South Africa
Source: www.iol.co.za

Then BRICS Chairperson President Cyril Ramaphosa flanked (from left) President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, announcing the outcomes of the XV BRICS Summit in Sandton, South Africa on August 24, 2023.

A CRISIS opens up many opportunities as the famous saying goes.

The rapid shock of trade and tariff wars launched by Trump 2.0 against Mexico and Canada and then China and Colombia followed by the attacks on South Africa have sparked intense global debate.The central theme is the preservation of white nationalism and identity in the context of mass immigration and culture.

Nations would have to face these volleys- both political and economic in real time.The Elon Musk show is in top gear especially as it is dismantling core elements of the US bureaucracy associated with social democracy, diversity and soft power. Here ‘development aid’ is not seen as US soft power but as a waste of budgets that should be used for domestic purposes.

When decoding Trump 2.0 it is important to note that the BRICS bloc is not a hegemonic group but a bloc formed to reform global governance, finance and trade to be more inclusive and representative of global realities.

As the geo-economic rise of the East, anchored in China, has grown astronomically in the past decade, BRICS offers new models of economic development backed by real institutions and programs albeit within the parameters of global capitalism.

Trade in local currencies is a small step in trying to reduce volatility and new momentum around a ‘BRICS currency’ may be a logical outcome only in the long term.

Secondly, the Trump 2.0 administration's international relations view is worlds apart from the Biden administration and notions of bipartisanship may be at the bottom of the pile for the next few years. The BRICS bloc has naturally been in the crosshairs for Trump. The impact on each BRICS nation and their priorities are different, with varying levels of impact and influence.

The growth of BRICS in 2024- 25 with new members such as significant Asian economies Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia as well as Cuba and Bolivia has raised the ire of the US.

Transactionalism is the signature of Trump. Dealmaking is the mode of Trump 2.0. From the Mexican and Canadian tariffs and then delaying them in exchange for border patrols etc, to having discussions on accessing critical minerals in Ukraine as a bargaining chip, dealmaking is happening in real-time.
Trump 2.0 will more likely have a transactional approach to BRICS nations rather than deal with them as a bloc. In the past decade, political, social and cultural elites of the US have identified China as the strategic competitor and rival to US hegemony.

The Chinese model is vastly different from the US and West. Led by a centralised Chinese Communist Party and State Commission, it has managed to achieve remarkable economic and technological development in just a few decades. They have mastered the developmental state as well as globalisation.

Through major global infrastructure and development programs like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS and FOCAC, the model of development solidarity without interference in nations affairs has won the hearts and minds of the Global South.

Trump's approach is expected to be more bombastic and rooted in trade wars and tariffs. Beijing already has a well-developed Trump strategy and diversification plans for both trade and technology. As the Trump administration disengages with the world through massive cuts in development aid, China's soft power and development support is more than willing and able to fill the gap.

Nations such as Iran, Cuba and Bolivia have been designated as opponents of the US and EU for decades and this will intensify under Trump 2.0. Democratic South Africa has taken a more balanced approach regarding global affairs. South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the ICJ, and its membership in BRICS has been an issue for the US, which has applied significant pressure to change course.

South Africa’s AGOA future is at risk should it be removed from the programme when up for review in July 2025. The US provided direct funding to South Africa under PEPFAR, which has now been suspended, creating a funding crisis for hundreds of health NGOs. This may be a silver lining for Africa whose economies have become too dependent on Aid thus eroding state capacity and innovation.

A third category of nations that will have both complicated and competitive and anxious relations with Trump can be classified as Frenemies.

Under the Democrats administration, Russia was clumped with China as a first-tier rival. However, under Trump, this has now changed. The Trump-Putin direct, lengthy telediplomacy call on 12 February is a clear indicator of the chemistry and ‘common consensus’, especially regarding the Ukraine-Russia war and any settlement or peace process.

This brotherhood is most strong on the current cultural and information wars. Trump and Putin have much common ground on confronting the ‘Globalists’- the EU bloc, Canada, Australia etc, and it's still just less than one month into his Presidency.

Brazil, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have historically been allies of the US. With their inclusion in the BRICS bloc, they are taking much more nuanced positions on major issues from global governance, Palestine, climate change, and the need for UN and governance reforms.

India’s strategic autonomy approach, one where it seeks solid relations with both the US, EU and BRICS nations will guide its relations. Prime Minister Modi's state visit to both France and the US in the same week signals its strategy of diversified relations with powerful nations and blocs, but this approach can lead to inertia as political administrations change.

Individually, BRICS Plus nations would continue to evolve their national interest policies and tactics with Trump 2.0. However, the erratic, volatile politics and sudden decisions are way too disruptive and concerning for all BRICS nations and the Global South since all BRICS nations are committed to a generally stable international order.

BRICS nations are important in their regions and would continue to advance their core agenda to grow, promote and preserve the UN. Its overall collective global agenda will prevail in the current severe headwinds of Trump. The sheer weight of history and humanity and the geo-economic and political shifts are now irreversible.

* Ashraf Patel is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue IGD, UNISA.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

We have concluded the G20 ministerial meeting in Johannesburg.

I wish to extend, through the mass media, our gratitude to our South African friends for their excellent organisation of the discussions, both in terms of substantive content and the resolution of numerous protocol-related and logistical matters.

The main focus of the deliberations among the foreign ministers was the crucial goal of amplifying the voices of developing nations in global decision-making. The discussions were substantial, and we observed tangible progress in this regard.

Since last year, the African Union has attained full membership within the G20. The League of Arab States (LAS) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) are interested in securing equivalent status. Such ambitions are commendable. We are confident that, in due course, the EAEU may also rightfully aspire to similar standing, as each of these associations demonstrates positive momentum in their contributions to the development of international economic relations.

We articulated our perspective on international challenges and their resolution during a period when multipolar realities are increasingly acknowledged. The advent of multipolarity is self-evident to us and to the BRICS nations. Statistical evidence underscores this trend.

The combined gross domestic product of BRICS states has surpassed that of the G7 countries. BRICS accounts for 37 percent of global GDP, compared to the G7’s 29 percent. This disparity heightens the urgency of reforming global economic institutions to reflect the genuine weight of the Global South and the World Majority within the world economy, alongside fostering non-discriminatory economic ties. These matters were actively deliberated. Russia stands ready to vigorously facilitate further progress in this domain, though numerous challenges persist.

A majority of participants in the Johannesburg meeting acknowledged the extremely low likelihood that the UN-approved 2030 Sustainable Development Goals will be fulfilled. Merely 17 percent of these Goals currently exhibit prospects for realisation.

Concurrently, global inequality continues to rise, compounded by other systemic challenges confronting developing states. We welcome measures aimed at augmenting technology transfers, additional preferential funding, and food assistance to developing nations. While these steps are long overdue, they remain insufficient to fundamentally alter the trajectory.

The global economy is marked by disproportionate growth in defence and military expenditures. According to Western experts, such outlays now total $2.4 trillion annually. An egregious example is the regime of Vladimir Zelensky, which has absorbed (or at the very least, absorbed) hundreds of billion dollars in military aid – resources that could have been allocated to vital global development programmes, particularly in Africa.

The IMF and World Bank have set records in sustaining Zelensky’s regime through loans and credit facilities vastly exceeding the sums allocated to African and other developing nations. We underscored that global stability was being undermined, with profoundly negative repercussions for the world economy.

We urged our Western counterparts to respect universally recognised rules of international law. Emphasis was placed on revitalising the United Nations’ role as a platform for coordinating state actions and forging a fair balance of interests. The stabilising influence of consensus-based multilateral frameworks on international economic relations was also highlighted. These include the SCO, the EAEU, the African Union, LAS, and the aforementioned CELAC. Collectively, they offer enhanced opportunities to address emerging regional challenges.

The role played by BRICS certainly attracts everyone’s attention at the global level. We briefed our colleagues in detail on the results of last year’s summit in Kazan where a number of promising ideas were formulated in terms of the G20 mandate: agreements to launch BRICS payment and settlement mechanisms, an investment platform, and a grain exchange.

Speaking about entities that play a certain role in international economic relations, the G20 in general retains the role of a dialogue platform between the old and new centres of power. We spoke in favour of preserving the economic profile of this association as it was intended and agreed at the very beginning of its creation in 2008, without politicising the G20 agenda as our Western colleagues have been trying to do in recent years, seeking to “Ukrainianise” the agenda. These attempts have always failed. They take a lot of energy and nerves from the participants, especially the Sherpas.

We drew the attention of our colleagues to a significant date, especially as it is being celebrated in the year of Africa’s G20 presidency – the 65th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Our country (back then the Soviet Union) played a major role in the adoption of this historic document. Despite the successes achieved by the countries of the Global South freed from the burden of exploitation, the problem has not been completely resolved. There remain 17 non-self-governing territories in the world. Colonial dependency has largely given way to neo-colonial dependency. Former parent states and Western transnational corporations have monopolised markets and supply chains and are using their advantages to extract natural resources and raw materials from countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Then they add value at their own enterprises making maximum profit from the whole process.

