Russia
Source: www.nkibrics.ru

Bahrain did not receive an invitation to become a BRICS partner state but it will continue to participate in the BRICS Plus group’s activities, the Middle Eastern nation’s Ambassador to Russia Ahmed Al Saati told TASS.

"This is an international association. An invitation should come from the organization itself. However, we have always been participating; we attended the Nizhny Novgorod event," he said in response to a question.

"We take part in the BRICS Plus group’s activities. We always participate in all BRICS Plus meetings," the envoy added.

According to him, Bahrain will wait and see how BRICS will develop. "It’s certainly very important to work with everyone, especially with China, India and Russia. They are our good friends. This is an important organization but before we make a decision, we need to study the situation from every angle to figure out what the outcome will be for us," the ambassador explained.

Russia
Source: www.nkibrics.ru

The meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during the BRICS Summit in Kazan has laid the strategic foundation for the next level of the development of bilateral relations, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said.

"The meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during the [BRICS] Kazan summit has laid the strategic foundation for the next level of the development of relations between the two states," the top Chinese diplomat told Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro.

According to Wang Yi, China "is ready to work with Russia to further strengthen cooperation and cohesion, contribute to the steady development of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, and support the development and rebirth of their countries and the reform of the global governance system."

The foreign minister also said that China and Russia must work with their BRICS partners to implement the results of the BRICS Summit, expand and strengthen the BRICS mechanism, enhance the influence of the Global South and increase its role in the multipolar world.

China
Source: english.cssn.cn

In late October, the 16th BRICS Summit took place in Kazan, Russia, marking the first in-person meeting of the bloc’s leaders since its historic expansion. To interpret the outcomes and significance of this summit, CSST interviewed Yaroslav Lissovolik, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council and founder of the think tank BRICS+ Analytics, and William Daldega, a professor from the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Politics at the Federal University of Pelotas in Brazil.

New advances

In his speech at the Kazan summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping called on BRICS countries to work for high-quality development of greater BRICS cooperation. Since its introduction in 2001, the term BRIC, later extended to BRICS and BRICS+, has evolved from a novel economic concept into an irreplaceable multilateral mechanism, expanding from its original four members to encompass broader cooperative initiatives.

Lissovolik pointed out that the BRICS summits are an important barometer of the state of the Global South, its degree of consolidation, and its energy and capacity to transform the global economy. “BRICS summits set important milestones for the economies of the developing world and the entire global economy in terms of policy trends and initiatives directed at improving global economic governance.”

Reflecting on this year’s Kazan summit, Daldega observed that it has consolidated the expansion process announced in January 2024. The introduction of the partner country mechanism at the summit signals a significant challenge ahead: balancing the participation of new members with that of the founding members, especially in terms of group dynamics.

In Lissovolik’s view, the BRICS leaders adopted the right decision to institute the partner country mechanism, or what he called a “partnership belt,” incorporating certain of the developing economies that had earlier applied for BRICS membership.

“Such a partnership belt will not only further increase the weight of BRICS+ on the international stage (including in international financial and economic organizations), but will also widen the scope for plurilateral agreements and alliances within the BRICS+ circle to pursue some of the key initiatives in the economic sphere,” he explained. “Most importantly, the creation of the BRICS partnership belt also shows to other developing economies the openness and inclusiveness of BRICS.”

“As the agenda of BRICS expands to include concrete initiatives in building a new payment system [BRICS Pay], the relevance of BRICS for global financial markets is further increased,” Lissovolik added.

Appeal of BRICS

In recent years, there is an increasing interest from candidates wishing to join BRICS. “Its attractiveness stems from both its geographic diversity, representing the Global South across continents, and its economic relevance, as it unites leading developing economies,” Daldega said. “The group has managed to reconcile differing interests and aspirations through diplomatic dialogue.”
Lissovolik concurred, emphasizing that the BRICS+ platform has become an important gateway for resolving disputes within the developing world. The Kazan summit featured critical discussions and agreements aimed at bridging divisions among developing countries. These advances can be further improved in the coming years, with BRICS also explicitly delineating solutions and approaches to global challenges in their final summit declaration.

“With greater focus and pragmatism, BRICS will be in a position to deliver decisive contributions to resolving global economic challenges and making tangible progress in reforming global economic governance,” Lissovolik said.

China’s role

Since the establishment of BRICS in 2009, China has been committed to improving its mechanisms and maintaining cooperation among its members. Daldega affirmed that China has undeniably been a major actor within BRICS and a catalyst for initiatives within the group, noting that its political and economic influence underpins the bloc’s resilience and appeal. While partner nations benefit from close ties with a country of China’s stature, China, in turn, consolidates its status as an emerging or developing economy and expands trade and investment opportunities within the group.

Development has always been a core objective for BRICS. For members, development is essential to sustaining their own growth and influence. For China, the development of its BRICS partners is particularly important, as these nations are key markets for Chinese exports and capital, Daldega explained.

“Going forward, the success of the BRICS project depends to a significant degree on China’s economic success and its ability to imbue the bloc’s agenda with pragmatic economic priorities,” Lissovolik noted. “I would also not exclude the possibility of further innovations coming from China in making the BRICS+ platform even more inclusive and open—perhaps with respect to the advanced world as well—to the degree that BRICS+ could become the key platform for relaunching the economic globalization process on a more equitable and sustainable basis,” he concluded.

