its members do not share an ideology – arguably the next best strategy is to propose real reform, from the UN Agenda 2030 to the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the WHO and the G20 (whose summit is in November in Rio).

The kernel of the Kazan Declaration – which had been debated for months – is to move in practice towards in-depth institutional changes and to reject Hegemony. The Declaration will be presented to the UN Security Council. There’s no doubt the Hegemon will reject it.

This paragraph sums up the reform drive: “We condemn the attempts to subject development to discriminatory politically motivated practices, including but not limited to unilateral coercive measures that are incompatible with the 5 principles of the UN Charter, explicit or implied political conditionality of development assistance, activities, aiming at compromising the multiplicity of international development assistance providers.”

2. The BRICS Outreach session. That was Bandung 1955 on macro-steroids: a microcosm of how the new, really de-colonized, non-unilateral world is being born.

President Putin opened and handed the floor to the leaders and heads of delegations of other 35 nations, most at the highest level, including Palestine, plus the UN Secretary General. Quite a few speeches were nothing short of epic. The session lasted 3h25. It will be circulating all across the Global Majority for years.

The session tied up with the announcement of the new 13 BRICS partners: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkiye, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. A strategic tour de force including 4 Southeast Asian powerhouses; the top two Central Asian “stans”; 3 Africans; 2 Latin Americans, and NATO member Turkiye.

3. The Russian BRICS presidency itself. Arguably no other nation would have been able to pull off such a complex and impeccably organized summit, held after over 200 BRICS-related meetings throughout the year across Russia conducted by unnamed sherpas, members of working groups and the BRICs Business Council. Security was massive – for obvious reasons, considering the odds of a false flag/terrorist attack.

4. Connectivity corridors. That is the main geoeconomic theme of Eurasia integration, and Afro-Eurasia integration as well. Putin explicitly named, more than once, the new growth drivers of the near future: Southeast Asia and Africa. Both happen to be key partners of several high-profile Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. Additionally, Putin named the top two connectivity corridors of the future: the Northern Sea Route – which the Chinese describe as the Arctic Silk Road – and the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), where the three drivers are BRICS members Russia, Iran and India.

So that translates as BRICS China crisscrossing Eurasia from east to west while BRICS Russia/Iran/India crisscross it from north to south, with ramifications in all latitudes. And with all the energy add-ons, with Iran positioning itself as a crucial energy hub, opening the finally feasible possibility of building the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, one of the unfinished sagas of what I described in the early 2000s as Pipelineistan.

There were immense expectations all across the Global Majority of a major breakthrough in Kazan on alternative payment systems. Realist Russian-Chinese finance tech experts commented they did “not see anything at all except for another round of initiatives about grain exchange, precious metals exchange and investment platform. BRICS Clear is being somehow developed but the rest will not work without proper sovereign infrastructure.”

And that brings us back to the UNIT project – a form of “apolitical money”, anchored in gold and BRICS+ currencies, which was exhaustively discussed by the working groups and reached the Russian Ministry of Finance. The next necessary step is a trial run by a major business conglomerate. That may happen soon, and if successful, will stimulate other major companies in BRICS nations to tag along.

As for the BRICS digital investment platform, it is already a go. Alongside the NDB – the BRICS bank, and Putin encouraged former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to stay on the helm – this will facilitate Global South access to financing without the dreaded IMF/World Bank “structural adjustment” conditionalities. The BRICS grain exchange, establishing clear, transparent rules, will be essential to ensure Global South food security.

The BRICS made it clear that the complex drive towards a new settlement/payment infrastructure is inevitable, but a long work in progress, especially when the G7 – which for all practical purposes is hijacking the agenda for the G20 next month in Rio – wants to finance at least $20 billion of a $50 billion package to Ukraine with proceeds from stolen Russian assets.

And that brings us to the most glaring BRICS problems. Achieving consensus on difficult dossiers is extremely hard – and may lead, in the long run, to BRICS moving towards an absolute majority mechanism to get things done.

The Brazilian case – vetoing Venezuela as a BRICS partner – did not go down well at all among members, among partners and across the Global South. The current Lula government may be under tremendous pressure by the Hegemon’s Democrat establishment, but that in itself does not explain the decision.

There is a massive anti-BRICS lobby inside the highest levels of the Brazilian government, “facilitated”, as usual, by American NGOs as well as the European Commission (EC), heavily infiltrated among the proverbial comprador elites. Brasilia this year privileged the G20 over BRICS. That foresees trouble for next year, when Brazil assumes the BRICS presidency.

There’s a major takeaway of all of the above. Kazan proved that the driving force of BRICS is actually the notorious Primakov triangle – or RIC (Russia, India, China). It’s now possible to add Iran, and that would make it RIIC. Everything of substance in the inter-connected processes of BRICS integration and Afro-Eurasia integration depends on RIIC.

