Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Even in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. diplomatic influence is decidedly on the wane, notes ‘The National Interest’.
A picture is worth a thousand words. The recent photo of world leaders assembled at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru, reflected the ascendance of the Chinese leadership on the global stage. China’s Chairman Xi Jinping was strategically placed at the center of the action on the front row, while the president of the United States of America was consigned to the rear corner of the photo line-up. The photo was adroitly staged to promote the idea that China is ascending — and the United States is declining.

This should come as no surprise for those familiar with South America. China has become that continent’s largest trading partner. It is also the region’s biggest lender. This is a far cry from the twentieth century when the United States was dominant and Beijing barely registered. In 2000, China accounted for less than 2 percent of all Latin American exports. Since then and over the next twenty years, China’s trade with Latin America has grown twenty-six-fold.

While Washington expresses concern over the military implications of China’s $1.3 billion financing and construction of a major port facility in Chancay, Peru, Beijing’s angle of attack for influence in South America and beyond remains more economic. General Laura Richardson, the outgoing U.S. combatant commander for SOUTHCOM, has aptly warned that to compete effectively with China, Washington must concentrate more on developing nonmilitary policies that will help create commercially attractive alternatives to what Beijing offers.

Professor James Holmes of the Naval War College has reminded us that the “humble merchantman is just as important a part of Chinese sea power as a ship of war — arguably more.” The U.S. military, even its robust State Department-like regional combatant commands, cannot fix this soft power problem with military tools. China is gaining power around the world by using commercial clout, and not so much the PLA except along its immediate borders. Across Africa and Asia, as well as South America, China has become the central trading partner.

Meanwhile, U.S. influence appears to be on the wane, a power shift reality exemplified by the organization of BRICS. BRICS was initially founded by India, Brazil, China, and Russia in 2006. It has since added five more countries: first South Africa, then Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and the UAE, becoming BRICS+. Almost half the world’s population comprises the membership, accounting for about 28 percent of the global economy and 44 percent of its oil supply. Another thirty countries have expressed interest in joining (such as Saudi Arabia), and thirteen have become associated with BRICS as “partners,” including notably Turkey, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Nigeria, and others.

The influence of BRICS has already worked its way into the diplomatic national security sphere. The RIO G20 Summit, composed of the world’s twenty largest economies, went even less well for the United States than the Lima economic cooperation confab. The G20, hosted by Brazil’s President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, took rocky turns for Western participants, particularly when it came time to draft the final summit communique. Brazil’s President took good care of his fellow BRICS members, Russia, China, and Iran, by successfully watering down tougher, pro-Western language on the Ukraine and Middle East wars.

The show was certainly not run by Washington and its European allies, underscoring major shifts underway in the global balance of power. India’s leader, Narendra Modi, and China’s Chairman Xi were seen comfortably interacting on the sidelines, continuing to boost ties just a month after the two countries appear to have worked out a resolution of their long-standing Himalayan border disputes. Once again, just like in Lima, America’s president was “out of the picture” when President Biden missed the official summit photograph taken on the first day, awkwardly requiring a redo later in the conference.

As a new administration takes office, rising sentiments of protectionism and “reshoring” will collide with a growing coalition of countries that have powerful and growing economies of their own. The way forward for the United States in this new world may well end up testing American power as much or more in the economic sphere than it already has in the military.

UAE
Source: dawnmena.org

At the start of 2024, the multilateral BRICS consortium of five emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—underwent its first expansion in 13 years, admitting Ethiopia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Iran to its ranks. But Saudi Arabia, arguably the most sought-after and high-profile invitee, stopped short of joining the bloc as a full-fledged member. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman skipped the annual BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan in October, it fueled speculation about whether Saudi Arabia could potentially refuse its invitation and content itself with observer or partner status instead. The Saudis have expressed interest in joining the BRICS for several years, starting with statements from the crown prince in 2022, but have also kept their intentions ambiguous.

As far as President Vladimir Putin is concerned, roping the Saudis into the BRICS is a sure-fire means of turbocharging the "multipolar world order" he has championed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If Saudi Arabia formally joined the BRICS, the bloc would account for the lion's share of global crude oil exports, which could potentially move the kingdom closer to making oil contracts in non-dollar currencies and render BRICS+ all the more attractive to the wider Arab and Islamic world. By holding the annual BRICS summit in the Muslim-majority republic of Tatarstan, Russia was aiming to showcase the country's multi-confessional makeup to delegates from the Middle East and North Africa.