Editor：Yu Hui

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today marks the conclusion of the G20 summit, culminating Brazil's presidency of the G20. Throughout the year, Brazil has steered the group, hosting an extensive array of events, as is customary. I am confident that significant results and robust agreements have been secured, which is of paramount importance.

The establishment of a new coordinating entity – the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty – received support. This initiative, personally championed by President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aims to expedite progress towards the complete eradication of hunger, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals, which, despite being long endorsed, have not been effectively implemented, although this ought to be accomplished by 2030. I am hopeful (and can assert with a reasonable degree of certainty) that the formation of such an alliance will enhance outcomes in this domain, in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals.

Russia has become a participant in this mechanism. We have already declared our intention to contribute our best practices to the project portfolio under the alliance's auspices. These encompass programmes for assisting developing nations, including school meal initiatives and agricultural development schemes. These programmes are devised to transfer appropriate technology, expertise, and methodologies to developing countries, enabling them to increasingly depend on their own resources.

We have reiterated our fundamental stance that the G20 is, first and foremost, an economic forum, which was the very purpose of its inception. Its objective was to facilitate substantive economic dialogue between "developed" and "developing" economies, with the aim of identifying optimal pathways for global economic advancement that benefit all –addressing poverty and inequality, and ensuring the most effective operation of all multilateral institutions.

The G20 should be anchored in the principles of the UN Charter, foremost among them the principle of the sovereign equality of states. This has historically been absent from Western policy, which has never honoured sovereign equality. However, current circumstances are compelling a shift, as the BRICS nations and other countries collaborating with the group are advancing at a considerably faster rate. In any event, the UN Charter serves as the bedrock of all international cooperation across various fields. It is imperative to apply its principles in their entirety and within context, rather than selectively as if from a "menu," as the West tends to do.

A declaration - a comprehensive document - was adopted. Most importantly, it recognises modern realities and is centered on the core task of shaping international relations based on multilateralism, pluralism, and the elimination of inequalities both between and within countries. Many (including us) noted that inequality, and eradicating hunger and poverty have become quite relevant for the developed nations, where the number of people living below the poverty line is on the rise. These inequalities in the international arena stem from the colonial and neo-colonial practices of our Western “colleagues” and centuries of Western dominance.

Despite the efforts to limit the Declaration to economic issues, it includes a section addressing the geopolitical situation in terms of conflicts in various regions of the world. We agreed to that just like we did last year with regard to the Declaration adopted at the previous G20 Summit in New Delhi. As expected, the West pushed to impose the Ukraine-centric agenda but failed, since not a single Global Majority country was supportive of it. Together with our partners from the developing world, we emphasised the importance of focusing on resolving each and every ongoing conflict globally, particularly the Middle Eastern crisis. The tragic plight of the Palestinians largely stems from social engineering and direct interventions in the Middle Eastern region by Washington and its allies.
The Declaration includes a paragraph on Ukraine, which we accepted because its central message calls for a candid and realistic dialogue about peace.

There’s an important aspect of the Declaration which I mentioned earlier. It has a paragraph (which starts the section) advocating for the resolution of disputes based on justice and international law, namely, the full scope of the UN Charter. This is crucial, particularly when applied to Ukraine. The West emphasises only the principle of territorial integrity. It dreams of Ukraine taking back the territories it had as of 1991. These lands were home to the Russian people for centuries on end, but the Zelensky regime disenfranchised them. They choose to look the other way when it comes to this matter, even though the other section of the Charter (Article 1) clearly states the importance of respecting human rights regardless of race, gender, language, or religion. The rights of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine regarding language and religion have been eradicated under Ukrainian legislation. Western nations, however, dismiss these violations, because Zelensky is allegedly upholding the “European values.”

Let them take these territories with these people and let him sort it out with them on his own. What a disgrace.

To follow up on the economic agenda, the key issue (apart from combatting famine, poverty, and inequality) is the reform of global institutions. Most delegations from the Global South emphasised the dominance of Western players in these entities, which can no longer claim exclusivity, first, on moral grounds, and, second, in light of modern-day realities.

The world is changing rapidly. Over the past several decades, it has taken on a new “face.” We have cited figures on many occasions: BRICS now accounts for 37 percent of the global economy, while the G7 has dropped below 30 percent. This gap continues to widen because BRICS countries currently have an average growth rate of 4 percent, twice that of the G7 economies.

The October 22-24 BRICS Summit in Kazan is still fresh in our mind. It was frequently mentioned in the remarks delivered by representatives of the Global South. The assessments we heard here show that the association is ready to develop an independent toolset - payment, settlement, clearing, investment, trading, and other mechanisms - that could be used independently of the West. This work is underway, and someone mentioned it today.

No one is looking to dismantle the existing “tools” of the post-war world order, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, or the World Trade Organisation. However, given the significant issues arising from the West abusing its control over these systems, the parallel creation of alternative tools, which I just mentioned, clearly makes sense.

