Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

The option for disengagement from BRICS is gaining adherents among Brazilian diplomats and is being actively promoted by sectors of Brazilian organized civil society, especially those NGOs and think tanks that receive financial support from European and American institutions. The engagement of these sectors in the G20 events during Brazil's Presidency of 2024 and the lack of interest in the BRICS process during Russia's Presidency in the BRICS in the same year is another sign of alertness, writes Fabiano Mielniczuk.

During the South Africa Summit held in 2023, the BRICS countries agreed to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to become new members in 2024. Although it was welcomed by the foreign offices of the member countries as a demonstration of the group's strengthening, when viewed from the Brazilian perspective the results were far from satisfying. Depending on how harsh the critic is, the expansion can even be seen as a defeat. In this sense, the country needs to re-evaluate its strategy towards BRICS in general, and towards the expansion process in particular, in order to continue to be a relevant actor in the multipolar world.

In 2010, Brazil supported South Africa's entry in the BRICS, but analysts tend to consider that decision as motivated by interests of domestic politics; an attempt of president Lula da Silva to curry favour with the Brazilian Black Movement. Moreover, at the international level, the inclusion of South Africa could facilitate Brazil's diplomacy due to the curious situation in which the informal group began to function within another, namely IBSA, formed a few years earlier by India, Brazil and South Africa. Since then, Brazil had been cautious regarding the expansion of BRICS. The country fears that the dilution of power among new members could negatively affect its influence in the process of transforming the structure of international governance.

The salutary caution from the beginning gave place to one of a different kind from 2022 onwards. It seems that the cautionary position on the expansion stems from Brazil's lack of clarity regarding the possible benefits that BRICS can offer. Russian actions in Ukraine and increasing tensions between China and the USA have brought discomfort to Brazil. In this context, Brazilian diplomacy interpreted the actions taken by the Chinese presidency of BRICS in 2022 as aimed at strengthening the pillar of political and security cooperation to the detriment of the others. In the same vein, the accelerated expansion of the group sponsored by Beijing was interpreted as a decision to meet the needs of the security interests of China and Russia. This stance by Itamaraty seems to be out of line with Lula's presidential diplomacy, as he has offered himself as a mediator in the conflict between Russia and the West and quite explicitly supported the inclusion of new members in the BRICS. This misalignment between Itamaraty and the Presidency has crippled Brazil's capacity to assess the importance of BRICS and has resulted in some inconsistencies, which are highlighted below.

Firstly, it is worth noting that Brazil's erstwhile support for the informal and flexible format of the group was jettisoned with Brazil's insistence on the establishment of explicit criteria for the accession of new members. In what could be seen as a Brazilian victory, these criteria were defined in the "Guiding Principles, Standards, Criteria and Procedures" for expansion, adopted in South Africa. However, the "Guiding Principles" did not contemplate the Brazilian proposal. Brazil supported three criteria for the entry of new members: the new members' commitment to the BRICS reform agenda, participation in the G20 and participation in the NDB. An analysis of the document clearly indicates that only the first proposal was covered, albeit in a very general way. There are no references to the G20 and the NDB in the document. Brazilian diplomacy would argue that, despite not being incorporated in the "Guiding Principles", the Brazilian proposal was accepted, at least partially, in practice: of the six new members invited, two belonged to the G20 (Argentina and Saudi Arabia) and two to the NDB (the United Arab Emirates and Egypt). However, considering Argentina's refusal to join BRICS and the entry of Iran and Ethiopia, which do not belong to either of these organizations, this positive assessment is attenuated. The insufficiency of this outcome from Brazil's perspective is even clearer when one considers that the definition of the formal criteria for entrance did not impose any limits on the number of future members, as Brazil wished.

Brazil's defeat in the enlargement process is not surprising and reflects a certain disengagement on the part of Brazil from the BRICS. In fact, the drastic change in the direction of world politics from 2022 onwards has fuelled an already well-known stance in Brazilian diplomacy that has been openly reproduced by diplomats occupying key positions in the BRICS negotiating process. According to them, IBSA would better serve Brazil's interests, as it is a coalition where there would be no "taboo-issues" such as democracy, human rights or gender. The fact that this idea disregards the way in which India has redefined its contemporary identity does not go unnoticed. The negative impact of such reading on the expanded BRICS is also not ignored, as the incorporation of Arab Muslim countries in the BRICS necessitates that the current members take a more sensitive and generous look at intra-bloc differences. In this context, the pro-IBSA discourse seems more like an escape route from BRICS than a bet on IBSA itself.

Another inconsistency that harms the country's participation in the BRICS-Plus format concerns the appointment of key figures in the BRICS ecosystem. After the presidency of the pro-Western liberal Marcos Troyjo at the NBD (appointed by former President Jair Bolsonaro), President Lula da Silva appointed former president Dilma Rousseff for the position in 2023. Seen as the political rehabilitation of the former President of Brazil after her 2016 impeachment, her appointment was considered appropriate by the other BRICS members due to Rousseff's role in launching the NDB at the Fortaleza Summit, in 2014.

This interpretation neglects that it was during Roussef's first term (2010-2014) that Brazil distanced itself from allies such as China and Russia in an attempt to rebalance relations within BRICS through the relaunching of partnerships with the USA and Europe. This strategy of rebalancing was advocated by chancellor Antonio Patriota (2011-13), who was dismissed from his position after a diplomatic fiasco in Bolivia — a Brazilian diplomat at the Embassy in La Paz fled by car to Brazil without the government's authorization with a Bolivian senator who was accused of corruption by the Morales government, had received asylum at the Embassy, but did not have a safe-conduct guarantee to leave the Embassy. That episode damaged Roussef's authority and created a crisis with Bolivia. The responsibility was fully assumed by the diplomat involved and years later he received an administrative penalty for his participation in the escape. Last year, Roussef was not particularly happy to meet him at the BRICS Summit in South Africa where he was Brazilian Sherpa for the BRICS and, apparently, demanded that President Lula da Silva dismiss the diplomat.