This is abnormal in the twenty-first century. We support our partners from the World Majority nations who are speaking out more and more loudly and insistently in favour of liberation from neo-colonial practices.

South Africa, which has led the G20 this year, completes the succession of BRICS presidencies that began in 2022, when Indonesia was at the head of the G20. In 2023 it was India, and in 2024 it was Brazil. This successive version of BRICS being at the helm of the G20 has had the positive outcome of strengthening the position of the Global South in our forum. All this contributes to the establishment of a fairer multipolar world order based on the sovereign equality of states, as required by the UN Charter, and on all other principles of the Charter in their totality and interrelation.

Overall, we are satisfied with the outcome of the meeting. Disagreements have not disappeared, but the conversation is continuing. This is always useful. I believe that in Johannesburg, we managed to set a positive vector for further interaction within the G20, to draw attention to acute problems, first and foremost on the African continent, but also in other countries of the Global South.

This is a good and useful contribution to the work on the preparation for the G20 Summit in Johannesburg in November 2025.

Question: You said that the G20 is above all an economic association. However, all representatives of South Africa, opening the year of its presidency, among other economic challenges, set the goal of achieving consensus on the Ukrainian crisis in the G20. How successful is this, in your opinion? Is such a consensus possible, given the composition of the participants?

Sergey Lavrov: I am not aware of the fact that the South Africans had set themselves such a goal. I followed closely how they assumed their position and how our Sherpas worked. They had no such task.

Yesterday, I was received by the President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa. Today, I had a long conversation with the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Ronald Lamola. They confirmed that they fully support the need not to deviate from the originally agreed mandate of the G20 – trade, financial, economic, logistical, and transportation issues.

I did not see it that way. And my colleagues who worked on the preparation of the ministerial meeting did not see such a trend.

Question: As is known, the United States ignored the ministerial meeting in Johannesburg at a high level. At the same time, previous summits and meetings were openly torpedoed by the West in an attempt to impose the Ukrainian agenda. How can such a destructive EU influence be neutralised? Does the G20 have a future?

Sergey Lavrov: You said the previous meetings were torpedoed by the West’s attempts to Ukrainianise them. I would say this is not an entirely correct way to put it. Previous attempts by the West to Ukrainianise the G20 agenda were torpedoed by other participants in that association.

If you look at the final documents, after all the G20 participants agreed to include a small text on geopolitical issues by way of compromise, you will not find anything in them that could be rejected by the Russian side. They mention a large number of emerging challenges, including the Palestinian problem that was highlighted at the 2024 summit, alongside what is happening in the Gaza Strip and in the Middle East in general.

However, our experts spent a lot of time to harmonise these small texts. And they had no impact whatsoever on the problems of Palestine, Ukraine or Africa, where conflicts are again on the rise. This is because there is an appropriate format for all political crises.

On the bright side, I would like to note that these “inserts” in the declarations of the G20 leaders have in no way affected the essence of economic discussions, which were in the interests of forging a multipolar world order, and agreements formulated in these documents.

Question: The aggressive World Minority is dwindling every day yet remains as aggressive. Statements from Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron and Kaja Kallas are becoming increasingly rhetorical. What do you think they are hoping for? And what will they most likely face?

Sergey Lavrov: This bewilders me as well. The European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, spoke at the G20 with the same array of accusations, proclaiming certain “plans” that would prevent Russia from taking its rightful place in the world. There is some tragicomic element to this.

I noted her remarks about the Russian-American meeting in Riyadh on February 18 this year. She said that the “TV picture” with the Russian Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State and the national security advisers of Moscow and Washington standing there gave the impression to the entire world that Russia was a winner. This mentality has not disappeared since long ago, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, when it was necessary to build new relations in the European part of Eurasia – it was always either/or – either you are with us or against us.

When the first coup d’état took place in Ukraine in 2004, we didn’t believe it was a manifestation of hostile Western policy, yet these problems persisted and worsened. Under pressure from the United States, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine did not recognise Viktor Yanukovich’s victory in the second round and ordered a third round of voting, though it was not provided for in the Constitution. As a result of unbridled manipulations in the third round, election victory came to Viktor Yushchenko.

Before the third round of voting, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht publicly stated that he urged Ukrainian voters to make the “right” choice: either they are with Russia or with Europe. This confrontational attitude has not vanished. Behind it lies the desire not to let anyone escape the “supervision” and influence of Western countries. They are still trying to use the same tactics in all parts of the world, including the post-Soviet space.

Speaking of the people who are now trying to express an assessment of Western countries and prevent a rift among them, I cannot fail to mention NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. He speaks as if he were the president of a large and powerful country rather than a clerk obliged to reflect the consensus opinion of all NATO members. He is travelling all over the world, to the capitals of the Alliance member states, demanding that no peace settlement should be allowed which would let Russia get at least some benefit from the special military operation.

According to our information, he is “mentoring” Zelensky, telling him to stand his ground, not to show weakness before the start of negotiations, and emphasising the inadmissibility for Kiev to hint at the possibility of softening positions and “territorial concessions”. This is bacchanalia. This man (in this case, Mark Rutte) is abusing, grossly violating his functional duties.

Not all NATO members take such a barefaced stance. Not all of them want to continue wasting money on arming Ukraine, to subordinate all the work of both NATO and the European Union to Zelensky’s wishes. So the truth will triumph.

Today more sensible voices are heard not only from a number of European countries but also from Washington. We have spoken in detail about the outcome of our talks. Russian President Vladimir Putin has touched on this subject several times. The main thing is not that we are giving in to someone or that someone is giving in to us. This “either/or” should not exist. There must be an understanding that politics and diplomacy is, first and foremost, a dialogue, a desire to hear the partner and find in his statements what coincides with your own interests. Then there appears consensus on certain issues, which does not mean that disagreements will be completely eliminated. This will never happen. The main thing is to achieve results in the areas where interests coincide, and to translate them into practical actions, including in the economy. As for the areas where interests diverge, we must not allow this divergence to degenerate into a confrontation, especially a hot one.

Question: How have your G20 counterparts from friendly nations received the resumption of the Russian-American dialogue? How might this impact the formation of a multipolarity sought by the World Majority states?

Sergey Lavrov: All welcomed our meeting. They understand that this does not signify the conclusion of the era of confrontation between Russia and the West. However, the very initiation of dialogue itself represents a return to normalcy, a fact universally acknowledged and welcomed.

The reaction of the “tragicomic figures” heading the Brussels bureaucracy and NATO to the meeting in Riyadh is highly illustrative. The mere fact that representatives of two great powers sat down, engaged in discussion, and articulated their respective positions is perceived by them as a betrayal of Western interests. These individuals are not in good health.

By and large, all our counterparts from the World Majority share this assessment. Perhaps not all express it directly. Yet, based on prevailing sentiments, this is indeed the case.

Question: In the draft UN General Assembly resolution prepared by Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, the Baltic states, and several other European nations ahead of February 24, Moscow is demanded to withdraw its forces from Ukraine “immediately” and “unconditionally.” Notably, the United States has refrained, for the first time since the start of the special military operation, from co-sponsoring such a resolution on Ukraine. In your view, does this indicate a shift in Russian-American relations and the beginning of a thaw?

Sergey Lavrov: This reflects the pragmatism inherent in the policy of the Donald Trump administration. During meetings with leaders of several states – confirmed in discussions with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and likely in engagements with other representatives of the World Majority – he has emphasised that his guiding principle is common sense.

This is the sole factor I perceive as influencing the altered list of co-sponsors of this latest purposeless, dead-end resolution you mentioned.

Question: What issues is the Russian Foreign Ministry addressing in preparation for a potential meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump? When might it take place?
Sergey Lavrov: When it occurs, you will be informed.

What issues are under consideration? Confidentiality constitutes an integral element in preparing any diplomatic process. Thus, I am certain we will communicate updates in due course. However, the Kremlin press service will issue notifications first and foremost.

Question: US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has stated that the possibility of easing sanctions against Russia could be discussed within the framework of negotiations on the Ukrainian crisis. What is Moscow’s position regarding Western sanctions? Can a resolution of the Ukrainian crisis be achieved without a comprehensive settlement of the sanctions issue that takes into account Russia’s interests?

Sergey Lavrov: We do not broach that subject. Our stance is rooted in the fact that this constitutes a gross violation of the very principles the West itself enshrined in the global economic order: fair competition, inviolability of property, the presumption of innocence, and free-market mechanisms. All these tenets have been dismantled. To this, we must add the outright theft of Russian assets. It is shameful. They have not merely stolen but are now exploiting the accrued interest to fund the war against our country through Ukrainian proxies.