BRICS countries are increasing their role and influence within the G20 which was evident at the 2023 Delhi Summit, the 2022 Indonesia Summit, and especially during the latest discussions. BRICS’ stronger position has been aided by last year’s decision to admit the African Union as a full member of the G20. This time, Brazil’s chairmanship invited to the summit the President of the New Development Bank which was created by BRICS, and top officials from the League of Arab States.
The Declaration confirms the importance of amplifying and strengthening the voice of the Global Majority in all key political and economic bodies from the UN Security Council to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and to fully restore the WTO’s functioning. The WTO dispute resolution body, a core WTO mechanism, remains blocked and is unable to operate due to procedural manipulations by the United States which is effectively holding the former hostage.

The Global South nations, with the backing of the Russian Federation, have long endeavoured to enhance their share in the allocation of quotas and votes in the IMF and the World Bank, to reflect their genuine influence in the global economy. Once again, we have encapsulated this principle within the G20 Declaration. All our previous efforts to endorse pertinent appeals have been fruitless, as the West, despite approving of this equitable notion, persistently ensures it remains on paper.

I have addressed the reform of global institutions and food security on two occasions. I acquainted my colleagues with our nation's initiatives in implementing President Vladimir Putin's proposition to establish a Greater Eurasian Partnership, encompassing the EAEU, the SCO, ASEAN, and other regional alliances. We perceive this as a substantive foundation for constructing a novel Eurasian security framework, accessible to all countries on the continent.

I highlighted our contributions towards resolving food and energy security challenges, where we stand, as corroborated by statistics, as dependable and leading suppliers. This is merely one facet of what Russia can extend to the countries of the Global South. In practice, we are forging strong collaborations with them across numerous other domains, including advanced, efficient information and communication technology products of Russian origin, which are garnering increasing interest from our partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

I must acknowledge that the success of this year's Brazilian "shift" builds upon the G20's positive outcomes from prior summits in Indonesia in 2022 and India in 2023. South Africa is poised to assume the next chairmanship.

This BRICS "shift" will extend for another year. Our South African counterparts have already delineated their priorities – they intend to advance the agenda of reforming global institutions, as previously mentioned, while bolstering capacities for sustainable development with an emphasis on combating poverty, hunger, and inequality. For evident reasons, South Africa will focus particularly on the challenges facing the African continent and our dialogue with Africa through the Partnership Forum, established by the Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg in 2023, which we initiated a fortnight ago in Sochi at the inaugural Russia-Africa Ministerial Conference. We will duly consider the initiatives of our South African colleagues in this regard. This will constitute a working, informal yet beneficial coordination.

Question: You began by speaking about support for Brazil’s initiative on establishing a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty. Could you share the details? How do Russia and Brazil, including as BRICS nations, intend to increase their contribution to global food security, and, most importantly, how is the West trying to exploit this issue?

Sergey Lavrov: The West is always trying to distort things. They have a habit of presenting things in a way to put the blame on others instead of Western countries.

As for food security, President Putin has more than once provided the example of frantic and ill-considered emission during the pandemic, when the United States and the EU printed about 10 trillion dollars and euros and used them to buy up everything that was available on the market. They did that to prepare for the periods of isolation so that they have enough food and other goods. That is when prices hiked.

For our part, we have always satisfied the developing countries’ requirements. We are doing this now as well, despite the obstacles hindering the use of Western ports for exporting our fertilisers, grain, wheat and other crops. Insurance companies have raised prices sky-high. Lloyd’s has added the territory and ports of the Russian Federation to its “listed areas” of war. They have sent official letters regarding this to all our partners, which has automatically doubled, tripled, or even quadrupled the insurance rate.

They have also been erecting other obstacles for us, for example, arresting our fertilisers. In other words, they blocked the usual, effective and optimal routes for the export of our products which the Global South needs. They put the blame for this on us, saying that it was the Russians who began the war. It is obvious to everyone that this is irresponsible behaviour, especially when people look like adults but continue to promote their [erroneous] arguments unashamedly. This makes me wonder.
The idea of the Alliance – over 80 countries have signed that document, and Russia was among the first to support it – is that all parties help as much as they can to promote the achievement of this task based on the Sustainable Development Goals, in this instance to end poverty and hunger by 2030.
As I said, we have many years of experience, including at the bilateral level. We are promoting the system of school meals, primarily in the neighbouring Central Asian countries and also in other parts of the world, namely Africa and Latin America.

We have programmes for supporting farms and supplying modern technologies to them. Farming is developing rapidly and effectively in Russia, which can be seen from the harvesting data. We are pleased with our harvests that allow us to export quite a lot. Every country has its strong points and experience in other areas. We can collaborate.

Our Algerian friends told us that they needed fertilisers. In June 2023, President of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune visited Moscow. He said they would buy our fertilisers but would prefer Russia to establish their production in Algeria.

Every country that has signed the document on the establishment of the Alliance can make a contribution to this, including through the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other structures. Their leaders attended the meeting on the establishment of the Alliance. It is a positive initiative. I am confident that Brazil as its author will not let things take their course but will see to its practical implementation. We will support their efforts.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On November 18, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a meeting with Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The parties praised the progress made in the political dialogue and practical cooperation between Russia and China, especially against the background of the persisting turbulence in the world system. They also focused on the process of implementing the agreements reached at the highest level, including during the BRICS Summit in Kazan, and on planning further contacts in various formats.
The ministers underscored the importance of strengthening foreign policy coordination between Moscow and Beijing at international venues, such as the UN and its Security Council, BRICS, the SCO, G20, and others. They also had an in-depth exchange of views on a wide range of global and regional issues.

