Russia
Source: mid.ru

1. BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers and Special Envoys on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) met on March 28, 2025, in Brasília, Brazil, to exchange views on the current situation in the region.
2. They reiterated their serious concern over continued conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, especially the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which threaten regional stability and have a negative impact on international peace and security. They reiterated the need to ensure peaceful resolution of disputes and agreed that conflicts should be solved exclusively through peaceful means, including political and diplomatic means, on the basis of full respect for international law, including the UN Charter, and international humanitarian law.
3. They reasserted the primary role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in maintaining international peace and security, in regular interaction with the General Assembly. They acknowledged the important role played by regional organizations in addressing threats to international peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. They advocated for the strengthening of multilateralism as a means to promoting and ensuring peace, stability, and development in the MENA region.
4. They stressed that peace and stability in the MENA region require developmental cooperation and integration. They reiterated the need to address the root causes of regional tensions, including foreign intervention and occupation, especially the Israeli illegal occupation on Palestine. They emphasized the importance of contributing to post-conflict countries’ reconstruction and development. They called upon the international community to assist MENA countries in meeting their development goals.
5. They agreed to strongly condemn terrorism and confront extremism, in all its forms and manifestations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed and called on countries of the region to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to terrorism. They expressed their commitment to prevent, combat and counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including the cross-border movement of terrorists, as well as terrorism financing networks and safe havens, dismantling terrorist training camps, in accordance to international law, and swiftly bringing perpetrators of terrorism to justice. They pointed out that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. They affirmed their unwavering commitment to contributing further to the global efforts to prevent and counter the threat of terrorism on the basis of respect for international law, in particular the UN Charter, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international refugee law, emphasizing that States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorism, with the UN continuing to play a central and coordinating role in this area. They called for further consolidation and strengthening of the working methods of UN Security Council Sanctions Committees to ensure their effectiveness, responsiveness and transparency. While recognizing that there is no justification for terrorism, a comprehensive approach by the whole international community is needed to effectively prevent, combat and counter terrorist activities, including through measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in line with the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy. They rejected double standards in countering terrorism and confronting extremism. They called for the expeditious finalization and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism within the UN framework.
6. They expressed their commitment to the promotion of the principles of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, and the adoption of measures to jointly address hate speech, racism, gender discrimination and extremism, in line with the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2686 and other relevant United Nations Resolutions.
7. They expressed grave concern at the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, marked by the unprecedented escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip, following the Hamas’ attack on October 7 2023, and as a result of the Israeli military offensive that led to more than 50,000 deaths among Palestinians, mostly women and children, as reported by the UN Secretary-General, mass forced displacement of civilians, and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, places of worship, and UN facilities. They reiterated the need for full respect of international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as for immediate, safe, unhindered, and sustained humanitarian access and the provision of aid at scale and in accordance with the basic principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence reaffirmed by relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and emphasized that unconditional humanitarian access must be facilitated and not be used for political purposes.
8. They deplored the collapse of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, condemned the resumption of Israeli attacks against Gaza, and urged all parties to fully respect and comply with the terms of the agreement, including the release of all hostages and detainees held in violation of international law.
9. They recalled that the Gaza Strip is an inseparable part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, underlined, in this regard, the importance of unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian Authority, and reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to their independent State of Palestine.
10. They called on the international community to support the Palestinian Authority in undergoing reforms to fulfill the Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations for independence and statehood, as well as the expeditious reconstruction of the civil infrastructure of the territory, with a central role by the Palestinians, as agreed in the Emergency Arab Summit on Palestine of 4 March 2025, and they noted with appreciation the initiative to convene an upcoming pledging conference to be held in Cairo.
11. They underscored that efforts to stabilize and rebuild Gaza should go hand in hand with a just and lasting political resolution of the protracted conflict, based on the relevant UN Resolutions. They also stressed the priority of fully implementing all three stages of the Gaza ceasefire agreement. In that respect, they exhorted the parties concerned to engage in good faith in further negotiations to achieve the permanent cessation of hostilities, the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and the release of all hostages and detainees held in violation of international law.
12. They expressed their firm opposition to the forced displacement, temporary or permanent, under any pretexts, of any of the Palestinian population from the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Forced displacement of Palestinians would constitute a grave breach of international law, including international humanitarian law, and would also pose a serious threat to the stability of the region.
13. They strongly condemned the killing of humanitarian aid workers and the targeting of humanitarian premises in Gaza, which have significantly impacted humanitarian operations in the Strip and reportedly led to the withdrawal of 30% of the UN’s international staff, as well as constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law.
14. They recognized the importance of enhanced international efforts to uphold international humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
15. They reasserted their steadfast support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and stressed the need to fully respect the mandate, bestowed on it by the UNGA, for the provision of basic services to Palestine refugees in its five fields of operations. In this context, they deplored the implementation of legislation approved by the Israeli parliament on October 28, 2024, that aim to severely hinder the activities of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They noted, in this regard, the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in the legal proceedings instituted by South Africa against Israel, which, inter alia, reaffirmed Israel’s obligation to ensure the provision of humanitarian aid in Gaza. Cognizant of General Assembly Resolution ES-10/25, they also expressed their conviction that, until a just and lasting solution to the plight of Palestine refugees is reached, in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, and relevant UN Resolutions, UNRWA will remain essential and irreplaceable.
16. They reaffirmed that a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be achieved by peaceful means and depends on the fulfillment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination. They reiterated their unwavering commitment to the two-state solution, based on international law, including relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and the Arab Peace Initiative, with an independent and viable State of Palestine living side by side with Israel, in peace and security, in line with internationally recognized borders of June 1967, which includes the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
17. In this context, they welcomed the launching of the “Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution” and expressed their commitment to multilateral initiatives aimed at resuming concrete negotiations with a view to implementing this objective. They also look forward to contributing to the outcomes of the upcoming High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two State Solution, to be held in June, in New York.
18. They condemned the provocative statement regarding plans for the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the Occupied West Bank and the intensification of settlement activity in the West Bank, as well as with demolitions of Palestinian residences and structures, including in East Jerusalem. They reiterated that settlements are illegal under international law and that any settlement activity must be stopped and reversed. They deplored the escalation of military operations carried out by Israeli forces in the West Bank and condemned the significant increase in attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian citizens. They agreed that military operations in the West Bank must cease and that all individuals involved in acts of violence must be held accountable.
19. They took note of the advisory opinion of July 19 2024 of the International Court of Justice, “on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem”, which determined, inter alia, that the continued presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful and must be brought to an end as rapidly as possible; that all States are under the obligation not to recognize any changes in the physical character or demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the territory occupied by Israel on 5 June 1967, including East Jerusalem; that Israel is under the obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory; and that Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.
20. They reasserted their unwavering support for the Palestinian request to become a full member of the United Nations.
21. They recalled UN Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) and, in this regard, rejected any decisions and actions which purport to alter the character, status or demographic composition, as well as any measures of de facto or de jure annexation, of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and declared that such unilateral decisions have no legal effect. They emphasized the inadmissibility of altering the historical status of Jerusalem’s holy sites and reasserted their support to the Hashemite custodianship.
22. They reasserted their firm support for Lebanon’s stability, security, sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. They welcomed the election of a new President and the appointment of a new cabinet in Lebanon and expressed their strong support for the Lebanese government in addressing the country’s economic, political, and security challenges.
23. They welcomed the ceasefire in Lebanon and called on all parties to strictly adhere to its terms and to fully implement UNSC Resolution 1701. They condemned the continued violations of the ceasefire agreement and the frequent violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. They called on Israel to respect the articles of the ceasefire agreement entered into with the Lebanese Government, to withdraw its occupying forces from the five sites in Southern Lebanon.
24. They highlighted the vital role played by UNIFIL and agreed it is imperative to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of movement of all United Nations personnel and equipment, as well as to respect the integrity of UN premises. They condemned all attacks against UNIFIL installations and personnel and emphasized that such attacks are a violation of international law and UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
25. They reaffirmed their commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria and called for a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian-owned UN-facilitated political process, based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), in a manner that ensures the security and well-being of the civilian population and where all political and social components of Syria’s society are represented and protected, including women and youth, without any discrimination based on race, sect, or religion. They condemned the widespread violence perpetrated in Syria’s Latakia and Tartus provinces since 6 March, including mass killings of civilians among the Alawite community, the continuation of terrorist activities by ISIL and Al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters’ presence in Syrian territory as well as the risk of transferring of terrorists from Syria to regional countries. Syria should firmly oppose all forms of terrorism and extremism. They stressed their continued support for the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Syria. They encouraged the international community to support the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria. They condemned the Israeli occupation of the demilitarized zone in Syria, in violation of international law and the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, as well as Israeli attacks against the Syrian territory and called for the immediate and full withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Syria including the occupied Syrian Golan. They took note of and encouraged efforts aiming at integrating military institutions into the Syrian State with a clear and unequivocal exclusion of any parties involved in terrorist activities.
26. They reasserted their support for Yemen’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for a peaceful, comprehensive, and inclusive political settlement to the Yemeni crisis. They underscored the urgency of addressing the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.
27. They stressed the importance of ensuring the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms of vessels of all states in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab Strait, in accordance with international law. They encouraged enhanced diplomatic efforts by all parties to that end, including by addressing the causes of the conflict, and continued support for dialogue and Yemen’s peace process under UN auspices.
28. They reiterated their strong commitment to Iraq’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as expressed their continuous support and engagement to promote stability and economic development in Iraq. For this purpose, they underscored the collective responsibility of the international community in assisting the Iraqi government in the implementation of policies and programs to increase investment, trade, and overall social development in Iraq. They reaffirmed their opposition to any external interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs, and supported Iraq’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty and independence, promote economic reconstruction and to play a greater role in regional affairs.
29. They noted the latest developments regarding nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the recent imposition of new unilateral sanctions against Iran, and reiterated that political and diplomatic engagement remains the only viable and practical option in this regard. They underlined the necessity for maintaining favourable conditions required for diplomatic efforts. They also stressed the necessity for all States to refrain from any action that undermines the technical, objective and impartial work of the international Atomic Energy Agency. They encouraged Iran’s continued cooperation with the IAEA and stressed the need to fully respect its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
30. They rejected recent threats against the Islamic Republic of Iran and called for the de-escalation of the situation, which has the potential to undermine international peace and security. They underlined, in this context, the provisions of article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which establishes that States “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”.
31. They stressed their support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of Libya, as well as for a “Libyan-led and Libyan-owned” political process with UN-led mediation. They acknowledged, in this regard, the endeavors of regional organizations and the neighboring countries of Libya. They reiterated their respect for the will and free choice of the Libyan people, called on all parties to strengthen consultation and dialogue, as well as to refrain from any actions that could undermine the October 2020 ceasefire, and emphasized the need for all foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries to withdraw from Libya without further delay in a synchronized, phased, gradual, and balanced manner. They welcomed the efforts of the League of Arab States and the African Union, including its High-Level Committee for Libya, to restore stability and foster the unification of Libya. They reaffirmed their call to hold simultaneous, free, and fair presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible. They also reiterated their call on all parties to create necessary conditions for holding elections, based on a sound and agreed constitutional framework.
32. They expressed grave concern over the escalating violence and humanitarian crisis in Sudan and reiterated their call for an immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire and peaceful resolution of the conflict with engagement in peace talks as the only way to end this conflict, sustained, urgent and unimpeded access of the Sudanese population to humanitarian assistance, and the scaling up of humanitarian assistance to Sudan and neighboring states. They condemned the attack on the residence of the Head of Mission of the United Arab Emirates Embassy to Sudan on 29 September 2024, causing extensive damage to the premises located in a residential area in Khartoum. They stressed the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, and the obligations on receiving States including under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
33. They welcomed the convening of the High-level Humanitarian Conference for the People of Sudan on 14 February 2025 co-hosted by AU, Ethiopia, IGAD, and UAE, in coordination with the UN.
34. They expressed deep concern about the disruptive effect of unilateral coercive measures, inter alia in the form of unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions that are contrary to international law, as well as their far-reaching implications for the human rights, including the right to development, of the general population of targeted states in the region. Such measures undermine the UN Charter, the multilateral trading system, the sustainable development and environmental agreements. They called on all countries to refrain from introducing unilateral coercive measures and trade restrictions inconsistent with the UN Charter, international law, relevant provisions of the World Trade Organization and other multilateral trade rules that might have a direct or indirect negative impact on trade flows. They also underscored the need for dialogue and multilateral cooperation to address international disputes and promote stability.
35. They agreed to meet again under India’s chairship of BRICS in 2026. They also reiterated the importance of holding regular consultations on the Middle East and North Africa, including at the UN.