For years now, Putin has gone out of way to win over the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and by extension Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. State-led initiatives include piloting Shariah-compliant banking in certain parts of Russia, agreeing to de-list the Taliban as a terrorist group, and criminalizing the desecration of Qurans. But Russia's outreach may have come up short, which may help explain why Saudi Arabia is second-guessing a geostrategic alignment with Moscow—and by extension, ever joining the BRICS at all.

Saudi Arabia is second-guessing a geostrategic alignment with Russia—and by extension, ever joining the BRICS at all.
- Saahil Menon

There are other factors at play, as the kingdom looks to hedge its bets ahead of Donald Trump's return to the White House. A key but overlooked factor is the brewing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is no secret that MBS's grandiose Vision 2030 agenda, to transition the Saudi economy away from oil, entails supplanting the UAE, and especially Dubai, as the Arabian Peninsula's commercial and entertainment hub. It is just one point of friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as MBS consolidates ever-more power in Saudi Arabia and openly competes with the UAE for geopolitical and economic influence in the Middle East.

Especially when it comes to normalization with Israel, MBS may have played his cards more wisely than his mentor-turned-rival, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the president of the UAE. Abu Dhabi has found itself in a Catch-22 since Hamas's attack into Israel on October 7, 2023 and Israel's punishing war in Gaza in response. The UAE has not taken a critical line against Israel, let alone threatened to walk away from the Abraham Accords, which would cause the Emirati leadership to lose face domestically and ruffle feathers in Washington.

The Abraham Accords were supposed to give the UAE some influence over Israeli policy in Palestine—delaying West Bank annexation, first and foremost—but the UAE has not used any of its diplomatic leverage to signal its discontent with the war in Gaza or pressure Israel into adopting a cease-fire. But maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel under the mantra of peace risks pitting pro-Palestinian popular sentiment across the region against the Emirati government. As the International Crisis Group reported earlier this year, "Emirati elites portray the Abraham Accords as a step toward a more harmonious Middle East, with the UAE at its heart"—a message that is increasingly out of step with the brutal realities in Gaza.

Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has driven a much harder bargain when it comes to formally recognizing Israel and is now holding out for NATO-like security guarantees from the U.S. as a pre-condition for normalization with Israel. Riyadh's insistence on a two-state solution, with an independent Palestinian state and East Jerusalem as its capital, looks more like a rhetorical ruse to buy time and extract maximalist concessions from Washington. The Saudis have been running out the clock on Biden's lame-duck presidency and were openly gunning for a Trump victory over Kamala Harris. With Trump's win, they could end up distancing themselves even further from the BRICS—for the right price, which Trump is likely to pay given his transactional approach and personal business ties to the Saudis.

A second Trump presidency, on top of the already bipartisan support for the kingdom in Washington, offers Saudi Arabia far more than the BRICS ever could.

- Saahil Menon

From the standpoint of a thin-skinned MBS, gravitating toward like-minded authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China that avoid passing judgment on or meddling in the internal affairs of other nations was his best bet to spite Joe Biden for labeling him a "pariah." That said, the crown prince knows full well how much the kingdom benefits from close U.S. ties—and American military protection—and how limited his room for maneuver actually is, despite all the talk of a more multipolar region and world. Aiding and abetting the "de-dollarization" agenda being pursued by Russia and the expanded BRICS could prove politically calamitous for the Al Saud family dictatorship, whose self-preservation still hinges on toeing the line with Washington.

At the same time, there is no real value proposition that a country like Saudi Arabia derives from being part of the BRICS. Entering the bloc will have little, if any, bearing on Saudi relationships with existing members—many of whom the kingdom already boasts outsized leverage over. Egypt, for instance, relies heavily on Saudi largesse to keep its failing economy afloat, and in 2022 ceded the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to the House of Saud as a token of gratitude. There is also the sizeable diaspora of Egyptian expatriates in Riyadh and Jeddah who could be deported on a whim in the event of a diplomatic fallout.