These inconsistencies suggest that Brazil, despite the competence of its diplomacy, is confused in its relationship with BRICS. The fact that the Biden administration has contributed decisively to the maintenance of Lula da Silva in power after the failed coup attempt attributed to former President Jair Bolsonaro must also be considered. Lula da Silva wants BRICS to be strengthened, but he is indebted to the USA and some European countries for guaranteeing him in office and does not intend to jeopardize relations with them — not at least until the justice concludes the judgment of the former President. Meanwhile, the option for disengagement from BRICS is gaining adherents among Brazilian diplomats and is being actively promoted by sectors of Brazilian organized civil society, especially those NGOs and think tanks that receive financial support from European and American institutions. The engagement of these sectors in the G20 events during Brazil's Presidency of 2024 and the lack of interest in the BRICS process during Russia's Presidency in the BRICS in the same year is another sign of alertness.

In this complicated scenario, the best strategy is to appeal to the direct involvement of Celso Amorim, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Chief Advisor for International Affairs of President Lula da Silva. As one of the fathers of BRICS, Amorim is trusted by the other partners and has the moral authority to realign the major Brazilian actors from both the government and the civil society towards the BRICS. Moreover, the doubled-in-size BRICS-Plus will demand a different organizational strategy from Brazil, which has enormous difficulty in keeping up with the workload involved in all the BRICS dimensions. One might think of the creation of a BRICS Task Force that could well be headed by Amorim and aggregate a quantitatively significant group of diplomats under his leadership. In the short term, this looks like the only way to put Brazil back on track in the BRICS process.

South Africa
Source: www.iol.co.za

The Agricultural Business Chamber (Agbiz) has said that while BRICS+ remained a political grouping with no formal trade structure, the bilateral agreements between the BRICS+ countries for increasing trade were encouraging.

Agbiz chief economist Wandile Sihlobo yesterday said that South Africa would continue prioritising the widening of agricultural exports in this grouping, but also keep supplying its key export markets.

"Such efforts will not be at the expense of robust markets in Europe, Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East," Sihlobo said.

"South Africa's agricultural sector still has room to grow and trade is essential to the sector's growth strategy."

He said export opportunities for South Africa's agricultural products were opening up within the BRICS+ countries.

"Over the past two years, China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have widened market access for various agricultural products from South Africa," Sihlobo said.

"Admittedly, Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have only recently joined the BRICS+ grouping, and market access is part of the long-term bilateral engagements with South Africa. South Africa has access to selected fruits, wine, wool, meat and grains."

However, Agbiz noted that South Africa aimed to broaden market access in BRICS+ for most of the country's agricultural products.

For this reason, through the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg and the prior engagements, South Africa prioritised trade as a significant point on the agenda for discussion.

"The political principals broadly agreed that deepening trade was necessary for the BRICS countries. Still, each country's trade and agricultural authorities are responsible for taking the lead and seeking market access from member countries," Sihlobo said.

"The idea of a BRICS agricultural trade agreement that some argued for has not yet been thoroughly ventilated. The priority so far was for each BRICS member to work to reduce import tariffs and address the phytosanitary constraints for various products that BRICS member countries would present."

Sihlobo said with BRICS adding new members to form a bigger BRICS+ from January 1, 2024, the agricultural trade opportunities had increased.

"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt are some of the newest members. These two countries present enormous opportunities for widening South Africa's agricultural exports. Egypt spends about $16 billion (R294bn) a year importing agricultural products from the world market. These are mainly wheat, maize, soybeans, palm oil, beef, apples and pears, dairy, cotton, potatoes and tea, among other products," he said.

"It is here that South African grain farmers, traders and beef producers should focus on increasing exports. Egypt even took the initiative of visiting South Africa at the start of this year in search of maize imports. The Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development and the South African Cereals and Oilseeds Traders Association were at the forefront of the engagements."

Even before adding the new members, the original BRICS countries were already significant importers of agricultural products as this group's agricultural imports averaged $255bn annually between 2019 and 2022, according to Trade Map data.

China accounts for 71% of all the agricultural imports into the group, followed by India at 11%, Russia at 11%, Brazil at 4% and South Africa at 3%.

The products these countries imported include soybeans, beef, maize, berries, wheat, palm oil, poultry meat, cotton, barley, dairy products, pork, apricots and peaches, sugar, wool, sunflower seed, nuts, sorghum, goat meat, wine, grapes, bananas, avocados, mangos, guavas, and fruit juices, among other products.

South Africa produces some of these products in abundance and has surplus volumes for exports.

Despite these sizeable agricultural import figures, the intra-BRICS agricultural trade remained relatively low.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Business model innovation in EM: towards a BRICS+ business model


In the discussions on the future evolution of the BRICS+ format the macro perspective as well as the geo-political/geo-economic view frequently overshadow the micro-level discussions regarding new business models and firm-to-firm modes of cooperation to be employed by entrepreneurs. In reality, the BRICS+ construct as a macro-level concept that envisages various forms of international cooperation across the Global South may quickly lose momentum without the support from the "bottom-up" impulses emanating from the business sector. One area that may be quite promising in exploring the possible modalities of business cooperation across the developing world is business model innovation (BMI), an exciting and actively developing branch of business studies. One of the definitions of business model innovation is "the discovery of a new business model that is new to the world or new to the industry in which it is being introduced"[1].