As always, the meeting was held in a trust-based and constructive atmosphere, which is a hallmark of the Russia-China strategic partnership.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The spectacular comeback of Donald Trump to the White House will undoubtedly have a profound impact on the US overall international positioning, as well as on specific dimensions of the US approaches to various regions of the world. Of course, the US foreign policy has a bipartisan nature, it is devised and managed not only by the executive, but also by the legislative branch of power and the role played by the American Deep State in the foreign policy making should not be underestimated either. Yet, it is the President, who calls the tunes and who leaves a deep personal imprint on the set of foreign policy priorities, major decisions and the overall relations with allies, partners, adversaries and foes of the United States.

During his first term as US President Donald Trump displayed his ability to make abrupt and highly personal decisions like withdrawing from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal in 2018 or assassinating of General Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, in Baghdad in 2020. Given the unpredictability of the 47-th US Commander-in-Chief, it might still be too early to properly assess the likely shifts in the US approaches to the Middle East region. However, some changes are easy to predict.

First, the US support for Israelis going to get even stronger than it has been under the Joe Biden Administration, the ongoing Washington’s criticism of Israeli military actions in Gaza, in the West Bank or in the South of Lebanon are going to be softer. Second, the US positions on Iran are going to get even tougher, which means that JCPOA will not be resurrected from its grave and the US sanctions against Tehran will not be lifted. Third, Trump is clearly committed to continue his efforts to promote the Abraham Accords further assisting Israel in building relations with major Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. Trump will also try to sell more US-made arms to affluent nations of the Gulf, to undermine the OPEC+ global oil prices regulative mechanism and to advance a Middle East version of the NATO Alliance to counter security challenges coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the radical Shia groups supported from Tehran.

At the same time, the second Trump Administration is unlikely to increase the US military presence in the MENA region. On the contrary, it might pursue the strategy of a gradual withdrawal of US forces from places like Iraq and Syria, especially if the threats of direct attacks on the US military personnel increase. Such withdrawal, if it takes place, would lead to new vacuums of power and an overall decline of the US influence in the region. Finally, the overall Trump’s foreign policy transactionalism is going to manifest itself in the MENA region as well: the new Administration is likely to focus on getting immediate gains through concluding specific ‘deals’ rather than on building long-term strategic partnerships; this approach is going to create additional challenges for the sustainability of the US present positions in the Middle East.

What do these coming changes mean for Russia’s policies in the region? How could Moscow respond to new challenges that the United States is going create for the Kremlin in the region? Are there any opportunities for even a very limited US-Russian cooperation or coordination in the Middle East? Will Russia continue its “business as usual” aimed at maintaining the existing status-quo or will it be forced to review and to revise its positions towards Israel, Palestinians, Iran and its main partners in the Arab world? Let us have a look at the most important pieces of the rich and diverse Middle East mosaic, namely—on Israel, Palestine, Iran and the Arab Gulf states.

Israel

The Russian-Israeli relations started experiencing problems long before the US 2024 elections. In particular, the launch of the special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 had a significant impact on the Israeli public opinion and on the country’s leadership, particularly during Yair Lapid's tenure as Prime Minister (the second half of 2022). However, despite a strong pressure from the West and a rise of pro-Ukrainian sentiments at home, Israel chose not to subscribe to US or EU sanctions imposed on Moscow and decided against direct deliveries of Israeli-made lethal arms to Ukraine (though the official explanation of the latter decision offered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was linked not to Russia’s interests, but rather to concerns that weapons transferred to Ukraine might fall into Iranian hands, reverse engineered and used against Israel in future).

After the terrorist attack on October 7, the Kremlin promptly condemned the Hamas strike and stated that Israel had the right to defend itself, but later on took a very critical position towards the subsequent Israeli military actions in Gaza, in the West Bank and in the South Lebanon. Speaking of the Israeli plans in Gaza at an early stage of the Tzahal ground operation, Vladimir Putin even referred to the Nazi siege of Leningrad during the Second World War, warning about the prospect of an excessive or nondiscriminatory use of military power by Israel as a potential explicit violation of international law. On many occasions Russia demanded an immediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and supported relevant drafts of the UN Security Council resolutions, most of which were vetoed by the United States. In its turn, Russia blocked US proposed Gaza related resolutions claiming that the United States was not really interested in exercising an appropriate pressure on Israel that would lead to a lasting ceasefire in Gaza.

Yet, Moscow has never been ready for a complete breakdown of its relations with Israel or even for lowering the level of its diplomatic presence in Tel Aviv. Though the Russian-Israeli trade experienced significant decline over last couple of years, the Jewish state remains visible as a trade and investment partner. Approximately 1.3 million former citizens of Russia and the Soviet Union now reside in Israel, making up 15% of the nation’s population. Right after a high-level delegation from Hamas visited Moscow in the end of October, 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry in a special briefing expressed its confidence that the bilateral relations with Israel would continue to develop further in various areas.

The Russian-Israeli communication experienced a number of setbacks: for instance, in fall of 2023 Israel stopped to warn Moscow in advance about its planned airstrikes in Syria. However, until now Israeli officials continue to underscore the importance of the bilateral relations fundamental disagreements between the two sides notwithstanding. We can assume that active Russia-Israel contacts (including military and intelligence communication links) continue in various formats and at various levels.