RIC scored a major hit right before the Kazan summit with Beijing and New Delhi announcing their Ladakh normalization. That was achieved by Russian mediation. Then there’s Turkiye; Erdogan was adamant to stress his BRICS enthusiasm in the few hours he spent in Kazan. Later in Istanbul, scholars confirmed he’s dead serious about Turkiye’s partner status and eventual admission as a full member.

In the language of symbols, the minarets of the Kul Sharif mosque in the Kazan Kremlin were the de facto trademark of the summit: graphic multipolarity in effect. The lands of Islam did get the message – with serious, auspicious repercussions ahead. As for the conductors as the high-speed multi-nodal train leaves the station, all attention should be focused on RIC. May all the Global South have a safe trip.

France
Source: theconversation.com

The last two summits of Brics countries have raised questions about the coalition’s identity and purpose. This began to come into focus at the summit hosted by South Africa in 2023, and more acutely at the recent 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia.

At both events the alliance undertook to expand its membership. In 2023, the first five Brics members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – invited Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join. All bar Saudi Arabia have now done so. The 2024 summit pledged to admit 13 more, perhaps as associates or “partner countries”.

On paper, the nine-member Brics+ strikes a powerful pose. It has a combined population of about 3.5 billion, or 45% of the world’s people. Combined, its economies are worth more than US$28.5 trillion – about 28% of the global economy. With Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as members, Brics+ produces about 44% of the world’s crude oil.

Based on my research and policy advice to African foreign policy decision-makers, I would argue that there are three possible interpretations of the purpose of Brics+.

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• A club of self-interested members – a kind of global south cooperative. What I’d label as a self-help organisation.
• A reforming bloc with a more ambitious goal of improving the workings of the current global order.
• A disrupter, preparing to replace the western-dominated liberal world order.

Analysing the commitments that were made at the meeting in Russia, I would argue that Brics+ sees itself more as a self-interested reformer. It represents the thinking among global south leaders about the nature of global order, and the possibilities of shaping a new order. This, as the world moves away from the financially dominant, yet declining western order (in terms of moral influence) led by the US. The move is to a multipolar order in which the east plays a leading role.

However, the ability of Brics+ to exploit such possibilities is constrained by its make-up and internal inconsistencies. These include a contested identity, incongruous values and lack of resources to convert political commitments into actionable plans.

Summit outcomes

The trend towards closer trade and financial cooperation and coordination stands out as a major achievement of the Kazan summit. Other achievements pertain to global governance and counter-terrorism.

When it comes to trade and finance, the final communiqué said the following had been agreed:

• adoption of local currencies in trade and financial transactions. The Kazan Declaration notes the benefits of faster, low cost, more efficient, transparent, safe and inclusive cross-border payment instruments. The guiding principle would be minimal trade barriers and non-discriminatory access.
• establishment of a cross-border payment system. The declaration encourages correspondent banking networks within Brics, and enabling settlements in local currencies in line with the Brics Cross-Border Payments Initiative. This is voluntary and nonbinding and is to be discussed further.
• creation of an enhanced roles for the New Development Bank, such as promoting infrastructure and sustainable development.
• a proposed Brics Grain Exchange, to improve food security through enhanced trade in agricultural commodities.

All nine Brics+ countries committed themselves to the principles of the UN Charter – peace and security, human rights, the rule of law, and development – primarily as a response to the western unilateral sanctions.

The summit emphasised that dialogue and diplomacy should prevail over conflict in, among other places, the Middle East, Sudan, Haiti and Afghanistan.

Faultlines and tensions

Despite the positive tone of the Kazan declaration, there are serious structural fault lines and tensions inherent in the architecture and behaviour of Brics+. These might limit its ambitions to be a meaningful change agent.

The members don’t even agree on the definition of Brics+. President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa calls it a platform. Others talk of a group (Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi) or a family (Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jianan).

So what could it be?

Brics+ is state-driven – with civil society on the margins. It reminds one of the African Union, which pays lip service to citizens’ engagement in decision-making.

One possibility is that it will evolve into an intergovernmental organisation with a constitution that sets up its agencies, functions and purposes. Examples include the World Health Organization, the African Development Bank and the UN general assembly.

But it would need to cohere around shared values. What would they be?

Critics point out that Brics+ consists of democracies (South Africa, Brazil, India), a theocracy (Iran), monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia) and authoritarian dictatorships (China, Russia). For South Africa this creates a domestic headache. At the Kazan summit, its president declared Russia a friend and ally. At home, its coalition partner in the government of national unity, the Democratic Alliance, declared Ukraine as a friend and ally.

There are also marked differences over issues such as the reform of the United Nations. For example, at the recent UN Summit of the Future the consensus was for reform of the UN security council. But will China and Russia, as permanent security council members, agree to more seats, with veto rights, on the council?

As for violent conflict, humanitarian crises, corruption and crime, there is little from the Kazan summit that suggests agreement around action.