BMI hence deals with the modalities of how new business models emerge and are developed, with the key dimensions of business models innovation (the "magic triangle" of business models) being formed by what is offered to the customer; how is the value proposition created; who is the target customer and why does the model generate value[2]. To qualify as business model innovation at least 2 of these four dimensions of business model development need to be transformed and innovated. And while there are dozens of business models that can be combined with each other in coming up with new innovative approaches and strategies[3], there does appear to be a lack of business models that target explicitly sales and production of goods and services in emerging markets. Among the few business models that do so is the "reverse innovation" model in which simple and inexpensive products designed and manufactured in emerging markets are also sold in advanced economies[4].

On the basis of the existing business model innovation framework it may then be expedient to develop a number of business models with a particular focus on emerging markets. One possible version could be a BRICS+ business model that is based on the production/sale of goods in the core BRICS-5 economies (China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Russia) – these are the economies with the largest economies and consumer markets in their respective regions. Furthermore, each of the BRICS-5 economies has a regional free-trade arrangement (MERCOSUR in the case of Brazil, Eurasian Economic Union in the case of Russia, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in the case of India, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the case of China and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in the case of South Africa) that can facilitate the sale of products manufactured in core BRICS economies to their respective regional partners.

Accordingly, within a BRICS+ business model the goods are initially produced in the core BRICS-5 economies and are then sold to the respective regional markets as a further stage of product development that is tailored to consumer preferences and logistical conditions in these economies. Adapting sales and products to local conditions in the regional partner economies may be facilitated via employing such business models as "no frills" (value proposition kept to a minimum with cost savings passed to consumers in the form of lower prices), "white label", "franchising" or "affiliation"[5]. There may also be further extensions in the BRICS+ model life-cycle, whereby after the stages of core BRICS-5 and BRICS regional partners, the goods are also sold in advanced economies as part of the "reverse innovation" model. This would in effect represent an expanded BRICS++ business model that covers not only emerging markets, but also a further development or sale of products in developed economies. Apart from "reverse innovation" some of the business models that may be employed at this BRICS++ stage include "add-on" (extra options/offerings that are priced higher than the core offering) or "experience selling" (the value of the product or service is increased by the experience offered with it)[6].

Within the "magic triangle" of business model innovation the BRICS+ business model addresses the "How?", the "Value" and the "Who?" dimensions. With respect to the Value dimension, profit generation is attained via taking advantage of the regional free trade agreements within the BRICS+ platform. Greater value generation is also achieved through using core BRICS economies as a base for sales and production as these markets have some of the largest pools of "middle class" consumers, qualified labour and research and development (R&D) financing in the developing world. In terms of the market segments (the "Who?" dimension), the model presents a staged process in product sales/production, with sales in core BRICS economies being followed by their regional partners as well as advanced economies. In terms of its operational modalities (the "How?" dimension), the model focusses on exploiting the regional integration linkages across developing economies to advance product sales across the BRICS+ space with lower costs. The latter concerns lower import duties paid in selling goods from the regional BRICS core hub to regional partners as well as lower production costs in terms of labour, materials and energy compared to advanced economies.

The BRICS+ and BRICS++ model in some respects combines elements of the "reverse innovation" business model (in the BRICS++ stage) and Vernon's product cycle theory (in the BRICS+ stage with respect to core BRICS markets vs their regional partners), in which "products should be developed in knowledge- and capital-intensive higher income countries and then produced in low-wage countries"[7]. The sequencing in the implementation of the BRICS+/BRICS++ model may have the benefit of giving companies a sufficient presence in the most populous economies of the developing world before making further inroads into the more sophisticated and competitive developed markets. It also allows companies to secure presence in those markets of the world economy that are likely to witness the highest levels and growth rates in the ranks of the "middle class" as well as in the "consumption-driven" younger generation cohorts (given the demographic trends in the world economy that favour the developing nations).

The use of the BRICS+ business model would generate more returns and would take on greater prominence across the corporate world of the Global South in case the BRICS+ economies develop a platform for the main regional integration blocs of BRICS economies that involves greater liberalization of trade and investment flows across such regional integration arrangements. Stronger impulses towards regional integration, trade liberalization and the harmonization of technical standards in the main regional blocs of the developing world would also contribute to a greater propagation in the use of the BRICS+ business model.

Overall, the BRICS+ business model may be employed to advance sales across a range of products and services. Perhaps some of the more promising venues in terms of the "What?" dimension of the business model innovation triangle could be ecological/green products that are likely to find not only growing demand within the developing world, but that could also be adapted to the market preferences and standards in advanced economies. Another trajectory for the BRICS+ model is the segment of digital platforms in the consumer and financial sectors that could exploit network effects built in the emerging market space to subsequently expand presence in the advanced markets. In the latter case, companies could make use of platform business models such as "get the big shots" (attracting key users who can also bring their own networks to the platform), "subsidize the sensitive" (subsidizing the highly price-sensitive users that are crucial to the growth of the platform), or "piggyback" (connecting with an existing user base from a different platform and leveraging its assets) to scale up their market share[8]. Companies pursuing such business model strategies with the aim of increasing sales across the BRICS+ and BRICS++ space would need to develop BRICS+ ecosystems and partnerships that facilitate the possibility to leverage the resources that local producers and distributors have in the respective regions of the BRICS+ world.



Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Image by ds_30 via Pixabay

[1] Constantinos Markides. Business Model Innovation. Cambridge Elements. Business Strategy. Cambridge University Press. 2023, p. 4

[2] Oliver Gassman, Karolin Frankenberger, Michaela Choudury. The business model navigator. The strategies behind the most successful companies. Second edition. FT Publishing. Pearson. 2020, p. 7-8

[3] There are various schools of thought on the creation of new business models: from the technology-driven school (University of California, Berkeley) to Strategic Choice School (Harvard Business School). The one that is employed in the discussion on BRICS+ business model is the Recombination School (University of St. Gallen) that presents business models as a recombination of existing models and patterns – see Oliver Gassman, Karolin Frankenberger, Roman Sauer. Exploring the field of business model innovation. New Theoretical perspectives. Pelgrave Macmillan. 2016, p. 19

[4] Oliver Gassman, Karolin Frankenberger, Michaela Choudury. The business model navigator. The strategies behind the most successful companies. Second edition. FT Publishing. Pearson. 2020, p. 275

[5] Oliver Gassman, Karolin Frankenberger, Michaela Choudury. The business model navigator. The strategies behind the most successful companies. Second edition. FT Publishing. Pearson. 2020, p. 327, 97

[6] Oliver Gassman, Karolin Frankenberger, Michaela Choudury. The business model navigator. The strategies behind the most successful companies. Second edition. FT Publishing. Pearson. 2020, p. 149

[7] Oliver Gassman, Karolin Frankenberger, Michaela Choudury. The business model navigator. The strategies behind the most successful companies. Second edition. FT Publishing. Pearson. 2020, p. 275

[8] Felix Wortmann, Sven Jung, Oliver Gassman. The platform business navigator. The strategies behind the most successful platform companies. First edition. FT Publishing. Pearson. 2024, p. 178, p. 179, p. 185

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Question: I would like to start with a topic which has been dominating the global agenda since 2022 and touched not only every Russian household, but all people in general. People have been calling it various names, be it the special military operation, the Ukraine conflict or a war. What we hear today, including in the Western media, is that Russia is winning on the front. In your opinion, what has changed since 2022 against the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict?

Sergey Lavrov: As far as terminology is concerned, stopping the war the West had already unleashed at that time against us by the hands of the Nazi regime in Kiev was precisely our objective when we launched the special military operation.

We were honest in what we did, and expected the other side to demonstrate the same kind of dignity when in February 2014 the West, represented by France, Germany and Poland, helped broker a deal between the then-President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, and the opposition for calling a snap election and forming a national unity government. European Union representatives signed this deal, but the very next morning the opposition decided that it could not care less about the deal or the EU in general and went on to perpetrate a government coup. They announced a government of the victors instead of forming a national unity government. Their first initiative was to terminate the official status of the Russian language in Ukraine. However, at least 80 percent of Ukrainians think, live and communicate in Russian.

This is how the war started. The republics that refused to accept the government coup were labelled as terrorists. Crimea peacefully returned to its home port, to use President Vladimir Putin's words. Meanwhile, the Donbass republics had to experience a real war, artillery strikes, with air forces bombing peaceful cities. You know how it happens. Singing the Minsk Agreements took a whole year with Germany and France, represented by Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Francois Hollande, acting as guarantors. The UN Security Council approved the Minsk Agreements too. There was a sincere belief among us that having these agreements implemented would serve our interests. But the West has recently acknowledged that their only objective when signing the Minsk Agreements was supplying more weapons to Ukraine.

The war was quite long in the making, and has been waged for a long time too. The West has introduced its usual tools into the mix, including sanctions, blackmail and threats. We did not have any other choice. In late 2021 and early 2022, the Kiev regime clearly opted for settling what it called as the Donbass issue by force. We decided to defend our own security, since NATO has been trying to draw Ukraine into its ranks and had already plans to set up military bases on its territory, including on the Sea of Azov, which is on Russia's doorstep. We launched the special military operation to protect Russians who have been living on this land for centuries since Cathrine the Great added them to the Russian crown. Russian military commanders and manufacturers defended and developed this territory, while the Kiev regime outlawed these people by banning the Russian language across the board, be it in education, media, culture, or even everyday communications. This is what the special military operation is all about.

Today, we can hear Western leaders recognising that Ukraine has been facing an increasingly challenging situation. This is quite an elaborate way of saying that their idea of inflicting what they call a strategic defeat on us is doomed to fail. The most farsighted and simply smart, serious Western politicians understand this. Still, the West has been searching for the weapons it delivers to Ukraine across the world. Over 50 countries have been contributing to these efforts.

At first, the Americans led the charge. Today, they designated NATO as the focal point. It holds its Ramstein-format meetings. Several days ago, Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin said at a meeting of this kind that they would never lose. This means that instead of talking about inflicting a defeat on Russia, they are now focusing on not suffering a defeat themselves. This can be viewed as a Freudian slip on Lloyd Austin's behalf since he basically recognised that the Ukrainians are not the ones doing the fighting. They are just tools and their bodies have very little value. The West keeps saying that it would not let its people die in Donbass. So they pretend that they care about having fewer Ukrainian killed there, too. This is a racist logic that I do not want to discuss.

As for what to do next – there is much debate now about the planned conference in Switzerland, a meeting where Bern intends to bring together representatives of the West and the Global South. However, despite the loud declarations that this new initiative is aimed at developing generally acceptable approaches, this is not true. I spoke with Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Ignazio Cassis at the end of January in New York, when we both participated in the UN Security Council meetings. He told me about "the plan." I immediately tried to bring him down to earth and make him see that they would not be allowed to deviate from Vladimir Zelensky's formula, which involves Russia's eventual capitulation, the payment of reparations, a tribunal for the Russian leadership, and more of the same. Ignazio Cassis assured me that we were wrong. He said that Switzerland, as a neutral country, would make every effort to ensure a realistic framework for discussion. But the Swiss Confederation is no longer a neutral state. The country is now at the forefront of supporting and arming the Kiev regime. This state takes the toughest stance against Russia, consistently joining the ever-new sanctions.

The concept behind the Swiss conference is showing through already, and it is nothing short of Vladimir Zelensky's peace formula all over again. Admittedly, they tried to underscore Switzerland's independence by focusing on three tracks: nuclear safety, food security in the context of see shipments, and humanitarian issues.

This doesn't change anything. Vladimir Zelensky's formula also includes these three issues as something to disguise its openly illusory and Russophobic nature. Vladimir Zelensky and his team insisted that Russia should not be invited to this conference under any circumstances. That was because he needed space to woo the countries of the Global South and sign them up to the common platform, which will be subsequently presented to Russia as an ultimatum.