Recent reports indicate that several Western companies are prepared to return and resume operations in Russia. I believe our economic officials have responded appropriately. The essence of their position is as follows: over the years of this hybrid warfare, including through unlawful sanctions, we have taken significant steps to drive the robust development of domestic industries that previously relied heavily on the United States, the European Union, Japan, and others. This newfound state has enabled us to appreciate the value of mastering our own technologies for the prosperity of our economy, which, in certain instances, have already surpassed their Western counterparts.

A similar logic should guide our approach to the potential return of Western companies to Russia (there is no need to dissuade them). However, their re-entry should be permitted only in sectors that do not pose risks to our economy should certain parties once again wake up on the wrong side of the bed.

The same holds true for sanctions. In many respects, they compelled us, but through this, they also gave us a lesson and inspired profound reforms and a fundamental restructuring of our economy to ensure comprehensive, sovereign, and independent development, free from the whims of those who still presume dominance over global affairs, including the world economy.

I will conclude where I began. Multipolarity is gaining ascendancy. The growth trajectories of new, formidable centres of power – economic, political, and financial – demonstrate that this multipolarity is irreversible. In this context, the G20 retains its relevance as a forum where Western participants may come to recognise the inevitability of this process and begin adapting to it.

We do not assert that multipolarity excludes the West. They too are part of our planet, the global economy, and international affairs. The G20 serves as a viable platform for exchanging views, clarifying positions, and educating our Western counterparts.

Russia
Source: mid.rulink

On February 21, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil Mauro Vieira on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Johannesburg.

In the course of the conversation, the two foreign ministers discussed topical issues on the bilateral agenda, in particular, the schedule of upcoming high-level and top-level contacts, and synchronised their watches on the main areas of cooperation between Moscow and Brazil on key multilateral platforms, including in the BRICS, which is chaired by Brazil this year. During the exchange of views on the Ukrainian crisis and a number of other international and regional issues, Sergey Lavrov informed about the results of the Russian-US contacts held in Riyadh and drew attention to the need to take into account the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis in the work of the Group of Friends for Peace launched by the Global South countries with Brazil's participation.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr President,
In conditions of global economic fragmentation, a dialogue on global issues in the G20 remains in high demand as never before. We commend the Republic of South Africa’s substantial preparations for the forum and the topicality of chosen thematic priorities. We are particularly impressed with the emphasis on a search for a common denominator in the interests of combining efforts to facilitate sustained growth and development.

We still have a long way to go for attaining the desired results, and the overall background for joint work in conditions of geopolitical confrontation, that is being incited, remains unfavourable. The statistics are well-known: We are lagging far behind a schedule for achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals until 2030, and only 17 percent of them are on track. Additional intensive efforts are urgently needed for attaining multiple parameters, including the fight against poverty, food security and access to energy.

Historical experience shows that it is impossible to independently cope with common challenges and threats. This is why the G20 was established in 2008 at the level of national leaders. At that time, it was necessary to put out the fire of a global financial crisis in emergency circumstances. It became possible to stabilise markets for a while. However, we are now witnessing an entire cascade of intertwined crises. Behind them are armed conflicts that have been unleashed and inspired by the West, trade, technological and hybrid wars, the demolition of the international trade system, the weaponisation of the dollar that has turned into a tool for manipulations.

A weakened link of the global chain dooms the entire humankind to ordeals. The West’s anti-Russia sanctions, augmented by terrorist attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines, are a convincing example. This has seriously impaired the competitive potential of those who initiated unlawful restrictions, primarily the EU. Apart from the West’s economic miscalculations, all this has slowed down global growth rates, provoked inflation, market setbacks and undermined the Global South’s development.

Nevertheless, the modern world is being transformed drastically and becoming truly multipolar. The 500-year period of Western domination is irreversibly becoming a thing of the past. It is necessary to find the strength and to accept this objective reality. The international community does not want to be hostage to unilateral decisions of former sovereigns. This is particularly obvious today when we are celebrating the 80th anniversary of Victory in the war against Nazism and the 65th anniversary of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as a starting point of acquiring independence by Africa, Asia and the entire Global South.

In 2022, BRICS confidently outpaced the G7 in terms of GDP. Today, BRICS and the G7 account for 37 and 29 percent of the global GDP, respectively. At the same time, developing states are growing twice as fast as Western countries: 4 percent compared to less than 2 percent. They generate advanced ideas and facilitate progress, including in the sphere of artificial intelligence. During Russia’s BRICS Chairmanship at the Kazan summit in 2024, the participants adopted multiple promising decisions to launch non-discriminatory, independent of anyone’s whim mechanisms stimulating investment and trade, with due consideration for Africa’s special needs.

The neo-liberal circles in the West regard the objective process of burgeoning multipolarity as a challenge rather than an opportunity. They are putting an absurd stake on a confrontation, on inflicting a “strategic defeat” on rivals. In so doing, they use neocolonialist practices that include siphoning off natural resources from developing countries on the cheap, imposing pseudo-environmental taxes on their products, attempting to thwart cooperation between countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other, and containing the industrialisation of the Global South. For example, the production of rare-earth metals by developing countries can bring them a pitiful $11 billion per year in profits, whereas the production of accumulator batteries in the West on their basis results in earnings to the tune of $400 billion per year.

We know well how the global financial system operates. The G20 Rio de Janeiro summit in November of last year revealed figures of military spending worldwide that amounted to $2.4 trillion. Assistance to Ukraine derived from the theft of sovereign assets and cuts in international aid to development has reached exorbitant proportions.

Under these circumstances, G20 retains its status as a useful venue for aligning the interests of states with different strategies and development levels, this primarily due to the efforts of BRICS countries. In 2024, leaders of our countries stated in no uncertain terms that the Global South should be given some true leverage for influencing the activities of multilateral institutions, specifically the IMF and the World Bank, a leverage that conforms to its weight category in the world, and make the WTO heed its interests. The task for now is to implement the agreements, and Russia will help this in every way.

It is important to guarantee that developing countries are independent in using their natural resources and getting a fair price for them. They should also have an equal and direct access to markets, supply chains, technologies and investment. We share South Africa’s plans to survey the G20 activities over past years. We hope that the result will enable us to reaffirm our commitment to de-politicised interaction based on the unshakeable principle of consensus with an eye to implementing the task to ensure a sustainable and comprehensive economic growth, a task set back in 2009. This would be a worthy result of Africa’s first ever G20 summit.     

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr Volodin,
Colleagues,

I am happy to have this opportunity to address the State Duma deputies during the Government Hour.

I would like to emphasise our appreciation for the professional and friendly relations between diplomats and legislators that allow us to share views on the various issues the Foreign Ministry is engaged in. Your regular contacts with your constituencies provide valuable insights into which foreign policy topics concern them.

The key task of our diplomatic service has been to create safe and favourable external conditions for the steady progress of our country, its economic and technological sovereignty, and the improvement of the well-being and quality of life of the Russian people, as stated in all versions of the Foreign Policy Concept, including the latest version from March 31, 2023. We began discussions on current issues with the State Duma deputies on February 6 of this year. I was invited to a joint meeting of three committees, where we coordinated our approaches informally on specific aspects of foreign policy and the international situation. Today, we continue this discussion as part of the Government Hour with all State Duma members.

I will not elaborate extensively on our actions in the international arena. President Vladimir Putin has outlined our objectives on several occasions during the past news conference on the results of the year and in numerous interviews.

The key trajectory at the current stage is the ongoing movement towards a multipolar world. This is a historic process connected with the emergence of new centres of power on the world map, particularly among the Global Majority. Many of these nations have achieved remarkable results in various areas, especially in the economy and social sphere. They are pursuing a nationally-oriented foreign policy and are increasingly taking responsibility for the situation in their regions.
Our partners in the Global South and Global East represent authentic civilisations, cultures and religions, and are members of diverse integration associations. They share a commitment to steady, peaceful progress without outside diktat or pressure. Like us, they advocate for the democratisation of international life and respect for the people’s natural right to determine their own destiny. A community of such states is emerging on the global stage, as evidenced by enhanced cooperation mechanisms such as BRICS and the SCO. This is undoubtedly a positive trend.

It should also be said that the countries of the collective West, which claim to have accepted the reality of the multipolar world, are clinging to their privileged positions and trying to preserve the last remaining elements of their domination. The West is not ready yet to accept and apply the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety and interconnectedness. They interpret that basic document of international law selectively, picking the elements they need at any given period in history and disregarding everything else. For example, in the instance of Ukraine they are highlighting respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. At the same time, they de-emphasise the fundamental principles of the UN Charter such as the right of nations to self-determination and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of race, sex, language and religion. Incidentally, it was these fundamental rights which the colonisers violated and the neo-Nazi Kiev regime, acting with the connivance of its external patrons, never respected.