USA
Source: carnegieendowment.org

The potential of BRICS members and partner countries to fulfill their individual aspirations via BRICS hinges on what vision of the future of world order ultimately wins out within BRICS.

Carnegie’s Global Order and Institutions Program identifies promising new multilateral initiatives and frameworks to realize a more peaceful, prosperous, just, and sustainable world. That mission has never been more important, or more challenging. Geopolitical competition, populist nationalism, economic inequality, technological innovation, and a planetary ecological emergency are testing the rules-based international order and complicating collective responses to shared threats. Our mission is to design global solutions to global problems.

Introduction

Stewart Patrick and Erica Hogan

At their October 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, the original five members of the BRICS coalition—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—welcomed into their fold four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In January 2025, Indonesia became the bloc’s tenth member. Nine other nations have been officially designated as “partner countries,” and some two dozen have either been invited to join (for example, Saudi Arabia) or expressed interest in doing so (for example, Türkiye). BRICS states including Russia have touted the group’s expansion as a defining moment, heralding the dawn of a post-Western world order in which the “global majority” is finally empowered.

Among analysts, the significance of the BRICS expansion remains a matter of debate. On paper, “BRICS+” has the potential to become a major geopolitical and geoeconomic force. The bloc already boasts about 45 percent of the world’s population, generates more than 35 percent of its GDP (as measured in purchasing power parity, or PPP), and produces 30 percent of its oil. BRICS countries have also established an extensive and thickening latticework of intergovernmental cooperation. In addition to founding dedicated institutions such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), created in 2014 with an initial funding of $100 billion, and the New Development Bank (NDB) established in 2015 with an initial subscribed capitalization of $50 billion, the coalition has (like the G7 and G20 forums) embraced networked minilateralism, launching transnational partnerships and working groups on topics of shared interest from energy security to health, climate change, sustainable development, and technology transfer. BRICS avowedly seeks to challenge Western-dominated institutions of global economic governance, as well as to displace the U.S. dollar from its entrenched role in the world economy. Many analysts therefore depict BRICS expansion as a watershed moment in the shift to a more egalitarian international system.

However, the ultimate implications of these developments for world order remain unclear. No doubt, the expanding coalition will shape prospects for—and the nature of—international cooperation in a turbulent world. The main uncertainty is whether BRICS+ signals a turn against rather than simply away from the West. Some analysts anticipate that BRICS could evolve into a coherent, anti-Western bloc and complicate prospects for multilateralism, including by deepening divisions within the G20 and the United Nations. Heightened tensions between the United States and China (which dominates the bloc), as well as U.S. President Donald Trump’s confrontational approach toward BRICS, make this a possibility. Other observers are more sanguine, pointing to the group’s heterogeneity—which will only increase as the coalition expands—and to the fact that most BRICS members and aspirants have no desire to create a world of rigid blocs. They may view the coalition as a useful platform and vehicle to pursue reformist aims, but they remain open to cooperation with Western countries (and other middle powers) on matters of common concern.

These uncertainties—about the motivations of individual BRICS countries and aspirants, the bloc’s likely significance in concrete domains and its potential impact on world order, and the possibilities for cooperation between BRICS and the West—are obstacles to informed policymaking, as well as to nuanced consideration of how the coalition’s trajectory could be steered in the direction of global bridge-building.

To fill these gaps in understanding, Carnegie’s Global Order and Institutions (GOI) Program has launched a new initiative on BRICS Expansion: Understanding Its Motivations, Significance, and Implications for World Order. The ultimate objectives are fourfold:

• To better understand the goals and perceived benefits of BRICS for individual members and aspirant countries, including where these align and diverge.
• To identify those global domains where an expanding BRICS coalition has the potential to make its biggest impacts.
• To explore alternative scenarios for the evolution of BRICS and their implications for global order and multilateral problem-solving.
• To consider possibilities for bridge-building and practical cooperation between Western and BRICS countries on matters of shared interest, including in the G20 and other forums.

As an initial, scene-setting exercise, the GOI program solicited short commentaries from prominent experts on seventeen countries, including the five original BRICS members, the five new members, and seven nations—Colombia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Türkiye, Venezuela, and Vietnam—from different regions of the world that are either partner countries or aspire to or are considering joining the bloc. In each case, the GOI program invited authors to respond to three questions. First, what is “your” country’s primary interest in BRICS? Second, in what spheres do the country’s leaders expect BRICS to have the biggest impact? Third, how are recent geopolitical and international trends—such as Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency or U.S.-China tensions—shaping the country’s preferences regarding, and the likely trajectory of, BRICS?

Despite their brevity, the commentaries provide some important, if preliminary, insights. To begin with, country interests and motivations regarding BRICS vary markedly. Some nations perceive opportunities for expanded trade and investment with other BRICS members as a key benefit of membership or association. Others are more politically motivated, seeking higher-profile leadership roles on the global stage, especially within the Global South, or greater decisionmaking power in multilateral forums.

A common thread across these disparate interests and motivations is the need to respond to and manage the consequences of American dominance. Some countries are seeking in BRICS a safe harbor from U.S. diplomatic coercion and economic statecraft, an escape from pressure to democratize, and a means to mitigate the impact of sanctions and tariffs. Even countries that enjoy relatively positive relationships with the United States value BRICS as a vehicle for greater international economic integration in an otherwise fragmenting Western-centric global economy, as well as an opportunity to garner greater power than they hold within traditional, Western-dominated multilateral forums. For developing countries, BRICS also offers a compelling prospect for obtaining development financing without political conditions and in local currencies rather than in dollars or euros. Countries engaged with BRICS are united in their desire to shift the global balance of power away from American unipolarity and in their belief that BRICS can help facilitate this transition.

At the same time, BRICS member states, partner countries, and aspirants remain divided on their engagement with the United States, and in particular on the extent to which BRICS is or should be an explicitly anti-American bloc, designed to counter U.S. interests. Some countries desire to maintain positive relations with the United States, even as they welcome the advent of a more egalitarian world system. Others, not least Russia, seek to position BRICS as a rival bloc to the U.S.-dominated West.

The potential of BRICS members and partner countries to fulfill their individual aspirations via BRICS—whether to create a more egalitarian mode of global governance, to hedge against Western instability while maintaining a geopolitical neutrality, or to participate in an alternate international economic system outside of the reaches of American sanctions—hinges on which vision of the future of world order ultimately wins out. It will also depend on the degree of common purpose demonstrated by countries of the West themselves—whose like-mindedness and solidarity the second Trump administration has suddenly called into question—as well as on the Trump administration’s willingness to countenance a more egalitarian global order rather than force middle powers to choose between BRICS membership and friendly relations with the United States.

The Original Five

• Brazil
• Russia
• India
• China
• South Africa

New Members

• Egypt
• Ethiopia
• Indonesia
• Iran
• United Arab Emirates

Partners and Potential Aspirants

• Colombia and Venezuela
• Nigeria
• Saudi Arabia
• Senegal
• Türkiye
• Vietnam

The Original Five

Brazil
Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil derives tangible benefits from BRICS membership—above all, prestige, geopolitical influence, greater proximity to China, and an “insurance” against diplomatic isolation.

These four main benefits explain why Brazil has enthusiastically embraced the group since its inception in 2006.
First, in the view of Brazilian policymakers, membership came with considerable prestige. Joining the bloc implicitly equated Brazil with the large powers China, India, and Russia, which was an especially important gain for a country that often worries that its decisions to limit defense spending and to be a “good international citizen” (for example, by signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) might diminish its leverage on the global stage. Brazil’s association with BRICS might also have helped consolidate the country’s image as an “emerging power,” even though its growth has been below the global average for over a decade.

Second, Brazil believes that as a member, it can influence the adaption of global institutions in response to the shift from U.S.-led unipolarity to multipolarity—for example, by advocating the reform of existing institutions but also supporting the creation of new ones, such as the BRICS-led NDB. Brazil has been deeply skeptical of U.S.-led unipolarity and sees strengthening ties with other emerging powers (or great powers, such as China) as a means to increase its leverage when negotiating with Washington. This explains why even very pro-American politicians such as former president Jair Bolsonaro have not abandoned the BRICS group.

Third, BRICS membership helps the Brazilian government manage its economic relationship with China, its most important trading partner, and adapt to that nation’s rise. Whereas the United States, Europe, and Latin America were Brazil’s dominant economic partners until the early 2000s, Brazil now exports more to China than to the United States and the European Union combined. This shift has required a profound redistribution of diplomatic resources and the development of new regional expertise within Brazil’s bureaucracy, its businesses, and civil society. And it has made initiatives such as the BRICS Business Council and Brazil’s cooperation with think tanks and universities from other BRICS countries highly relevant. For numerous Brazilian participants, engaging in these activities offers the first opportunity to travel to other BRICS member states, which are of growing economic importance to Brazil.