When our Swiss colleagues say they want to invite Russia to the first conference, they are not telling the truth. We will not participate in any events that promote Vladimir Zelensky's peace formula in one way or another. This much has been clear to everyone for a long time. We are serious about being open to negotiations based on the reality. Everyone knows this, too – from experience.

We have discussed China's twelve-point initiative. In 2023, we met twice with the leaders of seven African states, led by President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa. They put forth their ideas. Following the second meeting between Russia and the African Union, a document was approved that outlined specific humanitarian steps to be taken.

We spoke with President of Brazil Lula da Silva who has his own view of things. I was in Brazil recently and participated in BRICS and G20 events. I had a lengthy conversation with President Lula and his advisers to discuss any ideas they had.

We hear statements about Russia refusing to negotiate almost daily. They say they want to, but Russia is refusing. That is not true either, but we no longer expect honesty or decency from our Western partners.

We will continue accomplishing the objectives of the special military operation. The demilitarisation of Ukraine is a necessary step. This is clear to everyone, considering the militant clique that is now in charge in Kiev. Denazification, too, is inevitable – and this is also clear to everyone. Kiev's racist laws legislate the concepts that are part of Nazi ideology and glorify individuals who were convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal. This is unacceptable in today's Europe.

When High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other EU and NATO leaders say that they are supporting Ukraine and defending European values, for which Ukrainian citizens are dying, they expose themselves. This happened in Europe in the past when Napoleon and Hitler used the countries that they occupied in their wars against Russia and the Soviet Union.

At a fundamental level, this has remained part on their mentality. President of France Emmanuel Macron has recently said in an interview with The Economist that Russia has always been a threat for all Europeans and particularly for Germany and France. The ambitions of Napoleon and Hitler were based on their views of Russia as a threat. I am not going to comment on the French president's views. He is obviously acting from fiercely anti-Russia positions. I am aware of the system of power in France and the French' claim to a role in Europe and the world. It cannot be ruled out that Macron needs this "caveman Russophobia" to become Europe's leader, using a subject which the West has made the main issue on the international stage.

When we look at what the West did in other parts of the world, including the Balkans, it is clear that the focus on this subject rests on hyped-up information wars. We will see where this leads. The West is lying. There is no doubt of this.

Speaking about threats to Europe, when the special military operation began, and for some time before it, they called for admitting Ukraine to NATO to prevent Russia from attacking a member of the alliance. Now they say that if Ukraine loses, Russia will attack NATO. Where is the logic? There is none. There is only a desire to justify the policy that the US has forced Europe to adopt. For me, this happened in a strange way. Europe has naively agreed to do a job forced on it by Washington, which does not want to be criticised by its own people ahead of the election.

Question: Speaking about the European leaders who openly made unflattering remarks about Russia, I would like to mention your British colleague, David Cameron, who first said, and then presumably regretted his words, that the Ukrainians can use British weapons to strike targets on Russian territory. How is this possible?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes, use them to strike any targets inside Russia. David Cameron does not regret his words. People like him have no regrets; they don't know what regret is.

It has been reported that Reuters, which interviewed him, has suspended the version you mentioned and announced that a new text would soon be posted. But they ultimately posted the same text.

David Cameron has reaffirmed his view that Ukrainians can use British arms to strike targets in any part of Russia. This is the British. Their reputation is well known.

Question: I know that you are not paid to be optimistic, but what if Ukrainians and your Western partners proposed ceasing fire and sitting down to negotiate an agreement? Who would you agree to speak with, and what would you tell them?

Sergey Lavrov: I do not see anyone we can talk with. I have cited the statements made by the Ukrainian, American and European leaders and politicians. None of them are ready for a serious conversation. They are playing with negotiations in the form of a conference in Switzerland. The Copenhagen format has no future. The West is using any trick in the book, including blackmail and lies, to involve as many developing and Global South countries in these get-togethers. Some countries agree to attend, telling us later that they only do so to explain the pointlessness of such events without Russia or based on ultimatums. Some of them have become disappointed and stopped attending such events.

Question: The Balkans are also a major global hotspot, and it has been this way for quite some time now. Everyone knows how the West has been pressuring the Serbs, the Republic of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska, and the West has substantially increased this pressure in recent months. We can all see today what is going on within the UN General Assembly with Germany and Rwanda trying to push through a draft UNGA resolution on Srebrenica laying all the blame on a single nation. In your opinion, what is the purpose of this draft resolution on Srebrenica and why they chose to submit it at this juncture?

Sergey Lavrov: What they want is to subdue the Serbs. This is what they had on their minds all along and stay focused on this objective. Thet have already tried to make the UN Security Council adopt a resolution of this kind ten years ago. We used our veto power at that time. I find it hard to explain what guides the Europeans, from a practical perspective, in their efforts to promote this idea, except for one possible explanation. They believe that the Serbs are too restive and independent in their actions since they refused to join the sanctions against Russia. The Serbs do not want to recognise Kosovo's independence and do not want Kosovo to join international organisations. The West is basically offering Belgrade an ultimatum. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been cast as the main villain who allegedly seeks to dismantle the Dayton Accords, while in reality he and his team are the only ones in Bosnia who are fighting for the Dayton Principles.

They keep telling Belgrade: do you want to join the European Union? Considering that President Aleksandar Vucic reaffirmed his European-centred policy vision, go ahead and recognise Kosovo and join the sanctions against Russia, since being part of the EU entails fighting Russia by default. How can you tell the Serbs anything of this kind, while turning a blind eye to the history of our friendship, the way we fought for freedom, independence, and even the Orthodox faith? The West could not care less about all of this. I would even go as far as saying that this is precisely what they are after. They want to destroy the relations we have forged between us, and have been quite successful in this regard.