We have no doubt about the future of international relations. We are witnessing the growth of an objective divide between the progressive Global Majority and the collective West, which, as you can see every day, is striving uselessly to close its ranks but is unable to abandon the egoistical customs it has developed over the past five centuries when it ruled the world.

We are convinced that there is no reasonable alternative to our foreign policy, which has been approved by President Vladimir Putin. It is based on our national interests. Russia has always been and remains open for equal cooperation based on mutual respect with everyone who is ready to work together with us on the basis of a fair balance of interests in security, politics, the economy, culture and contacts between people. We will always be ready to speak with any country on the basis of mutual respect.

Our regional priorities include strengthening a “goodwill belt” through gradual integration with the former Soviet republics and other neighbours, as well as through the maintenance of stability in Greater Eurasia. We are working towards this with individual states on a bilateral basis, as well as within organisations such as the CSTO, the CIS, the EAEU, the SCO and other multilateral structures. Another important element of our ties with Central Asian partners is the CA5+Russia format. There are similar platforms like the forum of the Caspian Littoral States and the Caspian Five – Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

During a meeting with senior staff of the Foreign Ministry on July 14, 2023, President Putin put forth a strategic initiative aimed at creating a new Eurasian security architecture to replace the failed Euro-Atlantic model. This Eurasian architecture will be open to all Eurasian countries, including European ones.

We believe that all states should have an opportunity to contribute to the well-being of our shared continent, the largest, the most populous and probably the most economically promising continent. Africa has the African Union that unites all African countries. Latin America has the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Eurasia does not have an organisation of this kind. There is the OSCE, which is based on the Euro-Atlantic concept, and numerous subregional structures I have already mentioned. There are ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and many other associations. But we do not have a forum uniting all our states. That is why we will advocate the concept presented by President Putin.

We have already started working towards this end. We have signed treaties with our neighbours, and we are developing ties with their associations. I would like to specially mention the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Security Guarantees within the Union State, and the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the People’s Republic of China. We are also working in the same spirit to develop cooperation within multilateral military-political associations such as the CSTO and the SCO, as well as with all constructive thinking countries in Eurasia. We are always glad to welcome them.

We have recently concluded a comprehensive partnership agreement with Iran. In collaboration with our Belarusian friends, who have successfully convened the Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security for two consecutive years, we have drafted the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. This document is designed to establish the regulatory foundations for a new geopolitical reality on our continent and will be presented at the upcoming third Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security.

Regarding country priorities, Belarus, as I have mentioned, remains central to our efforts in advancing the Union State framework and reinforcing coordination within the international sphere.

Our comprehensive strategic partnership with China continues to deepen and ascend dynamically. As assessed by our leaders, these relations have reached an unprecedented level, transcending in substance the traditional alliances of previous eras. This year, we anticipate further development of our joint diplomatic engagements, including at the highest level: President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping will undertake a visit to Moscow timed to coincide with the Victory Day celebrations on May 9, while President Vladimir Putin will travel to China in connection with the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of the Second World War and the defeat of Japanese militarism in late August – early September 2025.

Relations of specially privileged strategic partnership with India are progressing steadily. As part of the annual highest-level exchange programme, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Moscow in 2024. The ensuing negotiations yielded a new package of decisions, the implementation of which is now underway.

An intensive political dialogue is maintained with all member states of the CSTO, the EAEU, the CIS, as well as with Iran, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – though this list is far from exhaustive.
Our network of enduring partnerships spans all continents, with numerous states having elevated relations to the level of strategic partnership.

Russian-African cooperation has been substantially reinforced. In November 2024, the inaugural ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum was successfully held – a historic first. Convened pursuant to the decisions of the Second Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg in 2023, this event proved highly productive. Together with our African partners, we continue to work towards the practical implementation of agreements reached at both summits and the ministerial conference. Efforts are focused on unlocking the vast potential of our cooperation with Africa, which – following the dissolution of the Soviet Union – had not merely stagnated but significantly diminished as other priorities took precedence. Today, we are re-engaging to duly acknowledge our African friends, just as they recognise our contributions to their liberation from colonial oppression. The prospects before us are exceedingly favourable and must be actively pursued without delay.

On a separate note, I would like to elaborate on our efforts within the UN framework. In 2024, we initiated a strategically significant and visionary project aimed at combating neocolonialism. Under this project, the United Russia party spearheaded the creation of the International Movement for Combating Modern Neocolonial Practices – For the Freedom of Nations! Subsequently, the Foreign Ministry secured the adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution titled Eradication of Colonialism in All Its Forms and Manifestations in December 2024. The next objective is a UN decision to designate December 14, 1960 (the date of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) as the International Day Against Colonialism.

We are leveraging UN platforms to advance collective approaches to biological and international information security. A notable achievement includes the finalisation – at Russia’s initiative – of the inaugural International Convention on Countering Cybercrime. This instrument has been agreed upon and will open for signature in June 2025 in Vietnam.

A distinct emphasis must be placed on our work within BRICS, which has evolved into a principal hub for reconciling the interests of leading Global Majority states and a pivotal pillar of the multipolar world order.

We chaired BRICS in 2024. I am confident that the objectives outlined in our programme have been achieved. The group’s Kazan summit was attended by delegations from 35 states and six multilateral organisations, including the United Nations.

During Russia’s tenure, a decision was agreed to admit Indonesia – the largest Muslim-majority nation and a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 – as a full-fledged BRICS member. Equally significant was the establishment of a partner-country category within the group. Already, a dozen states have confirmed their desire to join BRICS in this capacity. Agreements were reached to advance cooperation across all domains, particularly in the financial and economic sphere – a matter of fundamental importance at this stage of shaping a multipolar world order.
The SCO operates on similar principles. We regard it as a robust, substantive foundation for the emerging architecture of equal and indivisible security across Eurasia.

Among other multipolar platforms, the Group of Twenty (G20) warrants mention. Meetings of foreign ministers in this format will convene tomorrow and the day after in Johannesburg, South Africa. Within the G20, alongside like-minded BRICS partners and other states of the Global South and East, we continue to counter Western attempts to “Ukrainise” the agenda and impose discriminatory, inequitable solutions in economic, financial, trade, and climate matters. This platform must be further utilised to urge our Western colleagues towards productive collective efforts rather than the promotion of unilateral approaches and recipes.

Substantial attention is devoted to cultural, humanitarian, and public diplomacy. Last year, our country successfully hosted the World Youth Festival. The inaugural international multisport tournament Games of the Future took place, alongside the BRICS Sports Games. In September 2025, the first international song contest Intervision is scheduled in the Moscow Region, with participation confirmed by numerous states across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We anticipate these will constitute major cultural events of global stature.

The protection and promotion of the Russian language abroad remains our constant priority. We intend to fully leverage the potential of the International Organisation for the Russian Language, established at the initiative of Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev under CIS auspices – though its charter explicitly states openness to all nations globally. We expect all procedures required for the full operational launch of this structure to conclude by year-end.

Among our paramount priorities is safeguarding traditional spiritual and moral values shared by all world religions and civilisations. We maintain close collaboration with the International Russophile Movement, uniting representatives of civil society, politicians, cultural figures, and business people from over 100 countries spanning the East, West, and South. Particular emphasis is placed on cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church and engagement with Islamic, Buddhist, and Jewish associations adhering to Russia’s traditional confessions.

We defend the lawful rights of our citizens abroad, providing assistance and support to them. We consistently underscore that we abandon no compatriot under any circumstances. Outreach continues with organisations of our compatriots who preserve cultural, linguistic, and spiritual ties with their historical Motherland. Many face acute challenges surviving amid rampant Russophobia unleashed in the West. Pursuant to President Vladimir Putin’s directive, a major project was launched last year to attract to Russia all individuals upholding traditional values and facing persecution by authorities in their current countries of residence. Our Ministry, embassies, and consulates are actively engaged in implementing this endeavour.

We systematically employ diplomatic tools to assist Russian businesses in developing financial settlement mechanisms and transport-logistics chains with foreign partners – systems immune to illegitimate external pressure.

This year we will mark the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 80th anniversary of the UN. As usual, our attention will be focused on rallying international efforts against any manifestations of neo-Nazism, Russophobia and other forms of racial and religious intolerance. We are concerned about the unrestrained growth of such manifestations in the territories controlled by the Kiev regime, in the Baltic states and some other EU countries, as well as in Canada with its multimillion diaspora of Hitler’s collaborators. It is inspiring that our firm stance against the revival of Nazism is shared by the overwhelming majority of the international community, which has been clearly demonstrated by the adoption of the resolution on combating the glorification of Nazism at the UN General Assembly in December 2024. While planning foreign policy engagements and other commemorative events dedicated to the Great Victory, we will closely coordinate our efforts with our friends within the CIS. This year has been declared in the Commonwealth as the Year of the 80th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the Year of Peace and Unity in the Fight Against Nazism. We have been working to have the crimes committed by the Nazi invaders and their accomplices recognised as the genocide of the Soviet people. We will rely on close cooperation with the Federal Assembly in these and other matters.