In a similar vein, guest workers from remittance-dependent India and Ethiopia make up much of the migrant labor force across the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. If anything, the number of Indian and Ethiopian migrant laborers in Saudi Arabia will only grow further given the pace and scale of MBS's outsized infrastructure projects, despite terrible working conditions. One could argue that India's ambivalent stance on the Gaza conflict, after initially pledging its full-throated support for Israel, is attributable to the pressure its ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is under from Gulf monarchies to demonstrate some degree of solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

Ultimately for Saudi Arabia, sanitizing its tarnished image and bolstering non-oil revenue take precedence over lofty anti-imperialist posturing synonymous with the BRICS and especially with Putin's Russia. As such, the Saudis can ill-afford to turn their backs on or fall out of favor with the U.S., which has long provided cover for their abysmal human rights record. A second Trump presidency, on top of the already bipartisan support for the kingdom in Washington, offers Saudi Arabia far more than the BRICS ever could.

Turkey
Source: www.aa.com.tr

China said on Tuesday that the BRICS is an important platform for emerging markets and developing countries to cooperate rather than targeting third countries, according to state-run media.

During a regular press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian responded to US President-elect Donald Trump's threat to impose a 100% tariff on BRICS nations in the event of dollar replacement, saying the group aims for mutual development and prosperity.

"BRICS, as an important platform for emerging markets and developing countries to cooperate, advocates openness and inclusiveness, win-win cooperation, non-confrontation and not targeting any third party," state-run Global Times quoted Lin as saying.

"China is willing to work with BRICS partners to deepen pragmatic cooperation in various industries and make more contributions for sustained global economic growth," she said.

On Saturday, Trump warned that he would impose a 100% tariff on any BRICS country that attempts to move from the US dollar in international trade.

He was referring to the economic alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – now expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Meanwhile, Beijing has announced that it will strengthen export controls on dual-use items to the US under the Export Control Law and related regulations.

"These measures aim to protect national security, safeguard national interests, and fulfill non-proliferation obligations," said the Commerce Ministry.

Exports of dual-use items to or for military use in the US are prohibited under the most recent legislation.

Exports of dual-use items containing gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the US will generally be prohibited.

The latest Chinese move came after the Biden administration announced on Monday that Washington had imposed new export controls on China, limiting the sale of cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing equipment and high-bandwidth computer memory to the communist country, according to Voice of America.

On Monday, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Beijing protested to Washington on the latest chip curbs.

"The move has seriously damaged the international trade order and disrupted supply chain stabilization," Lin said, urging the US to abide by the laws of the market economy and the principles of fair competition.

*Writing by Islamuddin Sajid

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

While addressing a question regarding the US president-elect's threat on Sunday to impose a 100 percent tariff on BRICS countries if they don't give up their plan to create a currency that could replace the US dollar, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, responded diplomatically concerning BRICS' principles and China's stance.

He pointed out that as an important platform for cooperation between emerging markets and developing countries, the BRICS countries advocate openness, inclusiveness, win-win cooperation and not to engage in camp confrontation or target third parties in order to achieve common development and universal prosperity.

China is willing to continue to work with BRICS partners to deepen practical cooperation in various fields and make more contributions to the sustained and stable growth of the world economy, Lin added.

Despite so, reading between the lines, the readers would not have mistaken Beijing's view on the incoming US president's intimidation that emerging market economies deserve more rights in deciding for themselves in international financial affairs corresponding to their increasingly important roles in the world economy.

Also, Beijing tries to dispel Washington's concern that the US is targeted by BRICS countries by stressing that BRICS cooperation are open and inclusive and does not target any third party, reminding the US side that it will also benefit from a common development and universal prosperity the BRICS countries are working for.

Not to mention the fact, which Lin also highlighted, that the emerging market economies can greatly boost a sustainable recovery of the world economy, which will also serve the US' interest as the US economy is dragged by the lackluster world economic situation.

That being said, the US has no reason to shoot its own feet by waving the tariff bat just to protect its exclusive dollar interest, which, if imposed, will likely backfire against the US itself as it will be the US enterprises and consumers that will bear the cost of the tariffs at last.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Just over a month after Nigeria was officially added to the BRICS bloc as a partner state alongside the 12 other countries during the annual BRICS Summit held in Russia in October, the West African country is now seeking South Africa's endorsement to attain full membership in BRICS and the BRICS New Development Bank.