What the Council of Europe did recently was a shame. PACE voted to accept Kosovo as a full member, and the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers is scheduled to take up this item on its agenda in a couple of weeks. There is no doubt that they will be able to have this decision approved. They have already sought to justify what they do with Kosovo in the Council of Europe by saying that Kosovo has made great strides in its anti-corruption efforts and building an effective judiciary. But everyone knows about the total chaos reigning in Kosovo. Still, our Western colleagues have no qualms casting Kosovo nothing short of a beacon of democracy. Democracy was something alien for this territory at all times. This is a land of organised crime and ethnic cleansings targeting ethnic Serbs.

I heard that Serbs have been leaving this region since 2003, and this outflow carries on. In January 2003, about 15 percent of those who identified as Serbs at that moment had already left. They are also seeking to eradicate the Orthodox faith. This is an obvious fact. And the West likes it this way. The West wants to damage the Orthodox faith beyond repair in order to place the Orthodoxy under the leadership of the Patriarch of Constantinople who, in turn, takes his orders from the United States, depends on it from a financial standpoint and is ready to satisfy every whim it has.

The same goes for the way they treat Republika Srpska. Today, there is a self-appointed high representative from Germany, who does not have any legitimate status, since the UN Security Council has not approved his candidacy according to the rules, but this representative is doing everything to discredit Republika Srpska and promote a unitary structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has been seeking to approach certain political forces within the Bosnian Croat community. However, they do have a vision on ways to assert their identity and the Dayton principles dealing with the equality of the three state-forming nations. How sad. And all this comes from people who often accuse us and other countries of violating the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions. What they present as their agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina today amounts to an outright effort to derail a UN Security Council resolution.

This may well explain why the United States Permanent Representative at the Unite Nations in New York Linda Thomas-Greenfield said, after the council passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza for the month of Ramadan, that even if the resolution was adopted, and the United States did not prevent this from happening by abstaining during the vote, everyone knows that this is a non-binding resolution. However, the UN Charter stipulates that all Security Council resolutions are binding documents. However, when it comes to resolutions on Palestine or the Balkans, the United States denies them their binding nature if they reflect the interests of others, in this case, the people of Serbia. This is what we must understand to begin with.

Question: What is the role of international organisations, when they work the way you have explained and as things are in fact? Must we continue to believe in these principles?

Sergey Lavrov: We should believe in them, of course, if only because all current problems stem from the fact that the UN Charter is grossly violated. It fully retains its relevance if used in an honest way in the entirety of its principles and with account taken of the close interconnection between these principles. If this had been so, many of the West's actions would have been illegitimate. Specifically, the West has never been guided by the key principle of the UN Charter that the United Nations is based on the sovereign equality of states. Name at least one instance where the West talked to whoever it may be as an equal.

China is a great power, the world's fastest growing economy, and number one economy in PPP terms. The US Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State travel to China to harangue their hosts and publicly demand that they stop cooperating with the Russian Federation. PRC President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi replied that China made its own decisions on who to cooperate and have relations of any kind with. The Chinese said they never cooperated with anyone against anyone else, and we are also committed to this position. The West, in the meantime, is doing precisely the opposite, trying to create an anti-Russia and an anti-China coalition. An anti-Russia coalition is their immediate goal, while an anti-China one is being knocked together in anticipation of the moment when China emerges as the main threat (that's how they call it) and the main adversary. They are beginning to introduce sanctions against China.

Where international organisations are concerned, everyone must follow the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety. They are just paying lip service to territorial integrity with regard to Ukraine, the same as in 2014, when people in Crimea voted in a referendum for a return to the Russian Federation. There followed an immediate demand to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity.

In 2008, when Kosovo suddenly proclaimed independence in a situation where there were no military hostilities and negotiations were in progress between Belgrade and Pristina, the West said that this was fully in keeping with the self-determination principle enshrined in the UN Charter. No one is concerned with the logic. They said this and their entire propaganda machine intended to brainwash the man in the street is up and running at full capacity. There is no leaving this path any longer.

Yet another worrisome point is that the West has put the secretariats of international organisations under its control. The UN, for example, has a category of employees with "permanent contracts." We were against this arrangement back in the 20th century and were fighting it in the 1970s and 1980s. But later the General Assembly voted for contracts, including permanent ones. People with these contracts dominate the UN Secretariat. Just imagine: a person comes to work in New York, knowing that he or she will live there until retirement. They get residence permits and subsequently are naturalised. Their children go to school and to university. All their money, naturally, is deposited in US banks.

There is a report entitled Composition of the Secretariat. It lists many names from other civilisations (Indian, Pakistani, African, etc.), with "Senegal-US" or other identity in the parenthesis. Practically everyone there has dual citizenship. It is clear, therefore, that if the United States decides to use those people in its interests (and it uses them regularly), it has all the necessary leverage for this purpose. This is why we need to reform the UN, including its Secretariat, to remove the existing slant in favour of the Western countries. The same goes for the UN Security Council, where it is necessary to do away with the historical injustice expressed in the over-representation of the West and under-representation of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The same kind of action is needed inside the Secretariat.

This is difficult because many people have become "welded" to their jobs. To some degree, they are united by corporate solidarity. But look at its leadership: all the key posts – Secretary-General, his deputies for politics, for peacekeeping, for humanitarian matters, security department, etc. – are filled by representatives of NATO countries. Russia heads the counterterrorism directorate and China – that dealing with economic and social issues. These are important areas, but all the administrative leverage is in the hands of NATO members.

Question: You have been serving as Foreign Minister for a very long time, 20 years. You interacted with representatives and leaders of the United States early on, and you did so more recently. What has changed? What kind of people are sitting in Washington now, and why are they impossible to talk to?