The second Trump Administration is likely to be even more supportive of Israel than the Biden Administration was. It is not accidental that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cheerfully endorsed Trump’s victory referring to it as “a new beginning for America and a powerful re-commitment to the great alliance between Israel and America”. Netanyahu had complicated relations with Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, so the return of Donald Trump to the White House is predictably welcomed in the Israeli leadership. It should be noted that Trump has never been particularly specific on how he would approach the Israel-Hamas war or on how his policies would differ from predecessor Joe Biden’s. On can only predict that he will urge Israel to “finish the job” in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank as soon as possible to avoid more collateral damage to the Israeli international reputation. However, if “finishing the job” includes annexation of parts of the West Bank, such actions by Israel are unlikely to meet a lot of opposition or resentment in Trump’s White House. After all, it was Donald Trump, who back in 2019 proclaimed U.S. recognition of the Golan Heights as a part of the State of Israel, making it the first country to do so.

Trump is likely to block all the UN Security Council resolutions condemning Israeli authorities’ actions in Gaza and in the West Bank, to assist Israel in countering possible Iranian strikes against Israel and to continue providing Israel with massive military assistance. This approach may bring down Israeli incentives to keep strong relations with Moscow, but will not eliminate them altogether. Though many in Israel, including the above mentioned Yair Lapid, call for a “reassessment” of the bilateral relations accusing Moscow of explicitly siding with Hamas, the odds are that despite continuous tensions and despite an even heavier reliance of Israel on the United States under the second Trump Administration, both sides will try hard to avoid further deterioration of their bilateral relations and to limit the already inflicted damage to the extent possible.

Palestine

Moscow always boasted of having close contacts with many Palestinian groups in Gaza and in the West Bank. After October 7, 2023 the Russian approach to Palestinians included two main lines. First, the Russian leadership on many occasions expressed its strong support of the Palestinian people and reiterated its commitment to the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though Moscow condemned the October 7 terrorist attack, its contacts with Hamas never stopped and Russia did not add the organization to its list of terrorist groups (one should note, however, that Russia’s relations with Hamas have never been completely cloudless: for instance, in the beginning of the civil war in Syria Russia stood on the side of Bashar al-Assad, while Hamas tilted to the Syrian opposition).

In August 2024, Vladimir Putin met with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, marking their first in-person meeting since 2021. This meeting seemed to be mostly symbolic, aimed at reconfirming Russia's positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and critical assessment of the Israeli operation in Gaza. The Kremlin also committed itself to providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of the sector. In October, 2024, Mahmoud Abbas was invited to Kazan for the XVI BRICS Summit hosted by Russia and had an exclusive meeting with Vladimir Putin on the margins of the Summit.

Second, Moscow continued to position itself as a potential mediator in Palestinian affairs. In late February, 2024 it arranged an intra-Palestinian meeting involving 14 various factions, including Hamas and Fatah, aiming to foster political unity among Palestinians amid the ongoing conflict. It was not the first meeting of this kind, Russia hosted similar events at least four times since 2011. However, the recent meeting was very special, given the challenging security environment in and around Palestine. Most of analysts expressed their doubts about any significant progress that could be reached in such a format. The complexities of intra-Palestinian politics have not disappeared after October 7, and Russia’s influence over many Palestinian factions remains limited.

So far, it seems that Russia’s efforts to consolidate diverse Palestinian group, like similar efforts by China, had only very modest, if any success. Still, the meeting in February demonstrated that the Kremlin maintained its leverage with major Palestinian groups and that Russia could not be completely marginalized in or easily excluded from a future Palestinian settlement. Given the approaching generational change in the Palestinian leadership with Mahmoud Abbas turning 90 in 2025, this leverage should not be underestimated.

The second Trump Administration is not likely to energetically promote any plans for a full-fledged Palestinian state or to exercise strong pressure on Israel in this direction. Neither it is likely to put more emphasis on gross violations of human rights or alleged war crimes in Gaza or in the West Bank. It is also worth noting that back in 2018, Trump canceled U.S. funding for the UN’s Palestine refugee relief agency, UNRWA, which Biden partially resumed in 2021. The odds are that the second Trump Administration will severely limit or even cancel altogether the US support for UNRWA that would question the ability of the agency to continue providing support to Palestinians (in later October, 2024 the Israeli parliament passed a law terminating all the activities of UNRWA on the territory of the country by the end of the year). This apparent unwillingness of Donald Trump to stand up for Palestinians despite a strong public support of the Palestinian rights inside the United States implies that Moscow can gain more attention and appreciation in the Middle East region by positioning itself as a strong champion of the Palestinian cause.

Iran

The Israeli-Palestinian escalation coincided with continuous attempts by Moscow and Tehran to bring their relations to a new level. The Israeli military operation in Gaza that soon proliferated to the Southern Lebanon, as well as Israeli strikes of targets in Beirut, Damascus and Tehran itself seriously jeopardized the positions of the Islamic Republic in the region and motivated the Iranian leadership to seek closer links to Russia. In particular, Tehran is interested in getting more access to advanced Russian military hardware, such as such as Su-35 fighter jets and the S-400 defense missile systems. Russia, in its turn, put more emphasis on its relations with Tehran even earlier: after the beginning of its special military operation in Ukraine it started actively upgrading its political, economic, infrastructural and security ties to the Islamic Republic with an expectation to turn these relations from an alliance of convenience into a strategic partnership.