Unity of purpose

What about shared interests? A number of Brics+ members and the partner countries maintain close trade ties with the west, which regards Russia and Iran as enemies and China as a global threat.
Some, such as India and South Africa, use the foreign policy notions of strategic ambiguity or active non-alignment to mask the reality of trading with east, west, north and south.

The harsh truth of international relations is there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. The Brics+ alliance will most likely cohere as a global south co-operative, with an innovative self-help agenda, but be reluctant to overturn the current global order from which it desires to benefit more equitably.

Trade-offs and compromises might be necessary to ensure “unity of purpose”. It’s not clear that this loose alliance is close to being able to achieve that.

USA
Source: www.csis.org

From October 22–24, 2024, BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—met in the Russian city of Kazan for their highly anticipated yearly summit. While BRICS summits rarely produce groundbreaking final documents, a product of their internal diversity, this summit was notable for several developments. It saw the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for their first summit. Second, dozens of countries have applied to join BRICS, including Latin America’s dictatorships. Yet, major questions persist about the future of the grouping and how it will present itself as an alternative to the status quo.

Q1: What is the BRICS grouping?

A1: Originally identified by Goldman Sachs’ economist Jim O’Neill as experiencing the most rapid growth until 2001, BRIC—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—formed as a group of emerging market economies seeking to represent those interests on the global stage. In 2009, Russian president Vladimir Putin hosted the first official BRIC summit, and China (PRC) invited South Africa to join a year later. Besides their projected growth, the five countries that comprised BRICS until this year have very little in common—each finding their own reason for attending BRICS summits. In fact, after numerous meetings, the bloc made little progress toward building a cohesive identity. Part of this rests in the starkly divided ways each country approaches BRICS. Brazil, India, and to a lesser extent South Africa, see the BRICS as a non-Western institution amplifying their claims to “nonalignment” or “multi-alignment” in international affairs. China and Russia, on the other hand, increasingly view the BRICS as an institution meant to signal the decline of the West and the rise of an alternative global order based around multipolarity, with greater gravitational pull toward Beijing and, to a lesser extent, Moscow. Despite his war of aggression in Ukraine, Putin has touted the BRICS, complicating matters for other BRICS countries.

The BRICS remains primarily an economic bloc. The goal of the bloc is to counterbalance Western power as represented by the G7, mainly through an agglomeration of emerging economic powers. The main avenues for this have been two new multilateral institutions, the New Development Bank (NDB, known as the “BRICS Bank”) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), which seeks to rival the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to lessen the dominance of the dollar.

Q2: Why is the BRICS group expanding?

A2: The BRICS has several fissures among its member countries, but a key divergence is over the question of expansion. While Russia and China favor expansion, Brazil, India, and South Africa resist the idea out of fear of diluting their influence with the other two. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly altered the calculus for expansion, as many Western nations sought to distance themselves from Moscow. For Russia, expanding BRICS sends the message that Russia is by no means a “pariah,” with many countries rejecting sanctions on Russia and attempts to isolate it. For China, increasing the attraction of BRICS is a crown jewel in its long-term project of courting countries in the Global South in order to sow a more Beijing-centric global order.

At the latest BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE became the latest countries to join the BRICS (rebranding to BRICS+), having been invited following the last BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. The expansion marks the evolution of BRICS into a more cohesive anti-Western agglomeration. Saudi Arabia has officially been accepted into the bloc, but the kingdom has not decided whether to join the group since last year’s invitation, while Argentina outright rejected its invitation. The expanded BRICS bloc now represents roughly 45 percent of the world’s population, and with the inclusion of the UAE and Iran, the bloc accounts for almost 30 percent of global oil output, a number that would dramatically increase should Saudi Arabia join. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), the newly expanded bloc now holds 35 percent compared to 23 percent of global PPP 20 years ago. For comparison, the G7 group held 40 percent PPP in 2004, compared to 29 percent this year.

The latest expansion is not set to end with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE. It is estimated that over 40 countries have expressed interest in joining the forum and that 24 countries are in the formal application process. While no formal invitations were given to countries in Kazan, a new category of “partner countries” emerged to signal future rounds of expansion—a via media between Brazil and India’s staunch opposition and China and Russia’s drive to expand the bloc. With expansion being the ineluctable fate of the BRICS, observers will seek a throughline in these countries’ actions on the international stage. It is yet to be seen whether the amalgamation of countries that compose BRICS+ finds economic and political significance in their membership.

Q3: What benefits accrue to members of the BRICS?