Sergey Lavrov: These individuals are captive to centuries of Western hegemony on the global stage. They are hostage to colonial and neo-colonial policies and they still want to continue to live at the expense of others.

They created globalisation and strengthened the US dollar, hailing it as the world's main currency, not the property of the United States, but the property of global society, the backbone of world trade and investment. They also hailed the World Trade Organisation, fair competition, the presumption of innocence, and market mechanisms. But as soon as China took advantage of that globalised system imposed by the Americans and began to outplay the United States, they immediately blocked the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Once China filed complaints at DSB over US discrimination, they just shut it down. The DSB is inactive now; what methods they have used to do it is beside the point. In much the same way, when they decided to punish Russia, they shrugged off the inviolability of property and stole our state reserves, a national asset essentially contributed by Russian taxpayers.

It is worth negotiating when the other party embraces the need to find a balance of interests, not when they use any means to try and impose their will, to force the other party to obey. So far, this is what we have seen them do; the only dialogue they agree to is one between the hegemon and the rest of the world. They do not seem ready for a fair dialogue, as required by the UN Charter.

There has been much debate. The 2024 United States elections are scheduled to be held soon. There is no split between Democrats and Republicans on Russia or China. Some may take a tougher stance, others may use an even tougher rhetoric than that, but we do not see any difference in principle. Both parties (whichever of them wins the election), by and large, see Russia as their enemy. An opponent, or an adversary – these are technicalities. The American establishment sees what they describe as a "strategic defeat" of Russia as their goal anyway.

As President of Russia Vladimir Putin said in response to a similar question, we are ready to work with any leader of the United States who has the trust of the American people, if they are ready. Well, as we Russians say, love cannot be forced.

Question: While Russia's relations with the West have soured, its relationship with China is flourishing. What are China and Russia's strategies for the future with regard to the new world order? What is your and your Chinese partners' vision of the world? Will our future be based on the principle of a balance of forces or the concept of collective security?

Sergey Lavrov: Russia-China relations are now better and more effective than ever, in keeping with international law and key principles of the UN Charter. They have never been better in our history, and this is above all thanks to President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping.

We have developed a system of relations in all spheres, including the economy, investment, trade, science, high technology, space exploration, nuclear generation, culture, sport and arts. Active events are held in absolutely all spheres of human activity at the level of multifaceted Russia-China partnership and strategic cooperation, just as this is stipulated in our documents. They also say that relations between Russia and China are much firmer, stronger and more reliable than the military alliances of the past century. This is true. Russia and China have formed a duo that is having a strong positive influence on the international situation.

Without this Russia-China link, the situation on the international stage would have been much worse, first of all because the West would have thought that it can act with impunity and immunity. We are relying on the structures we are creating or have created with the People's Republic of China. Their effectiveness is growing, because of the growing interest in them. For example, BRICS has doubled the number of its members. This year, Russia is chairing this association, which already has 10 members. Interest in the SCO is growing as well. Like in the case of BRICS, countries are "standing in line" to join it.

Russia and China are actively working in Southeast Asia jointly with ASEAN nations. We have our supporters in the G20, first of all the BRICS countries and those who share our views. There are many multilateral platforms where we are working together and venues that are becoming regional development centres.

In Eurasia, we have the EAEU, the SCO, ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council and a number of other associations, including in South Asia. Now that Eurasia is becoming the driver of global economic growth, it is only fitting for these regional associations to strengthen their role in the development of this geopolitical and geoeconomic trend. This process has already begun. Contacts are being developed between the SCO and ASEAN, and between the EAEU and the SCO and ASEAN. Taken together, as President Putin said, this is absolutely naturally developing into a Greater Eurasian Partnership, which we see as a structure that is open to all Eurasian countries, including those on the European part of the continent.

So far, Europe is trying to block out and isolate Russia. There is no need to say that this is unwise. It only shows the standards of the decisions made by politicians in Western Europe. Doors should be left open. Nature, history and the Lord have given us a common and very rich continent. If you want to live better, you should make use of these advantages.

But those across the sea tell the European part of the continent that they should buy expensive gas to punish Russia. Europe is struggling with tremendous economic problems because the United States is using it above all to support Ukraine and wage a war against Russia. Everyone is predicting the demise of Germany as an industrial miracle. That miracle rested on the cheap and reliable Russian pipeline gas. Where are the Nord Stream pipes? They have been blown up. We have no doubt that it was done at the very least with the Americans' support. This can be concluded from the fact that they have been refusing to provide any information about investigation at the UN Security Council. Likewise, they have not made any, even the smallest move to prove their accusations against Russia. You remember how dead bodies were demonstrated in Bucha in early April 2022, and new sanctions were immediately adopted against us. To this day, we have not received the lists of people whose dead bodies allegedly lay in that street.

Speaking about Russia-China relations, they are a flexible junction in many organisations, including the UN, the SCO and BRICS. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has an agreement with China on the parallel promotion of the EAEU's integration processes within the framework of China's Belt and Road initiative.

I mentioned the role of regional organisations in Eurasia. Increasingly more countries in Africa no longer rely on the globalisation mechanisms, which worked well until the Americans discredited them and proved their own unreliability, but on the mechanisms that are developed within the framework of the African Union and subregional African associations.

The same is taking place in Latin America. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is increasingly more relying on itself. President of Brazil Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has called for working towards replacing the US dollar with their own currencies. This process is also underway in BRICS, where alternative payment systems are a goal formulated during last year's summit.

The growth of the economy and the development of such trends make nations look at the organisations that are responsibly for security. The North Atlantic bloc was established after WWII, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe was established in 1975. Both NATO and the OSCE were built on the principle of Euro-Atlantic solidarity. In other words, the United States is using NATO and the OSCE to control its allies.