Finally, Brazil values BRICS as a “mutual diplomatic support group,” providing reliable backing during periods of global isolation from the West. The group has served as a vital life raft for member states facing temporary challenges on the world stage. In 2014, fellow BRICS nations shielded Russian President Vladimir Putin from diplomatic exclusion after the annexation of Crimea. In 2021, they supported Bolsonaro when he became internationally isolated following Trump’s failed reelection. This support notably occurred despite Bolsonaro’s tense relationship with China. While Brazil may not agree with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its own experience with U.S. sanctions in the 1980s (over its nuclear program) and recent bouts of being isolated from the West make the safe haven function of BRICS a key attraction—one which Western policymakers often overlook.

During its 2025 BRICS presidency, Brazil will likely use the group to craft its multi-aligned strategy in the face of Trump’s return to the White House and intensifying U.S.-China competition. While Brazil was unable to stop the BRICS expansion—which it long opposed, fearing a loss of prestige, more limited access to Chinese President Xi Jinping, and China’s and Russia’s growing clout—it will still seek to prevent the group from moving in a more anti-Western direction, which would complicate Brazil’s ongoing important ties with the United States. Because finding meaningful consensus is bound to become more difficult with increased membership, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will also seek to emphasize less controversial topics where Brazil has the potential to be a leader on the global stage, such as food security and the green transition.

Brazil is quietly rooting for Trump to ease tensions between the West and Russia, which would remove a source of friction between Lula and Western leaders in recent years. While European governments, along with the former administration of U.S. president Joe Biden, criticized Brazil for not joining their efforts to isolate Putin, a ceasefire in Ukraine would make it easier for Lula to welcome Putin to the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro this July.

Russia
Alexander Gabuev

“The Kazan BRICS summit declaration has reaffirmed our states’ shared commitment to build a more democratic, inclusive, multipolar world. We have also affirmed a shared determination to combat practices of using illegitimate sanctions or undermining traditional moral values,” Russian President Vladimir Putin pontificated when closing the annual BRICS summit on October 24, 2024, in Kazan, Russia. The message was clear: the Kremlin sees BRICS as a foundation for Pax Post-Americana.

But it hasn’t always been that way: Moscow’s primary interests in BRICS have evolved over time. Russia was the first of the major developing economies to start turning an ambiguous marketing tool of bankers into a political club. (It was Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill who coined the term “BRIC.”) The original format was very relevant amid the global Great Recession of 2008. Russia hosted the first summit of BRIC leaders in 2009 (South Africa did not join until 2010), and back then, the key idea was to supplement the Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and redistribute voting rights within those bodies from developed to developing countries. However, over time, as Russia’s relations with the West soured due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin saw new potential in BRICS as a tool to make the world less U.S.-centric.

BRICS currently serves three primary Russian interests. First, Moscow wants to be seen as part of a dynamic group of non-Western great and middle powers that are shaping the future of the post-American world order. The Kremlin insists that BRICS represents the “global majority” of non-Western countries and that the bloc has already surpassed the U.S.-led G7 in terms of both GDP and population and is therefore more inclusive and influential.

Second, Russia wants BRICS to become a sandbox for developing tools of trade, finance, and investment outside of U.S. mechanisms, particularly U.S. dollar–dominated ones. This interest, formulated even before Crimea’s annexation as a push to boost trade in national currencies to make the global financial system less dependent on the U.S. dollar and thus more resilient, is now directly connected to the Kremlin’s survival tactics amid the tsunami of Western sanctions unleashed since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin believes that launching alternative tools on the BRICS platform, such as new payment systems different than the international messaging network SWIFT, will make it easier for Russia to escape Western sanctions while maintaining international economic relationships, particularly as BRICS includes many crucial U.S. and Western partners including Brazil, India, and Indonesia.

Finally, BRICS provides a vehicle for high-level bilateral contact at a time when Putin and some of his officials are restricted in their global movements by International Criminal Court arrest warrants and broader sanctions and when some of Russia’s non-Western partners are wary of hosting senior Russians.

Going forward, Russia believes that BRICS can help develop and expand institutional frameworks to make the global financial system and markets less dependent on the United States. One priority is fortifying tools such as the NDB and the pool of BRICS national currencies to make these instruments invincible to U.S. sanctions. Russia’s own negative experience with the NDB over the last three years has exposed the current limitations of these tools in a world where any multilateral financial institution still needs to raise capital in global markets by issuing U.S. dollar–denominated bonds. Russia wants to supplement these mechanisms with additional tools such as a BRICS investment platform, insurance mechanism, payment system, logistics infrastructure, and e-commerce network. If these elements are integrated into a BRICS ecosystem for trade and trade settlement in national currencies, a sanctions-proof framework could emerge that may be immune to Western pressure. The same motivation inspires other Russian proposals to create new BRICS hubs for trading in hydrocarbons, metals, agricultural goods, fertilizers, and diamonds. Last but not least, Russia hopes that BRICS can be a powerful voice to frame the global conversation about artificial intelligence and that the Kremlin’s own views, amplified by the voices of powerful players including China and India, will be taken into account.

The summit in Kazan was a big success for Russia, since it demonstrated the futility of Western efforts to isolate the country and Putin personally. And while it exposed the clear limits of other BRICS members’ appetites for embracing mechanisms that the United States could view as tools for sanctions evasion, the Trump administration’s recent moves—including the imposition of tariffs, the mass reduction in the U.S. federal workforce (supposedly aimed at reducing the country’s budget deficit), and the potential infringement on the U.S. Federal Reserve’s independence—are only fueling global interest in alternatives to U.S. dollar–denominated financial instruments. The Kremlin hopes that BRICS mechanisms will, over time, satisfy this growing demand.

India
Ashley J. Tellis

Unlike most other multilateral groups, the BRICS’ genesis was not driven by common goals. In fact, its internal cleavages are as pronounced as its commonalities, a fact critical to understanding India’s role therein.
Among the initial five members, India has the closest ties with Russia and South Africa because of past bipolar competition and the anti-apartheid struggle, respectively. India’s ties with Brazil are cordial but limited, originally expressed through the G77 group of developing countries now frequently referred to as the “Global South.” India’s ties with China, in contrast, are persistently rivalrous despite the deepening amity between Moscow and Beijing. Both India and Brazil seek to prevent BRICS from sliding into inveterate anti-Westernism as Moscow and Beijing would prefer. Conversely, despite India’s close relationship with South Africa, the latter has strong sympathies for Russia, increasingly close ties with China, and a striking suspicion of the West.

Despite these incongruities, India has been a stalwart BRICS member for multiple reasons. First, when the West dominates the high tables globally, BRICS affords India an alternative stage where New Delhi can associate with other emerging powers and display international leadership that satisfies its desires for status and recognition. Second, India views BRICS as a useful instrument for engendering multipolarity wherein India becomes one of several great powers in the global system. Third, BRICS provides another forum for India to claim leadership of the Global South—an old objective given new impetus by the recent membership additions of five new developing countries, with others waiting in the wings. Fourth, BRICS supplies New Delhi with opportunities to demonstrate its strategic autonomy and preference for flexible, issue-based partnerships even as it preserves its valuable relationship with the West. Fifth, India values BRICS for direct materialist reasons, expecting that the group’s emerging financial institutions—the NDB and CRA—will provide new sources of lending to developing countries and “democratize” the global financial architecture.
New Delhi expects BRICS to demonstrate its greatest impact in two arenas. Politically, India hopes the group will help erode the primacy of the United States and its allies in international politics. Although this erosion would likely accelerate if BRICS were demonstrating greater coherence, if not actual unity, India believes the existing group still provides an important “voice” to geographically distributed and influential developing countries while fostering more equitable international rule-making bodies that encourage the consolidation of multipolarity globally.

Economically, India hopes that the NDB will provide more resources to developing countries and the CRA will offer financial support during economic crises without the conditionality associated with Western lending. Obviously, both institutions are still far from being adequate substitutes for international financial institutions (IFIs) or Western or Chinese assistance, but India’s support for the UAE’s membership was colored greatly by its strong bilateral ties and its desire to expand the BRICS’ financial base to compete with Western and Chinese lending. The quest for a revamped international financial architecture, however, does not imply supporting the entire BRICS agenda: given its rivalry with China and its desire to avoid becoming trapped in Russia’s confrontation with the West, New Delhi has shunned outlandish ideas such as creating a BRICS currency or championing de-dollarization, even as India seeks to immunize itself from U.S. sanctions directed at third countries.

The most important international trend that affects India’s participation in BRICS is the dramatic rise of Chinese power. Although BRICS initially coalesced through a Russian initiative, Moscow—a friend of New Delhi—was soon replaced as its driving force by Beijing, which is at odds with New Delhi. China demonstrated its dominance most clearly in the recent BRICS expansion: India was ambivalent because it portended a loss of influence within the grouping, but Chinese-Russian collusion quickly overwhelmed Indian (and Brazilian) diffidence. India’s objective, consequently, remains preventing BRICS from becoming a virulently anti-Western clique (Moscow and Beijing’s preference), while averting complete Chinese domination of the grouping (Beijing’s objective). This task is challenging because China’s trade with all the BRICS countries is typically larger in volume and broader in scope than India’s trade and is often linked to strategic investments and state-backed initiatives that provide Beijing with even greater political influence.
The imperative of India to stay engaged with BRICS has only increased with Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Although India’s priority is protecting its ties with the United States, the uncertainties surrounding the current U.S. strategic trajectory and U.S.-China relations require India to hedge all the more by deepening its engagement with other partners and groups. New Delhi has long viewed multi-alignment as the best bedrock for safeguarding its interests in an increasingly disordered international system. Its continuing involvement with BRICS, despite the complexities, will be an integral part of that effort.

China
Tong Zhao

As China observes the West’s decline and the Global South’s rise, BRICS has become Beijing’s strategic bridge to harness and potentially shape non-Western countries’ transformative power to reform the international order.
While Beijing faces challenges in managing the diverse and sometimes competing interests within the broad Global South network, it expects BRICS to provide a crucial platform. Through selective membership invitations, the establishment of BRICS partnerships, and the engagement of nonmember states via informal dialogues, China hopes to more effectively coordinate non-Western positions, unify voices, institutionalize cooperation, and maintain a leadership role within the Global South community. For Beijing, BRICS initiatives can be a force multiplier for Chinese efforts to expand influence in the global order.

As BRICS expands, China seeks to distinguish BRICS as a superior international cooperation alternative to Western-dominated institutions by highlighting BRICS’ principles of equality and consensus-based decisionmaking. Yet Chinese strategists are questioning the practicality of consensus as the increasing number of members complicates Beijing’s ability to steer the group’s direction without appearing overly assertive. Some Chinese experts are even suggesting that BRICS establish an exit mechanism for members that don’t fully align with China’s geostrategic vision. This reflects Beijing’s growing concern over maintaining unity and its leadership role within the group as China’s influence, though significant, faces challenges from diverse member interests.