The accidental death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19, 2024 slowed down for while further rapprochement between two nations and arguably delayed finalizing a new Russian-Iranian agreement, on which the two sides had worked for some time, but did not change the direction Though newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized his intention to reach out to Iran’s Arab neighbors and to the West, these opportunities turned out to be quite limited and the Islamic Republic continues its long-term drift towards Moscow and Beijing.

In August of 2023, at the fifteenth BRICS summit meeting in Johannesburg Iran was formally invited to join the group, which it did in early 2024. Vladimir Putin and President Pezeshkian met twice in October of 2024—first at an international conference in Ashgabat—the capital of Turkmenistan, and once again at the BRICS summit in Kazan. The long-awaited new bilateral agreement on strategic partnership between Russia and Iran should be signed soon, though over last year there were many delays and procrastinations allegedly caused by the change in the Iranian leadership and initial expectations within the Pezeshkian team about opportunities to relaunch Islamic Republic’s relations with the West that finally failed.

Though some hawks in Moscow might look forward to a major war between Israel and Iran, the official Russian position remains cautious. In the end of October Vladimir Putin stated once again that strategically Russia had nothing to gain, but would encounter additional problems in case the current Israeli-Iranian confrontation evolves into a major regional war. A wider regional instability might, of course, send the global oil prices going through the roof, but this instability would also have unpredictable political and economic consequences—most likely, detrimental to long-term Russia’s interests.

The second Trump Administration is going to take a tough approach to Tehran. We can expect more sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear program, more pressure on Iranian regional partners and proxies, more support for the Iranian political opposition with the ultimate goal of a regime change in the Islamic Republic. Though one cannot completely rule out a transactional deal between Washington and Tehran under the second Trump Administration, the chances for such a deal are not high. Moreover, it is very likely that Trump will exercise a lot of pressure on the US European allies in order to prevent any meaningful rapprochement between Iran and Europe. As a part of the overall US anti-Iranian strategy, one can predict even harder moves on Houthis in Yemen—authorizing massive strikes against the Houthis political leaders and their military infrastructure. Economic sanctions against Houthis are likely to expand, and the severe humanitarian crisis in Yemen is likely to be ignored by the White House.

Of course, Trump will try to do his best to avoid getting the United States into a direct military confrontation with Iran. Still, this option cannot be ruled out—the Israeli leadership might push hard the United States in this direction. A lot will depend on who exactly will handle the Trump Iranian portfolio—with hawks like Mike Pompeo or Robert Greenway in charge the risks on a large-scale regional conflict will go higher. In theory, one could imagine Donald Trump entering a direct negotiation with Iran in order to reach a comprehensive agreement with the Islamic Republic, but right now such a scenario looks very unlikely.

It would be logical to predict that under such circumstances the alliance between Moscow and Tehran will continue to deepen though some wrinkles on this relationship will need ironing. For instance, the two sides have demonstrated somewhat different attitudes to the so-called Zangezur Corridor linking Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan. This cooperation will also continue within multilateral bodies like SCO and BRICS. Only some very dramatic political changes either in Russia or in the Islamic Republic could create challenges to this cooperation. However, at this point such changes are very hard to imagine.

The Arab world

For a long time, Russia recognized the importance of maintaining friendly relationships with the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. These relationships were not directly affected by the cautious response from the capitals of these states to the Israeli-Palestinian escalation though in Moscow they might have expected a stronger reaction. In any case, in December, 2023 Vladimir Putin visited Saudi Arabia and UAE, where the sides confirmed their commitment to continue cooperation on managing the global oil prices as well as to further promote bilateral trade and investment.

Both KSA and UAE were invited to join BRICS, and the 7th Russia-GCC Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue held in Riyadh in September of 2024 confirmed that the Russian and the GCC approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian escalation have a lot in common. Both KSA and UAE participated in the XVI BRICS Summit that took place in Russia’s Kazan in October of 2024, though Saudi Arabia was represented by its foreign minister and claimed the status of an ‘invited guest’ rather than that of a full-fledged BRICS member.

It seems that in Moscow they understand very well the limitations of opportunities that Russia has in dealing with GCC states and also the limitations of the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian escalation on strategic priorities of these states. The predominant assumption in Moscow is that the progress in Abraham Accords will continue though at a slower speed than it did before the Gaza crisis. On the other hand, Donald Trump may be ready to invest more of his political capital into the Abraham Accords than his predecessor in the White House did. Of course, a Middle East NATO uniting major Gulf Arab states and Israel in their common deterrence of Iran is the last thing that Moscow would like to see emerging in the region, but Russian experts take a rather skeptical view on the ability or political will of major regional actors to move fast in this direction, given multiple strategic, geopolitical, organizational and other obstacles on this way.