Speaking during the ministerial session of the 11th Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission held in South Africa on Monday Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Nigeria's minister of state for foreign affairs said that the request be contained in the draft communique of the Bi-National Commission, that will be presented to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Nigerian President Bola Tinubu for their approval, according to Nigerian newspaper The Punch.
While also seeking South Africa's backing to join the Group of 20, Odumegwu-Ojukwu expressed Nigeria's commitment to playing a significant role in fostering regional peace as she encouraged South Africa to help accelerate the Sudanese peace process.

"We are strongly committed to seeking a resolution of the crisis in Sudan and in this guise, we seek South Africa's support to further accelerate the peace process and to ensure that within our region, conflicts are de-escalated. We can hope that with peace, greater progress and development can be achieved across all spheres," Odumegwu-Ojukwu said.

While responding to Nigeria's request Roland Lamola, South Africa's minister of international relations and cooperation promised to amplify Nigeria's wishes and underscored the mutual resolve to deepen dynamic and vibrant bilateral relations. On Sunday, South Africa formally took the leadership of the G20, a central forum for the world's major economies.

USA
Source: www.cbsnews.com

President-elect Donald Trump on Nov. 30 threatened to slap a 100% tariff on a group of nine nations — the so-called BRICS — if they try to replace the U.S. dollar with another currency.

The BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Trump said he'll enact the tariffs if the countries either move to create a new rival currency to the dollar or back an alternative currency to replace the greenback as the world's reserve medium of exchange.

"We require a commitment from these Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace the mighty U.S. Dollar or, they will face 100% Tariffs, and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful U.S. Economy," Trump said on Truth Social.

Trump's move comes after he recently threatened to impose 25% tariffs on all products from Canada and Mexico entering the U.S., along with an additional 10% tax on goods from China, in what he says would force the countries to do more to halt the flow of unauthorized migrants and illicit drugs into the U.S.

Why do BRICS countries want an alternative currency?

The BRICS — named after the original five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) — was formed in 2009 to advance the interests of emerging economies and to make them less dependent on the U.S. dollar, which is by far the most commonly used currency in global commerce.

The primacy of the dollar in international trade gives the U.S. a number of advantages, including lower borrowing costs for the federal government and enormous geopolitical influence around the world.

In October, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a new international payments system at a BRICS summit, saying "the dollar is being used as a weapon," the Associated Press reported. In 2023, meanwhile, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed creating a new, common currency in South America to reduce its reliance on the dollar in international trade.

Would a BRICS currency threaten the dollar?

Creating a competing new currency would be difficult given how widely used the dollar is to conduct business around the world. Despite the existence of the euro and growing importance of China's renminbi, the dollar remains the world's main reserve currency, representing roughly 58% of the world's foreign exchange reserves, according to the IMF. Also, critical commodities like oil and gold are still mostly bought and sold using dollars.

"Economically, it's not a major issue because the idea of the BRICS countries being able to put together an alternative as a reserve currency for the U.S. dollar is not plausible in the short or intermediate term," said Mark Weinstock, a global trade expert and professor of economics at Pace University.

In other words, BRICS nations would struggle to create a viable currency given the relative strength and stability of the U.S. economy and the faith that global investors and trading partners have in U.S. government debt. And while the group's members have some interests in common, unifying behind a single currency would be politically fraught and technically complex.

"Fundamentally, if you are going to create your own form of money, that desirability is commensurate with the economic strength and integrity of the issuer. BRICS countries don't have the type of institutions that inspire global confidence to convince people that it is a satisfactory alternative to the dollar," Weinstock said.

Some BRICS members are already downplaying the push to get a new currency off the ground. After Trump's tariff threat last weekend, South Africa's government on Monday issued a statement on social media saying there are no plans to create a BRICS currency.

"Recent misreporting has led to the incorrect narrative that BRICS is planning to create a new currency," South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation said. "This is not the case. The discussions within BRICS focus on trading among member countries using their own national currencies."

What would stiff tariffs on BRICS goods mean for U.S. consumers?

While economists largely agree that a 100% tariff on goods imported to the U.S. from BRICS nations is a long shot, if it came to pass the move would not benefit U.S. consumers, they say. Such levies would drive up the cost of goods from BRICS member nations, potentially fueling inflation and leading to higher prices for consumers.

