Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Even in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. diplomatic influence is decidedly on the wane, notes ‘The National Interest’.
A picture is worth a thousand words. The recent photo of world leaders assembled at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru, reflected the ascendance of the Chinese leadership on the global stage. China’s Chairman Xi Jinping was strategically placed at the center of the action on the front row, while the president of the United States of America was consigned to the rear corner of the photo line-up. The photo was adroitly staged to promote the idea that China is ascending — and the United States is declining.

This should come as no surprise for those familiar with South America. China has become that continent’s largest trading partner. It is also the region’s biggest lender. This is a far cry from the twentieth century when the United States was dominant and Beijing barely registered. In 2000, China accounted for less than 2 percent of all Latin American exports. Since then and over the next twenty years, China’s trade with Latin America has grown twenty-six-fold.

While Washington expresses concern over the military implications of China’s $1.3 billion financing and construction of a major port facility in Chancay, Peru, Beijing’s angle of attack for influence in South America and beyond remains more economic. General Laura Richardson, the outgoing U.S. combatant commander for SOUTHCOM, has aptly warned that to compete effectively with China, Washington must concentrate more on developing nonmilitary policies that will help create commercially attractive alternatives to what Beijing offers.

Professor James Holmes of the Naval War College has reminded us that the “humble merchantman is just as important a part of Chinese sea power as a ship of war — arguably more.” The U.S. military, even its robust State Department-like regional combatant commands, cannot fix this soft power problem with military tools. China is gaining power around the world by using commercial clout, and not so much the PLA except along its immediate borders. Across Africa and Asia, as well as South America, China has become the central trading partner.

Meanwhile, U.S. influence appears to be on the wane, a power shift reality exemplified by the organization of BRICS. BRICS was initially founded by India, Brazil, China, and Russia in 2006. It has since added five more countries: first South Africa, then Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and the UAE, becoming BRICS+. Almost half the world’s population comprises the membership, accounting for about 28 percent of the global economy and 44 percent of its oil supply. Another thirty countries have expressed interest in joining (such as Saudi Arabia), and thirteen have become associated with BRICS as “partners,” including notably Turkey, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Nigeria, and others.

The influence of BRICS has already worked its way into the diplomatic national security sphere. The RIO G20 Summit, composed of the world’s twenty largest economies, went even less well for the United States than the Lima economic cooperation confab. The G20, hosted by Brazil’s President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, took rocky turns for Western participants, particularly when it came time to draft the final summit communique. Brazil’s President took good care of his fellow BRICS members, Russia, China, and Iran, by successfully watering down tougher, pro-Western language on the Ukraine and Middle East wars.

The show was certainly not run by Washington and its European allies, underscoring major shifts underway in the global balance of power. India’s leader, Narendra Modi, and China’s Chairman Xi were seen comfortably interacting on the sidelines, continuing to boost ties just a month after the two countries appear to have worked out a resolution of their long-standing Himalayan border disputes. Once again, just like in Lima, America’s president was “out of the picture” when President Biden missed the official summit photograph taken on the first day, awkwardly requiring a redo later in the conference.

As a new administration takes office, rising sentiments of protectionism and “reshoring” will collide with a growing coalition of countries that have powerful and growing economies of their own. The way forward for the United States in this new world may well end up testing American power as much or more in the economic sphere than it already has in the military.

UAE
Source: dawnmena.org

At the start of 2024, the multilateral BRICS consortium of five emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—underwent its first expansion in 13 years, admitting Ethiopia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Iran to its ranks. But Saudi Arabia, arguably the most sought-after and high-profile invitee, stopped short of joining the bloc as a full-fledged member. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman skipped the annual BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan in October, it fueled speculation about whether Saudi Arabia could potentially refuse its invitation and content itself with observer or partner status instead. The Saudis have expressed interest in joining the BRICS for several years, starting with statements from the crown prince in 2022, but have also kept their intentions ambiguous.

As far as President Vladimir Putin is concerned, roping the Saudis into the BRICS is a sure-fire means of turbocharging the "multipolar world order" he has championed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If Saudi Arabia formally joined the BRICS, the bloc would account for the lion's share of global crude oil exports, which could potentially move the kingdom closer to making oil contracts in non-dollar currencies and render BRICS+ all the more attractive to the wider Arab and Islamic world. By holding the annual BRICS summit in the Muslim-majority republic of Tatarstan, Russia was aiming to showcase the country's multi-confessional makeup to delegates from the Middle East and North Africa.

For years now, Putin has gone out of way to win over the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and by extension Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. State-led initiatives include piloting Shariah-compliant banking in certain parts of Russia, agreeing to de-list the Taliban as a terrorist group, and criminalizing the desecration of Qurans. But Russia's outreach may have come up short, which may help explain why Saudi Arabia is second-guessing a geostrategic alignment with Moscow—and by extension, ever joining the BRICS at all.

Saudi Arabia is second-guessing a geostrategic alignment with Russia—and by extension, ever joining the BRICS at all.
- Saahil Menon

There are other factors at play, as the kingdom looks to hedge its bets ahead of Donald Trump's return to the White House. A key but overlooked factor is the brewing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is no secret that MBS's grandiose Vision 2030 agenda, to transition the Saudi economy away from oil, entails supplanting the UAE, and especially Dubai, as the Arabian Peninsula's commercial and entertainment hub. It is just one point of friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as MBS consolidates ever-more power in Saudi Arabia and openly competes with the UAE for geopolitical and economic influence in the Middle East.

Especially when it comes to normalization with Israel, MBS may have played his cards more wisely than his mentor-turned-rival, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the president of the UAE. Abu Dhabi has found itself in a Catch-22 since Hamas's attack into Israel on October 7, 2023 and Israel's punishing war in Gaza in response. The UAE has not taken a critical line against Israel, let alone threatened to walk away from the Abraham Accords, which would cause the Emirati leadership to lose face domestically and ruffle feathers in Washington.

The Abraham Accords were supposed to give the UAE some influence over Israeli policy in Palestine—delaying West Bank annexation, first and foremost—but the UAE has not used any of its diplomatic leverage to signal its discontent with the war in Gaza or pressure Israel into adopting a cease-fire. But maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel under the mantra of peace risks pitting pro-Palestinian popular sentiment across the region against the Emirati government. As the International Crisis Group reported earlier this year, "Emirati elites portray the Abraham Accords as a step toward a more harmonious Middle East, with the UAE at its heart"—a message that is increasingly out of step with the brutal realities in Gaza.

Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has driven a much harder bargain when it comes to formally recognizing Israel and is now holding out for NATO-like security guarantees from the U.S. as a pre-condition for normalization with Israel. Riyadh's insistence on a two-state solution, with an independent Palestinian state and East Jerusalem as its capital, looks more like a rhetorical ruse to buy time and extract maximalist concessions from Washington. The Saudis have been running out the clock on Biden's lame-duck presidency and were openly gunning for a Trump victory over Kamala Harris. With Trump's win, they could end up distancing themselves even further from the BRICS—for the right price, which Trump is likely to pay given his transactional approach and personal business ties to the Saudis.

A second Trump presidency, on top of the already bipartisan support for the kingdom in Washington, offers Saudi Arabia far more than the BRICS ever could.

- Saahil Menon

From the standpoint of a thin-skinned MBS, gravitating toward like-minded authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China that avoid passing judgment on or meddling in the internal affairs of other nations was his best bet to spite Joe Biden for labeling him a "pariah." That said, the crown prince knows full well how much the kingdom benefits from close U.S. ties—and American military protection—and how limited his room for maneuver actually is, despite all the talk of a more multipolar region and world. Aiding and abetting the "de-dollarization" agenda being pursued by Russia and the expanded BRICS could prove politically calamitous for the Al Saud family dictatorship, whose self-preservation still hinges on toeing the line with Washington.

At the same time, there is no real value proposition that a country like Saudi Arabia derives from being part of the BRICS. Entering the bloc will have little, if any, bearing on Saudi relationships with existing members—many of whom the kingdom already boasts outsized leverage over. Egypt, for instance, relies heavily on Saudi largesse to keep its failing economy afloat, and in 2022 ceded the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to the House of Saud as a token of gratitude. There is also the sizeable diaspora of Egyptian expatriates in Riyadh and Jeddah who could be deported on a whim in the event of a diplomatic fallout.

In a similar vein, guest workers from remittance-dependent India and Ethiopia make up much of the migrant labor force across the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. If anything, the number of Indian and Ethiopian migrant laborers in Saudi Arabia will only grow further given the pace and scale of MBS's outsized infrastructure projects, despite terrible working conditions. One could argue that India's ambivalent stance on the Gaza conflict, after initially pledging its full-throated support for Israel, is attributable to the pressure its ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is under from Gulf monarchies to demonstrate some degree of solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

Ultimately for Saudi Arabia, sanitizing its tarnished image and bolstering non-oil revenue take precedence over lofty anti-imperialist posturing synonymous with the BRICS and especially with Putin's Russia. As such, the Saudis can ill-afford to turn their backs on or fall out of favor with the U.S., which has long provided cover for their abysmal human rights record. A second Trump presidency, on top of the already bipartisan support for the kingdom in Washington, offers Saudi Arabia far more than the BRICS ever could.

Turkey
Source: www.aa.com.tr

China said on Tuesday that the BRICS is an important platform for emerging markets and developing countries to cooperate rather than targeting third countries, according to state-run media.

During a regular press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian responded to US President-elect Donald Trump's threat to impose a 100% tariff on BRICS nations in the event of dollar replacement, saying the group aims for mutual development and prosperity.

"BRICS, as an important platform for emerging markets and developing countries to cooperate, advocates openness and inclusiveness, win-win cooperation, non-confrontation and not targeting any third party," state-run Global Times quoted Lin as saying.

"China is willing to work with BRICS partners to deepen pragmatic cooperation in various industries and make more contributions for sustained global economic growth," she said.

On Saturday, Trump warned that he would impose a 100% tariff on any BRICS country that attempts to move from the US dollar in international trade.