We have long become disillusioned in these Euro-Atlantic principles, in particular, because the Americans have destroyed the system of arms control and are unable to work honestly in the humanitarian and economic spheres. We believe that the Euro-Atlantic security model has discredited itself and failed. We are now speaking about creating a Eurasian system of security. When countries that respect their history and traditions want to chart their own course and independently determine their future, they can also come to an agreement in the sphere of security.

We are working on this at the SCO, fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime. These efforts are also being taken at the CSTO and the CIS. A forward-looking conversation is only possible if the countries located in the western part of the continent see the futility of their colonial policies aimed at subjugating others and interfering in the affairs of other regions, like the South Caucasus or Central Asia, and when they are ready to develop cooperation not on the balance of forces, which you mentioned, but on the balance of legitimate interests. So far, there are no preconditions for this.

Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

The BRICS Tuberculosis Research Network held its 15th meeting in Moscow on 23–25 April 2024 as part of Russia's BRICS Chairship. The meeting was held as part of the All-Russian Research and Training Conference with International Participation 'Tuberculosis and Socially Significant Infections: Challenges and Solutions in the Post-COVID Period'.

The meeting addressed key scientific research in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of tuberculosis, including multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, as well as other areas of cooperation that require more intensive research.

On 23 April, a plenary session was held jointly with the conference participants. The opening speech at the plenary session was delivered by Professor Irina Vasilyeva, the director of the National Medical Research Centre of Phthisiopulmonology and Infectious Diseases of the Russian Ministry of Health and president of the Russian Society of Phthisiologists.

Russian Deputy Minister of Health Sergey Glagolev delivered a welcoming address. Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge, the WHO regional director for Europe, spoke on behalf of the WHO, and WHO Representative in the Russian Federation Batyr Berdyklychev also delivered welcoming remarks.

The participants discussed the development of phthisiopulmonological systems in BRICS countries and exchanged experience in combatting tuberculosis.

The second day (24 April) was devoted to an analysis of the work of the BRICS Research Network in 2023, the epidemic situation with tuberculosis in BRICS countries, and promising research in the field of phthisiology.

On the third day (25 April), the participants focused on the draft resolution of the 15th meeting of the BRICS Tuberculosis Research Network. They discussed the scientific focuses in research that BRICS countries can conduct jointly and agreed to coordinate the draft resolution with the national ministries of health.

The Roscongress Foundation manages the events of Russia's BRICS Chairship.

Russia
Source: brics-russia2024.ru

Moscow will host the International Conference 'Antimicrobial Resistance: A Global Challenge to the National Well-Being of BRICS. Reality and Innovation' on 30–31 May 2024.

The Conference will be attended by roughly 100 representatives of BRICS countries, as well as the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).

Discussion topics at the Conference will include: the current state of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and the AMR monitoring system in BRICS countries; standards and recommendations used in BRICS countries to determine sensitivity to antibiotics; the feasibility of standardizing microbiological diagnostics and equipment used in BRICS countries; scientific developments in the therapy, prevention, and diagnosis of infections in BRICS countries and opportunities for scientific cooperation in this field; and antibiotic consumption in BRICS countries as part of the 'One Health' concept.

The participants will also consider areas for further cooperation in monitoring the problem of AMR within the BRICS framework.

Upon conclusion of the Conference, BRICS experts are expected to adopt a joint statement that will subsequently be presented at the High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly on Antibiotic Resistance in September 2024 in New York.

The Roscongress Foundation manages the events of Russia's BRICS chairship.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Over 60 countries are set to participate in the 2024 BRICS Games in Kazan this year, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Wednesday, TASS informs.

"A spectacular sporting event is set to take place in mid-June in Kazan, where the BRICS Games will be held from June 11 to 24," Zakharova announced.

"This year, the organization's traditional event will feature competitions in 30 sports disciplines, and we expect delegations from more than 60 countries to arrive," she told journalists.

The 2024 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Games will be held in Kazan on June 12-23 and will feature events in 20 different sports.

The press office of the Tatarstan Sports Ministry announced on April 23 the launch of ticket sales for the 2024 BRICS Games. According to the ministry, ticket prices range between 100 and 300 rubles (between $1 and 3). Tickets for the rest of the event's sports competitions are expected to go on sale later.

The 2024 BRICS Games will be held in Kazan on June 12-23 and will feature events in 20 different sports.



In mid-May 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the government to submit proposals for organizing and holding the 2024 BRICS Games in Russia.

Russia's acting-Sports Minister Oleg Matytsin emphasized later that the BRICS Games are not meant to rival any other competitions and will not interfere with the international sports calendar as well as with the IOC-approved calendar of events.

Earlier this year, Russian acting Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid an official visit to China, where he stated that the 2024 BRICS Games and the following World Friendship Games in Russia would be organized based on the principles enshrined by International Olympic Committee (IOC) Charter.

The International Olympic Committee Executive Board convened for a meeting at the Olympic House in Lausanne, Switzerland, on March 19-20 and following the opening day it decided to bar athletes from Russia and Belarus from taking part in the Parade of Athletes and also exclude them from the 2024 Olympics overall medal standings. The IOC, however, ruled that Russian athletes, cleared to participate in the upcoming Olympics, would not have to sign anything denouncing their country's special military operation in Ukraine.

On October 12, 2023, the IOC suspended the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) until further notice after the Russian organization included the Olympic councils of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR), the Zaporozhye and Kherson Regions as its members.

The Swiss-based CAS registered on November 6, 2023 an appeal from the ROC against the IOC's decision on the Russian governing Olympic body's suspension.

The suspension means that the ROC cannot act as a national Olympic committee or receive financing from the Olympic movement. The IOC however reserved the right to clear Russian athletes to take part in the Olympic Games in Paris in 2024 as neutrals. Later, IOC President Thomas Bach said that Russian athletes should have no affiliation with the ROC if they want to compete at the Olympic Games.