"Like any tariffs, this would mean higher prices for consumers," Weinstock said. "That's always the impact of the tariff."

Among the leading products the U.S. gets from BRICS countries are coffee from Brazil, electronics and clothes from China, and minerals from South Africa, according to trade data.

Why are some economists criticizing Trump for threatening the BRICS?

Some experts criticized Trump's threat to punish the BRICS, saying it makes the U.S. look weak.
"It isn't a good look, as it indirectly elevates the stature of a non-threat and suggests a lack of confidence in the dollar," Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former Treasury Department economist, wrote on X.

Trump's threat could actually accelerate a move away from the dollar by other countries, according to Setser, who said that an effort to effectively coerce countries to use the dollar "is actually a long-run threat to the dollar's global role."

"It makes the use of the dollar appear to be a favor to the U.S.," he added.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The BRICS Summit held in Kazan from October 22–24, 2024, brought attention to several defining factors regarding Latin American countries that will be important for the continent’s political and economic development in the near term. With the admission of two countries from this region as associate members of the bloc, the Latin American presence in the pool of developing countries seeking to increase their weight in shaping the new world order is set to grow. Bolivia and Cuba joined BRICS as partners along with 11 other countries: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Together with the core BRICS countries and the new members who joined a year earlier, this means a fundamentally new format of international interaction, where the diversity of participants creates a platform for polyphonic dialogue. While their overarching interests align, each country has its own priorities and expectations from BRICS membership.

Bolivia’s interests

The Plurinational State of Bolivia is developing a left-leaning economic model that prioritizes the social redistribution of state revenues, mainly generated from the exploitation of the nation’s natural resources. Bolivia is rich in hydrocarbons, primarily natural gas, and holds the world’s largest lithium deposits, estimated at over 21 million tonnes. While the export of Bolivian hydrocarbons (mainly to neighboring Brazil and Argentina) remains a traditional revenue stream, the lithium industry is a relatively recent addition to the country’s foreign economic priorities. Lithium nationalization in 2008 gave a start to the development of Bolivia’s deposits, but for several reasons—which include difficulties in attracting investment, a lack of technological infrastructure, opposition from indigenous communities and local environmental organizations—full-scale exploitation of deposits has never been launched, aside from a few pilot projects. It was only in 2021 that two Chinese companies and Russia’s Uranium One Group, part of the management circuit of Rosatom state corporation, won the development tender.

By joining BRICS as a partner, La Paz aims to cement its position as a supplier of raw lithium to the global market. Given the vast scale of its national reserves, the Bolivian government is keen to expand its pool of international investors. In turn, La Paz is ready to offer its partners cooperation in other areas, such as energy resources and food production. BRICS countries already dominate Bolivia’s foreign economic relations, led by Brazil ($3.5 billion), China ($3.5 billion) and India (around $2 billion), which is a major importer of Bolivian gold. Beyond trade, China is also an active investor in Bolivian infrastructure and technology projects.

Cooperation with Russia is growing more important for Bolivia. The lithium agreement is part of a broader strategy between the two governments to encourage investment in key sectors. On the sidelines of the Kazan Summit, Presidents Luis Alberto Arce and Vladimir Putin held a bilateral meeting to discuss joint nuclear technologies (Bolivia has opened a unique high-altitude El Alto Nuclear Research and Technology Center (CNRT), designed for peaceful nuclear applications and built by Russian experts), cooperation in education, lithium contracts and other issues that bring the interests of the two nations closer together. La Paz and Moscow also share a vision for building a global world order and advocate a multipolar world.

At the same time, the complex political situation in Bolivia and the conditions in which the country may find itself by the 2025 general elections cannot be ignored. The dispute over the presidential candidacy threatens to undo the political project that has been unfolding in the country since 2006. Social divisions and an economic crisis are fueling deep uncertainty and pessimism in Bolivian society about the country’s development outlook. BRICS could be a new opportunity for economic breakthroughs if the current course is maintained after the elections. However, if opposition forces come to power, Bolivia may well follow the path of Argentina, which abandoned plans to join the bloc after a change of government.