He was referring to the economic alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – now expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Meanwhile, Beijing has announced that it will strengthen export controls on dual-use items to the US under the Export Control Law and related regulations.

"These measures aim to protect national security, safeguard national interests, and fulfill non-proliferation obligations," said the Commerce Ministry.

Exports of dual-use items to or for military use in the US are prohibited under the most recent legislation.

Exports of dual-use items containing gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the US will generally be prohibited.

The latest Chinese move came after the Biden administration announced on Monday that Washington had imposed new export controls on China, limiting the sale of cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing equipment and high-bandwidth computer memory to the communist country, according to Voice of America.

On Monday, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Beijing protested to Washington on the latest chip curbs.

"The move has seriously damaged the international trade order and disrupted supply chain stabilization," Lin said, urging the US to abide by the laws of the market economy and the principles of fair competition.

*Writing by Islamuddin Sajid

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

While addressing a question regarding the US president-elect's threat on Sunday to impose a 100 percent tariff on BRICS countries if they don't give up their plan to create a currency that could replace the US dollar, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, responded diplomatically concerning BRICS' principles and China's stance.

He pointed out that as an important platform for cooperation between emerging markets and developing countries, the BRICS countries advocate openness, inclusiveness, win-win cooperation and not to engage in camp confrontation or target third parties in order to achieve common development and universal prosperity.

China is willing to continue to work with BRICS partners to deepen practical cooperation in various fields and make more contributions to the sustained and stable growth of the world economy, Lin added.

Despite so, reading between the lines, the readers would not have mistaken Beijing's view on the incoming US president's intimidation that emerging market economies deserve more rights in deciding for themselves in international financial affairs corresponding to their increasingly important roles in the world economy.

Also, Beijing tries to dispel Washington's concern that the US is targeted by BRICS countries by stressing that BRICS cooperation are open and inclusive and does not target any third party, reminding the US side that it will also benefit from a common development and universal prosperity the BRICS countries are working for.

Not to mention the fact, which Lin also highlighted, that the emerging market economies can greatly boost a sustainable recovery of the world economy, which will also serve the US' interest as the US economy is dragged by the lackluster world economic situation.

That being said, the US has no reason to shoot its own feet by waving the tariff bat just to protect its exclusive dollar interest, which, if imposed, will likely backfire against the US itself as it will be the US enterprises and consumers that will bear the cost of the tariffs at last.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Just over a month after Nigeria was officially added to the BRICS bloc as a partner state alongside the 12 other countries during the annual BRICS Summit held in Russia in October, the West African country is now seeking South Africa's endorsement to attain full membership in BRICS and the BRICS New Development Bank.

Speaking during the ministerial session of the 11th Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission held in South Africa on Monday Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Nigeria's minister of state for foreign affairs said that the request be contained in the draft communique of the Bi-National Commission, that will be presented to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Nigerian President Bola Tinubu for their approval, according to Nigerian newspaper The Punch.
While also seeking South Africa's backing to join the Group of 20, Odumegwu-Ojukwu expressed Nigeria's commitment to playing a significant role in fostering regional peace as she encouraged South Africa to help accelerate the Sudanese peace process.

"We are strongly committed to seeking a resolution of the crisis in Sudan and in this guise, we seek South Africa's support to further accelerate the peace process and to ensure that within our region, conflicts are de-escalated. We can hope that with peace, greater progress and development can be achieved across all spheres," Odumegwu-Ojukwu said.

While responding to Nigeria's request Roland Lamola, South Africa's minister of international relations and cooperation promised to amplify Nigeria's wishes and underscored the mutual resolve to deepen dynamic and vibrant bilateral relations. On Sunday, South Africa formally took the leadership of the G20, a central forum for the world's major economies.

USA
Source: www.cbsnews.com

President-elect Donald Trump on Nov. 30 threatened to slap a 100% tariff on a group of nine nations — the so-called BRICS — if they try to replace the U.S. dollar with another currency.

The BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Trump said he'll enact the tariffs if the countries either move to create a new rival currency to the dollar or back an alternative currency to replace the greenback as the world's reserve medium of exchange.

"We require a commitment from these Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace the mighty U.S. Dollar or, they will face 100% Tariffs, and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful U.S. Economy," Trump said on Truth Social.

Trump's move comes after he recently threatened to impose 25% tariffs on all products from Canada and Mexico entering the U.S., along with an additional 10% tax on goods from China, in what he says would force the countries to do more to halt the flow of unauthorized migrants and illicit drugs into the U.S.

Why do BRICS countries want an alternative currency?

The BRICS — named after the original five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) — was formed in 2009 to advance the interests of emerging economies and to make them less dependent on the U.S. dollar, which is by far the most commonly used currency in global commerce.

The primacy of the dollar in international trade gives the U.S. a number of advantages, including lower borrowing costs for the federal government and enormous geopolitical influence around the world.

In October, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a new international payments system at a BRICS summit, saying "the dollar is being used as a weapon," the Associated Press reported. In 2023, meanwhile, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed creating a new, common currency in South America to reduce its reliance on the dollar in international trade.

Would a BRICS currency threaten the dollar?

Creating a competing new currency would be difficult given how widely used the dollar is to conduct business around the world. Despite the existence of the euro and growing importance of China's renminbi, the dollar remains the world's main reserve currency, representing roughly 58% of the world's foreign exchange reserves, according to the IMF. Also, critical commodities like oil and gold are still mostly bought and sold using dollars.

"Economically, it's not a major issue because the idea of the BRICS countries being able to put together an alternative as a reserve currency for the U.S. dollar is not plausible in the short or intermediate term," said Mark Weinstock, a global trade expert and professor of economics at Pace University.

In other words, BRICS nations would struggle to create a viable currency given the relative strength and stability of the U.S. economy and the faith that global investors and trading partners have in U.S. government debt. And while the group's members have some interests in common, unifying behind a single currency would be politically fraught and technically complex.

"Fundamentally, if you are going to create your own form of money, that desirability is commensurate with the economic strength and integrity of the issuer. BRICS countries don't have the type of institutions that inspire global confidence to convince people that it is a satisfactory alternative to the dollar," Weinstock said.

Some BRICS members are already downplaying the push to get a new currency off the ground. After Trump's tariff threat last weekend, South Africa's government on Monday issued a statement on social media saying there are no plans to create a BRICS currency.

"Recent misreporting has led to the incorrect narrative that BRICS is planning to create a new currency," South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation said. "This is not the case. The discussions within BRICS focus on trading among member countries using their own national currencies."

What would stiff tariffs on BRICS goods mean for U.S. consumers?

While economists largely agree that a 100% tariff on goods imported to the U.S. from BRICS nations is a long shot, if it came to pass the move would not benefit U.S. consumers, they say. Such levies would drive up the cost of goods from BRICS member nations, potentially fueling inflation and leading to higher prices for consumers.

"Like any tariffs, this would mean higher prices for consumers," Weinstock said. "That's always the impact of the tariff."

Among the leading products the U.S. gets from BRICS countries are coffee from Brazil, electronics and clothes from China, and minerals from South Africa, according to trade data.

Why are some economists criticizing Trump for threatening the BRICS?

Some experts criticized Trump's threat to punish the BRICS, saying it makes the U.S. look weak.
"It isn't a good look, as it indirectly elevates the stature of a non-threat and suggests a lack of confidence in the dollar," Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former Treasury Department economist, wrote on X.

Trump's threat could actually accelerate a move away from the dollar by other countries, according to Setser, who said that an effort to effectively coerce countries to use the dollar "is actually a long-run threat to the dollar's global role."

"It makes the use of the dollar appear to be a favor to the U.S.," he added.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The BRICS Summit held in Kazan from October 22–24, 2024, brought attention to several defining factors regarding Latin American countries that will be important for the continent’s political and economic development in the near term. With the admission of two countries from this region as associate members of the bloc, the Latin American presence in the pool of developing countries seeking to increase their weight in shaping the new world order is set to grow. Bolivia and Cuba joined BRICS as partners along with 11 other countries: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Together with the core BRICS countries and the new members who joined a year earlier, this means a fundamentally new format of international interaction, where the diversity of participants creates a platform for polyphonic dialogue. While their overarching interests align, each country has its own priorities and expectations from BRICS membership.

Bolivia’s interests

The Plurinational State of Bolivia is developing a left-leaning economic model that prioritizes the social redistribution of state revenues, mainly generated from the exploitation of the nation’s natural resources. Bolivia is rich in hydrocarbons, primarily natural gas, and holds the world’s largest lithium deposits, estimated at over 21 million tonnes. While the export of Bolivian hydrocarbons (mainly to neighboring Brazil and Argentina) remains a traditional revenue stream, the lithium industry is a relatively recent addition to the country’s foreign economic priorities. Lithium nationalization in 2008 gave a start to the development of Bolivia’s deposits, but for several reasons—which include difficulties in attracting investment, a lack of technological infrastructure, opposition from indigenous communities and local environmental organizations—full-scale exploitation of deposits has never been launched, aside from a few pilot projects. It was only in 2021 that two Chinese companies and Russia’s Uranium One Group, part of the management circuit of Rosatom state corporation, won the development tender.

By joining BRICS as a partner, La Paz aims to cement its position as a supplier of raw lithium to the global market. Given the vast scale of its national reserves, the Bolivian government is keen to expand its pool of international investors. In turn, La Paz is ready to offer its partners cooperation in other areas, such as energy resources and food production. BRICS countries already dominate Bolivia’s foreign economic relations, led by Brazil ($3.5 billion), China ($3.5 billion) and India (around $2 billion), which is a major importer of Bolivian gold. Beyond trade, China is also an active investor in Bolivian infrastructure and technology projects.