The achievement of the goals of the special military operation is inseparable from the subject of Victory over Nazism. We are working together with our colleagues in parliament to show to the international community that there is no alternative to eradicating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis.

President Vladimir Putin pointed this crucial point out in his telephone conversation with US President Donald Trump on February 12, 2025. We also highlighted this subject yesterday during our meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. I would like to emphasise that this has to do with eliminating threats to Russia’s security, which have been created over years through attempts to drag Ukraine into NATO, and with firmly putting an end to the Kiev regime’s actions to eliminate everything that is associated with Russia, Russian culture and the Russian World, namely the Russian language and culture, the Russian media and the canonical Orthodox Church.

President Putin has set challenging tasks to the Foreign Ministry. We will continue doing everything in our power to more actively and quicker adjust the ministry’s operational structure to modern requirements. We are moving personnel to more important “hotspot” foreign policy areas, primarily African states and other countries of the Global Majority. We have created a new department, the Second African Department. We are expanding our diplomatic presence in the CIS countries, Asia and Latin America. We have opened three new embassies in Africa and plan to open seven more within two years. This systematic work will be continued.

I would like to point out that the foreign policy concept approved by President Putin  is a strategic document prepared for many years ahead. It does not depend on changes in the domestic policy or the whims of our ill-wishers. We see that it is supported by the leading national political forces that are represented in the State Duma, for which we are sincerely grateful. We feel our citizens’ support through you. We are aware of this and highly appreciate this. This is giving us strength and energy.
I would like to thank you for your cooperation and comradely assistance, and to reaffirm our readiness to continue working in this spirit in the future.

Question: Recent reports emanating from US President Donald Trump’s team contain notably intriguing elements. While introducing migration-related restrictions, Donald Trump has unexpectedly extended invitations to the white population of South Africa, pledging the most favourable conditions. Incidentally, one might recall the preferential treatment afforded by US authorities to Cuban migrants over decades. Washington perceives this as a method to foment discontent within Cuba.

Is it not time for Russia to employ migration regulation more flexibly to advance our national interests? What is the position of the Foreign Ministry and your personal view?

Sergey Lavrov: In October 2024, President Vladimir Putin issued a set of instructions to optimise procedures pertaining to labour migration from states of the near abroad. The Foreign Ministry serves as one of the co-implementing bodies. Leading roles are held by the principal agencies, notably the Ministry of the Interior and its department responsible for migration matters.

We proceed from the premise that any tightening of our approach towards labour migrants from Central Asian states, primarily the South Caucasus, and other former republics would not serve our long-term interests. Naturally, maintaining order remains imperative. Numerous violations have been documented across a range of geographical regions from which migrants originate. We maintain that enhanced oversight of their conduct is necessary, yet barriers – let alone the imposition of a visa regime – should not be erected.

Indeed, compared to previous arrangements, additional measures are now being enacted. These are precisely aimed at strengthening oversight, not creating impediments to labour migration.

We have deliberately held multiple meetings with ambassadors of the EAEU member states, comprehensively addressing their inquiries and elucidating the rationale guiding our actions. It is enshrined in the EAEU founding documents that citizens of all member states possess equal rights. They may arrive without formal invitations or prior declarations of employment location, etc. These provisions now require clarification. Migrant arrivals must be monitored. Competent authorities must ascertain the whereabouts of such individuals, identify their employers, and ensure compliance with the laws of the Russian Federation. I am convinced this can be achieved without erecting artificial obstacles in relations with our closest allies.

The meetings conducted with EAEU ambassadors demonstrated their understanding of this situation. Laws exist universally but evolve in accordance with life’s exigencies.

Question: Russian embassies are mandated to maintain comprehensive awareness of processes within their host states – encompassing economics, politics, culture, and migration. The Kozyrev-era policies led to staff reductions and even embassy closures in several countries. What are the prospects for normalising the operations of Russia’s foreign missions in the USA, particularly in light of your visit to Riyadh? Are there plans to expand our diplomatic personnel in Asian, African, and Latin American states?

Sergey Lavrov: As I noted earlier, we are establishing additional embassies. The Second African Department has been created.

By 2026, embassies are planned in Gambia, Liberia, the Comoros, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, and South Sudan – totalling seven embassies. This constitutes a significant number. While we are receiving assistance, we are also actively seeking internal reserves to minimise our reliance on budgetary support.

Discussions with colleagues from the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Industry and Trade include expanding trade representations across Africa. At present, only five exist, yet more are required.

Question: The developments in the Transnistrian-Moldovan region, the recent crisis in Transnistria, and the ongoing instability in Gagauzia all contribute to the complex situation in Moldova. The recent elections demonstrated that the current president secured victory in the second round largely due to votes from the diaspora abroad. How do you evaluate the development of bilateral relations in light of these recent events?

Sergey Lavrov: The question is highly relevant. Our primary concern is the well-being of the people in Transnistria, including more than 200,000 Russian citizens living there. Chisinau’s policy of imposing artificial obstacles to the region’s basic livelihood is unacceptable, and we will firmly oppose it.

Maia Sandu holds Romanian citizenship. As you mentioned, the circumstances surrounding the recent election were astonishing. A total of 234 polling stations were opened abroad, yet in Russia – home to the largest Moldovan labour and overall diaspora – only two stations were established, making it physically impossible for more than 10,000 people to vote. Our requests to ensure voting access for all Moldovans residing in Russia were denied.

This is a blatant mockery of common sense and the very concept of democracy. The US Vice President addressed this issue at the Munich Conference, citing an example of blatant manipulation of election procedures in Romania. This practice is widely used, and the current Moldovan leadership appears to be following the example set by its Romanian counterparts.

At present, our primary concern is ensuring the supply of electricity to Transnistria. This matter is being managed by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Alexander Novak and the Ministry of Energy.

Chisinau and the European Union imposed significant obstacles, refusing to allow Transnistria to receive electricity through a scheme involving the direct participation of the Russian Federation. Instead, they pushed their own version, which still relies on deliveries of Russian gas but in a way that minimises or even attempts to erase Russia’s role entirely. These are dishonest tactics. We are not surprised by the EU’s approach, but we believe countries should act in their own national interests rather than blindly following the directives of an unelected bureaucracy.

Question: Public foreign policy statements made by members of Donald Trump’s team at the Munich Conference indicate a significant shift in the US perspective on the future framework for global security and strategic stability. It is evident that considerable tensions have emerged within the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. Do you agree that revisiting the issue of multilateral Eurasian arms control – potentially through a new START-4 agreement – along with guarantees of equal and indivisible security in Europe and globally, could, during future negotiations with the US, help push the Ukrainian issue into the background and diminish European influence over their trajectory?

Sergey Lavrov: This is a relevant question. In my previous answer, I referenced the US Vice President’s speech at the Munich Conference. This is a team that approaches issues from a different perspective, one primarily focused on American interests, as they naturally perceive them.
Yesterday, this approach was reaffirmed during our talks with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In opening the dialogue, he stressed that Donald Trump’s team operates on the principle that all international relations, in all their aspects, should be grounded in the recognition of each state’s national interests, and that a dialogue must be conducted based on this premise. National interests will never fully align; more often than not, they diverge on separate issues relevant to each country. However, where they do align, every effort should be made to maximise mutual benefit. And where they differ, as the US Secretary of State noted, responsible global powers, including Russia and the United States, must ensure that these differences do not escalate into confrontation, particularly one that would be detrimental to many other nations.

This fundamental approach highlights the divide between Donald Trump’s team and the Brussels bureaucracy. The latter now finds itself in a state of disarray, as the focus has clearly shifted toward fostering relationships with individual states that prioritise the protection of their national interests. I see this as a constructive trend.

Regarding discussions on security and strategic stability, we remain hopeful that the necessary conditions for progress will be established. As demonstrated in yesterday’s talks, there is a beginning of movement toward normalising relations across various sectors. At the very least, there is a stated willingness to initiate this process. The goal is not only to resolve the Ukrainian crisis but also to create the foundation for rebuilding and strengthening trade, economic, and geopolitical partnerships between the Russian Federation and the United States.

For now, we must deal with the legacy left by the Biden administration, which actively worked to undermine even the initial efforts toward establishing a long-term partnership between our countries.
Question: We could not fail to ask about yesterday’s talks in Saudi Arabia. US President Trump previously stated the need to reach an agreement with the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian settlement as soon as possible and threatened otherwise to impose tariffs and sanctions on Russian exports to the United States. You have given the initial assessment of the negotiations.