A3: The BRICS+ grouping has yet to build a substantial track record of solving global challenges. While the bloc is relatively young compared to more venerable institutions like the G7 and G20, it has assiduously avoided taking on issues that could throw into stark relief the contradictory foreign policy preferences and outlooks of its diverse membership. Where the BRICS+ have been most successful at finding common ground is in efforts towards building an alternative financial architecture to the U.S. dollar. Countries have a variety of reasons for supporting such moves to end the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. In some cases, it is merely a question of reducing transaction fees and timelines by cutting out the middleman that is the U.S. financial sector when making foreign currency transactions across borders. For other BRICS+ members and aspirants, it is about circumventing U.S.-led sanctions imposed against them that make it challenging to hold dollars and interact with global financial markets. From this perspective, the new “BRICS Bridge” alternative payments system initiative is highly attractive.

A secondary appeal of the BRICS+ grouping is the gravitational pull of China’s economy. The PRC is the largest trading partner for all the countries included in the grouping’s 2023 expansion, and fellow founding members like Brazil depend heavily on the Chinese market, too. New members of the BRICS+ are therefore joining an attractive and, for the time being, a relatively small network that guarantees face time with one of their largest trade and investment partners, including at the leader level during annual summits. While this element of the BRICS+ appeal is downplayed by the grouping, it is an undeniable driver behind the group’s appeal to new members.

Finally, BRICS+ is a signaling device for countries that feel excluded from the current international order. The group’s overall orientation towards the Global South and fervent appeals to consider a non-Western alternative for global governance hold sizeable appeal in many circles. Indeed, even countries that are not explicitly opposed to the United States find benefit in joining BRICS+ as a means of enhancing their national prestige and nonaligned credentials.

Q4: What do Latin America’s dictators expect to gain from BRICS+ membership?

A4: With the enlargement of BRICS, democracies are now outnumbered 22 to 3 when factoring in the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries added as partner countries in Kazan. This makes life complicated for the few democracies in BRICS+. The bloc will become a magnet for other autocracies that are clearly aligned with Moscow and Beijing and have anti-Western grievances. In Latin America, the dictatorships of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, and Cuba’s Miguel Díaz-Canel all expressed interest in BRICS+ membership. Semi-authoritarian Bolivia also wants to join the club, while democratic Argentina, under President Javier Milei, declined the invitation to join the group over “ideological differences.”

The three Latin American dictatorships deploy an “anti-imperialist” ideology aimed squarely at the United States. In response to human rights violations and corruption, U.S. sanctions have been placed on all of them. Venezuela and Nicaragua are also subject to European and Canadian sanctions. These two countries also face sectoral sanctions, and Cuba has had to contend with the U.S. embargo for decades. These regimes mutually support each other, diplomatically, militarily, and economically through subsidies of Venezuelan oil, but also through a shadowy network of illicit activities that one long-time researcher of organized crime in Latin America called a joint criminal enterprise. They have all also embraced BRICS founders China, Russia, and new member Iran as investors, trading partners, friends, and allies, regularly receiving high-level diplomatic visits. All three countries depend on schemes to circumvent sanctions and resent the U.S. dollar’s global reserve currency status and the “exorbitant privilege” it provides Washington.
At the time of the South Africa summit, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel described the BRICS group as an important alternative to the established international economic order. Two weeks ahead of the summit in Kazan, Cuba officially asked to be considered a BRICS+ partner country, which was approved. Díaz-Canel was not able to travel to Russia because of an unprecedented four-day electrical black-out that affected all of Cuba and had the potential to lead to significant protests. Cuba sees BRICS+ as an economic lifeline for its moribund economy which some consider to be worse than during the so-called “special period” after the Soviet Union collapsed. Russia has been deepening its relations with its old Cold War ally, especially since its invasion of Ukraine. It signed several economic agreements with Havana in May 2023, approved a customs cooperation agreement to increase bilateral trade in June 2023, and in March 2024, Putin modified Russia’s credit agreements, restructuring Havana's debt to make payments easier. Russia has also been recruiting Cubans to fight in Ukraine, and there are suspicions that Cuba is either sharing intelligence or allowing the PRC to use the island for signals intelligence gathering against the United States.

Nicaragua also faces economic headwinds as the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Its shift towards the PRC in 2021 has yet to yield large economic gains. While Nicaragua maintains a free trade agreement with the United States, it endeavors to diversify trade and investment, especially as Ortega’s brutal crackdown has brought it into Washington’s crosshairs. Joining BRICS+ may be another attempt by Ortega to ingratiate himself with Xi Jinping, even as Nicaragua has also pledged to be “Russia’s regional platform in all matters.” Ortega himself had said in September 2023 that his motivation in joining BRICS+ was because “BRICS . . . [wants] to cooperate, not to invade or bomb another country but to strengthen economic and social relations in the fight for peace,” eliding Russia’s daily bombing of civilian targets in Ukraine or the large-scale People’s Liberation Army military exercises around Taiwan.
Since his brazen theft of the July presidential election in Venezuela, Maduro has found himself more internationally isolated. Formerly reliable friends like President Lula of Brazil and President Petro of Colombia have refused to recognize his victory, while Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico has said she would not get involved. Maduro’s gatecrashing of the BRICS+ party was therefore to be expected. In Kazan, Maduro called for a “new international financing system.” Venezuela is heavily indebted to China and repays the debt with shipments of oil. It has also relied on Russia’s fleet of shadow oil tankers to evade Washington’s sanctions. BRICS+ offers the possibility of forging closer ties with countries key to circumventing existing and any reimposed sanctions against Venezuela. Even though Maduro’s bid came up short, Maduro likely got what he wanted—he demonstrated to the world his willingness to leave Venezuela during a moment of domestic turbulence, he pigeonholed Putin and Xi for important photo ops meant to disprove the idea of his diplomatic isolation, and both Putin and Xi endorsed Venezuela’s bid to join the BRICS+, with Putin using his closing remarks at the summit to urge Brazil and Venezuela to work out their differences.