Cooperation with Russia is growing more important for Bolivia. The lithium agreement is part of a broader strategy between the two governments to encourage investment in key sectors. On the sidelines of the Kazan Summit, Presidents Luis Alberto Arce and Vladimir Putin held a bilateral meeting to discuss joint nuclear technologies (Bolivia has opened a unique high-altitude El Alto Nuclear Research and Technology Center (CNRT), designed for peaceful nuclear applications and built by Russian experts), cooperation in education, lithium contracts and other issues that bring the interests of the two nations closer together. La Paz and Moscow also share a vision for building a global world order and advocate a multipolar world.

At the same time, the complex political situation in Bolivia and the conditions in which the country may find itself by the 2025 general elections cannot be ignored. The dispute over the presidential candidacy threatens to undo the political project that has been unfolding in the country since 2006. Social divisions and an economic crisis are fueling deep uncertainty and pessimism in Bolivian society about the country’s development outlook. BRICS could be a new opportunity for economic breakthroughs if the current course is maintained after the elections. However, if opposition forces come to power, Bolivia may well follow the path of Argentina, which abandoned plans to join the bloc after a change of government.

Cuba’s expectations

For Cuba, international support from BRICS countries means a chance to overcome its long-standing and multifaceted crisis, which the island cannot tackle on its own. Havana views its primary objectives as countering US unilateral restrictive measures and seeking alternative sources of financing. While Cuba maintains trade relations with all BRICS nations, their share in the total trade turnover is modest. China is the top trading partner among BRICS members, accounting for about 13% of Cuba’s foreign trade. Trade between the two nations saw its biggest growth between 2005 and 2015, but in recent years there has been a decline in Cuban–Chinese interaction. Although Cuba joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, meaningful results have yet to materialize. Latin American countries account for one-third of Cuban foreign trade, with Brazil’s share at just 3.2%. The expansion of trade and economic relations with Russia has pushed its share in Cuba’s trade to 7%. Strengthening foreign economic relations is, therefore, a top priority for Cuba.

Meanwhile, the main obstacle to this goal is the economic embargo imposed by the United States, with Cuba consistently calling on the international community to demand its lifting. Although bilateral relations thawed during the administration of Barack Obama, and both sides attempted to find common ground on some fundamental issues, neither is ready to abandon its stance. Nor does Havana’s rapprochement with BRICS signal a complete departure from attempts to engage with Washington constructively. The US will still be in the focus for Cuba. However, given the new balance in the White House following recent elections, it will not be easy for Havana to maintain the status quo and prevent the hegemon from increasing its pressure.

Contradictions between Venezuela and Brazil

One country that shares Cuba’s aspirations is Venezuela, which faces severe Western sanctions and a serious economic crisis. Caracas primarily counts on the assistance of Russia and China, but Venezuela’s relations with other members of the bloc are much more complex. For instance, this is true for Venezuela’s ties with India, which revolve around India’s demand for oil from this Bolivarian country. Due to US sanctions, India stopped oil imports from Caracas in 2019 but is ready to resume cooperation after the restrictions are eased. That said, New Delhi does not provide any political support to the Venezuelan government, and the prospects for broadening ties in other areas are slim.
Brazil’s veto on Venezuela’s inclusion in the group of BRICS partners has exposed deep divisions within the region and intensified the rift within Latin America’s left-wing political landscape. The fact that it was the position of Brazil, the region’s only representative in BRICS, that became an obstacle for Venezuela, sparked the most backlash and bitter antagonism from Caracas. For Nicolas Maduro and his team, potential BRICS membership appears to be an important foreign policy objective. With close ties to Russia and good relations with some Asian and African nations, Venezuela seemed well-positioned for admission. In addition, the country has robust relations with several BRICS members, including Iran and China. In 2023, Caracas signed an all-weather strategic partnership agreement with Beijing (China has similar agreements only with Russia, Belarus and Pakistan). Until recently, there had been no overt opposition to Venezuela’s membership in the group.

Meanwhile, Venezuela and Brazil have experienced diplomatic ruptures in the recent past. In 2019, relations were severed after then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recognized opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s interim president. Diplomatic ties were only restored in 2023 when Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva returned to power in Brazil. However, relations between the two nations soured again after the presidential elections in the Bolivarian country in July 2024, when Maduro was declared the winner. The results remain unrecognized by several countries, including Brazil, which has officially called for the release of electoral records and withheld recognition of the current Venezuelan government. This rift has exacerbated the row over Brazil’s veto, leading Maduro to recall his ambassador for consultations and make harsh remarks against Brazil. Compounding matters, Brazil is set to chair BRICS in 2025, which makes it unlikely for Venezuela to join the bloc before it mends ties with Brasilia. Given Brazil’s consistency and firmness in pursuing its foreign policy, the matter may have to be put on ice indefinitely.

Brazil’s aspirations

As of now, Brazil remains the only Latin American country represented in BRICS as a full member. It plays one of the main roles in promoting the agenda of the Global South on the global stage. Central to this effort is Lula da Silva, who, during his two previous presidential terms (2003–2006, 2007–2011), pursued an active policy of strengthening ties with developing nations in Asia and Africa. His commitment to multilateralism in foreign policy reflects the national tradition of positioning the country as a regional power with global ambitions.

The rotation of the BRICS presidency, coupled with the extension of Dilma Rousseff’s tenure as head of the New Development Bank, is likely to favor Brazil’s ability to expand its role in the group and the world. In a challenging domestic political climate, where the government faces strong opposition from a large part of society, success in the international arena will be crucial for Lula da Silva. While the South American giant is now struggling to consolidate Latin American neighbors around it and drive regional integration, current Brazilian diplomacy has focused its efforts on global initiatives.
International engagement is part of Brazilian national identity. Its historical tradition of assuming the role of a regional leader in multilateral forums and accumulated experience that Brasilia leverages as a diplomatic asset enable it to act in the international arena from a position far surpassing that of a developing nation burdened by major internal socio-economic problems and lacking the military capabilities of the great powers. Brazil’s vision of a world based on international rules, where every nation has a say, is what it seeks to promote in the global context, harnessing the potential of BRICS.

External factors

Other Latin American nations have also signaled their willingness to join the bloc. These include Honduras, Nicaragua (which submitted applications ahead of the Kazan Summit in 2024) and Colombia, highlighting broad interest and intention to deepen cooperation within the Global South paradigm. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that Argentina’s accession to BRICS, which was denounced by President Javier Milei, may remain on the agenda and be postponed for a while. Since Argentina has already been invited and its political landscape is fluid, the prospect of joining the bloc could become a reality for this country if BRICS-aligned forces regain power in Buenos Aires.
Finally, an important factor in expanding the participation of Latin American countries in BRICS will be US policy toward the region under Donald Trump. While his cabinet has not yet been approved and no clear directions have been outlined, various speculations heighten uncertainty and heat up expectations of different forces but fail to provide an objective picture. However, it is clear that Latin American countries once again find themselves in a position where they must react to the steps taken by the northern hegemon. The efforts to establish an independent course, made over the past decades by various governments in the region—mostly left-leaning—have not yet yielded the desired results and have not become a tangible reality. Therefore, their foreign policy, including in other areas, will depend to a certain extent on the Washington factor. In this sense, BRICS, not only for the newly joined Cuba and Bolivia, could become a platform to help Latin American countries reduce their dependence on the US and build alternative routes for their foreign economic and foreign policy activities.

Amid the global uncertainty that plagues today’s world, Latin American countries are looking for appropriate mechanisms to advance and strengthen their positions. Key among them are coalition-based forms of international cooperation, such as those offered by BRICS, a partnership that promises mutual benefits.

Nigeria
Source: afripoli.org

This article is part of the BRICS thought leadership series, published by APRI in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg. It explores key themes from the 16th BRICS Summit and the group's broader initiatives. The series is edited by Ada Mare, Bhaso Ndzendze, Serwah Prempeh.

Introduction: The growing demand for BRICS membership

Amid escalating tensions in the Middle East and Ukraine, shifts in the global economic order, and debates about the future of international institutions, BRICS has drawn increased global attention as a significant player in global governance. In August 2023, during South Africa's presidency, 40 countries expressed interest in joining BRICS, and 23 submitted formal applications. Continuing this trend, the 2024 BRICS Kazan summit marked a pivotal moment, bringing together heads of state from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with leaders from newly added countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates – as part of one institution. Even before fully acclimating these new members, BRICS saw 34 more countries express interest in joining. However, at the summit, only 13 countries were invited under a new partner category, leaving some aspirants disappointed.

Demand for BRICS is at an all-time high, symbolising broader realignments in international relations. Yet the key question remains: What is attracting countries to BRICS, and can the group sustain its appeal?

The politics behind the expanding membership of informal groups, particularly BRICS, remain underexplored. BRICS lacks the ‘compliance pull’ of formal organisations like the WTO, which incentivise participation through legal obligations and penalties for non-compliance. Instead, states are pursuing multi-alignment by joining informal groups to boost their strategic autonomy and reduce dependence on any single power. Other explanations for BRICS' appeal emphasise rising powers seeking status in an exclusive club with strong economic credentials and close ties to China and other markets. Traditional Western notions of soft power – focused on cultural influence, political ideals and diplomatic strategies – have limited relevance to BRICS, which operates through a form of multilateral, so-called compound soft power and by pooling decision-making.

These explanations alone do not account for BRICS’ ability to act as ‘a magnet’ attracting countries worldwide or the surge in demand for membership. Understanding BRICS’ appeal is crucial, as the group’s enlargement has significant implications for global governance. BRICS members are positioning themselves as key players in shaping new norms, institutions and ways of conducting international affairs. Moreover, as BRICS seeks to consolidate a global majority, it must design effective enlargement policies, as countries around the world weigh the benefits of joining.

To address this research gap, this article introduces the concept of the ‘magnetic pull’ of informal groups, focusing on BRICS and exploring why non-member states seek to join. By examining BRICS’ expansions in 2010 and 2023, as well as Russia’s 2024 BRICS presidency, this study investigates how the group’s foundational ideas and outreach strategies have evolved and resonated with prospective members. It argues that the group’s initial appeal was based on its economic credentials and the broad promise of system reform. In recent years, however, the group has become more strategic and focused, systematically conducting outreach to attract potential members. South Africa’s advocacy to join the original BRIC group and then represent Africa within BRICS was pivotal in both expansions. However, the BRICS’ 2024 expansion has highlighted limits to the group’s appeal and challenges to internal cohesion.