What are your expectations of the new Trump administration’s possible international security policy, including in the context of the NATO expansion problem and the situation in Eastern Europe?
Sergey Lavrov: Although it is my belief that words are important and can radically change the situation at times, we will assess intention statements by comparing these statements with concrete actions.

You mentioned US President Trump’s statements concerning NATO’s expansion. He was the first and so far, I think, the only Western leader who has admitted, publicly and loudly, that one of the root causes of the Ukraine situation was the previous administration’s ‘pushy’ policy of dragging Ukraine into NATO. None of the Western leaders has ever said such a thing, but Donald Trump has made this point several times. This alone is a signal that he understands our approach.

In a telephone conversation with him, President of Russia Vladimir Putin reiterated that what we wanted was not a ceasefire – which would only allow [the West] to re-arm Ukraine and pit it against our country again – but a lasting sustainable peace based on eliminating the root causes of the conflict: the NATO aspect and the extermination of all things Russian, which runs counter to Ukraine’s obligations under the UN Charter and numerous conventions.

Yesterday, Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov and I spoke with US Secretary of State Mr Rubio, and US President’s National Security Advisor Mr Waltz.

I assume that they are interested in removing any artificial obstacles to potentially very promising and mutually beneficial initiatives, primarily economic projects. I also believe they are determined to resume dialogue on foreign policy issues, on the international situation and on conflicts. We welcome this. We used this practice in the past; I cannot say it always worked without a hitch, but nothing does. It works fine as long as we meet, hear each other and are heard, and subsequently make decisions that are realistic in regard to our partners affected by these decisions.

We have made the first steps back from the edge of the abyss where the Biden administration has brought our relations. Those were very first steps. But the atmosphere is positive, and the intentions are positive. We will see where we go from here and what steps will be taken.

Question: In your view, what are the most significant events and initiatives planned by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) abroad this year to mark the anniversary of the Great Victory and the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of the Second World War?

I would also like to inform you that, in collaboration with colleagues from the Foreign Ministry, we have commenced preparations for the Memory is Stronger Than Time international expedition. This initiative is dedicated to the defeat of the Kwantung Army and the 80th anniversary of the Victory Parade held in September 1945 in Harbin, PRC. As part of the expedition’s efforts to immortalise the shared history of our two nations, plans are underway to install a commemorative plaque in Harbin City honouring the Victory Parade of September 1945.

We seek your support for this endeavour and ask the Ministry to offer political and diplomatic assistance to facilitate its implementation.

Sergey Lavrov: We attach particular importance to the 80th anniversary of Victory not only because it is a sacred date for us – the sacred Victory of our fathers and grandfathers, and the heroic feat of our mothers and grandmothers – but also because it remains one of the most pressing issues in contemporary international politics, given attempts to revive Nazism and neo-Nazism.

We will leverage our capabilities in close cooperation with the United Russia Party, which has initiated this international movement alongside other parliamentary parties. Councils of Russian compatriots, active in approximately 120 foreign countries, are planning a series of events, including film screenings, discussions, and meetings with political analysts. These will be organised within the frameworks of the Immortal Regiment, St George’s Ribbon, Candle of Remembrance, and Garden of Memory campaigns. Rossotrudnichestvo and embassy-affiliated schools are preparing to conduct the Victory Dictation. There is every reason to expect substantial participation.

All embassies and consulates are engaged in ensuring the meticulous maintenance of memorials and burial sites abroad. Special clean-up efforts and dedicated funding are allocated annually ahead of Victory Day. It is noteworthy that the Government prioritises the preservation of such monuments.
In China, approximately 80 memorials and burial sites of Soviet soldiers are registered. The Chinese side, in accordance with the relevant bilateral agreement, ensures their proper upkeep, timely restoration, and related measures.

In August-September 2025, the Memory is Stronger Than Time expedition – organised through the Combat Brotherhood National Veteran Organisation – is planned to mark the 80th anniversary of the defeat of the Kwantung Army, as you mentioned. To my understanding, the installation of a commemorative plaque in Harbin is envisaged. This will require coordination with Chinese counterparts. We stand ready to lend our support.

Question: Russia is the leading Arctic power, with the longest coastline and the largest untapped reserves of natural resources. The Northern Sea Route, a key global passage, runs through the waters of the Russian Arctic seas.

The actions taken by Arctic states during Russia’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council should not be overlooked. The declarations from other nations regarding territorial claims in the region, as well as coalitions focused on defence and security matters, compel us to adopt a more assertive stance.
What response measures does the Foreign Ministry plan to take for the expansion of Arctic cooperation with friendly countries, including key Arctic Council observers like China and India, the latter of which was recently visited by our State Duma delegation led by Vyacheslav Volodin?
Sergey Lavrov: You’ve essentially answered your own question.

We need to focus on action, not adopt the stance of the offended. That will get us nowhere. We don’t seek to harm anyone, but we will stand our ground when it comes to what is rightfully ours.
As the largest Arctic power, with the longest coastline and the most developed infrastructure, including the Northern Sea Route – something some Arctic Council countries view with envy – we are in a strong position to assert our interests.

President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Government prioritise the further development of the Arctic region, ensuring that people living there have everything they need for a comfortable life. This is a strategic resource for our country.

As for the Arctic Council, no one has kicked us out. This is impossible to do. During our chairmanship, the other seven countries coordinated their positions. Under the Biden administration, there was no need for coordination, everyone essentially obeyed. While the ministerial level wasn’t engaged, technical and expert groups continued to work, as they do now, with all eight states involved.
I believe the key thing is to focus on our work: advancing our plans and making them happen. Let others observe that we are capable of developing our own territory and waters, not just the territorial ones but also the continental shelf, where we have good positions in the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in terms of supporting our applications.

Our positions are strong, supported by agreements that regulate our territorial relations. We have such agreements with nearly all of our neighbours. Therefore, we must continue doing our work. Our partners in the Arctic Council will have no choice but to resume normal cooperation with us.
At the same time, China and India are interested in advancing the development of the Northern Sea Route. They acknowledge our leadership in the Arctic, and we will certainly continue to strengthen our cooperation with these countries.

Question: Judging by the results of 2024, the framework for cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan in terms of emergency prevention and management has unfortunately, in my opinion, developed a small crack. Our regions bordering Kazakhstan faced severe floods in 2024. This was connected, among other things, with the lack of cooperation at the national and governmental levels. The governors of these regions were not even included in the relevant commission. How can we adjust the format of our cooperation to involve governors in this work?

Sergey Lavrov: This commission is not accountable to the Foreign Ministry. However, the Russian-Kazakh commission on the joint use and protection of transboundary water bodies is in place. In fact, it held a regular meeting on November 7, 2024, in Volgograd. As a result of this meeting, a joint working group was established to focus on cooperation during floods and flood events, addressing your concern. This issue, along with all other matters related to our shared border with Kazakhstan, is receiving due attention.

Regarding the composition of the commission, we stand ready to adapt. The more local representatives are included in bilateral commissions, the more effectively they will function, the more “immersed” they are in the subject matter at hand.

Question: You’ve discussed the concept of a multipolar world and the Global Majority in detail. What priorities do you see for cooperation within the BRICS group, particularly in terms of the economy as the foundation of everything: the payment system, financial institutions, prospects, a common currency?

Sergey Lavrov: At the BRICS summit, Brazilian President Lula da Silva proposed discussing the currency challenges arising from the previous US administration’s misuse of the dollar’s status as a reserve currency.

US President Donald Trump recently commented on this issue, describing it as a serious mistake by the previous administration. This move weakened the dollar’s position and is driving more and more countries, even those that traditionally use the dollar, to explore alternative variants of payment as a precaution. The use of national currencies and the development of relevant platforms are topics currently being discussed within BRICS.

At the initiative of Brazilian President Lula da Silva, the previous BRICS summit’s resolution emphasised the need to develop proposals for alternative payment platforms through the Ministries of Finance and central banks. As a result, specific proposals were put forward, including the creation of a cross-border payment initiative, a reinsurance company, and the BRICS Clear settlement and depository infrastructure.

Russia is actively involved in these initiatives, which aim to strengthen BRICS’ resilience against external shocks. Many would prefer to slow down the development of this increasingly influential group. Fair competition is welcome, but if pressure comes in the form of sanctions, tariffs, or exclusion from Western-controlled banking systems, it ceases to be a competitive struggle and instead becomes a clear violation of WTO norms.

The situation remains fluid, with a trend toward establishing reliable settlement systems and business management frameworks that are stable in any scenario.

Question: How would you assess the strategic partnership between Russia and China within the current global political landscape? Which joint initiatives with China do you consider most critical for strengthening our bilateral relations?