Cuba’s expectations

For Cuba, international support from BRICS countries means a chance to overcome its long-standing and multifaceted crisis, which the island cannot tackle on its own. Havana views its primary objectives as countering US unilateral restrictive measures and seeking alternative sources of financing. While Cuba maintains trade relations with all BRICS nations, their share in the total trade turnover is modest. China is the top trading partner among BRICS members, accounting for about 13% of Cuba’s foreign trade. Trade between the two nations saw its biggest growth between 2005 and 2015, but in recent years there has been a decline in Cuban–Chinese interaction. Although Cuba joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, meaningful results have yet to materialize. Latin American countries account for one-third of Cuban foreign trade, with Brazil’s share at just 3.2%. The expansion of trade and economic relations with Russia has pushed its share in Cuba’s trade to 7%. Strengthening foreign economic relations is, therefore, a top priority for Cuba.

Meanwhile, the main obstacle to this goal is the economic embargo imposed by the United States, with Cuba consistently calling on the international community to demand its lifting. Although bilateral relations thawed during the administration of Barack Obama, and both sides attempted to find common ground on some fundamental issues, neither is ready to abandon its stance. Nor does Havana’s rapprochement with BRICS signal a complete departure from attempts to engage with Washington constructively. The US will still be in the focus for Cuba. However, given the new balance in the White House following recent elections, it will not be easy for Havana to maintain the status quo and prevent the hegemon from increasing its pressure.

Contradictions between Venezuela and Brazil

One country that shares Cuba’s aspirations is Venezuela, which faces severe Western sanctions and a serious economic crisis. Caracas primarily counts on the assistance of Russia and China, but Venezuela’s relations with other members of the bloc are much more complex. For instance, this is true for Venezuela’s ties with India, which revolve around India’s demand for oil from this Bolivarian country. Due to US sanctions, India stopped oil imports from Caracas in 2019 but is ready to resume cooperation after the restrictions are eased. That said, New Delhi does not provide any political support to the Venezuelan government, and the prospects for broadening ties in other areas are slim.
Brazil’s veto on Venezuela’s inclusion in the group of BRICS partners has exposed deep divisions within the region and intensified the rift within Latin America’s left-wing political landscape. The fact that it was the position of Brazil, the region’s only representative in BRICS, that became an obstacle for Venezuela, sparked the most backlash and bitter antagonism from Caracas. For Nicolas Maduro and his team, potential BRICS membership appears to be an important foreign policy objective. With close ties to Russia and good relations with some Asian and African nations, Venezuela seemed well-positioned for admission. In addition, the country has robust relations with several BRICS members, including Iran and China. In 2023, Caracas signed an all-weather strategic partnership agreement with Beijing (China has similar agreements only with Russia, Belarus and Pakistan). Until recently, there had been no overt opposition to Venezuela’s membership in the group.

Meanwhile, Venezuela and Brazil have experienced diplomatic ruptures in the recent past. In 2019, relations were severed after then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recognized opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s interim president. Diplomatic ties were only restored in 2023 when Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva returned to power in Brazil. However, relations between the two nations soured again after the presidential elections in the Bolivarian country in July 2024, when Maduro was declared the winner. The results remain unrecognized by several countries, including Brazil, which has officially called for the release of electoral records and withheld recognition of the current Venezuelan government. This rift has exacerbated the row over Brazil’s veto, leading Maduro to recall his ambassador for consultations and make harsh remarks against Brazil. Compounding matters, Brazil is set to chair BRICS in 2025, which makes it unlikely for Venezuela to join the bloc before it mends ties with Brasilia. Given Brazil’s consistency and firmness in pursuing its foreign policy, the matter may have to be put on ice indefinitely.

Brazil’s aspirations

As of now, Brazil remains the only Latin American country represented in BRICS as a full member. It plays one of the main roles in promoting the agenda of the Global South on the global stage. Central to this effort is Lula da Silva, who, during his two previous presidential terms (2003–2006, 2007–2011), pursued an active policy of strengthening ties with developing nations in Asia and Africa. His commitment to multilateralism in foreign policy reflects the national tradition of positioning the country as a regional power with global ambitions.