To maintain its appeal and strengthen its relations with Africa, BRICS must enhance its enlargement policy, establish effective conflict management mechanisms and actively support climate initiatives.

Understanding BRICS’ ‘magnetic pull’

This article introduces the concept of the ‘magnetic pull’ of informal groups to explain BRICS’ appeal to non-members. Unlike soft power, which leverages values as a source of attraction and prioritises value projection over uptake, the 'magnetic pull' is rooted in ideas about development and future positioning. It gains momentum through the proactive outreach efforts of member states. This ‘pull’ mechanism draws on Beland and Cox's 2016 study of ideas as ‘coalition magnets’, which explores how certain ideas gain traction and are promoted by policy entrepreneurs. They argue that ideas shape political power relations by acting as a ‘coalition magnet’ that draws in diverse individuals and groups. Policy entrepreneurs strategically use these ideas to frame interests, mobilise supporters and build coalitions. The success of an idea in coalition-building depends on its positive, emotional appeal (valence) and capacity for multiple interpretations (ambiguity).

Applying this framework to BRICS helps examine how and why the group attracts such a diverse array of nations, especially those seeking to reform traditional Western-dominated structures. We can expect BRICS’ ideas to function as coalition magnets if they exhibit both valence and ambiguity, are actively promoted by BRICS members and are embraced by prospective members.

This study draws on official BRICS documents, statements from prospective members and media reports to evaluate how the group's ideas and outreach have resonated with prospective members over time. The analysis covers the period from BRICS’ emergence as an independent body in 2009 to mid-November 2024, focusing on the first enlargement in 2010, when South Africa was invited, the second enlargement in 2023 and Russia’s 2024 BRICS presidency. It explores whether the idea of BRIC(S) serves as a coalition magnet and compares different enlargement phases.

Analysing BRICS’ enlargementsFirst enlargement: South Africa joins BRIC

The inaugural BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) summit in 2009 launched BRIC as an informal group of fast-growing, ideologically diverse economies with large populations. It outlined the key ideas BRIC would pursue: seeking a more multipolar and democratic order, advocating for practical reforms of global governance – specifically economic and financial infrastructure – and incrementally and proactively advancing cooperation while serving the common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries. The investment acronym BRIC carried inherent valence, associated with rising economies and growth. The group’s political mandate to diversify and reform the international system emphasised hope and change, though it gave no specific details as to how this would be accomplished.

Initially, BRIC had no formal plan for expansion or engagement with other emerging and developing countries. Although South Africa and Nigeria were often mentioned in the press as potential members, only South Africa joined. Nigeria, one of the ‘Next 11’ emerging economies, was discussed in the context of positioning sub-Saharan Africa as the ‘fifth BRIC’, but it was not actively campaigning for membership in 2010. At the time, it was more focused on internal challenges such as political instability and corruption, despite maintaining friendly relations with BRIC members. In contrast, South Africa successfully campaigned for inclusion, highlighting its role as Africa's political representative and a gateway to the continent's economic potential. The government, including the president, foreign and trade ministries, and business delegations, lobbied for membership and leveraged ties with BRIC through other rising power groups such as India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil-South Africa-India-China (BASIC).

South Africa’s Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane emphasised that, in contrast to the North's zero-sum perspective, BRIC nations sought to reshape global power and advocate for a more representative, fair and equitable system. Reflecting on the importance of emerging powers in the struggle against colonialism, with ties of solidarity and partnerships forged over decades, Nkoana-Mashabane viewed BRIC as a model for development cooperation in a South-South context. At the same time, BRIC’s appeal was also practical, offering opportunities for trade, investment, technology sharing and collaboration across in various sectors. Notably, BRIC-Africa trade increased nearly eightfold from 2000 to 2008. Trade Minister Rob Davies outlined three engagement pillars: reforming multilateral institutions, including coordination within WTO and G20; building South Africa's industrial base; and supporting Africa's development agenda.

Given South Africa’s relatively small population and economy, the country’s selection, announced without clear criteria or formal enlargement negotiations, raised questions about its fit. This suggested a geopolitical decision, rather than a purely economic one, was made to include an African representative. Since BRIC operates by consensus, all member states had to agree on inviting a new member. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov highlighted that South Africa’s inclusion as ‘a leading African state’ added ‘a truly global dimension’ to the group and noted that its collaboration with BRIC in the G20 had advanced international financial reforms. Ultimately, South Africa’s effective campaigning, rather than systematic outreach by BRIC members, secured its place in the group.

Second enlargement during South Africa’s presidency: extensive outreach

After South Africa joined BRIC, now BRICS, the group declared its openness to engaging with non-member countries, particularly emerging and developing nations, as well as international and regional organisations. Two years later, South Africa hosted a BRICS Outreach Dialogue with African leaders, bolstering its regional leadership. During China’s presidency in 2017, China expanded BRICS’ outreach through the BRICS Plus Initiative, which aimed to create a broader network of development partnerships. It organised the Dialogue of Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs), inviting leaders from Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Tajikistan and Thailand to join the summit and discuss global development, South-South cooperation and the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

South Africa’s 2018 BRICS presidency continued both the BRICS Africa Outreach – inviting Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Zambia – and the BRICS Plus outreach – inviting Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica and Turkey. These countries were selected for their leadership in regional and global organisations. However, outreach efforts slowed between 2019 to 2021 due to a lack of consensus on invitations and the pandemic.

BRICS Plus outreach efforts resumed during China’s 2022 BRICS presidency. China first held the BRICS Plus Dialogue at the foreign ministers’ level, involving Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand and the UAE. It then hosted a High-Level Dialogue on Global Development during the BRICS summit, attended by leaders from Algeria, Argentina, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Senegal, Thailand and Uzbekistan. The summit declaration supported BRICS expansion talks and called for the development of guiding principles and criteria for new members.

Hosted by South Africa, the 2023 BRICS summit prioritised expansion. Although there were significant disagreements over membership criteria – such as whether to expand at all and what political and economic requirements should be imposed – consensus was ultimately reached. The criteria included alignment with BRICS' principles, strengthening the group, UN membership and support for multilateralism and global governance reform. Prospective members were required to commit to the SDGs, support an open multilateral trading system and advocate for greater representation of developing countries (including Brazil, India and South Africa), particularly in institutions like the UN Security Council. Additionally, they needed to be emerging or developing countries with regional and strategic global influence, diplomatic, friendly and substantial trade relations with BRICS, a strong economic standing and committed to only imposing sanctions authorised by the UN Security Council.

Only six countries were invited to join BRICS in 2023. Those selected were apparently chosen for their existing economic ties, energy resources and interest in financial coordination, including efforts toward de-dollarisation. Among these, the UAE and Egypt were already members of the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) and dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The UAE viewed BRICS in the context of forming blocs to face global challenges, enhancing its support for multilateralism and boosting trade relations with the Global South. Egypt previously participated in the 2017 China-led dialogue and saw BRICS membership as an opportunity for development, trade and investment. Facing high inflation and debt repayment issues, Egypt found BRICS' de-dollarisation agenda appealing and discussed using local currencies for commodities trade with China, India and Russia.

Iran applied for BRICS membership in 2022 after participating in the BRICS summit, with officials stating that membership would boost the economy, weaken sanctions, reduce dependence on the dollar and provide access to broader markets. Ethiopia applied in 2023, citing its status as a founding member of the African Union and its desire to align with BRICS for national interests. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed highlighted BRICS’ promotion of South-South cooperation, while experts noted Ethiopia’s deteriorating relations with Western powers amid civil war.

Overall, BRICS’ appeal, as perceived by new members, has been economically focused and has emphasised South-South cooperation. This did not significantly change between the first and second enlargements. Each new member has prioritised BRIC’s original ideas while interpreting them to fit their specific interests. However, while the group’s outreach during the second enlargement played a key role in increasing demand for membership, many countries that attended outreach events never applied to join the group.

The limits of BRICS’ magnetic pull are best illustrated by countries formally invited to join as full members, such as Argentina and Saudi Arabia, which have not proceeded with membership. Argentina’s new government rejected BRICS membership, questioning its economic benefits and ideological orientation. Saudi Arabia, initially eager to join to diversify its economy, is still considering membership nearly a year after its expected entry.

Russia’s 2024 BRICS presidency: cautious growth and pragmatism

The integration of new countries into BRICS has been complex, leading Russia to announce a pause on further expansion. However, the 2024 Kazan Declaration introduced the BRICS Partner Country category without specifying criteria or naming individual partner states. It was reported that BRICS agreed to invite thirteen countries - Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, Uganda and Uzbekistan. These countries cited various reasons for joining the group.

Indonesia views joining BRICS as ‘a manifestation of its independent-active foreign policy’ and a means to promote the interests of the Global South. Nigeria believes that ‘being multiple-aligned is in (its) best interest’. Vietnam seeks to diversify foreign relations and strengthen independence. Uganda values BRICS’ efforts to ‘alter the current international order, in which a few nations dominate the majority’. Bolivia sees BRICS’ alternative economic framework as potentially beneficial to its development goals, while Malaysia hopes that joining could secure trade deals or investments. Through BRICS, Belarus seeks a fairer world order, the right to define its development ideology independently and an end to domination by the collective West. Cuba regards BRICS as a ‘key player in global geopolitics and a beacon of hope for the countries of the South’. Finally, Turkey has an incentive to explore other economic platforms, given its stalled EU accession process.