Finally, there is semi-authoritarian Bolivia. The country’s president, Luis Arce, attended the BRICS summit in South Africa, where he made common cause with other leaders seeking to move away from international financial transactions in U.S. dollars. The country has faced dollar shortages with reserves falling to $4 billion from a peak of $15 billion in 2014, in part because of falling natural gas production. The government said last July it was determined to curb dependence on the dollar for foreign trade, instead turning to the Chinese yuan. Arce also attended this year’s summit in Russia, looking for new investments in Bolivia’s mining sector. Last year, Russian and Chinese companies invested more than $2.8 billion in Bolivian lithium mines. In Kazan, Arce talked about Bolivia’s mineral wealth and said his participation in BRICS+ aimed to secure “mutual benefit” for his country and other BRICS+ members. Like Cuba, Bolivia secured BRICS+ “partner country” status in Kazan.

Q5: How has this put Brazil, and other democracies in BRICS, in a bind?

A5: After last year’s expansion of the BRICS at the Johannesburg Summit, the balance of power shifted decisively within the bloc. Autocracies outnumbered democracies, putting Brazil and India, in particular, in a bind. Both countries have long seen BRICS as a balancing act and capable of proving their “multi-alignment” or “nonalignment” bona fides. BRICS gave Brazil and India a platform to discuss the importance of “democratizing” international relations and increasing “multilateralism.”

Neither country desires confrontation with the West and both resent the current direction of BRICS+. Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign ministry, did not support the expansion of the BRICS—the diplomatic corps did not want to dilute Brazil’s power vis-à-vis China and Russia and make decisionmaking in an already unwieldy organization even more difficult. Brazil and India managed to stave off expansion efforts by China and Russia dating back to at least 2017, but starting last year, the two countries lost control. China and Russia are driving expansion efforts, as seen in the strong concentration of energy-producing countries in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, selected as the first cohort for expansion.

The inclusion of Iran, as well as Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, were particularly problematic in raising the cost of membership in the BRICS+—at least in taking it from somewhat negligible to rather costly for a country like Brazil. As the archrival to the United States, a state sponsor of terror, and perennial disruptor of the Middle East, Iran’s presence vitiated Brazil’s incessant reassurance that—to quote Lula himself—the “BRICS is not against anyone.” BRICS+ now looks less like a vehicle for nonalignment than it does one of confrontation with the West and the increasingly Beijing-centric order China seeks to erect. Following Russia’s cutoff from SWIFT, efforts to skirt Western payment systems by constructing the “BRICS Bridge” of central bank payments in digital currencies have only heightened fears about sanctions evasion, especially with Latin America’s dictatorships knocking at the door. It is safe to say that Brazil feels less able to control intra-BRICS+ dynamics, as China purportedly ignored Brazil’s request to avoid explicitly anti-Western countries such as Iran in expansion efforts.

The democratic deficit within BRICS+ is only increasing. The list of BRICS+ partner countries tips the autocracy-democracy balance even further in the direction of the former. That a founding country’s leader (Putin) faces an International Criminal Court indictment already creates myriad hurdles for current BRICS+ members. Compounding this challenge, at least two of Latin America’s three dictatorships face investigations for “crimes against humanity.” This could translate to less enthusiastic participation by countries like Brazil as it seeks to “lean out” of the BRICS in recognition of its increasing liabilities—reversing a decade of enthusiastic participation “leaning in” to perceived benefits.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow of the Americas Program at CSIS. Rubi Bledsoe is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS. Henry Ziemer is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS.

USA
Source: carnegieendowment.org

It might seem that within BRICS, Russia should be overshadowed by the giant economies of China and India, especially the former. Yet what is happening is almost the opposite, with Russia effectively taking over the leading role in the club.
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Carnegie Politika is a digital publication that features unmatched analysis and insight on Russia, Ukraine and the wider region. For nearly a decade, Carnegie Politika has published contributions from members of Carnegie’s global network of scholars and well-known outside contributors and has helped drive important strategic conversations and policy debates.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has not only shattered lives and upended international relations. It is also changing the character and identity of organizations whose founding members include Russia—above all, BRICS, whose members and guests gathered in the Russian city of Kazan last week for the organization’s annual summit.