To date, China has successfully steered BRICS’ evolution from a platform focused primarily on economic and trade cooperation to one also encompassing political and security issues. BRICS currently embraces a comprehensive framework built on three pillars: economy and finance, politics and security, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. These pillars align with China’s broader strategic priorities: economic development, security, and narrative and normative power—key areas that reflect its long-term competition with the United States and other Western countries and that complement Beijing’s three global security, development, and civilization initiatives (known as GSI, GDI, and GCI).

In China’s strategic vision, BRICS engagement supplements the Belt and Road Initiative’s geoeconomic focus and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s geopolitical-security role in expanding China’s global influence.

Economically, BRICS serves as China’s hedge against Western decoupling. Beijing leverages BRICS members’ collective economic power—now exceeding the G7’s GDP when measured in terms of purchasing power parity—to strengthen its energy, food, critical minerals, and supply chain security. The group also promises to help mitigate potential Western sanctions in a future East-West crisis. In addition, BRICS expands Beijing’s economic influence by promoting de-dollarization, advancing the internationalization of China’s renminbi currency, and shaping rules and standards in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.

Regarding security, China pursues multiple objectives through BRICS, from seeking cooperation to ensure domestic stability and regime security to addressing shared, nontraditional threats such as terrorism. While countering Western military influence remains a central goal, China treads carefully in promoting direct military and defense cooperation under BRICS, as it’s mindful of member state political sensitivities and internal group dynamics.

China’s strategy for enhancing its narrative and normative power through BRICS remains less defined. Beijing’s expectation that managed cultural and people-to-people exchanges can forge a common identity and shared values to drive deeper strategic cooperation within the BRICS-led Global South may prove difficult to realize. While Beijing appears to genuinely believe that BRICS can advance an alternative model of global governance rooted in so-called true multilateralism and the democratization of international relations, translating this abstract vision into effective and widely embraced solutions will likely prove to be a challenging learning experience for the rising power.

As U.S.-China competition intensifies under the second Trump administration, Beijing will likely further prioritize its engagement with Global South countries through BRICS. However, implementing China’s grand agenda will continue to involve numerous variables beyond Beijing’s control or even its anticipation. As China advances its global ambitions through BRICS, both Global South and Western countries will still have opportunities to pragmatically manage and navigate their relations with China to minimize international instability and confrontation.

South Africa
Gustavo de Carvalho and Steven Gruzd

South Africa, the smallest economy of the original five BRICS countries, sees the coalition as an important platform to amplify its global influence. The group’s objectives align with Pretoria’s broader goal of promoting a multipolar world where developing countries play a greater role in shaping international governance. BRICS allows South Africa to push for reforms in institutions such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, while advocating fairer representation of African and Global South nations.

Economically, BRICS offers alternatives to Western-dominated financial systems. The NDB has become an important funding source for infrastructure and development projects, with a growing share of loans being provided in local currencies. Although its loan book is still far smaller than that of the World Bank’s, the NDB has helped reduce dependency on the U.S. dollar and Western financial institutions. South Africa also sees BRICS as a way to strengthen trade and investment ties with other member countries, thereby balancing its economic relations, which have been historically skewed toward developed economies.

Beyond the economic arena, BRICS allows South Africa to shape global debates and challenge Western development, governance, and security narratives. Cultural and knowledge-sharing initiatives, including academic and policy exchanges, have become increasingly important for Pretoria’s efforts to promote a more inclusive international order.
South Africa expects BRICS to make the biggest impact in the areas of finance, trade, and knowledge production. The group’s financial cooperation has grown, particularly through increased trade in local currencies and the development of cross-border payment systems. While BRICS is not actively pushing for a common currency, it is creating financial alternatives that reduce members’ exposure to the current volatile global financial system. South Africa supports these efforts, alongside African financial integration initiatives such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System.
Trade and investment are central to BRICS activities as well. As BRICS expands, South Africa wants to position itself as a gateway to Africa, particularly within the African Continental Free Trade Area. The addition of Ethiopia and Egypt as BRICS members strengthens Africa’s presence in the group, opening opportunities for deeper regional economic cooperation. South Africa hopes to attract more investment from BRICS partners, particularly in manufacturing, digital technology, and green energy.

In the area of knowledge production, BRICS has been advancing research, technology, and education collaboration across its network of members. South Africa sees these linkages as an opportunity to contribute to global discussions on digital governance, climate policy, and alternative economic models. Initiatives such as the BRICS Network University and research partnerships help position the group as a counterweight to Western-led institutions that dominate global policymaking.

South Africa’s growing role in BRICS is partly shaped by shifting global politics. Relations with the United States have become increasingly strained, particularly after Washington’s negative reaction to the legal case that Pretoria brought against Israel at the International Court of Justice, as well as South Africa’s diplomatic engagements with China, Russia, and Iran. The Trump administration’s recent executive order halting aid to South Africa and accusing its government of discriminatory policies reflects the widening diplomatic gap. Against this backdrop, BRICS provides Pretoria an alternative space to navigate these tensions and reinforce its foreign policy autonomy.

U.S.-China competition also plays a role. While South Africa maintains strong economic ties with Western nations, its trade relationship with China has grown significantly. As BRICS explores alternatives to U.S. dollar–based trade, South Africa sees opportunities to diversify its financial systems and reduce external vulnerabilities. Pretoria’s long-standing commitment to nonalignment means it avoids taking sides in great power rivalries. Still, its participation in BRICS signals a preference for balancing Western influence with deeper engagement in emerging power blocs.
With BRICS expanding and institutionalizing new mechanisms—such as cross-border payment systems and a “partner countries” category—South Africa is positioning itself to benefit from the bloc’s more structured, long-term approach to cooperation. Pretoria’s focus within BRICS will likely remain on economic diversification, financial autonomy, and the strengthening of African agency in international decisionmaking as global tensions grow.

New Members

Egypt
Amr Hamzawy

Egypt has three primary motivations behind its participation in BRICS. First, Egypt seeks to secure financial and development aid and major investments for its economy, in addition to what it receives from the United States, the European Union, and international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.

Second, the Egyptian government hopes to expand trade exchanges in national currencies with other members, especially China, which is Egypt’s largest trading partner. Over the past years, Egypt has suffered from successive crises linked to the availability of the U.S. dollar for its trade exchanges, resulting in massive devaluation waves of the Egyptian pound. Therefore, the opportunity to use national currencies for trade among BRICS members represents an important priority for Egypt.
Third, Cairo sees joining an international group with Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi, as well as other major capitals in the Global South, as a move away from continued unilateral reliance on strategic partnerships with the United States and Western European countries and a move toward more diverse economic, political, diplomatic, and military cooperation.

In the short term, the Egyptian government expects that its BRICS membership will help secure additional financing opportunities and foreign direct investments to revive the economy. Egypt has no choice but to continue to introduce economic structural reforms that gradually push the most populous country in the Middle East and North Africa down the path of infrastructure modernization, renewable energy projects, and the green economy.

In the medium term, Egypt wants BRICS to become a bloc for global trade in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, as well as for promoting mutual development efforts across the Global South. The Egyptian government has frequently expressed interest in learning from developmental successes in China and India and using them as guiding models for its own efforts.

In the long term, Egypt sees BRICS as a bloc that can assume roles similar to the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Cairo perceives BRICS as an organization that can help pave the way for a genuinely multipolar world order—where the United States is no longer the sole hegemon and China doesn’t just become the competing pole in place of the Soviet Union.

But while Cairo desires a more multipolar global order, its strategic partnership with the United States remains a fundamental component of its foreign policy and is viewed as a precondition for achieving Egypt’s economic development goals. The United States has a major role in helping Egypt not only bilaterally but also multilaterally, including when it comes to the support Egypt receives from institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.

Egypt also considers partnership with the United States a necessity for achieving security and peace in the Middle East and for overcoming other national security challenges, such as the impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Egypt’s water security.

However, perceived biased American policies toward Israel since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023 have had Egyptian policymakers worried. And these concerns have been compounded by those surrounding Trump’s current policy proposals and pronouncements on the Middle East. For instance, the Egyptian government recently rejected Trump’s endorsement of plans to annex the occupied West Bank and to displace the Palestinian population of Gaza, and there is now serious questioning in Cairo about the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations.

America’s perceived bias is bound to push Egypt to work hard to turn its bilateral relations with countries such as China, India, and Russia into comprehensive strategic partnerships and to invest more in multilateral arrangements such as BRICS. Egypt wants to avoid being at the mercy of the United States’ whims.

Ethiopia
Etsehiwot Kebret

Ethiopia was one of the four new members that formally joined BRICS in early 2024. In his keynote speech at the October 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed underscored Ethiopia’s primordial interest in BRICS as an attractive multilateral vehicle to advance multiple national objectives, including infrastructure investment, manufacturing, and climate resilience. As with many other countries in the Global South, Ethiopia views BRICS as a platform that promotes economic cooperation and multipolarity, offering an alternative economic and political bloc that is not dominated by a single superpower as well as a forum where its interests and priorities may be respected and upheld. Indeed, the BRICS alliance offers Ethiopia a wealth of opportunities.
First, membership in BRICS facilitates new avenues for developmental and financial assistance, which is critical to Ethiopia’s long-term sustainable growth and development. The current international financial system is structured to meet the needs and interests of creditors, not heavily indebted countries such as Ethiopia. Potential access to NDB financing will allow Ethiopia to secure additional resources for key infrastructure projects across the nation.

Second, by strengthening its relationship with BRICS states, Ethiopia can use its newly gained diplomatic and political capital to promote its national interests within high-level global forums such as the UN Security Council and the G20, where other BRICS members are well-represented. Participation in BRICS will also elevate Ethiopia’s voice and representation in key international governance and economic decisionmaking bodies such as the G20, World Bank, and IMF. More directly, BRICS includes some of Ethiopia’s key partners, including China, its biggest economic partner, and Russia, a key security and diplomatic partner.

Third, the wide-ranging focus of the BRICS agenda, encompassing areas such as investment, trade, and infrastructure, aligns with Ethiopia’s developmental blueprint—the Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda. This alignment enables Ethiopia to prioritize and fund development projects consistent with its domestically determined developmental framework, which focuses on growth-producing assets, and without the conditionalities imposed by Bretton Woods institutions for financial support.

Given the unprecedented shifts in the world order, including rising tensions between the United States and China and Trump’s “America First” policy, Ethiopia must navigate an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. Trump has made it clear that he views BRICS as a rival bloc, as seen by his threatening to impose 100-percent tariffs to dissuade BRICS nations from creating a BRICS currency or moving to replace the U.S. dollar. However, despite the rapidly changing global dynamic, two key factors need to be considered.

First, due to Ethiopia’s strategic position in the Horn of Africa and in the hinterland of the Red Sea region, countries in both the West and East have a vested interest in Ethiopia’s stability and growth as an anchor state with great regional geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. This location provides Ethiopia with political and strategic leverage that reduces the potentially destabilizing geopolitical impact of global power shifts.