Algeria, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have expressed mixed feelings about BRICS, making their invitations to join as partners somewhat unexpected. Algeria, in particular, extensively campaigned to join BRICS before the 2023 Johannesburg summit, perceiving it as an economic and political powerhouse consistent with its nonalignment stance. After its application was rejected in 2023, Algeria decided not to reapply. Similarly, Kazakhstan engaged with BRICS, with reports that President Tokayev had ‘received proposals’ for membership. However, before the 2024 summit, he announced that Kazakhstan would refrainfrom applying, favouring the UN as a universal and uncontested organisation. Uzbekistan also sent mixed signals about its interest. During the 2024 summit, it reportedly aimed to join the BRICS Investment Platform and sought partnership, yet post-summit reports indicated that membership was not on the agenda.

To prevent issues with hesitant new members, the Russian presidency chose not to name specific countries in the Kazan Declaration and planned to formalise their membership later. BRICS countries were also more selective this year, with Brazil vetoing Venezuela’s application over election concerns.

Recommendations: lessons on BRICS’ appeal, constraints and future prospects

Recent expansions reveal important lessons about BRICS’ appeal and institutional growth:

1. Core ideas act as a magnet, but outreach is key to expansion. BRICS’ magnetism lies in the emotional appeal of its ideas. These are rooted in positive associations with investment and alignment with national and global development agendas. BRICS has translated broad ideas into concrete actions, notably through its bank and development projects, positioning itself as a possible alternative to Western-dominated institutions. Politically, the group’s commitment to amplifying the Global South’s voice and interests enhances this appeal, building on the legacy of South-South cooperation. However, BRICS’ outreach efforts have been pivotal in driving membership growth, especially following the 2022 summit, when the group started prioritising its expansion agenda and more strategically engaging with prospective members. By contrast, other non-Western groups, such as India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) and Russia-India-China (RIC), have experienced limited growth or activity over the past decade, with IBSA’s agenda largely absorbed by BRICS.
2. African policy entrepreneurship. African countries have shaped BRICS’ enlargements. South Africa secured membership without pre-existing criteria and subsequently championed outreach efforts after joining, hosting the pivotal 2023 summit that significantly expanded BRICS membership. Of the four new full members in 2024, two – Egypt and Ethiopia – are African. Demand for BRICS membership from African countries remains strong, with several nations reportedly interested, including Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. At the Kazan summit, three African countries – Algeria, Nigeria and Uganda – were invited to join.
3. Constraints on BRICS’ magnetic pull are increasing. Changes in government can significantly impact membership interest. As the group’s ideas and agendas evolve and become more specific, they are encountering greater resistance. Some countries have been wary of joining due to concerns about heightened tensions with the West, particularly those engaged in accession talks with the EU or treaty negotiations with Western partners. However, the new partner category and design innovations introduced at the Kazan summit, such as voluntary participation in financial initiatives, offer more engagement options and enhance the group’s appeal. If a range of engagement options widens even further and enables BRICS Plus to engage on an ad hoc basis, even countries less interested in the group, such as Mexico and Chile, might find an engagement format they are comfortable with.

As BRICS continues to evolve, it may take several steps to better manage its development and prospective members while strengthening its cooperation with Africa and the Global South:

1. Improving institutional design and conflict management. While BRICS proved effective in its original five-member format, the expanded group presents new challenges. To reform global governance, BRICS must act as a bargaining coalition and conduct coordinated negotiation campaigns. Previous efforts to reform the system, such as the push for a New International Economic Order, struggled with internal cohesion – a challenge that has also often plagued developing country mobilisation efforts in trade, climate and other realms. The recent impasse among African BRICS countries regarding UN Security Council reforms highlights broader challenges in jointly transforming global governance. Integrating professional conflict resolution – including facilitation, mediation, conflict resolution procedures and AI-supported consensus building – into institutional design and operational practices can improve group outcomes.
2. Systematically developing BRICS’ enlargement policy. BRICS seeks to represent the global majority. However, its current membership criteria set a high bar: sanctions exclude most Western countries, each BRICS member holds veto power over new applications and prospective members must align with BRICS agendas, some of which they may find unappealing. Countries that are excluded often express dissatisfaction – Algeria, for example, voiced concerns over the lack of transparency in its rejection. Partnership criteria have not been made public, raising additional transparency concerns. If BRICS aims to truly represent the global majority, it will need to develop clearer, systematic and more inclusive enlargement policies.
3. Strengthening climate adaptation to enhance BRICS-Africa relations. BRICS’s appeal as a development-oriented group is particularly strong among its African members. As BRICS positions itself as a leader and norm-maker in global governance and sustainable development, its composition of major carbon emitters poses a challenge for African nations, which are particularly vulnerable to climate change. With climate adaptation funding for Africa still highly inadequate, the question remains whether key BRICS emitters can increase their support for African members and partners. BRICS’ new climate and sustainable development cooperation framework is a step in the right direction, but much depends on its implementation.

In conclusion, BRICS' economic influence and push for systemic reforms have resonated strongly with non-Western countries. However, its ability to navigate internal tensions and define a clear path toward sustainable development will be key to sustaining its appeal, attracting new members and enhancing its global influence.

Nigeria
Source: afripoli.org

This article is part of the BRICS thought leadership series, published by APRI in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg. It explores key themes from the 16th BRICS Summit and the group's broader initiatives. The series is edited by Ada Mare, Bhaso Ndzendze, Serwah Prempeh.

Introduction: BRICS, a rising dream, and human rights

Composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, BRICS promises economic partnership and mutual support to counter global difficulties such as inequality, poverty and terrorism while securing a path towards ‘stability, sustainable development and prosperity’. However, is BRICS really going to reduce global predicaments? Will it help in propelling the international community towards an inclusive future? More importantly, can the BRICS members uphold human rights to create an inclusive international community?

This paper aims to analyse the current members’ standing on human rights. While BRICS has enormous potential as an international organisation with great appeal to rising nations, an analysis of the commitments of the current and new members to human rights will help explore whether BRICS could help in achieving an inclusive and peaceful international cooperation.

At its inception, the vision of BRICS was based on economic development. This has now extended to global politics, modifying Western influence and fostering a new pathway for growth and progress. The BRICS summit in October 2024 introduced the new member states joining the alliance: Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. Soon, this alliance of eleven nations will make up 37 per cent of the world’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and their currencies represent 6 per cent of all countries’ international reserves.

While economics are vital for the survival of human society, human rights remain a mandate for its functioning. The notions of freedom, dignity and respect enable people worldwide to reach their full potential, leading to emancipation. This in turn allows for the exploration of untried ideas. International politics has never been free of powerful states acting as political influencers in an attempt to establish hegemony over weaker states. In this regard, scholarship must pay close attention to geopolitical alliances and the swiftly growing organisations who are catching the attention of new suitors and are capable of spreading propaganda and pioneering an irregular international system in the name of developmental progress. For more clarity, we will consider the BRICS organisations, their capabilities and their contemporary standpoint on international platforms.

With its new additions, BRICS will be predominately constituted by members with autocratic forms of government. At the same time, the organisation will become of even greater importance to the international community, barring the economic power it will hold through GDP and its support of new cultural orientations. Among the members, a particular rising attribute is the demand to cease meddling in the internal matters of states. These developments led to the organisation’s original purpose: to restructure the Western-dominated world system and international institutions catering to the demands of a few powerful states. Additionally, BRICS has its own reliable financial cap, capable of funding and helping nations develop. Unlike Western aid programmes, BRICS aid comes with no conditions.
The growing concern for human rights advocates and practitioners is that most BRICS members are not democratic. In this sense, this growing organisation could be viewed as a union of governments that wish to govern their nations forever. These advocates and practitioners believe that BRICS might become a safehold for ‘autocratic regimes’ whose ambition it is to do away with the monetary domination of the Western bloc, so that their rule might be undisturbed by the boycotts that accompany the violation of ‘citizens’ freedom, human rights, not holding transparent elections and not hav[ing] the rule of law’. Another concern is that the influence of the major BRICS powers over the other members will grow. As leaders of such a dominant power alliance, it would be a cakewalk to gain footing as an arbitrator with Western associations.

With these considerations in mind, this paper examines the entrenchment of human rights provisions in the constitution of the five initial BRICS member states. This demonstrates how declaring human rights differs from implementing them and, therefore, from constituting a feasible alternative in human rights protection for the countries of the Global South. Thus, our analysis questions the role of BRICS as a guarantor of human rights beyond the developed Western world or, conversely, as a haven for autocratic regimes which instrumentalise human rights for the purpose of dominating the regions it purports to represent.

Analysis: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa’s constitutions and recent ventures violating human rightsBrazil’s constitutional commitments and actions amidst human right violations

Brazil’s constitution establishes a federal state (a ‘federative republic’) in which the dignity of the human person, labour and free enterprise, and political pluralism are established as foundations (Art. 1 III, IV, V, respectively). Moreover, the construction of society as ‘free, equal and just’, the ‘eradication of poverty’ and the promotion of general well-being without discrimination are fundamental objectives of the federative republic (Art. 3 I, III, IV).

By merely establishing such foundations it should become clear that human rights in Brazil will occupy centre-stage. This is made especially clear by the prevalence of human rights, the self-determination of the peoples and the repudiation of terrorism and racism among the principles defining the country’s international relations (Art. 4 II, III, VIII). Brazil’s constitution is formed around a strong social agenda, which entrenches a significant range of social rights, enhanced labour protection and an emphasis on equality in all domains. It is said that a constitution crystallises as its fundamental provisions the state’s greatest priorities. Sometimes, the greatest priorities also tend to be the state’s greatest problems. In the Brazilian context, this could not be more accurate. Activities in the nation, we are certain, would concern human rights practitioners. If it is true that without democracy, there can be no human rights, then Brazil is suffering from a serious democratic and human rights deficit.

The political tensions in Brazil during the ‘democratic’ elections are never free of controversies; hints of authoritarianism were indicated under President Jair Bolsonaro. The 2021 campaign noted many casualties where the police were involved in killings. This was followed by Bolsonaro’s sweeping claim that the 2022 elections were rigged and that ‘it was only through fraud that he could lose’. The democratic undermining caused ‘more than one million Brazilians, including prominent businesspeople, former Supreme Court justices, politicians, and artists’ to co-sign ‘a manifesto defending democracy and the rule of law’. The degradation of Brazil’s democracy is affecting the indigenous population, the climate laws and education. It is also exacerbating corruption and discrimination against people of colour.