Russia has tried to present BRICS as a new nonaligned movement. But in reality, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the organization increasingly resembles a club of Russia’s allies in opposing the West.

The fact that BRICS has added five new members since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine allows Moscow to interpret this major expansion as a gesture of support for its own actions by the Global South. Although the recent expansion and its potential continuation blunt the club’s elitism—and the clarity of criteria for joining it—Russia now attaches more weight to the number of members and how the new composition alters the organization.

In its pre-expansion lineup of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, BRICS was an alliance of several countries undergoing economic growth and democratic transformation—plus authoritarian China. India officially boasted the title of the most populous democracy in the world; Brazil held the same title for Latin America; and South Africa was lauded as the most stable democracy in Africa. Brazil, South Africa, and even Russia were touted as success stories of countries that had overcome dictatorships at the turn of the 1990s.

After Iran, Egypt, the UAE, and Ethiopia joined BRICS at the 2023 summit in South Africa, following which Saudi Arabia was also invited to join, the proportion of nondemocratic states in BRICS increased, making it more authoritarian and also more conservative, since the societies and legislation of the new member countries are far more traditional and anti-liberal, and their populations more anti-Western. In the meantime, two original members of the organization, China and Russia, have also moved toward personalistic dictatorships.

BRICS has started to transform from a club of the largest developing economies into a less exclusive group of non-Western states selected according to unclear criteria, but which are largely friends of the oldest members of the club, brought in by their lobbying efforts. And no one has shown more initiative than Russia in inviting new members. Amid such ill-defined criteria, the main condition for being invited to join is now that countries must be non-Western, even anti-Western.

The flip side of expansion is that the more members there are, the less control Russia has over ensuring BRICS follows an anti-Western and anti-liberal agenda. After all, not everyone is tempted by that new agenda. In August 2023, Argentina accepted an invitation to join, but in December, its new president Javier Milei sent a letter to the organization’s members declining to participate after all. And in contrast with the long list of those now wishing to join BRICS, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s statement ahead of the summit that his country would not be applying to join the group in the foreseeable future was also notable.

Another noticeable absence at the Kazan summit was that of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Nor is Saudi Arabia’s status in the organization entirely clear. The country received an official invitation to join BRICS at the same time as Argentina, but unlike Argentina has not experienced a change in political leadership. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Saudi Arabia is a full-fledged member of BRICS, and an invitation to the summit was personally conveyed to the Crown Prince by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and was not turned down. According to Saudi sources, however, the country participated in all events as an invitee, and not as a full member. Bin Salman did not go to Kazan, or even speak via video link. The Saudi foreign minister did not sign the joint Kazan Declaration. There could be several reasons for this, from unwillingness to share the organization’s anti-Western slant, coupled with pressure from the West, to differences between Russia and Saudi Arabia over the oil market.

It might seem that within BRICS, Russia should be overshadowed by the giant economies of China and India, especially the former. Yet what is happening is almost the opposite, with Russia effectively taking over the leading role in the club. China and India are not only the largest powers in Asia, they are also regional rivals. Inside BRICS, Russia finds itself in the role of their peacemaker and moderator. At last week’s summit in Kazan, Russia was clearly reveling in its role as mediator, calling on China and India to put their differences behind them for the sake of shared global goals.

And indeed, it would not be accurate to say that BRICS has no real substance beyond propaganda and anti-Western posturing. While it’s true that the member countries’ economic interaction has lagged behind their political interaction, they do share a genuine interest in making settlements in national currencies. After all, such settlements with Russia itself help other countries to save hard currency, and help China to promote its own currency as a regional reserve. Interest in alternatives to the SWIFT international payment system and the decentralization and diversification of the global financial system in general is just as real.

Still, the fact that warring Russia managed to host key ministerial meetings and a top-level summit on its territory, exposing the leaders of the Global South to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive rhetoric, could not help but at least partly transform BRICS into an anti-Western club. The authoritarian and conservative bent effected by the recent expansion, the growing list of candidates, and most importantly, Russia’s presidency of BRICS itself, have led the organization further away from the development agenda and closer toward Russia’s program of global confrontation.

USA
Source: www.forbes.com

The BRICS nations claim to offer an alternative to world leadership by the United States and its Western allies. In practice though, last week’s BRICS gathering in Russia illustrated once again that while these governments are eager to focus on failures of the West, they are unwilling to acknowledge the need for businesses to address the climate crisis or human rights abuses in global supply chains.

BRICS was created in 2009 by the governments of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa — hence the name. The coalition has recently expanded to include Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia also participated in the meeting hosted last week. While the BRICS was originally created to highlight investment opportunities, it has evolved into something more significant, promoting a new global political and economic force that is challenging the post-World War II model shaped and led by the US and Western Europe.