Second, consistent with Ethiopia’s long-standing position of nonalignment, strategically participating in and joining coalitions such as BRICS allows the country to strengthen its diplomatic and economic interests internationally. This can be seen in Ethiopia’s growing relationship with China, which was upgraded to what Beijing calls an “all-weather strategic cooperation partnership” during the Ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in September 2024. In a volatile and uncertain global political and economic landscape, BRICS offers Ethiopia and other Global South countries a welcome alliance to advance their national and shared interests.

Indonesia
Elina Noor

In January 2025, Indonesia officially became the first Southeast Asian member of BRICS, ahead of neighbors Malaysia and Thailand, both BRICS’ partner countries.

Indonesia’s quick ascension to membership came as a surprise to some, especially since former president Joko Widodo had demurred in 2023, cautioning against “rush[ing]” into joining the BRICS group. Just a year later, Jakarta’s about-turn was set in motion when Indonesia’s foreign minister, Sugiono, travelled to Kazan, Russia, representing the newly inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto at the BRICS summit. Indonesia’s membership application was reportedly fast-tracked given the country’s demographic, political, and economic significance.

Some Indonesian observers argue that Jakarta’s redirection has been driven more by status, visibility, and an internationally activist president than by economic imperatives. But there have been domestic concerns about the optics and value of joining a strategically disparate group of states that seem overshadowed by the sheer economic and political weight of China. This could, skeptics say, potentially undermine Indonesia’s long-standing “free/independent and active” (bebas aktif) foreign policy, complicate Western perceptions of the country’s alignment, and strain already stretched government resources, particularly given Jakarta’s simultaneous pursuit of membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

In response to this skepticism, Prabowo asserted that Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS in fact underscores the nation’s trademark independent and active policy: “Indonesia can’t be tied to specific blocs but aims to be everywhere.” It is worth recalling that Indonesia held back-to-back leadership of the G20 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2022 and 2023, respectively, so the country is not short of desire or capability “to be everywhere.”

For Indonesia, BRICS membership is an additional platform for the country’s strategic diversification rather than a diminution or dilution of its foreign policy approach. In terms of numbers, joining BRICS makes sense for Southeast Asia’s largest country, as measured in population, GDP, and land area. The group offers Indonesia an opportunity to trade with fast developing markets it does not usually do business with and expands the country’s options for sources of technology transfer and infrastructural development through mechanisms such as the NDB. Additionally, as major suppliers of key commodities such as oil and gas as well as rare earth minerals, BRICS’ strategic potential remains under-leveraged—a point surely not lost on Indonesia, home to the world’s largest nickel reserves and palm oil production.

Amid increasing chaos marked by great power tensions as well as an erosion of international law and accepted norms, Indonesia’s policy elites view BRICS as an avenue to bridge interests between developed and developing states, to advance economic reform, and to mitigate geopolitical competition.

Indonesia’s participation in BRICS may be read as a throwback to the spirit of the Bandung Conference of 1955—that is, the solidarity among nonaligned countries, particularly in Asia and Africa during a period of ideological bifurcation. But it is also Jakarta’s effort at contributing toward reshaping and stabilizing the international order even if, as critics claim, the engagement may be underpinned by the personal ambitions of Prabowo.

Iran
Karim Sadjadpour

Over the last four decades, few governments in the world have had a more clear and consistent grand strategy than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the country’s 1979 Islamist revolution, Iran has sought to drive America out of the Middle East, replace Israel with Palestine, and partner with like-minded countries (and nonstate actors) to help dismantle the U.S.-led world order. It is in this context that Tehran proudly joined BRICS in 2024, which it ambitiously views as a growing group of nonaligned nations who share its opposition to U.S. hegemony.

As one of the world’s most politically isolated and sanctioned nations, Iran views BRICS as both a geopolitical and economic counterweight to Western dominance. “One of our problems today is being dependent on the dollar,” Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a January 2025 speech touting the BRICS financial system. “Those countries [members of BRICS] have also understood this . . . [we] must strive to eliminate the dollar in trade as much as possible.”

“The Islamic Republic of Iran,” said Iran’s late president Ebrahim Raisi in 2023, “has unique capacities and is ready to participate in all three main areas of BRICS activities, i.e., political-security, economic-financial and social fields… we announce our readiness for any cooperation, joint economic action, and investment with the countries.”

Iran hopes to see the NDB and CRA emerge as alternatives to U.S.-headquartered financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, which operate in U.S. dollars, adhere to U.S. sanctions, and commonly attach political conditions to their development aid.

As a major oil and gas producer, Iran also sees BRICS membership as an opportunity to diversify its economic and geopolitical partnerships beyond China, which currently imports 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. Despite Tehran’s hope that BRICS membership may help it expand its commercial and diplomatic relationships with key markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, those nations that enjoy strong ties with the United States will likely continue to be deterred by the Trump administration’s forthcoming “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Iran.

In the aftermath of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Tehran’s export of drones to Russia, Iran has sought to strengthen its role as a producer and exporter of military hardware. BRICS offers Tehran a valuable opportunity to both import advanced technologies and expand its export of military equipment.

Despite Iran’s recent geopolitical setbacks—including the decimation of its regional proxies Hamas and Hezbollah and the collapse of its longtime ally, Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad—Tehran remains committed to its resistance against the United States and continues to believe that America is vulnerable both internally and externally.

Although Iran has reportedly sought to assassinate Trump—to avenge the killing of Revolutionary Guard commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020—it also sees in Trump’s presidency an opportunity to further polarize America internally and blunt its external power. Tehran has applauded Trump’s policies to shutter U.S. foreign aid and democracy assistance and has encouraged Trump’s instincts to withdraw U.S. forces from the Middle East.

Despite his public bravado, Trump has signaled to China, Iran, and Russia his willingness to negotiate with them. Meanwhile, Tehran hopes that Trump’s erratic behavior, coupled with his alienation of traditional U.S. allies, will bolster China’s standing as the more reliable global superpower.

While Israel has prevailed in Gaza militarily, its killing of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians has come with enormous reputational costs. With South Africa leading international legal action against Israel, Iran views BRICS as a useful forum to delegitimize Israel and advance its own regional posture.

United Arab Emirates
Ebtesam al-Ketbi

The UAE, which joined BRICS in 2024, views its membership from both economic and strategic perspectives. Economically, BRICS offers an opportunity to expand trade, attract more investment, and access new markets—all benefits that closely align with the Emirates’ strategy for economic diversification and growth. The UAE’s membership in BRICS will allow the country to expand its reach in re-exports, energy, and innovation while strengthening existing exchanges with the group’s countries. Today, the UAE is among BRICS’ most significant trade partners, with annual non-oil trade between the Emirates and BRICS member countries totaling approximately $93.2 billion and accounting for over 20 percent of the UAE’s total non-oil trade. The UAE leverages its geographic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe to maximize these opportunities. BRICS will offer the Emirates deeper trade and economic ties with the Global South, especially as the bloc plays an increasingly significant role in global growth.

The Gulf countries’ diversification and hedging strategies over the past two decades have been, in part, a response to evolving global economic dynamics, changes in international trade, and the broader transformations in globalization. With the United States achieving energy self-sufficiency and China’s economic rise reshaping trade patterns, the UAE’s largest trading partners are no longer the United States and Europe, but rather China and India. These shifts also include an increasing trend toward regionalization driven by protectionism and national priorities.

Through BRICS, the UAE can participate in economic projects focused on innovation and connectivity, thus strengthening its regional influence and advancing its ambitions in key sectors such as clean energy, food security, services, trade, infrastructure, technology, logistics, and investment. The UAE is involved in major BRICS-led initiatives and mechanisms, including the NDB. This bank focuses on infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging and underdeveloped economies, offering the UAE a platform to support its economic diversification goals.

Strategically, the UAE emphasizes that joining BRICS is not intended as a counterweight to the United States or Western countries, with which it continues to deepen cooperation. Instead, membership in BRICS and participation in other international platforms—such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (where it is a “dialogue partner”) and the G20 (where it has been a “guest”)—reinforces the UAE’s commitment to the principle of multilateralism in international relations, while also allowing it to expand its policy options by having a foot in diverse organizations. The UAE’s participation in various international platforms reflects a pragmatic approach in light of the fragmented international landscape, an unsettled global economic order, and fierce partisan divisions within the United States, especially under the Trump administration. The UAE expects BRICS to promote a rules-based international order founded on genuine multilateralism and mutual respect among nations.

From an Emirati perspective, BRICS serves as a platform to address imbalances in globalization and the international system. It will allow the UAE to expand its strategic autonomy and diversify its economic partnerships, better advance its national interests, and more effectively navigate the intensifying competition between global powers. The UAE believes addressing the imbalances will support global cooperation, reduce tensions, and move away from zero-sum dynamics.
Given the erosion of the international multilateral system, it is imperative to reform the United Nations and the Security Council to ensure fairer representation of countries, regions, and continents; to reassess the use of the veto; and to strengthen international institutions to prevent conflicts, promote global peace, and enhance solidarity in addressing poverty, inequality, and crises. BRICS countries should advocate a multilateral order that upholds state sovereignty, reevaluates economic sanctions, and expands options for countries to conduct trade through their own currencies in bilateral or multilateral transactions.

It is crucial for major powers to recognize the importance of dialogue, as it serves the collective interest of all nations. Middle powers such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye actively utilize their roles in mediation, positive neutrality, and strategic hedging to advance these principles in global forums such as the G20 and BRICS. At the same time, BRICS itself requires deep institutional reforms to enhance its effectiveness, inclusivity, and balance, ensuring that it is not dominated by one or two nations.

Partners and Potential Aspirants

Colombia and Venezuela (Aspirants)
Victor Mijares

Venezuela views BRICS as a crucial platform to counterbalance U.S. influence and mitigate its vulnerability to international sanctions, which have restricted its access to financing and global markets. Caracas’s pursuit of formal membership aligns with its broader strategy of deepening ties with emerging powers such as China and Russia, with which it has already established political, financial, military, and energy partnerships. For President Nicolás Maduro’s government, BRICS represents a mechanism to secure funding from the NDB, diversify its economic relations, and conduct transactions in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. Geopolitically, Venezuela sees BRICS as an opportunity to weaken the U.S.-led unipolar order and enhance its autonomy vis-à-vis the West.
Colombia, by contrast, approaches BRICS with greater caution. While President Gustavo Petro’s administration has expressed interest in diversifying international partnerships and attracting new sources of investment and infrastructure development, it remains careful not to jeopardize Colombia’s long-standing and structural ties with the United States, which remains its top security ally and economic partner in the hemisphere. For Bogotá, potential collaboration with BRICS serves as a way to expand its strategic options without committing to a full realignment. Consequently, Colombia’s primary interest lies in leveraging economic and commercial opportunities with emerging powers while preserving the financial and political support it receives from Western-aligned institutions.
Both Venezuela and Colombia recognize BRICS’ economic and financial dimensions as being the most impactful. For Venezuela, given it faces economic difficulties and international sanctions, its primary interest lies in securing access to NDB financing and conducting trade in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. Financing and trade mechanisms are critical for Venezuela to sustain oil production, acquire technology, and strengthen alliances with key BRICS members, particularly China and Russia.