Human rights are about safeguarding people against violence, treating them with respect and protecting them against abuse and exploitation. However, in Brazil these transgressions have been normalised and even overlooked. It is concerning where the trajectory of human rights is headed in Brazil. Notwithstanding the reforms of the current Lula government and the rising awareness of the vindication of indigenous peoples – along with the activism of the indigenous populations themselves – we can only speculate whether Brazil can one day fulfil the pledge for human rights protection the nation makes in its constitution.

Russia’s constitution and its actions

In relation to human rights protection, the Russian constitution clearly adopts the Western framework of the entrenchment of human rights. However, there are important differences. For example, unlike many European constitutions, which only provide a single declaration of human rights, the Russian constitution first entrenches general principles, and then specialises in the form of particular rights. Another differentiation is observed in Russia’s declaration as a ‘social state’ (Art. 7 Par. 1), which reveals the state’s intention to maintain ties with its Soviet heritage. The simultaneous declaration of classic liberal rights (private property and freedom of competition first and foremost) erases this possibility.

In reality, post-Soviet Russia adopts the classical Western ‘ordoliberal’ framework, i.e. the constitution of a liberal state on the basis of individual rights, but with a minimum entrenchment of social policies guaranteeing individual liberties and, contrary to the latter, a dependence on government politics for the range of their implementation. We may therefore ask: If Russia declares human rights in its constitutional document, what justifies the nation’s constant violation and lack of implementation of human rights? In 2022, the political opponent of President Putin, Ilya Yashin, was accused of ‘false information’ and sentenced to eight and a half years in prison. Similarly, in 2023, Vladimir Kara-Murza was accused of treason and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Russia declared war on Ukraine two years ago using cruise missiles to weaken the state before a ground incursion. Cities were bombed ‘using rocket artillery and cluster munitions’. However, because of Russia’s commitment towards human rights (as primarily entrenched in Article 2 of the constitution), ‘Moscow denies targeting civilians. Russia also contradicts reports suggesting that ‘Russian-affiliated forces committed apparent war crimes, including torture, summary executions, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, and looting of cultural property’.

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine has rightly spurred concern and debates in the international community, particularly in Europe. The invasion of Ukraine is not the first time Russia has acted as an aggressor: Similar invasions happened in 2008, with the invasion of Georgia; in 2014, with the invasion of Ukraine and Crimea; and in 2022, with the invasion of Kazakhstan. While one must recognise that Russia is involved in international developmental projects, it is also true that the nation creates the need for this development by promoting extremism.

India’s welfare dream and difficult neighbourhood relations

As declared in the constitution’s preamble, India is a ‘sovereign, socialist, secular democratic republic’. From this sentence only, it is clear what type of state India purported to become at the moment of its independence: The invocation of sovereignty indicates the country’s will to break ties with British imperialism and honour the people’s claim to self-determination. Furthermore, the preamble defines the state’s core values as justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Of these four values, justice is defined as ‘social, economic and political’, liberty as encompassing ‘thought, expression, belief, faith and worship’, equality as covering both ‘status’ and ‘opportunity’, and, finally, fraternity as the principle ‘assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation’.

The declaration and protection of human rights take centre-stage in the fruition of these values. It must also be noted that the constitution provides a broad definition of the ‘state’ as encompassing all territories within India, thus establishing a uniform locus for implementing those rights guaranteed in the constitution. By examining this extensive ensemble of entrenched human rights and directive principles in the constitution, it is evident that India purports to establish a quintessential welfare state. Even classic liberal rights (such as the right to personal liberty and formal equality), under the influence of the fundamental principles and the values declared by the constitution in its preamble, cannot be interpreted in any other manner than fulfilling the paradigm of the social state and affirmative government measures. Yet the recent democratic index suggests that democracy in India is declining. This is an ironic development: While India gains trust and reliability in the international domain, these qualities are diminishing within the nation.
In recent years, India has been pushing for a place on the UN Security Council. Given the country’s low democratic standards, this request can only be alarming. The tagline India aspires to inherit is to emerge as ‘a friend to the world’ (‘Vishwa Mitra’). However, India has not been able to achieve this goal with its neighbours, China and Pakistan. In 2016, a surgical strike was employed by the Indian government as a response to terror attacks on the Indian army. NSA Doval remembered Prime Minister Modi’s words: ‘This attack should not go without a response’. After the success of the strike, the PM stated that ‘retaliation should be immediate to send an unambiguous message’, talking about the terror attacks believed to be springing from within Pakistan. Similarly, in 2019, India conducted the ‘Balakot airstrike’ in Balakot, Pakistan, taking ‘revenge’ for the ‘heinous Pulwama terror attack on a convoy of Indian paramilitary personnel’.

We do not dispute India’s resounding message: ‘No cross-border terrorism will be tolerated’. However, the Indian government’s actions indicate a complete breakdown of trust between the Indian and the Pakistani governments. The concern for human rights compels us to argue that terrorism is a problem for all, and the Indian government must work with the Pakistani government to resolve their tensions. Acting alone for revenge and national security can result in the loss of innocent lives.

China’s ambition and arbitrary actions

China is explicitly defined as a ‘socialist state’ (Article 1 Paragraph 1) organised ‘under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class’. ‘The socialist system’ is proclaimed as ‘the basic system of the People’s Republic of China’. In that regard, all power is invested in ‘the people’ (Art. 2 Par. 1) as organised in both the National People’s Congress and local congresses (Art. 2 Par. 2). Human rights are not incorporated into a distinct section within the constitutional corpus but are included in the provisions declaring the state powers and the democratic sovereignty of the people. The first cluster of rights the constitution entrenches is that of the minorities residing within China, who are declared equal, with any form of discrimination being prohibited and the central state pledging to forge bonds of ‘equality, unity and mutual assistance’ among all peoples on Chinese territory (Art. 4). However, in practice, the Chinese government disregards the international standard of human rights. From denying freedom of speech to citizens through ‘fear of harassment, arrest, or retribution’, to disallowing the freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice, to minority citizens facing ‘mass arbitrary detention, Orwellian surveillance, political indoctrination, torture, forced abortions and sterilization, and state-sponsored forced labour’, China’s human rights conduct has worried many international commentators.

Following the assertive and expansionist nature of the country’s international policies and engagements in recent years, China is in treacherous waters. The turmoil of security dilemmas in the South China Sea is an example: The Chinese government expresses that the sea is part of Chinese territory. China continues to develop its military presence, ‘constructing ports, military installations, and airstrips,’ and has even come up with the strategy of ‘creating new (artificial) islands altogether.’ Meanwhile, China proclaims that it wants to enable the world to develop through peaceful cooperation, a tagline of its illustrious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative is promoted as noble and novel. However, the risk calculations suggest that while prosperity is a possibility, the ‘debt, governance, environmental and social risks’ of the BRI need to be taken into account. In the case of Sri Lanka, China provided money to build a port in Hambantota. When the Sri Lankan government was unable to repay the debt, the Chinese government was allowed lease the port for 99 years in exchange for ‘debt relief’. This is the ‘debt trap’ referred to by the media and some research agencies.

Another rising concern from European and Western countries is that the BRI is a way for China to increase its soft and socialising power, since the BRI may emerge as ‘a powerful lever to bend authoritarian-leaning countries toward Chinese interests’. The concern the European and developing nations carry towards the BRI indicates that Chinese projects and development strategies are not entirely reliable or trustworthy (though it should be noted that the strategies of the West have also been under scrutiny). To China’s advantage, its BRI emerges as an option for enforcing structural changes to a borrowing-nation’s political and economic functioning. In addition, China’s treatment of Tibet and Taiwan, with its long history of usurpation and threatening of both territories, does not project the country as one too considerate of its neighbours’ self-determination. This doubt, combined with China’s conduct of international affairs, is concerning for human rights advocates and practitioners.

South Africa’s failing state and concerns

While South Africa is a postcolonial state, it was not founded upon a settler population inhabiting a land forfeited by its Indigenous custodians, as is the case with many former colonies. On the contrary, in a world where ‘whiteness’ has historically signified ‘blackness’ domination, South Africa presents the example of a ‘Black’ state, where the formerly subordinated people, after decades of resistance, managed to cast off an inhumane Apartheid regime and gain their self-determination.

The South African constitution serves as a testament to this grand achievement. The introductory provision itself seeks to encapsulate this heritage. Human dignity, the elimination of racism and sexism and universal suffrage – among others – are entrenched as values of the state (Articles 1 a, b and d, respectively). It is as if the state, from its constitutive moment, seeks to do away with Apartheid’s discriminatory precedent. In this regard, the very preamble of the constitution pledges to ‘heal the divisions of the past, and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights’. Human rights thus occupy centre stage in South African constitutionalism and are codified in a single section entitled ‘Bill of Rights’. Furthermore, a wide agenda of social rights is enforced through positive measures: Housing, specifically ‘adequate housing’, is recognised as a right (Art. 26), along with the right to food, water, health care and social security (Art. 27), the protection of childhood (Art. 28) and education (Art. 29). However, there is a serious issue of human rights implementation in South Africa. It is not to be forgotten that the Indian Mahatma Gandhi experienced racial discrimination for the first time in South Africa.

Discrimination, corruption, a failed economy and political instability tarnish the state. The democratic progress and condition of the country have been on thin ice as long as economic inequality in the region has been high. Most unjust and corrupt situations are created by the government in power, and indeed, corruption is a prominent problem in South Africa. The Zondo Commission, set up in 2018, reported that about ‘1,438 persons in the public and private sectors’ have been caught for corruption, including ‘criminal charges against former President Zuma’s son for facilitating bribes for awarding contracts from state-owned companies’ to elites of the society. The government has been accused of being involved in a multitude of issues, including the violation human rights, killings of an unjust nature and inhuman treatment of people. The conditions of the jails are also extremely brutal, arrests and detention of citizens are often conducted on an unlawful basis and human trafficking is rife.