Sergey Lavrov: I could scarcely address this matter adequately within a single hour. As I noted in my opening remarks, our relations operate at an unprecedentedly advanced level. In essence and substance, they far surpass the traditional concept of an alliance as understood during the Cold War or thereafter.

These relations constitute an entirely new paradigm – grounded in equality and mutual benefit. They are defined by a trust-based, regular, and comradely dialogue at the highest levels, through which we establish fundamental parameters for deepening partnership, particularly in economic, trade, investment, transport, and logistics domains.

There exists no sphere of state activity in which our two nations lack coordination mechanisms. To illustrate: our prime ministers convene annually. Prior to these meetings, five preparatory meetings of specialised commissions – each co-chaired by deputy prime ministers – are held. This underscores the extraordinary breadth of our bilateral agenda with the PRC.

Trans-border cooperation is similarly institutionalised through dedicated commissions. Our convergence extends to humanitarian, cultural, and educational spheres. We observe growing numbers of Chinese students pursuing studies in Russia, paralleled by increasing Russian enrolment in Chinese institutions.

In coming days, a joint cinematic production titled Red Silk will premiere – one of several such projects. This initiative stems directly from agreements reached during earlier discussions between President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, who mandated systematic cooperation in film production.

We have numerous interesting plans. Humanitarian affairs, concert programmes, cultural exchanges – all serve to enrich our ties and anchor them in the lived experiences of ordinary citizens. We can engage in extensive discussions about foreign policy cooperation, yet it stands as an almost exemplary model.

Question: Cooperation between Russia, and previously the USSR, with the Syrian Arab Republic has endured for over 80 years. What are the prospects for future relations between the Russian Federation and Syria following the recent telephone conversation between President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa?

Sergey Lavrov: The telephone conversation between President Vladimir Putin and head of the current administration in Damascus Ahmed al-Sharaa was preceded by a visit by an interdepartmental delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov.

This visit occurred several days prior to the telephone discussion. Its outcomes were highly positive. They were received by Mr Ahmed al-Sharaa with the participation of the Foreign Minister and several heads of other agencies. Publicly, the current Syrian leadership reaffirms the necessity to respect the historic, strategic nature of our relations. Presently, one of their central priorities is preventing the repetition of the Libyan scenario, where NATO aggression resulted in the loss of statehood, territorial fragmentation, and an enduring failure to restore national unity – now spanning 15 years.

Similar threats exist in Syria. Those now in power recognise this reality. Additional challenges include intra-factional struggles, notably within the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, which is not homogeneous and comprises divergent factions.

Further complications arise from the unlawful presence of the United States on Syrian territory and the policy pursued by the Biden administration to incentivise the creation of a Kurdish quasi-state entity. We resolutely advocate for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Further high-level engagements with Syrian counterparts are scheduled for the coming days and next week. We will provide updates in due course.

Question: The 3+3 Platform includes Russia, Türkiye, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which cooperate to ensure peace and stability in the South Caucasus. At our last meeting, you emphasised the high potential of this format. The ongoing changes in Georgia’s foreign policy course promoted by the current Georgian government, political parties such as Solidarity for Peace and the Communist Party of Georgia, give reason to hope that in the future, the country will fully contribute to the 3+3 format, which will improve its work. At the parliamentary level, we have good contacts with all of the participating states.

What would you say about an idea of creating a 3+3 inter-parliamentary commission as an additional mechanism of cooperation through parliamentary diplomacy?

Sergey Lavrov: I fully agree with you about of the prospects for the development of the 3+3 format.
The initiative was co-sponsored by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye and supported by President Putin. Since it was initiated in 2021, there have been three 3+3 meetings, including two at the ministerial level, the last one in October 2024 in Türkiye. We agreed from day one that that the format was going to include three plus three participating states. We understand Georgia’s doubts and the nuances of its approach, but a chair will always be saved for that country’s representative at our table.

We reaffirmed this intention at the most recent ministerial meeting in Türkiye. During the talks, we decided to reformat this consultative platform as a more structured organisation. We also asked our 3+3 colleagues to convey to the Georgian side our assurances that the door was open and the chair was still there.

We trust that the current authorities in Georgia will support the need to focus on national interests. There is no doubt that the 3+3 format works in the interests of all participants. I should note that the previous US administration was jealous of this initiative but never doubted it, trying to promote a 3+1 format instead of 3+3 (three parties from the South Caucasus plus some Biden’s people who would give them orders).

As for the parliamentary dimension, if you propose this initiative, we will support it at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It would be useful.

Question: In 2026, Russia and Tajikistan will need to extend the bilateral agreement recognising dual citizenship of the two countries. The purpose of that agreement was to bring Russians back to Russia; 300,000 to 400,000 Russians have returned, but 0.5 percent continue to live in Tajikistan. According to the agreement, the new Russian citizens are entitled to certain preferences relating to social security, education, and other areas, the same as Russians moving to Tajikistan – I just mentioned their numbers. However, the special military operation has brought into focus the clause on military service and mobilisation, which allows them to avoid military service in Russia. I do not think this is fair. What are the prospects for this agreement, and how relevant is its prolongation in the current conditions?

Sergey Lavrov: That agreement was signed as far back as 1996, when a brutal conflict ended in Tajikistan, and has played a role in providing a reliable framework for Russia’s alliance with Tajikistan.
As for the exemption from military service, as I understand it, it was included in the agreement on the basis of reciprocity. No matter how few Russian citizens reside in Tajikistan, they enjoy the same rights as Tajik citizens in the Russian Federation. I cannot express a clear stance on the issue. As of today, the agreement is in force; it is useful and equitable, and meets not only the interests of Tajik citizens working in Russia, but also the interests of Russians living in Tajikistan. We value every citizen.

Question: Let us move from West to East, or rather to the Far East. Regions and municipalities in the Far Eastern Federal District actively cooperate with their counterparts in Southeast Asia. The Foreign Ministry promptly deals with all issues (with the exception, perhaps, of certain financial issues), for which they are thankful to you. How do you assess development prospects in an entire range of areas, including inter-parliamentary and inter-party cooperation, in the context of the special military operation and the strategic cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation?

Sergey Lavrov: You began with Southeast Asia, whereas the DPRK is in Northeast Asia. But we hold dear the whole of Asia.

We have a ramified system of relations with the ASEAN countries. Each year, meetings take place at the level of foreign ministers, who participate in events that ASEAN holds with its partners at the level of foreign ministers, defence ministers, and the Regional Security Architecture Forum. But the ASEAN region does not cover the entire continent. For this reason, we do not see any prospects for pooling the efforts of the existing sub-regional organisations, including ASEAN.

The situation in Northeast Asia, on the Korean Peninsula, is no less important. This is just a stone’s throw from our border. Russia has a joint stretch of border with the DPRK. We are not indifferent to developments on the Korean Peninsula. We are in favour of removing all risks.

Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea signed the Agreement on Strategic Comprehensive Partnership during President Putin’s historic visit to that country in the summer of 2024.  If you read it attentively, you will see that, in effect, it covers all areas, such as the economy, the humanitarian sphere, education, culture, military and military-technical cooperation. It includes an important article that says that in the case of an attack on or aggression against one of the parties to this Agreement by third countries, the other party shall render all necessary assistance, something that implies the use of military methods. The Agreement reproduces word for word the Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the DPRK, signed ten years ago. While ratifying it, the State Duma noted that the clause on reciprocal military assistance conformed to the laws and constitutions of each state party to the Agreement.

Question: During the previous Government Hour, I asked about the possibility of establishing a BRICS Tourism organisation within the BRICS framework. Last year, as part of the BRICS chairmanship, events such as the Games of the Future and the World Festival of Youth were successfully held, with Intervision planned for next year. What are your thoughts on making these events annual? In that case, BRICS Tourism could serve as the primary body for coordinating and facilitating tourist flows for these events.

Currently, there is a steady demand for medical tourism among BRICS countries. Russian medical institutions are well-equipped to meet this demand in terms of both cost and quality. What are your thoughts on introducing a medical visa in Russia? This initiative could significantly boost the influx of foreign tourists, enhance Russia’s global image, and strengthen its competitiveness in medical tourism alongside established leaders like Israel, Germany, and South Korea.

Sergey Lavrov: Tourism as a new dimension of BRICS cooperation is something we fully support.
The more people-to-people exchanges we foster, the stronger our relationships become. You mentioned several cultural events that have drawn significant participation, extending far beyond BRICS nations. If our relevant institutions, particularly those focused on tourism development, can enhance the value of what our country already offers, it would make sense to formalise this area within the BRICS agenda.