For Colombia, BRICS could provide new investment flows in infrastructure, energy, and trade with major economies such as China, India, and Brazil. However, this interest is tempered by concerns over potential political and financial repercussions from institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which play a crucial role in Colombia’s economic stability. Thus, while both countries see the economic and financial domains of BRICS as the most promising, their expectations differ based on their domestic circumstances and existing international relationships.

Recent international dynamics have reinforced Venezuela’s motivation to join BRICS. Economic sanctions and the growing U.S.-China rivalry have pushed Caracas to further consolidate its reliance on Beijing and Moscow—two central players within BRICS. Additionally, the war in Ukraine and the global reconfiguration of energy flows have heightened the strategic importance of oil-producing nations within the bloc. Venezuela perceives this as an opportunity to expand its influence in Asian markets and secure financial and political backing from BRICS members.

For Colombia, uncertainty surrounding Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency has led some domestic voices to advocate greater diversification of international alliances, reducing the country’s dependence on Washington. However, this approach faces resistance from business and political actors concerned about potential negative repercussions for U.S.-Colombia cooperation. Nonetheless, Petro’s government has cautiously explored the prospect of expanding its network of partners, recognizing that global polarization and intensifying U.S.-China competition could reshape the international order in ways that reward countries with diversified diplomatic and economic ties.

Nigeria (Partner)
Ovigwe Eguegu

Along with eight other countries, Nigeria formally joined BRICS as a partner country following the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. There are three primary motivations behind Nigeria’s participation in BRICS.

First, Nigeria sees BRICS as a grouping it naturally belongs to, since the group comprises the world’s leading emerging economies and provides a crucial space to strengthen economic ties with them. In recent years, Nigeria has lost its position as the biggest economy in Africa. It now sits in fourth place, trailing full BRICS members South Africa and Egypt, which occupy first and second place, as well as Algeria in third place. Nigeria sees BRICS as a unique platform where economic cooperation can be advanced through strategic partnerships with other major emerging countries. In 2022, trade between Nigeria and the five core BRICS countries totaled about $41.4 billion, which represents 32 percent of Nigeria’s overall trade with the world.¹ BRICS includes some of Nigeria’s most important economic partners, not least China, its biggest trade partner. And the UAE, a BRICS member, recently became the top source of foreign direct investment in Africa. Thus, BRICS provides a vehicle for closer and more frequent high-level contact to expand economic ties. In a press release, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country seeks to leverage BRICS to achieve shared development goals in domains such as trade and investment, energy security, infrastructure, and technology transfer.
Second, for Nigeria, BRICS is a means to achieve the broader strategic objective of a less U.S.-centric international system. Nigeria, like many emerging countries, is in favor of a multipolar world and sees BRICS as a group of like-minded countries keen to engineer systemic changes. One of the coalition’s major goals is to transform the international monetary and financial system by challenging U.S. dollar dominance in global trade while promoting trade and settlement in local currencies. A key part of this plan is to further de-dollarize the global oil market or at least part of it. Because Nigeria is Africa’s top oil producer and fifteenth globally, joining BRICS further cements the overlap of BRICS members and partners and members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. By granting Nigeria partnership status, BRICS is working to consolidate its influence over global energy markets. Access to development finance is another factor. For too long, Nigeria and other developing countries have decried the shortcomings of the Washington Consensus, a set of neoliberal economic policies and principles promoted by international financial institutions and some Western governments. BRICS also creates the opportunity for an alternative source of financing through its NDB.

Lastly, with economic and political challenges putting Nigeria’s long-standing position as a regional power into question, joining BRICS allows the country to position itself as an emerging power and to boost and reinforce its status. While Nigeria will not have the same decisionmaking powers and agenda-setting influence as a full BRICS member, as a partner country, it will participate in year-round meetings within the coalition framework, as well as attend the annual summit of BRICS leaders during which matters of global significance will be discussed. This gives Nigeria visibility and a louder voice on the global stage. Furthermore, Nigeria also aspires to join the G20, where South Africa, a founding BRICS member, is currently the rotating chair. This confluence may give Nigeria the chance to leverage its new BRICS partnership in pursuit of G20 membership.

Nigeria’s decision to become a BRICS partner country was based on a combination of political, strategic, and economic factors. But while the partnership provides opportunities in these domains, Nigeria must now perform a balancing act. It needs to maintain established relationships with countries such as the United States and France, despite these countries’ conflicts with BRICS members China and Russia. The success or failure of Nigeria’s engagement with BRICS will depend on whether it can craft policies that take advantage of the partnership while simultaneously managing the many challenges it faces at home and abroad.

Saudi Arabia (Invited)
Abdulaziz Sager

Although Saudi Arabia has not yet formally decided to accede BRICS membership, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan did lead a delegation at the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, and participated in its activities as an invited nation. Being part of the discussion aligns with the kingdom’s view that in a shifting world order, multifaceted relations with a variety of countries and organizations are both warranted and necessary. Through mechanisms such as BRICS, there are additional opportunities to advance global discussions on issues impacting the collective, shared priorities of developing and emerging economies. These priorities include economic cooperation, energy security, climate resilience, and greater representation in global governance. Moreover, such mechanisms and discussions are typically held in settings where the perspective of the Global South is better recognized.

Saudi Arabia’s readiness to consider BRICS membership and participate in its meetings should be viewed as a pragmatic approach to multipolarity, emphasizing collaboration with emerging economies without committing to any exclusive bloc. As it stands, Saudi Arabia already shares economic and development goals with many of the countries within the BRICS framework—through, for example, infrastructure projects via the Saudi Fund for Development, food security cooperation with Latin America, and renewable energy investments supporting climate resilience. The kingdom’s national interests are in essence converging with the broader agenda of multilateral alignment, but at the same time, the kingdom is seeking to maintain its foreign policy independence.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, participation in BRICS or any other multilateral framework should center on improving the global situation rather than pursuing narrow political or interest-based agendas. The goals of BRICS, as the kingdom sees them, should be fostering stability, enhancing economic cooperation, addressing global challenges such as energy security and climate change, and promoting dialogue among nations to create a more balanced and resilient international system.
In a time of global uncertainty and transition, Saudi Arabia’s priority is to maintain flexibility in its international partnerships, ensuring the protection of its national interests. Regardless of its own membership status, Saudi Arabia believes that all multilateral organizations should prioritize meaningful contributions that serve the greater good and drive positive global progress. In this context, Saudi Arabia used the Kazan summit as an opportunity to stress the value of international collaboration in addressing global issues. Prince Faisal bin Farhan reiterated the kingdom’s call for more robust international institutions that genuinely reflect the diverse needs and interests of all countries. In Riyadh’s view, many existing international institutions were designed in a different geopolitical era and have struggled to adapt to the realities of a more multipolar world. As a result, these institutions often fail to ensure fair representation in decisionmaking, respond effectively to evolving geopolitical and economic challenges, and equitably distribute economic power to support sustainable development.

In particular, the current global governance system is seen as overly Western-dominated and unresponsive to the needs of emerging economies. IFIs impose burdensome conditions on indebted nations, the UN Security Council remains paralyzed by great power vetoes, and institutions such as the World Trade Organization and G20 prioritize wealthier economies. Saudi Arabia’s calls for reform of international institutions reflect these concerns. The kingdom has expressed its commitment to fostering a more inclusive, just, and effective global governance system that better reflects today’s economic and geopolitical realities and upholds the principles of fairness and mutual respect.
Saudi Arabia’s active involvement in the recent BRICS summit thus reinforces important messages regarding fostering balanced international relations that reflect the interests of both the Global North and Global South.

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with BRICS is shaped by a mix of geopolitical shifts and evolving international trends. The ongoing U.S.-China tensions and the broader shift toward a multipolar world have encouraged Riyadh to diversify its partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. While maintaining strong ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia sees BRICS as an avenue to strengthen economic and political collaboration with major non-Western powers, including China and India, which are also key energy partners. The uncertainty surrounding Trump’s policies has reinforced Saudi efforts to hedge its strategic bets by deepening ties with emerging economies. Because BRICS’ goals broadly align with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, engagement with the group offers access to new investment opportunities, technology partnerships, and alternative financial mechanisms that will reduce dependency on Western institutions. However, Riyadh’s engagement remains pragmatic, prioritizing economic benefits and global stability rather than ideological alignment with any single bloc.

Overall, the kingdom sees the BRICS summit process as a strategic platform to expand their diplomatic and economic ties on a global scale. Through engagement with BRICS, Saudi Arabia aims to deepen economic cooperation and drive development within the Gulf region, using these partnerships to support sustainable growth. Additionally, the country recognizes BRICS as a means to contribute to broader global stability and to align their interests with other nations in fostering a resilient, multipolar world order that prioritizes balanced and collaborative economic policies.

Senegal (Aspirant)
Gilles Yabi

Although Senegal did not attend the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, the country has expressed interest in joining the group. Senegal’s main interest in becoming a member, or at a minimum developing close relations with the bloc, is to diversify the country’s international partnerships. Membership, or even more close alignment, would offer new options for financing economic development and thus reduce dependence on Western partners, particularly France (which previously colonized Senegal), Europe as a regional bloc, and the United States.

The desire to diversify its portfolio of partners is not new for Senegal, which has always made balancing cooperation with all regions of the world a hallmark of its foreign policy. In a context of changing global power relations, with the growing influence of China, India, and Brazil in particular, the BRICS bloc is not seen as a substitute for Senegal’s Western partners, but rather as a forum that allows the country greater latitude in enhancing its external alliances and international negotiations while pursuing its national interests.

China and India are important trade and economic partners for Senegal. According to data from 2023, India was the second-largest importer of products from Senegal and the fourth-largest supplier. China was the second-largest supplier after being the first in 2022, overtaking France. Russia, another driving force of the BRICS group, is also a rapidly growing trading partner, rising from seventeenth place as Senegal’s supplier in 2016 to fourth place in 2023.

From this point of view, the country’s interest in BRICS is justified by the desire to deepen already progressing bilateral relations with the most important BRICS members and to take advantage of the broader BRICS framework to forge new links with other group members whose economic and demographic weight are clear to everyone.

Senegal’s main policy concern is economic transformation and job creation for young people. The country is looking for investment from BRICS countries and for relatively powerful allies who can defend the interests of Senegal and African countries in international forums. Senegal needs to develop its capacity for local processing of its natural resources through agri-food and manufacturing industries, as well as to diversify the services sector and generally improve productivity through digitalization, technology transfer, and research partnerships. In these areas, enhanced cooperation with BRICS, either as a member or a privileged partner, seems a reasonable and realistic option, without implying a rejection of historical cooperation with Western nations.