Yet another significant factor in the insufficient implementation of human rights in South Africa concerns those for whom the independent state was constituted, i.e. the population of Black people with ancestral ties to the land prior to its colonisation, who often face discrimination. Additionally, xenophobia is a characteristic which has not left the country, instances of hate speech and harassment of migrant workers are constantly reported, and migrant voices are often suppressed, limiting their participation in the functioning of society.

South Africa’s conduct is clearly damaging its international commitment towards human rights. Meanwhile, there is also concern regarding the country’s infringement on the climate, which is considered a shared right of all humanity. South Africa is the ‘fourth biggest coal exporter, contributing to the climate crisis’. Aside from that of its BRICS partners, there has been little effort on the part of the international community to help the nation out of this crisis.
The new members and their implementation of human rights

A primary concern with the new BRICS members is that none of them are democracies. Furthermore, their track record, compared to that of the Western states, is poor when it comes to human rights: The human rights index for Egypt is 0.25 and Saudi Arabia's is 0.17. Similarly, Ethiopia has a human rights index of 0.38 and the UAE an index of 0.35. The human rights index of Iran is 0.22.

Specific human rights violations in these countries cast further light on this data. Egypt’s inhuman treatment of its citizens has been a recurrent theme of the last couple of years, involving ‘unlawful killings, enforced disappearance, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions’ along with a failing judiciary and law enforcing mechanisms. In the case of Ethiopia, the government lacks accountability and transparency in its functioning. There have been attempts to forcefully hold onto power, which has led to clashes with rebels, resulting in the deaths of innocent citizens. Furthermore, instances of ‘harassment and attacks against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) community have been a constant feature of Ethiopian society. In Iran, the authorities have been found guilty of limiting the freedom of speech and expression along with instances of unlawful killings. The nation has been under scrutiny for limiting the freedom of women and the prevalence of sexual assaults and harassment of women in police custody.
The UAE portrays itself as a ‘progressive, tolerant, and rights-respecting’ nation. However, it practices an arbitrary authoritarian policy. The nation limits the freedom of the press, and many cases of unlawful detainment of journalists and lawyers on baseless charges have been reported. Likewise, Saudi Arabia is responsible for numerous unlawful detainments and the systematic suppression of the fundamental human rights of its citizens. This has extended to limiting freedom of speech, baseless charges against citizens who express their opinions in public, subordinating the position of women in society, the execution of children and violating the king’s promise of abandoning the death penalty for juveniles.

Conclusion and recommendations: Will BRICS be able to uphold its commitment to human rights?

Our analysis suggests that the BRICS member states utilise human rights merely through declarations to assert their dominance in the regions they purport to represent. Current members have already committed multiple internal human rights violations, and the group’s expansion to include new members who are predominately not democracies has raised concerns about whether or not, beyond summit declarations, safeguarding and upholding human rights are a core part of BRICS. It is recommended that all member countries first adopt the classical catalogue of individual rights in order to demonstrate their commitment to the Universal Declaration of human rights.

Nigeria
Source: afripoli.org

Summary

• AI is crucial for economic growth and cooperation among BRICS nations, enhancing productivity and fostering collaboration.
• Through shared development efforts, AI can help BRICS countries address global challenges like climate change and cybersecurity.
• Regulatory frameworks and international cooperation are essential for ethical AI development, with BRICS countries leading efforts to establish global AI standards.

Introduction

The BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – represent five of the world’s fastest-growing economies, each having significant influence on the global economy and geopolitics. As these nations continue to develop, the role of technology, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), has become increasingly critical in driving economic growth, enhancing societal welfare and fostering international cooperation.

AI encompasses a variety of technologies and applications designed to simulate human intelligence. Its potential benefits span automation, data analysis and decision-making, making it a powerful tool for enhancing productivity, efficiency, innovation and human well-being (Makridakis, 2017; Saba & Pretorius, 2024). AI is also fundamentally transforming human interactions and business practices, heralding what could be a fourth industrial revolution (Lu, 2021). This technology therefore has the potential to not only transform industries within the BRICS countries but also to strengthen their collaborative bonds. For example, by sharing AI research and development efforts, these countries will be able to pool resources, reduce costs and accelerate technological advancements. Through such a collaborative approach, BRICS countries can pioneer the development of standardised frameworks and protocols that facilitate the integration and interoperability of AI systems across borders.

With the co-development and implementation of AI technologies, the BRICS nations can enhance their collective bargaining power globally. This unity will help them negotiate better terms in international trade agreements, protect their interests in global forums and address common challenges such as climate change and cybersecurity threats. Additionally, these countries can gain insights into regional and international trends using AI-powered data analysis and predictive modeling, enabling them to make informed decisions and coordinate their actions effectively. In sum, the development and sharing of AI technologies and technological resources can bridge the digital divide and ensure that all member countries benefit from the advancements in AI.

However, strengthening their position as lead actors on a geopolitical stage requires the BRICS countries to implement smart policies and create suitable conditions for developing AI technologies (Cyman et al., 2021). While the ongoing cooperation on the development of joint facial recognition systems, cross-border data sharing, regulatory frameworks, research and startup ecosystems paints a promising picture, AI's regulatory and ethical landscape needs greater attention if BRICS countries aspire to lead on responsible AI. Political, economic and institutional governance also play a critical role in determining the impact of AI on the economic growth of BRICS countries. They therefore need to balance the application of AI in different sectors against its negative impact on employment and the partial replacement of workers and unethical use cases that may hinder development among the member countries. For example, while the application of AI for maritime security and cross-border intelligence serves peaceful purposes, its possible implementation in the conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe may lead to abuse of the technology.

This warrants an analysis of the potential for AI to foster domestic development and international cooperation among the BRICS nations. However, the literature pertaining to the recent developments among BRICS countries is disparate. This paper attempts to consolidate these sources in order to explore the following research objectives:

1. The role of AI in fostering cooperation for collective economic growth in BRICS nations
2. The influence of AI on maritime and internet security
3. Emerging cooperation on AI regulation and governance

Comprehensive analysis of these aspects of AI development in BRICS is important for establishing a model of cross-border cooperation for other Global South countries.

AnalysisAI fostering economic growth and maritime security

The influence of BRICS countries on the global economy is profound. Formed during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, BRICS was established as a reformist group aiming to challenge Western dominance in multilateral financial institutions. Since 2014, BRICS has taken on a more geopolitical character, pushing for a fairer international system that better serves the Global South (Darnal et al., 2023). The expansion of BRICS provides access to new markets and trade opportunities, boosting economic growth and stability among its members. Diversifying economic interests is essential for reducing risks and building a resilient financial ecosystem (Bhowmick, 2024).

However, despite the shared goal of enhancing the Global South’s role in global trade, BRICS nations face numerous internal challenges. Intra-BRICS trade is complicated by opaque licensing restrictions, export taxes and logistical inefficiencies, such as cumbersome documentation, customs clearance delays and poor infrastructure (Baschuk, 2023). AI technologies offer a solution to these barriers by streamlining and automating trade processes, from customs clearance to trade compliance. By employing machine learning and natural language processing, AI can expedite document processing, detect anomalies and improve the efficiency of international trade, enhancing security and compliance (International Trade Council, 2023).

Economic imbalances within BRICS, particularly China's dominant position, also present challenges. For example, China’s dominance has led to the deindustrialisation of countries like Brazil, which has lost its status as the leading exporter of manufactured goods to South American nations (Baschuk, 2023). This underscores the importance of identifying new markets for trade. AI-driven market intelligence can help businesses analyse vast amounts of data to identify trends, consumer preferences and market demands. This enables companies to adapt their products and strategies to meet the specific needs of different markets, boosting their global competitiveness (International Trade Council, 2023).

At the same time, multinational companies from BRICS countries operating in regions like Africa and Latin America sometimes perpetuate exploitative practices in a manner similar to traditional West-Global South relations. This is particularly true in raw material extraction and labour use (Baschuk, 2023). AI can mitigate these practices by enhancing transparency and accountability through improved risk assessment and fraud detection. By analysing transaction data and shipping information, AI can detect suspicious patterns, enabling businesses and customs authorities to take proactive steps against illicit trade and protect intellectual property (International Trade Council, 2023).

Beyond trade, AI has the potential to revolutionise industries and economies. While AI is often seen as a catalyst for growth and employment, concerns remain about its potential to displace workers in the short term (Lu, 2021). However, economic theory suggests that while technological advancements may initially replace jobs, they will ultimately create new opportunities as industries evolve (Saba and Ngepah, 2024). This makes AI an essential technology for BRICS nations, where concerns about job displacement due to technological change are widespread.
AI can also play a critical role in enhancing maritime security for BRICS members, who control significant maritime regions, such as the Arctic Sea (Russia), the Western Pacific (China and Russia), and the Indian Ocean (India). Maritime security is vital for protecting resources and ensuring safe trade routes, yet it faces numerous threats, including piracy, terrorism and illegal activities. AI technologies can significantly enhance maritime surveillance by detecting suspicious activities and improving decision-making in naval operations. For example, AI can detect skiffs used by pirates, which are difficult to track using conventional radar systems (Pheng, 2020). In naval operations, AI improves command and control systems, making naval vessels smarter and more responsive to potential threats (Mukherjee, 2018).

Cybersecurity is another area where AI can bolster BRICS cooperation. The 2013 eThekwini Declaration and the 2015 Ufa Declaration highlighted the need for secure cyberspace among BRICS nations. While national cybersecurity policies differ across the bloc, AI can enhance cybersecurity efforts by detecting and responding to threats more efficiently. By fostering cooperation in this area, BRICS can strengthen its collective security in the digital age (Belli, 2019).