The number of tourists from BRICS countries and beyond visiting Russia is steadily and rapidly increasing. It’s important to assess the specific role this entity would play. If it’s merely for documentation and promotion, travel agencies already fulfil that function. We need a clearer understanding of its purpose, but in principle, the idea sounds promising, and we would support it.
As for medical visas, we currently see no pressing need. Electronic visas, which are already available in a simplified format for citizens of BRICS and several other countries, facilitate travel effectively. However, I will ask my colleagues from the Consular Department to evaluate whether introducing a dedicated medical visa could provide any additional benefits.

Question: At the end of 2024 and the beginning of this year, the Islamic Republic of Iran completed the ratification process for the Agreement among the Governments of the Caspian littoral States on Trade and Economic Cooperation. How is the ratification of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea progressing in Iran? What are the prospects for its approval, and is a positive resolution foreseeable in the near future, particularly in light of the work carried out by high-level experts within the dedicated working group?

Sergey Lavrov: This is an important issue. The Convention addresses key security concerns in the Caspian Sea, emphasising the exclusive responsibility of the Caspian states for all activities in the region. It also prohibits the military presence of third countries in the Caspian Sea and its surrounding area.

Four out of the five Caspian states have already ratified the Convention, with Iran being the only exception. During the finalisation process, the division of the Caspian Sea, including territorial waters and adjacent zones, was discussed. While the Convention outlines the general principles of this division, the specifics are complex, as they depend on the unique shape of each country’s coastline. In Iran’s case, a purely equal division would result in a disadvantage for them.

The Iranian side is currently working on ratifying the Convention and addressing the issue of defining
direct baselines, which determine the national zone parameters for each state.

Several solutions have been proposed at the expert level, and our Iranian colleagues are considering them. I will be meeting with Iranian representatives soon, and these issues are consistently raised in our discussions. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his interactions with the late President Ebrahim Raisi, put forward proposals aimed at facilitating a mutually acceptable agreement.

 Additionally, in 2023, the Russian Interdepartmental Commission on Caspian Cooperation was established under my chairmanship. During its meetings, we continue to develop initiatives to support our Iranian friends in completing the ratification process.

South Africa
Source: www.iol.co.za

Digital Sovereignty: How BRICS Can Reshape Global Tech PowerIn the digital age, data is the new oil and just like colonial powers had once extracted raw materials from the Global South with the intention to boost their industrial revolutions, tech giants in the West now harvest vast amounts of data from the developing countries in order to drive their Artificial Intelligence (AI), digital economies and machine learning.

Understanding Data Colonialism

Data colonialism is the unregulated extraction, commodification and monopolisation of data from developing countries by multinational corporations that are primarily based in the West. Companies like Meta, Google, Microsoft, Amazon and Apple dominate digital infrastructures across the globe, offering low-cost or free services in exchange for vast amounts of governmental, personal and commercial data. In countries across Latin America, Africa and South Asia, these tech conglomerates use their technological and financial dominance to enforce unequal digital dependencies. For example:

• The dominance of Google in cloud and search services means that millions of government institutions and businesses across the Global South store highly sensitive data on Western-owned servers, often located outside of their jurisdictions.
• Meta controlling social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram has led to content moderation policies that disproportionately have serious impacts on non-Western voices, while simultaneously profiting from local user-generated content.
• Amazon Web Services (AWS) hosts an immense amount of cloud storage and creates a scenario where governments and local startups in BRICS nations have to rely on foreign digital infrastructure.
• AI models and fintech systems rely on data from Global South users, yet these countries see little economic benefit from its monetisation.

The BRICS bloc response: Strengthening Digital Sovereignty

In order to counter data colonialism, BRICS countries have to prioritise strategies and policies that assert digital sovereignty while facilitating indigenous technological growth. There are several approaches in which this could be achieved:

1. Developing Independent Digital Infrastructures

BRICS countries have to reduce their reliance on foreign-owned digital infrastructure by investing in independent internet government structures, sovereign cloud services and indigenous AI development. Rostelecom in Russia, Alibaba Cloud in China and the National Data Centre of India serve as promising models. Brazil and South Africa could also follow suit by enhancing domestic cloud services to store and protect data that is locally generated.

2. Enforcing Data Localisation Trends

Data localisation laws state that data that is generated within a country should be stored and processed within its borders, helping to reduce vulnerabilities to foreign surveillance and exploitation. The General Data Protection Law (LGPD) of Brazil and the Personal Data Protection Bill exemplify attempts that are aimed at regulating cross-border data flows while ensuring that foreign tech companies comply with local legal frameworks.

3. Expanding the BRICS Digital Cooperation

The BRICS bloc could strengthen their existing collaborations using institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) or the BRICS Institute of Future Networks to fund joint technology projects, digital capacity-building and cybersecurity frameworks. A BRICS-led alternative to SWIFT and the development of cross-border digital payment solutions, such as BRICS Pay and Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), could challenge Western fintech dominance and enhance financial sovereignty within the bloc.

4. Encouraging Open-Source Indigenous Innovation

Reliance on Western proprietary software limits technological autonomy. By encouraging software development and investing in open-source alternatives, BRICS countries can foster a very self-sufficient ecosystem. India’s goals for indigenous operating systems, the advocacy of Brazil for free software in government institutions, and Russia’s pivot towards more open-source platforms highlight viable pathways for the reduction of the reliance on Western-controlled technology. 

5. Establishing Fair Digital Trade and Regulating Bug Tech

BRICS countries have to unite in the advocacy for global digital trade regulations that ensure fair access to technology markets while also curbing monopolistic practices by Western firms. This includes:

• Mandating transparency in AI algorithms, this will prevent the biases that disproportionately affect the Global South.
• Imposing digital taxes on foreign tech companies that are profiting from local markets without reinvesting in those economies.
• Demanding revenue-sharing models that are equitable where the Global South data contributors receive compensation for their machine learning advancements and their role in AI.

While the BRICS nations share a strong vision of unity and collaboration, their diverse political structures, regulatory frameworks, and economic priorities have created unique challenges in aligning digital initiatives. These differences however, also present an opportunity for learning and innovation as they work toward greater policy coordination. Additionally, as cyber threats evolve, BRICS countries are increasingly focused on strengthening their cybersecurity infrastructure to safeguard their digital ecosystems and reduce vulnerabilities. Although many still rely on Western-developed cloud services, software, and telecommunications infrastructure, this reliance highlights the potential for BRICS to invest in homegrown technologies and partnerships, fostering a path toward greater technical sovereignty and resilience.

Conclusion: The Future of the Global South’s Digital Autonomy

The Global South's technology destiny will be determined by the conflict between digital sovereignty and data colonialism. The BRICS countries run the risk of continuing to serve only as data providers for a system dominated by multinational businesses. In order to overcome this, BRICS needs to make investments in digital skills and research to support domestic technology innovation. While expanding digital trade cooperation might increase collective power in international markets, strengthening cybersecurity frameworks is crucial for protecting data. But data localisation regulations by themselves are insufficient. A complete approach that strikes a balance between innovation, international collaboration, and regulation is necessary to achieve actual sovereignty. By acting swiftly now, BRICS can guide the Global South toward a more just digital economy, utilising its data for sustainable growth and internal empowerment rather than for external exploitation.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Policy Brief # 56 / 2024

Climate change is identified in Russia’s Climate Doctrine as “one of the most serious challenges of the 21st century,” a statement that is hard to disagree with. Scientists around the world have agreed that anthropogenic factors play a key role in this process through greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. According to the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), by 2020, the increase in global average temperature compared to the pre-industrial era (1850-1900) reached 1.1 degrees Celsius. However, climate change mitigation measures currently pledged by nations are insufficient to maintain the rise in the global temperature within the limits set by the 2015 Paris Agreement.

BRICS countries play a crucial role in global climate policy. Even before its expansion, the association accounted for just under half of global carbon dioxide emissions (~47%). With the addition of Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Ethiopia in 2024, this figure exceeded 50% (51.76%). As BRICS now represents more than 45%6 of the world’s population and its combined GDP makes up over a quarter of the global total (~27%), it becomes clear that the success of the global fight against climate change largely depends on this set of countries, as the mitigation problem cannot be solved without decarbonizing BRICS economies.

While the five new BRICS members have very different approaches to climate policy, global climate change poses substantial economic, political and social challenges both for them and for other countries worldwide. Four of the new members are classified as developing countries (with Ethiopia being the only least developed country), and three of them have economies dependent on fossil fuels. At the same time, all five are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts: in the climate vulnerability ranking, the new countries fall into risk zones ranging from medium to very high. These circumstances make climate policy particularly relevant for all of them, both in terms of climate change mitigation and economic decarbonization (especially for the Gulf oil-producing countries) and adaptation.

Therefore, BRICS expansion opens new opportunities in climate change action for the entire association. This policy brief will examine the climate policies of new BRICS members and explore opportunities for expanding their climate cooperation with Russia and as part of broader BRICS initiatives.