At the same time, the Russian leadership does not want to get too much involved into Arab-Iranian disputes, since such an involvement would inevitably limit Moscow’s freedom of action in the region. Besides, the nature of Russia’s relations with the GCC group is very different from its relations with Iran: in case of the Islamic Republic the drivers of cooperation are common security concerns and a degree of complementarity of their respective defense sectors, in case of GCC states cooperation is based more on economic, educational, and other “soft power” factors. One can predict that in its policies in the Gulf area and in the Arab world at large Moscow will continue to pursue a “business as usual” approach trying to maximize investment opportunities, promoting trade, minimizing the negative impact of Western sanctions and stabilizing the global hydrocarbon prices.

Donald Trump has always paid a lot of attention to build stronger ties to rich Arab nations of the Gulf. It is worth noting that he chose Riyadh for his first foreign visit as president in 2017 and firmly stood by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the crisis surrounding the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents back in 2018. However, Trump’s continuous affection towards affluent Arab nations of the Gulf apparently does not extend to the Arab world at large—a re-elected Trump would also likely make significant cuts to the US foreign aid budget, which would have serious implications for countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. This highly selective approach to the Arab world displayed by the Trump Administration may create windows of opportunity for other international actors, including Russia.

The second Trump Administration will be interested in limiting the Russian-Arab cooperation to the extent possible. It will work hard to close any loopholes in US sanctions that creates opportunities for Moscow to use Gulf States, particularly—UAE, as international financial hubs to circumvent Western sanctions. It will try to erect various obstacles on the way to more active Russian-Arab military cooperation by offering attractive alternatives to its partners in the Arab world (for instance, dealing with UAE, Trump is likely to get back to previously stalled deals for the sale of F-35 fighter jets and armed drones). It will ignore or criticize any regional security proposals that might come from Moscow.

However, the US abilities to block further Russian-Arab cooperation are not limitless, and major Arab nations will continue to diversify their foreign policy portfolios. Another complicating factor for Trump’s relations with the Arab world is his first term alleged Islamophobic rhetoric and his anti-immigration policies, such as his two Muslim Travel Bans. Finally, there are many doubts in the Arab world about the sustainability of the US security commitments in the region that create additional incentives to diversify political investments by reaching out to Beijing and Moscow. This diversification, aside from the regional agenda, also includes efforts by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar to position themselves strategically as key interlocutors on the Russia-Ukraine confrontation—the role that they will try to maintain in future.

Since these days the Russian leadership is clearly preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine, it would be hard to imagine any ambitious, far-reaching initiatives on the Middle East security or development to come from Moscow anytime soon. The absence of active and substantive consultations with the West, above all—with the United States—is another complicating factor limiting a more strategic long-term approach to the region. However, the Russian leadership will definitely try to keep its foot in the doorway of the very complicated and highly volatile Middle East politics.

First published in the Guancha.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

With the multilateral system in shambles and geopolitical tensions rising, the United States should think seriously about how to deal with today’s multipolar world, writes ‘The National Interest’.

As leaders of the BRICS+ group of emerging economies met in Kazan, Russia, last month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the Middle East for the eleventh time since October 7, 2023. The symbolism is stark. While the U.S. is mired in another Middle East war — one that is diminishing its credibility and global leadership — China and Russia are in the early stages of building alternatives to U.S.-led global financial and security architectures. BRICS+ has the wind at its back in today’s emerging multipolar world — the group welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE at the beginning of 2024, added thirteen new partner countries at the Kazan summit. Dozens of other countries have also expressed interest in joining.

With competition between the United States, China, and Russia intensifying, Washington should take stock of what’s driving countries to BRICS+, which Beijing and Moscow wish to position as an anti-Western grouping. The good news for Washington is that other BRICS+ countries and applicants don’t necessarily see it that way yet. Brazil and India, two founding countries, see BRICS+ as a vehicle to democratize the existing international order and usher in changes within the system to make it more capable of addressing today’s global challenges. They don’t see it as part of a “rest against the West” strategy. Indeed, many Global South countries privilege their ties with Washington but also want to join BRICS+. However, all of this could change if Washington does not take global multipolarity seriously.

Global South countries see the U.S.-led “rules-based” order ripping apart at the seams, highlighted most conspicuously by Washington’s incongruous positions on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. For these countries, the U.S.-led order is a rigged game, with international laws and norms enforced by how they suit the interests of the West.

Another major issue for BRICS+ and Global South countries is Washington’s dominance of the global financial architecture and its widespread use of sanctions. Russia set an agenda for this year’s summit that heavily focused on sidestepping the power of the U.S. dollar, insulating itself and other countries from Western sanctions, and building alternative financial structures. “It’s not us who refuse to use the dollar,” Putin said at the summit. “But if they don’t let us work, what can we do? We are forced to search for alternatives.”

Nearly one in four countries, accounting for almost 30 percent of global GDP, are under U.S. sanctions. A Washington Post report this year detailed how U.S. sanctions have unleashed “economic warfare across the globe.” Certainly, countries like Russia should face consequences for their violations of international law. The problem is that these sanctions are often counterproductive. Sanctions on Venezuela, for example, have led to increased migration and more Venezuelans trying to get into the United States. It’s also pushed countries like China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea to create what The Wall Street Journal deemed a “global shadow economy” to evade these sanctions in ways that could increasingly undermine the U.S. dollar.