Regulatory cooperation on AI

The establishment of an adequate legal framework for regulating AI-based technologies in the digital era is crucial for the BRICS counties’ continued development. A significant legal instrument in this regard is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation among the BRICS members. Approved in 2015, the memorandum outlines the primary areas of cooperation, including the exchange of information on policies and programmes, promotion of innovation and technology transfer, high-performance computing, basic research, space research and exploration, aeronautics, astronomy and earth observation (Cyman et al., 2021). Additional focus areas include medicine and biotechnology, high-tech zones, science parks and incubators, technology transfer, information and communication technology, and geospatial technologies.

To fully realise the potential of the MoU, it is essential to implement short-term exchanges of scientists and experts, establish training programmes for human capital development and organise collaborative workshops and conferences. Additionally, the exchange of scientific information, creation of joint funding mechanisms and formulation of collaborative research programmes are necessary to foster innovation (Ibid). Greater access to infrastructure, simultaneous calls for research proposals and cooperation among national academies and agencies will further strengthen this partnership in science, technology and innovation.

Another pivotal legal document is the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, approved in 2015, which aims to consolidate efforts to foster innovative economic development based on advanced technologies and skills development (Ibid). This strategy seeks to build knowledge economies, promote a peaceful, secure, open, trusted and cooperative digital and internet space, and consider incentives to attract investment and production in BRICS countries by global IT manufacturers. It also aims to address human resource and technology gaps through international scientific and technological cooperation. To achieve these goals, BRICS should form a working group on ICT cooperation, promote regular ministerial interactions and offer training programmes for human capital development in IT and digital innovations. Additionally, the BRICS members should exchange expertise on information society policies to ensure equitable distribution of the benefits of these new technologies.

Though the MoU and the Strategy document are adequate in emphasising the importance of multinational cooperation, they do not specifically list the joint initiatives that can lead the way for AI collaboration. The state of AI regulation in each of the BRICS nations varies, depending on the cultural, social and economic nuances of each member nation. To leverage AI and the digital economy for accelerated development in the Global South, BRICS nations must enhance cooperation and promote joint activities to address AI-related concerns. This will enable member countries to drive robust economic growth and uphold the multilateral trading system, guided by the rules and principles of the World Trade Organization.

It is important to note that BRICS nations are currently collaborating on information and communications technologies (ICT). At the 10th BRICS Working Group meeting on Information and Communication Technologies Security in Moscow, they agreed to establish a contact point register for sharing information on cyberattacks. Meanwhile, Russia's proposals to enhance the regulatory framework for international information security and initiate dialogue with the scientific community received positive feedback from its partners (BRICS Russia, 2024). Additionally, the working group on ICT cooperation has grown in importance for countering the use of ICT for criminal and terrorist purposes, promoting innovative telecommunications equipment, developing new communication standards and technologies, and resisting cyber threats (Mahrenbach and Papa, 2024).

The BRICS group must collectively develop AI policies and advance members’ AI capabilities. Initiatives such as the BRICS AI Study Group and the Digital Economy Working Group, as committed to at the 2023 BRICS Summit, are steps in this direction (Ibid). Additionally, the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) is investing in AI applications within BRICS countries. As these developments progress, effective regulation is becoming more crucial. Approaches by the original BRICS nations towards AI regulation have been diverse. While India has a dedicated National Strategy for AI which lays down principles for inclusive, progressive AI that aids the economy, China's New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan emphasises responsible development, data privacy and cybersecurity, while aligning with the state's control and surveillance priorities. Russia's National AI Development Strategy prioritises infrastructure advancements, including supercomputing, cross-country collaboration and increased support for R&D, along with AI awareness and training initiatives. Brazil’s Proposed AI Regulation focuses on safeguarding fundamental rights and promoting secure, reliable systems to enhance national autonomy and reduce dependence on foreign AI tools. South Africa’s National AI Policy Framework seeks to integrate AI technologies for economic growth and societal well-being, positioning the country as a leader in AI innovation, while prohibiting practices like manipulation, exploitation of vulnerable groups, biometric categorisation of sensitive traits and social scoring.

However, aligning the diverse approaches to AI regulation within the BRICS countries presents a challenge. The BRICS group must navigate competition with governments and tech corporations that often dominate multistakeholder initiatives, potentially sidelining issues relevant to BRICS and developing economies. Coordinating regional discussions in South Asia and Africa could help establish shared positions or guiding principles on AI, emphasising its impact on labour and financial markets and cooperative measures for AI capacity-building.

Diversifying AI for the Global South

Since the signing of the MoU on Science, Technology and Innovation in 2015, AI has been a recurring topic in BRICS ministerial meetings across sectors such as agriculture, communications, education, environment, foreign affairs, science and technology, and trade. Declarations from leaders' summits and ministerial meetings indicate that BRICS countries view AI as a catalyst for economic growth, technological progress and inclusive societies (Ibid).

The BRICS nations have therefore called for an effective global framework on AI, with a focus on ethical development. They support communication and cooperation on AI technology to promote mutual benefits and advocate for strengthening the international governance of AI. This includes encouraging policy exchanges and dialogues with the aim of establishing a global governance framework to protect human rights while spurring innovation and economic growth (ABP News Bureau, 2023). In August 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans to form an 'AI study group' within the BRICS member countries with the purpose of monitoring AI technology development. This group aims to catalyse innovation in AI and develop a robust governance framework to enhance the security, reliability, control and equity of AI technologies (Digital Watch, 2023).

These initiatives are crucial. Not only may infrastructure challenges in the Global South hinder AI development due to the significant data requirements and computing resources needed to train AI systems (Okolo, 2023), the Global South often serves as a hub for outsourced data-labelling labour, raising concerns about data protection and AI misuse. The nascent state of AI legislation globally therefore presents an opportunity for the Global South to address the potential negative impacts of AI. Governments must draft and enact AI strategies to protect vulnerable communities and enable responsible innovation. Furthermore, these nations must be prominently represented in multilateral global conversations on AI governance (Digital Watch, 2023).

The BRICS countries are also collaborating on joint facial recognition systems and cross-border data-sharing networks, while simplifying regulatory frameworks, investing in education and research, and supporting AI start-ups. For instance, China is considering launching a BRICS centre for cooperation in technology development, as announced by Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu at a BRICS meeting during the Russian Chairmanship (Lavrov, 2024). Such developments counter the hegemony of the Global North in AI development and policymaking, and position BRICS members as vocal players representing the unique needs and challenges of the Global South.

On August 22, 2024, the National Center for Artificial Intelligence Development, under the Government of the Russian Federation, announced a significant enhancement in collaborative efforts between Russia and China in the domain of AI. This initiative is particularly noteworthy as it underscores the commitment of both nations to fostering a structured partnership aimed at advancing AI technologies. The National Center for AI outlined several key objectives for this collaboration, including the establishment of a working group dedicated to AI cooperation, facilitating the exchange of experiences and best practices concerning the regulation of ethics and the industrial application of AI, and promoting cooperative endeavors among BRICS nations to enhance their collective capabilities in AI development. This strategic partnership not only emphasises the importance of ethical standards in AI but also highlights the potential for increased synergies within the BRICS framework, aiming to leverage AI for economic and technological advancements across member states (Data Guidance, 2024).

Recommendations

Given their diverse economic landscapes, technological capabilities and developmental priorities, BRICS nations require a coordinated approach to leverage artificial intelligence (AI) for inclusive growth. Effective collaboration in AI can be achieved through several key strategies, which collectively bridge technological gaps and foster innovation across the member states. Here are a few recommendations for how BRICS countries can thrive in the evolving AI landscape.

Joint research initiatives

Joint research and development (R&D) initiatives should be established, focusing on socially relevant applications of AI in areas such as healthcare, climate change mitigation, agriculture and infrastructure management. By creating AI research hubs and innovation centres across BRICS countries, expertise can be pooled, enabling the development of solutions tailored to the unique challenges faced by these regions. Each nation's distinctive strengths – for example, China’s advancements in AI hardware, India’s proficiency in software development, and Russia’s capabilities in cybersecurity – can be synergised to drive innovation.

Ethical thought leadership

Developing common ethical and regulatory frameworks is critical to the responsible implementation of AI technologies. BRICS nations should collaboratively create guidelines that address key concerns such as data privacy, algorithmic transparency and the mitigation of biases in AI systems. By harmonising their regulatory approaches, these countries can ensure the ethical deployment of AI technologies and position themselves as leaders in shaping global AI governance.

Data exchange and sovereignty

Data sharing and infrastructure development is another critical pillar for collaboration. The establishment of shared AI infrastructure, including secure data-sharing platforms and cloud-based computing resources, can accelerate innovation and reduce duplication of effort. A BRICS-wide commitment to creating accessible AI infrastructure would enable all member nations to benefit from each other's advancements.

Talent development

Capacity building and talent exchange programmes should be prioritised. Investments in education, skilling and AI literacy across BRICS nations will foster the development of a highly trained workforce, ensuring that these countries can maintain a competitive edge in AI innovation while promoting equitable access to AI opportunities.

Conclusion

AI is destined to play a pivotal role in fostering cooperation among the BRICS members and in capacity development in the economic, regulatory and security landscapes. This paper underscores the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) to foster cooperation among BRICS nations. The analysis of the current regulatory, economic and security landscapes demonstrates that AI can serve as a catalyst for collaboration, addressing various challenges faced by these countries. Existing agreements and memoranda, such as the BRICS MoU on Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation, and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, provide a robust framework for future AI collaborations. These documents promote the exchange of information and innovation and lay the groundwork for the establishment of common standards and practices.

The cooperative development of AI technologies from a Global South perspective can enhance inclusivity and ensure that AI benefits all member nations. By working together on formulating regulations, ethical standards and practical use cases, BRICS countries can set a global precedent for AI governance. This unified approach can position AI as a driver of geopolitical collaboration, bridging the diverse economic, social and political profiles within the BRICS bloc.

Ultimately, fostering AI cooperation among BRICS nations will not only strengthen their collective voice in the global arena but also promote sustainable and inclusive technological advancement, reinforcing the importance of solidarity and shared progress in the digital age.

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