Liechtenstein
Source:
www.gisreportsonline.com Since last year, Thailand has been trying to accelerate its integration into regional and international frameworks and institutions under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin. Mr. Srettha and his team hope that this more active geo-economic institutional agenda will both boost the country’s economy and help restore its international standing after nearly a decade of military government since a 2014 coup.
A new vision of Thailand in a changing world
Since taking office in May 2023, Mr. Srettha has tried to build out a geo-economic institutional agenda to stimulate Thailand’s economy and reinforce its strategic position. That vision rests on positioning the country in key arrangements that allow it to use a combination of trade, investment and sectoral pathways to catalyze growth
in a more competitive, complex and polarized world. This vision, combined with Thailand’s capacity as Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy and one of the world’s 20 most populous countries, can help put it on the radar as an active diplomatic player that can contribute alongside others across a range of issue areas. “This could be an opportunity for us to strengthen regional and cross-regional cooperation that is open and outward-looking,” the prime minister
told an audience at a regional forum in Japan in June.
Mr. Srettha has looked to make quick gains on this front. At home,
he outlined his Vision 2030 “Ignite Thailand” program, which aims to transform the country into a global economic hub in eight industries: tourism, wellness and medical services, agriculture and food, aviation, logistics, future mobility, digital economy, and finance. Abroad, Thailand has moved forward with its bids to join both the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with developed economies, as well as the BRICS group with developing economies. (The group is named after its initial members before a recent expansion: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.)
In November 2023, Thai diplomats
were told that the twin BRICS-OECD bids were part of a broader approach where Thailand should try to play a greater role in regional and minilateral groupings in proactive, forward-looking and expansive ways, beyond just traditional multilateral forums. These included China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the Group of Twenty (G20), as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
A demanding environment for Thai diplomacy
Yet this vision is not without its challenges. Internally, evolving political dynamics and questions around the coalition government and Mr. Srettha’s Pheu Thai party have shown signs of exacerbating tensions between domestic and foreign policy. The prime minister suspended his overseas travel briefly in March after
mounting public criticism that he was spending too much time abroad. An April cabinet reshuffle also saw him
abruptly lose his foreign minister, who had helped develop this approach, amid lingering skepticism in some parts of the bureaucracy. Externally, it is unclear if Thailand, historically a U.S. treaty ally, will have the space to promote its wider agenda and avoid taking sides in the face of intensifying U.S.-China competition. Prime Minister Srettha himself
has noted that while he remains optimistic about the prospects for his vision, he is trying to advance it in a world that is facing three simultaneous challenges: intensifying superpower rivalry, declining multilateralism and globalization, and disruptive technological change.
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Managing those challenges can sometimes get in the way of this institutional agenda. For instance, Thailand’s membership application to join BRICS has been advancing at a time when the group is increasingly perceived by some as a bloc that advances a Sino-Russian joint agenda, rather than just another non-Western alliance promoting the interests of the developing world in specific functional areas, as was the case when it held its first summit in 2009. As a result, Thailand has had to advance its bid more quietly to avoid ruffling too many feathers.
ScenariosMost likely: Expansion
Thailand will continue to fill in the outlines of a more energetic approach, with some tangible benefits for the country. The expansive approach would be centered on trying to actively influence the agenda of leadership in new and existing institutions on issues that align with Thailand’s domestic agenda. Closer to home, this could include working with others to shape
institution-building in the Mekong subregion, which is increasingly being dominated by China and its Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework.
Further abroad, it could also include injecting more energy into perceived underperforming frameworks and bodies that encourage sectoral economic cooperation. These include the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (
BIMSTEC), which Thailand has chaired since 2022 and which brings together a mix of South and Southeast Asian states, as well as the Asia Cooperation Dialogue – the first international grouping to cover Asia as a whole, which Thailand is set to chair next year.
Less likely: Narrowing
Here, while Thailand’s geo-economic institutional approach would continue, the prism through which it is viewed would narrow as Prime Minister Srettha’s agenda begins running out of steam at home and the country comes under pressure from intensifying geopolitical competition abroad. The Thai government would focus more on a select few minilateral institutions and frameworks that bring more immediate economic benefits for the country. These are likely to be more issue- and sector-specific, such as Mr. Srettha’s
proposed joint-visa program among mainland Southeast Asian countries to boost tourism. They may also include the promotion of project-based connectivity schemes
with bordering states Cambodia and Laos, as well as Malaysia through Thailand’s southern provinces, including building roads and bridges to enhance trade. Thailand’s more ambitious institutional advances could also be challenged. For instance, the OECD accession process typically takes several years of rigorous review across key areas including structural reform, open trade and investment, inclusive growth and governance.
Least likely: Shift to domestic priorities
Here, Thailand would turn inward rather than outward in its geo-economic institutional approach. Given the country’s longstanding record of active diplomacy, regionally and internationally, this is most likely to occur in response to a shock, such as protracted political instability that paralyzes the government. In this scenario, Thailand’s institutional engagement will be constrained even further. It is likely to be limited to basic participation in traditional multilateral forums such as the United Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. We may also see a more transactional approach to advancing institutional priorities abroad that can be justified by linkages to increases in jobs and incomes at home within the government’s
prioritized sectors. This could include promoting soft-power-related initiatives in narrower ways and in select institutions, in fields like food, sports, fashion and film, for example through new programs, forums and expos with neighboring countries.