A core component of the BRICS agenda is to challenge the imposition of global environmental and human rights standards on businesses. According to BRICS members and many commentators from the Global South, efforts to incorporate environmental and social norms into global business are a form of Western imperialism. Countries like the US, Britain and France developed their industrial bases beginning in the 19th century. The BRICS take exception to efforts by the West to impose what they see as burdensome conditions on less developed states in a much shorter time frame. They claim that these efforts are primarily motivated by Western governments’ desire to stifle the economic growth and competitiveness of less developed states, which is not the case.

Over the last 20 years, as China has emerged as a global economic superpower, its development of the so-called Belt and Road Initiative illustrates the BRICS model. Since 2013, China has invested in the development of global infrastructure in more than 150 countries and 30 international organizations. Part of the Chinese government’s sales pitch is its explicit assurance that this development assistance will not include environmental or human rights conditions, in stark contrast to aid being offered by the West.

The BRICS model holds great appeal to less developed states trying to compete in today’s globalized economy. From their perspective, the enforcement of environmental or human rights safeguards impedes their efforts to grow their economies. Why should they be compelled to stop using coal as a cheap energy source or impose restrictions on the employment of children, when these were common features of the growth of Western economies a century ago?

While this perspective is understandable coming from less developed states, it is more cynically advanced by governments like Russia’s. Moreover, the climate crisis is real and existential, and that we don’t have the luxury of waiting decades to address it. Similarly, the exploitation of workers that often occurs in less developed states – including forced and child labor – compels the private sector to take remedial actions now. While ideally these imperatives would be addressed though national initiatives and regulation, in many developing countries, governments are unwilling or unable to protect their own people. Other states are therefore taking steps to address this governance gap and a more ambitious global regulatory framework is beginning to take shape.

The European Union is at the center of these efforts. In May, the EU adopted the new Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which requires each of the 27 EU member states to develop national laws that will require companies to identify, prevent, mitigate and remedy potential and actual adverse human rights and environmental harms relating to their global business operations. These requirements cover a company’s own operations, the operations of its subsidiaries and operations carried out by direct and indirect business partners in their “chain of activities.” France and Germany already have adopted national-level statutes to pursue these goals. The CSDDD is just one of a series of new EU laws that have recently come into force or are being developed.

These new laws are systematically reviewed in a new report, Setting Higher Standards: How Governments Can Regulate Corporate Human Rights Performance, written by Cecely Richard-Carvajal at the NYU Center for Business and Human Rights, which I direct. The report sets out a series of recommendations to European governments on how they will need to implement and apply the new laws most effectively. One important recommendation is for governments to develop and enforce performance standards and metrics by which corporate compliance can be assessed and companies held accountable. This will require companies to go beyond focusing on internal company policies and processes and focus on measures that result in improved outcomes for people and the environment.

As the report rightly observes “the central human rights issues affecting Exxon are very different from those facing Amazon, Nestle, Meta or Volkswagen.” For example, a key human rights risk for oil companies is that they often operate in conflict zones where security forces commit grave abuses. For social media companies, a key issue is the need to address harmful content on their platforms. The report states “because of these differences, it is necessary for governments to develop standards, derived from the broader human rights framework, that are tailored to specific industries and sectors.” While the development and application of such industry standards is daunting, there are useful models that governments can emulate.

One important example comes from the Fair Labor Association (FLA) a 25-year-old multistakeholder initiative involving companies, civil society organizations and universities, whose board I chair. Member companies from the apparel and agriculture sector join voluntarily, but once they do, they commit to applying workplace standards in their supply chains. The FLA Code is supplemented by a series of sector-specific metrics, which are used to assess company compliance. Individual companies go through the FLA’s independent accreditation process, which typically takes three to five years. It is an essential element of the FLA model to ensure they are abiding by these standards and metrics. Companies also are subject to FLA investigations in situations of persistent or serious noncompliance.

As European governments build a new human rights regulatory order, they can and should draw heavily on the FLA’s experience in successfully applying a standards-based approach. Western governments and global companies have an opportunity to adopt a shared responsibility model. This would recognize that addressing these challenges successfully has a financial cost. It would advance a model in which the added cost is borne both by local factory owners, farmers and miners, but also by those in the Global North, including, international financial institutions, governments and Western-based companies who are the beneficiaries of these goods and services. This will be key to successfully addressing the challenges posed by the growing BRICS movement. On a parallel track. the developing countries now being drawn into the BRICS orbit should distance themselves from the more cynical political exploitation of this evolving partnership by countries like Russia and China.

USA
Source: carnegieendowment.org

The U.S. Shouldn’t Dismiss BRICS Challenge

BRICS is emerging as a sandbox for experimentation with various non-USD instruments, including payment systems, cryptocurrencies, digitalized mechanisms for trade in national currencies or through barter, and hubs for commodities trading outside of dollar dominance.