The rotation of the BRICS presidency, coupled with the extension of Dilma Rousseff’s tenure as head of the New Development Bank, is likely to favor Brazil’s ability to expand its role in the group and the world. In a challenging domestic political climate, where the government faces strong opposition from a large part of society, success in the international arena will be crucial for Lula da Silva. While the South American giant is now struggling to consolidate Latin American neighbors around it and drive regional integration, current Brazilian diplomacy has focused its efforts on global initiatives.
International engagement is part of Brazilian national identity. Its historical tradition of assuming the role of a regional leader in multilateral forums and accumulated experience that Brasilia leverages as a diplomatic asset enable it to act in the international arena from a position far surpassing that of a developing nation burdened by major internal socio-economic problems and lacking the military capabilities of the great powers. Brazil’s vision of a world based on international rules, where every nation has a say, is what it seeks to promote in the global context, harnessing the potential of BRICS.

External factors

Other Latin American nations have also signaled their willingness to join the bloc. These include Honduras, Nicaragua (which submitted applications ahead of the Kazan Summit in 2024) and Colombia, highlighting broad interest and intention to deepen cooperation within the Global South paradigm. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that Argentina’s accession to BRICS, which was denounced by President Javier Milei, may remain on the agenda and be postponed for a while. Since Argentina has already been invited and its political landscape is fluid, the prospect of joining the bloc could become a reality for this country if BRICS-aligned forces regain power in Buenos Aires.
Finally, an important factor in expanding the participation of Latin American countries in BRICS will be US policy toward the region under Donald Trump. While his cabinet has not yet been approved and no clear directions have been outlined, various speculations heighten uncertainty and heat up expectations of different forces but fail to provide an objective picture. However, it is clear that Latin American countries once again find themselves in a position where they must react to the steps taken by the northern hegemon. The efforts to establish an independent course, made over the past decades by various governments in the region—mostly left-leaning—have not yet yielded the desired results and have not become a tangible reality. Therefore, their foreign policy, including in other areas, will depend to a certain extent on the Washington factor. In this sense, BRICS, not only for the newly joined Cuba and Bolivia, could become a platform to help Latin American countries reduce their dependence on the US and build alternative routes for their foreign economic and foreign policy activities.

Amid the global uncertainty that plagues today’s world, Latin American countries are looking for appropriate mechanisms to advance and strengthen their positions. Key among them are coalition-based forms of international cooperation, such as those offered by BRICS, a partnership that promises mutual benefits.

Nigeria
Source: afripoli.org

This article is part of the BRICS thought leadership series, published by APRI in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg. It explores key themes from the 16th BRICS Summit and the group's broader initiatives. The series is edited by Ada Mare, Bhaso Ndzendze, Serwah Prempeh.

Introduction: The growing demand for BRICS membership

Amid escalating tensions in the Middle East and Ukraine, shifts in the global economic order, and debates about the future of international institutions, BRICS has drawn increased global attention as a significant player in global governance. In August 2023, during South Africa's presidency, 40 countries expressed interest in joining BRICS, and 23 submitted formal applications. Continuing this trend, the 2024 BRICS Kazan summit marked a pivotal moment, bringing together heads of state from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with leaders from newly added countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates – as part of one institution. Even before fully acclimating these new members, BRICS saw 34 more countries express interest in joining. However, at the summit, only 13 countries were invited under a new partner category, leaving some aspirants disappointed.

Demand for BRICS is at an all-time high, symbolising broader realignments in international relations. Yet the key question remains: What is attracting countries to BRICS, and can the group sustain its appeal?

The politics behind the expanding membership of informal groups, particularly BRICS, remain underexplored. BRICS lacks the ‘compliance pull’ of formal organisations like the WTO, which incentivise participation through legal obligations and penalties for non-compliance. Instead, states are pursuing multi-alignment by joining informal groups to boost their strategic autonomy and reduce dependence on any single power. Other explanations for BRICS' appeal emphasise rising powers seeking status in an exclusive club with strong economic credentials and close ties to China and other markets. Traditional Western notions of soft power – focused on cultural influence, political ideals and diplomatic strategies – have limited relevance to BRICS, which operates through a form of multilateral, so-called compound soft power and by pooling decision-making.

These explanations alone do not account for BRICS’ ability to act as ‘a magnet’ attracting countries worldwide or the surge in demand for membership. Understanding BRICS’ appeal is crucial, as the group’s enlargement has significant implications for global governance. BRICS members are positioning themselves as key players in shaping new