At a broad strategic level, Senegal perceives BRICS as an important vehicle to shift the world order in a more equitable direction, so that it reflects the emergence of large and medium-sized non-Western powers and gives greater voice to non-Western populations. This view is reinforced by the outcome of the recent U.S. elections, the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe, the legacy of European colonization, the perception of a permanent and disproportionate Western influence on the world stage, and the serious security and economic difficulties faced by African countries.

The election of the nativist and nationalist Trump to another presidential term has reinforced the feeling that African countries should rely on themselves and reduce their dependence on the United States, as well as Europe. The rise of anti-migrant sentiment in both regions, particularly against African migrants in Europe, contributes to the perception that Americans and Europeans hold a negative view of African populations. Senegal is an open society and stable democracy with a large diaspora present on most continents. The country’s political elites are particularly well informed about internal political orientations and debates in Europe and the United States. They see the need to turn more to emerging and established powers such as China, which offers opportunities for cooperation based on explicit mutual economic interests.

Türkiye (Aspirant)
Sinan Ülgen

Türkiye’s interest in BRICS is first motivated by Ankara’s aspirations to enhance its strategic autonomy in international relations. Over the past decade, Turkish political elites have strived to reconceptualize the country’s place in the world. This reappraisal was necessitated by the fallout with the United States on regional security issues—primarily the overriding disagreement over the future of Syria—as well as the total loss of momentum in Türkiye-EU relations. This new outlook has led to a policy of rapprochement with key nations of the non-Western world, particularly China and Russia, as well as a balancing of Türkiye’s relations with its traditional partners in the West.

The second reason for Türkiye’s interest in BRICS has to do with economic expectations. Ankara hopes to receive more foreign direct investment (FDI), technology, and long-term finance capital from BRICS nations. Despite Türkiye being firmly anchored in the Western economic ecosystem, the country’s prevailing political tensions with Western countries—for example, related to NATO, the Middle East, and the war in Ukraine—coupled with a gradual erosion of democratic standards at home have acted as barriers to further economic integration. In fact, FDI flows from the West have declined and technology sharing has diminished. As a result, Turkish authorities have decided to seek these critical resources for Türkiye’s development objectives from a China-centered ecosystem. Turkish officials hope that establishing closer relations with BRICS states will help with this objective. In many ways, therefore, Türkiye’s interest in BRICS stems from the current absence of a more optimal economic roadmap, which remains conditional on substantive improvement in the country’s democratic norms and rule of law.

It is uncertain, however, whether Türkiye’s aspirations to establish a closer partnership with BRICS will actually advance under the present geopolitical conditions. Despite its desire to become a member, Ankara has so far not received an invitation. The group’s recalcitrance may be due to an internal decision to slow down BRICS’ expansion. But it may also be due to some members’ resistance to admitting a NATO member state. Additionally, there is now the Trump factor. At a time when the new U.S. administration is singularly focused on the China challenge and is adopting a more hawkish stance toward Beijing, it may become more difficult for a NATO ally such as Türkiye to continue to court BRICS. As a result, the Trump factor could indirectly end up helping to revitalize Türkiye’s relationship with the EU and by so doing compel Turkish authorities to deprioritize their BRICS aspirations. This outcome, however, will be conditional on EU leaders deciding to engage more constructively with Ankara against the backdrop of the security challenge posed by Russia and the economic challenges posed by the United States and China. EU leaders will have to believe that Türkiye can help Europe address its structural security and economic shortcomings.

Vietnam (Invited)
Trinh Nguyen

Vietnam’s interest in BRICS is motivated in part by similarities between itself and the group’s member states. Vietnam is a developing country and is a member of ASEAN, which champions noninterference; and similarly, BRICS members are largely emerging economies that also claim to support noninterference. In BRICS, Vietnam could find both representation and additional resources, including more access to finance, infrastructure investment, and supply chains. The NDB in particular could be an important source of financing, especially with its focus on local currencies.
Vietnam is trying to further develop its infrastructure and raise its GDP per capita, in part by attracting greater FDI and expanding its global trade links. It already has one of the more liberalized trade regimes in Southeast Asia, as well as trade agreements across the world. Many BRICS countries are already large trade, investment, and security partners of Vietnam. The country has negotiated comprehensive strategic partnerships with China (2008), Russia (2012), and India (2016). China is currently Vietnam’s largest trading partner, while Russia is an important partner in energy, oil, and gas.

Vietnam’s desire for more effective representation in international governance provides another motivating factor for joining BRICS. Government officials believe the country can gain more opportunities to influence international affairs via BRICS, as the group elevates developing country interests via forums and meetings that facilitate dialogue, cultural exchange, and cooperation, especially on matters of security and economics.

However, to date, Vietnam has taken a cautious approach to BRICS. It has expressed interest in the group but, unlike Indonesia, has yet to become a full member. Indeed, Vietnam has not yet accepted the invitation to join as a BRICS partner country, unlike its neighbors Malaysia and Thailand. It wants to lay low geopolitically for the moment and avoid becoming overly dependent on China, which seemingly dominates the bloc. It also wants to avoid jeopardizing its relationship with the United States, which remains an important export market for Vietnam. BRICS countries have angered Trump by discussing increasing trade in local currencies instead of the U.S. dollar, as well as by taking bolder steps to de-dollarize the global economy. Because Vietnam, of all the Asian countries, has the highest trade exposure to the United States as a share of GDP, the Vietnamese government hopes to stay neutral and move cautiously, especially as Trump continues to threaten tariffs.

Currently, Vietnam benefits more by positioning itself as a neutral country than it does by joining BRICS. This posture allows it to stay out of the crossfires of trade wars and extract benefits from investors looking for nonaligned host countries. While becoming a member is not likely in 2025, Vietnam will still curry favor with BRICS nations by attending conferences and forums and expressing an interest in someday joining. Vietnam already has free trade agreements (including the prized EU Free Trade Agreement) and bilateral trade agreements with major partners including with Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. While BRICS membership could carry benefits, it might bring more pitfalls in the short term, if not carefully managed.

Notes

• ¹Author calculations using data from multiple sources: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/nga; https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2025/01/26/nigeria-china-trade-volume-exceeds-20-billion/;
• https://apnews.com/article/nigeria-india-tinubu-modi-b4ff7377642edf4bb7ceb0f750c8612e; https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/nga/partner/zaf; https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/bra/partner/nga; https://www.tradeimex.in/blogs/nigeria-entry-into-brics-partner-country#:~:text=Nigeria's%20Trade%20with%20Russia,surplus%20in%20favor%20of%20Russia

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Russian exports have been making rapid inroads into the Indonesian markets since the start of the special military operation, adapting to local regulations and specifics. Under favorable conditions, Russia could secure a more systematic presence in certain niches, particularly in agriculture and energy. This could add a new depth to bilateral relations and become their hallmark for years to come, especially amid the uncertain outlook for Russian arms exports to Indonesia and the dynamics within BRICS.

Since the beginning of the special military operation, discussions on Russian–Indonesian relations have largely centered around three main topics. The first concerns the overall prospects for developing diplomatic dialogue, given the sanctions pressure on Russia and Indonesia’s peace plan for resolving the Ukraine crisis. The second is about the future of military-technical cooperation after Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s former Defense Minister, took office as president, especially in relation to the drawn-out plans to supply Russian Su-35 fighter jets. The third is about the outlook for a free trade agreement (FTA) between the EAEU and Indonesia, which experts and officials have been eagerly awaiting.

Since 2023, another meaningful theme has emerged: closer integration of Indonesia into BRICS and—after the country’s official accession—a comprehensive assessment of the prospects for Russian–Indonesian cooperation within the bloc.

As can be observed, issues of bilateral trade and economic engagement between Russia and Indonesia have often been overshadowed by the larger military-political and global agenda. The first naval military exercises in the history of Russian–Indonesian relations, conducted in 2024, played a major role in this context. They sparked a new round of expert discussions in both nations on elevating relations to a fundamentally new strategic level and exploring the potential to transform these joint drills into broader military-technical cooperation.

It is no secret that security has traditionally taken precedence over trade and economic cooperation, and Russian–Indonesian relations are no exception in this regard. However, the dialogue on military-technical cooperation, especially the deliveries of Russian arms to Indonesia, is a problematic and in many ways toxic topic. That said, the real prospects for developing military-technical cooperation, as well as bilateral relations in general, are often overestimated, stigmatized or simplified to a primitive equation—Indonesia has proposed a peace plan for Ukraine, joined BRICS, conducted joint military exercises and elected “pro-Russian” President Prabowo—hence, purchases of Russian military hardware and open support for Moscow on Ukraine issue are only a matter of time. Such conclusions are meaningless and ignore the realities of, at the very least, Indonesia’s multi-vector and proactive policy under Prawobo, which he has been vigorously promoting. One of the dimensions of this policy, albeit not so widely covered in global media and expert discussions, is mutual trade, which is evolving in intriguing ways.

Beyond just figures

The special military operation and its impact have spurred Russian–Indonesian trade, which amounted to $3.3 billion in 2023, up 22% from pre-crisis 2021. At first glance, these are unremarkable figures, which contradict Russia’s declared pivot to the East and the rapid reorientation of commodity flows to countries of the Global South after 2022. One could speculate a lot about the reasons behind this—sanctions, geographical remoteness and the resulting logistical constraints, insufficient market presence in both countries, difficulties in business communication, and more. These are all symptoms; the core issue is the goal-setting mechanism. Like the entire Southeast Asia, Indonesia has never been a priority region for Russia and will hardly become one anytime soon. Thus, the issues discussed above trace back to Russia’s initial strategic planning. Jakarta and other ASEAN partners play an important but ancillary role in the Russian foreign trade strategy.

First, this refers to the partial diversification of Russian exports in certain product categories, including as a way to reduce the growing dependence of the national economy on other Asian markets, particularly those of China and India.

Second, this function implies an even more targeted substitution of imports that were lost after Western trade routes closed—primarily high-tech goods such as industrial products and electronics.

Russia, in turn, is not among Indonesia’s priority trade and economic partners either, with the exception of certain product categories. In terms of its economic presence in Southeast Asia, Russia is a textbook example of a middle power, with a typical set of advantages and limitations inherent to such countries, and ranks alongside countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This is why Russian–Indonesian trade ties, by definition, cannot aspire to anything beyond niche cooperation, and the imminent signing of an FTA involving the EAEU will not remedy this situation.

However, this should not be perceived as a setback or a weakness in bilateral relations. There is no need to chase impressive trade turnover figures, which do not always reflect the real dynamics of mutual trade. A much more pragmatic and rewarding approach is to strengthen Russia’s targeted presence in specific sectors of the Indonesian economy. This requires a systematic effort so that Moscow could secure certain niches for the long term, independent of the sanctions situation. There are several trade areas where Russia is already a strategically important player for Jakarta or has the potential to play a more significant role. Given the trade surplus (73% in favor of Russia) and Moscow’s interests, the following section will focus on the most promising categories of Russian exports to Indonesia and the barriers to further growth. In all of these areas, except for asbestos, Russia has managed to increase its share in the Indonesian market since the start of the special military operation.