Carnegie Politika is a digital publication that features unmatched analysis and insight on Russia, Ukraine and the wider region. For nearly a decade, Carnegie Politika has published contributions from members of Carnegie’s global network of scholars and well-known outside contributors and has helped drive important strategic conversations and policy debates.

It’s easy to dismiss BRICS. The dominant view in the U.S. is that the grouping of emerging economies can’t present a real challenge to the current order – especially when it comes to the global financial system still underpinned by the U.S. dollar. But this week’s BRICS summit hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin points to a problem. Some of the most impactful countries in the Global South are cozying up to America’s adversaries like China and Russia, hoping to get more maneuvering space amid waning U.S. preeminence. They share an interest in reducing their dependency on the greenback, and have embarked on a long-term project to create hedging options. Whoever wins the U.S. election should pay attention and address the challenge.

When the four emerging markets originally referred to by the acronym—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—held their first summit in Russia in 2009 and established themselves as a political club akin to the G7, their agenda was shaped by the global recession and therefore mostly focused on the redistribution of voting rights in the IMF and World Bank in favor of the developing world. Later the group added South Africa, and last year BRICS expanded to include the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the latter of which has yet to decide whether to join. But adding more letters doesn’t make the BRICS more functional.

At first glance, the outcomes of the BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan that concluded on October 24 support this view. If it’s meant to be the non-Western answer to the U.S.-led G7, the BRICS members are remarkably short on actions they are willing to undertake together. While G7 declarations are usually dotted with hefty financial commitments for joint causes, the 43-page Kazan document largely consists of rounded formulas intended to disguise underlining tensions among BRICS members rather than elaborating an emerging consensus. There were also notable dropouts among participants, including Brazilian president Lula and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who opted instead to attend a summit with EU leaders in Brussels.

Finally, the gathering didn’t solve the Kremlin’s task of securing help from its BRICS friends to create alternative channels of funding for its war economy. Even the New Development Bank much touted as a BRICS alternative to the World Bank isn’t financing projects in Russia following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine: the bank trades its bonds on global markets and cannot afford to be cut off from the financial system underpinned by the U.S. dollar.

Still, these setbacks shouldn’t lead to complacency about the more fundamental challenges posed by the rise of BRICS. First, the sheer fact that so many world leaders, including Narendra Modi, leader of the world’s largest democracy India, and the president of NATO-member Turkey, Recep Erdogan, chose to be in Kazan with Putin, shows that Russia’s leader is not the global pariah the West would like to believe he is. More important than photo ops is the fact that trade with the countries attending has provided Putin with a lifeline, despite the sanctions unleashed by the West following the invasion of Ukraine. Moscow’s ability to finance its war, obtain Western technology, and survive strangled access to the dollar and euro points to the limitations of the Western sanctions toolkit and lack of support globally for U.S. policy goals that provide its adversaries with abundant maneuvering space.

Even more consequential will be the conclusions that countries around the world draw from these dynamics. As financial sanctions become America’s geoeconomic weapon of choice and the U.S. fiscal situation continues to erode, with gaping budget deficits and mounting public debt, many countries around the world have legitimate reasons to be worried about their dependency on the U.S. dollar in the long run. For now, there is no credible alternative to the greenback as the world’s only reserve currency, and none is likely to emerge in the short run. But looking at Russia’s experience, many countries are concluding that the Kremlin has managed to muddle through sanctions because it started to de-dollarize its financial system back in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea. Accordingly, to prepare for possible disruptions, they should start looking for hedging options now.

As a movement of non-Western countries, BRICS provides a perfect platform to do just that. Given how different the countries of the grouping are and the number of tensions between the largest players like China and India, it’s hard to imagine a common solution that would create, for example, a BRICS alternative to SWIFT. Rather, BRICS is emerging as a sandbox for experimentation with various non-USD instruments, including payment systems, cryptocurrencies, digitalized mechanisms for trade in national currencies or through barter, and hubs for commodities trading outside of dollar dominance. This patchwork portfolio of non-dollar solutions will be costlier and more cumbersome than the current system, but could be viewed as a hedge against fiscal and geopolitical risks associated with the U.S. The gradual emergence of an alternative to the U.S. dollar will put the current global system with the greenback’s privileged position under increasing stress.

The challenge may seem insignificant and remote, but doing nothing about it only increases the risks of it materializing some years down the road. For obvious reasons, no systemic solution to the problem exists without addressing the state of public finance in the U.S. Beyond that, the U.S. could work more with BRICS members like India and Brazil that are interested in adapting the current order to make it more inclusive, rather than destroying it. For example, the further redistribution of voting rights inside the IMF and World Bank and expansion of their leadership beyond the current American-European duopoly could be a good symbolic start to boost trust and inclusiveness in the existing system.