The joint declaration from the summit should be a cause for concern for U.S. policymakers. It called for global financial reform, creating a new BRICS+ investment platform and exploring alternatives to Western cross-border payment systems like SWIFT. BRICS+ has already made significant strides in reducing the use of the dollar for intra-group trade. China has led this charge, as its renminbi has overtaken the U.S. dollar in China-Russia trade. Beijing is also negotiating to increase the use of the yuan to settle oil transactions with major producers. China is also selling off U.S. dollar assets and buying record levels of gold.

De-dollarization may have a long way to go. However, given the profound implications for U.S. interests, U.S. policymakers should pay close attention. The dollar’s preeminent role as a reserve currency and in global commodity trade presents the United States and its citizens with “exorbitant privileges.” Not only does it give the U.S. tremendous influence and leverage in international relations, but also it means Americans have lower borrowing costs, access to cheap imports, and, overall, a higher standard of living.

BRICS+ critics often reasonably point out that the group has not accomplished much. But that doesn’t mean the group isn’t increasingly important, even if merely at a symbolic level for now. Washington can work with partner countries in BRICS+ to stymie the rising anti-U.S. sentiment that China and Russia want to foment. Washington should consider what is leading so many capitals to look for alternatives to U.S. leadership and, critically, the U.S. dollar and seek to address their concerns when they have a common cause.

It’s time for Washington to recognize that the post-Cold War unipolar moment is over.

read more in our Telegram-channel https://t.me/The_International_Affairs

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

With the multilateral system in shambles and geopolitical tensions rising, the United States should think seriously about how to deal with today’s multipolar world, writes ‘The National Interest’.

As leaders of the BRICS+ group of emerging economies met in Kazan, Russia, last month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the Middle East for the eleventh time since October 7, 2023. The symbolism is stark. While the U.S. is mired in another Middle East war — one that is diminishing its credibility and global leadership — China and Russia are in the early stages of building alternatives to U.S.-led global financial and security architectures. BRICS+ has the wind at its back in today’s emerging multipolar world — the group welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE at the beginning of 2024, added thirteen new partner countries at the Kazan summit. Dozens of other countries have also expressed interest in joining.

With competition between the United States, China, and Russia intensifying, Washington should take stock of what’s driving countries to BRICS+, which Beijing and Moscow wish to position as an anti-Western grouping. The good news for Washington is that other BRICS+ countries and applicants don’t necessarily see it that way yet. Brazil and India, two founding countries, see BRICS+ as a vehicle to democratize the existing international order and usher in changes within the system to make it more capable of addressing today’s global challenges. They don’t see it as part of a “rest against the West” strategy. Indeed, many Global South countries privilege their ties with Washington but also want to join BRICS+. However, all of this could change if Washington does not take global multipolarity seriously.

Global South countries see the U.S.-led “rules-based” order ripping apart at the seams, highlighted most conspicuously by Washington’s incongruous positions on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. For these countries, the U.S.-led order is a rigged game, with international laws and norms enforced by how they suit the interests of the West.

Another major issue for BRICS+ and Global South countries is Washington’s dominance of the global financial architecture and its widespread use of sanctions. Russia set an agenda for this year’s summit that heavily focused on sidestepping the power of the U.S. dollar, insulating itself and other countries from Western sanctions, and building alternative financial structures. “It’s not us who refuse to use the dollar,” Putin said at the summit. “But if they don’t let us work, what can we do? We are forced to search for alternatives.”

Nearly one in four countries, accounting for almost 30 percent of global GDP, are under U.S. sanctions. A Washington Post report this year detailed how U.S. sanctions have unleashed “economic warfare across the globe.” Certainly, countries like Russia should face consequences for their violations of international law. The problem is that these sanctions are often counterproductive. Sanctions on Venezuela, for example, have led to increased migration and more Venezuelans trying to get into the United States. It’s also pushed countries like China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea to create what The Wall Street Journal deemed a “global shadow economy” to evade these sanctions in ways that could increasingly undermine the U.S. dollar.

The joint declaration from the summit should be a cause for concern for U.S. policymakers. It called for global financial reform, creating a new BRICS+ investment platform and exploring alternatives to Western cross-border payment systems like SWIFT. BRICS+ has already made significant strides in reducing the use of the dollar for intra-group trade. China has led this charge, as its renminbi has overtaken the U.S. dollar in China-Russia trade. Beijing is also negotiating to increase the use of the yuan to settle oil transactions with major producers. China is also selling off U.S. dollar assets and buying record levels of gold.

De-dollarization may have a long way to go. However, given the profound implications for U.S. interests, U.S. policymakers should pay close attention. The dollar’s preeminent role as a reserve currency and in global commodity trade presents the United States and its citizens with “exorbitant privileges.” Not only does it give the U.S. tremendous influence and leverage in international relations, but also it means Americans have lower borrowing costs, access to cheap imports, and, overall, a higher standard of living.

BRICS+ critics often reasonably point out that the group has not accomplished much. But that doesn’t mean the group isn’t increasingly important, even if merely at a symbolic level for now. Washington can work with partner countries in BRICS+ to stymie the rising anti-U.S. sentiment that China and Russia want to foment. Washington should consider what is leading so many capitals to look for alternatives to U.S. leadership and, critically, the U.S. dollar and seek to address their concerns when they have a common cause.

It’s time for Washington to recognize that the post-Cold War unipolar moment is over.