Mineral resources

In terms of product nomenclature, Russia’s main strategic interest in trade with Indonesia boils down to increasing supplies of mineral resources, specifically coal briquettes—a crucial commodity that accounted for 34% of Russia’s total exports to Indonesia and valued at $828 million in 2023. Notably, these supplies have seen explosive growth—rising nearly 4.5 times compared to 2021—which allowed Russia to expand its share in Indonesia’s total imports of this product to 23.6% in 2022–2023, up from 8.2% in 2021 (see Table 1). This puts Russia second only to Australia, which accounts for nearly half of Indonesia’s coal briquette imports. Consequently, competition with other foreign suppliers poses little risk to Russia’s standing in the Indonesian market.

The key challenge lies in Indonesia’s ambition to cut its carbon footprint in the national economy and transition to cleaner energy sources, including liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, this move has yet to materialize, as coal briquette imports remain high in the past three years, domestic consumption is rising, and coal production hit a new high at 831 million tons in 2024. At the same time, coal accounted for 61.8% of Indonesia’s power generation in 2023—the second-highest share in Southeast Asia after the Philippines. Furthermore, Indonesia’s shift away from coal imports and production could potentially open a window of opportunity for Russian LNG exporters.

Table 1. Russia’s share in Indonesia’s total imports of selected products based on the 4-digit HS code, 2018–2023, %
Source: compiled by the author with data from Trade Map

Fertilizers

The export dynamics of fertilizers, Indonesia’s second-largest import category, have been mixed. On the one hand, after the start of the special military operation, Russia managed for the first time to overtake China and Canada to become the top supplier of this product to Indonesia. On the other hand, the value of Russian fertilizer exports dropped sharply from $811 million in 2022 to $481 million in 2023. However, in this case, it is not the absolute figures that matter, but Russia’s overall share in the Indonesian market, which increased to 22.7% (see Table 1).

The decline in fertilizer exports to Indonesia in nominal terms follows a broader trend affecting all of Jakarta’s key partners, especially Canada, whose exports fell fourfold. This is directly related to Indonesia’s import substitution policy. The country seeks to boost its agricultural productivity by building fertilizer plants and promoting a government program to subsidize farmers, thereby strengthening food security—a key priority for President Prabowo Subianto. In many ways, this policy is the main risk for Russia in the coming years, as Indonesia plans to achieve partial self-sufficiency by 2027, which primarily means reducing its dependence on imports from Russia, China and Canada.

Food products

One of the most promising categories of Russian exports is agricultural products, with supplies increasing sixfold in 2023 compared to 2022. The main driver of growth was the resumption of wheat and meslin deliveries in May 2023, which totaled $275 million for the year—up from $825,000 over the previous two years combined. As a result, Russia climbed to fourth place among the top five suppliers with a market share of over 7% in 2022–2023 (see Table 1). Looking ahead, Russia has the potential to overtake Bulgaria, which currently ranks third with only a slim lead.

In 2023, Russia also remained Indonesia’s second-largest supplier of millet, behind the U.S., with exports worth $10.7 million and a 28.5% share in Indonesia’s total imports of this product (see Table 1). With Indonesia’s population and domestic consumption on the rise (the country ranks as the world’s third-largest importer of wheat and meslin after China and Egypt), Russia has a chance to strengthen its foothold in the grain market. Furthermore, Indonesia has chronic difficulties in growing its own agricultural crops, and its import substitution policy is mainly focused on fertilizers.

Frozen fish

In addition to wheat and meslin, Russia can expand its footprint in the Indonesian frozen fish market, where it has already established a solid economic foundation. Among all the examined export items, this product stands out for its continuous growth in Russia’s share in total Indonesian imports, from 1.5% in 2018 to 15.6% in 2022–2023 (see Table 1). Since 2021, Russia has secured a position as Indonesia’s second-largest supplier of frozen fish, next only to China, which has controlled over 33% of the market for the past two years.

Meanwhile, bureaucratic barriers hinder the expansion of Russia’s presence in the food market.

First, Law No. 33/2014, on Halal Product Assurance, mandates certification for a long list of products under halal standards. This requirement applies to the full business cycle of export-import operations, from storage and distribution to marketing. The Halal Product Assurance Agency (Badan Penyelenggara Produk Halal), under the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, oversees the entire process. The law directly affects the interests of Russian companies, as it extends to a wide range of promising Russian exports, including agricultural and chemical products (fertilizers).

Second, there are problems with the lack of transparency in import licensing for agricultural products and compliance with phytosanitary quality requirements for imported goods, as well as occasional delays in obtaining import certificates for Indonesian companies, especially at the beginning of each calendar year.

Third, high customs duties hinder Russia’s efforts to expand its market presence. The tariff rate applied to Russian frozen fish exports to Indonesia stands at 7.5%—the same as for Seychelles, a major supplier of this product to Indonesia. Meanwhile, Russia’s competitors benefit from significantly lower import duties: 5.36% for Chile, 1.76% for Norway and zero for China and Australia due to their FTAs with ASEAN. This barrier could be removed or mitigated with the signing and further ratification of the EAEU–Indonesia FTA, which is likely to include a provision on fish exports. Otherwise, Russia, under the framework of the Eurasian Economic Commission, should insist during negotiations with its Indonesian counterparts on expanding a preferential trade regime for EAEU member states regarding this product category.

Finally, the lack of an electronic veterinary certification system, particularly the integration of state databases for veterinary control, is another obstacle to the export of fishery products. However, this issue is being addressed at the official level, as evidenced by a statement from Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev, who previously served as agriculture minister. A number of these issues, including the development of the halal industry, will be discussed during industry sessions at the Russia–Indonesia Business Forum. It will be held on April 14–15, 2025, in Jakarta, on the sidelines of the Russian–Indonesian Joint Commission on Trade, Economic, and Technical Cooperation meeting, in partnership with the Roscongress Foundation and the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN).

Iron and steel

The reorientation of Russian export flows after the start of the special military operation allowed Russia to strengthen its niche presence in the Indonesian steel market in 2022. In particular, iron and steel exports grew by nearly 1.5 times over the year, from $447 million in 2021 to $585 million in 2022. However, in 2023, total export volumes declined significantly to $409 million—returning to pre-pandemic levels recorded in 2019. This sharp drop was primarily caused by the near halt in supplies of products obtained by direct reduction of iron ore, which fell from $106 million in 2022 to just $19 million in 2023. Furthermore, in 2024, there was a decrease in the export of the largest product category within this group—semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel—from $461 million in 2022 to $390 million in 2023. This puts Russia in second place among the largest exporters to Indonesia, next only to Oman. At the same time, from 2022 onward, Russia has increased its share in the Indonesian market for semi-finished products from 14.8% in 2021 to 18.8% in 2022–2023 (see Table 1).

For Indonesia, the iron and steel market is one of the most sensitive, as local producers suffer significant losses due to the strong presence of foreign players. In order to stimulate domestic business, the country’s leadership regularly introduces various protectionist measures, which directly impact Russia’s interests. In particular, according to a decree issued by the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, from 2019 to 2030, the anti-dumping duties on hot-rolled flat products in coils apply to Russia as follows: 5.58% for PJSC Severstal, 8.96% for PJSC NLMK, 20% for PJSC MMK and 20% for other Russian companies. This has effectively shut Russian businesses out of the hot-rolled coil market, as reflected by years of zero exports of this product to Indonesia. Similar restrictions were introduced in 2024 against China, including Taiwan, and South Korea, covering all types of tin-coated flat-rolled products of carbon and alloy steel.

In addition, strict regulations on the import of metallurgical products were in place until May 2024. Specifically, Indonesian companies were required to obtain a special permission from the Ministry of Industry in the form of an import license (PI), a recommendation or technical consideration (Pertek) and an import technical verification and tracing (LS) to import iron, non-alloy steel and related products. Following amendments to previous documents and the introduction of the revised “Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 8” in May 2024, import licenses are no longer required. However, other bureaucratic regulations remain in place. In addition, the exemption from prohibitions and restrictions on imports of iron and steel only applies to commercial activities of up to $1,500 per shipment. In practice, the complex customs declaration system complicates communication between foreign exporters and their Indonesian counterparts, increases costs and considerably prolongs transaction approval timelines.

Asbestos

Among Russian exports to Indonesia, asbestos stands out. In some years (2019–2021), Russia held a near-monopoly, accounting for over 90% of all Indonesian asbestos imports (see Table 1). This was largely driven by the country’s low domestic demand and the extremely limited supply from foreign partners. Apart from Russia, only three countries, Brazil, China and Kazakhstan, export asbestos to Indonesia. In 2022–2023, Russia’s share sank to 77.2% due to three factors: a drop in Russian exports, a more than twofold increase in Chinese exports and Brazil’s entry into the Indonesian market. Nevertheless, given the limited supply, there are no objective reasons for Russia to lose its competitive edge here.

Pharmaceuticals

Another area of trade and economic cooperation that is currently underrepresented in absolute figures but has growth potential is the supply of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. One success story is the entry of the Russian company Polysan into the Indonesian market in 2023 with its Reamberin drug, which has anti-hypoxic and antioxidant properties. The expansion of cooperation in the pharmaceutical industry was also actively discussed at a high level during the meeting of the Russian–Indonesian Working Group on Trade, Industry and Investment at the 15^th International Economic Forum “Russia–Islamic World: KazanForum” in May 2024. In particular, Indonesian delegates expressed their readiness to facilitate access of Russian pharmaceuticals to the local market.

To a large extent, it is administrative barriers that prevent both countries from working more systematically in this area. For example, under Ministry of Health Regulation No. 1010 of 2008, any foreign pharmaceutical company must either localize its production of medicines in Indonesia or form a partnership with a local manufacturer. The latter requirement allows an Indonesian-registered national company to obtain regulatory approvals on behalf of its foreign partner to produce and sell products in the country.

Furthermore, in January 2023, the Indonesian government issued Decree No. 6, mandating that medicines, biological products and medical devices sold in the country, as well as their production methods (including related materials, processing, storage and packaging), must obtain halal certification. In this context, it appears most reasonable to explore ways to ease market entry for Russian companies.

However, boosting Russian exports to Indonesia, even with the implementation of an FTA with the EAEU, will be incomplete without strengthening the business and financial architecture. There are several shortcomings and limitations in this area.

First, institutional ties between the countries in business and finance are underdeveloped—there are no joint banks and Russian banking institutions have no branches in Indonesia. The Russian Export Center (REC) planned to establish a representative office in Jakarta in 2024, but no official announcements have confirmed its opening. The missing address and map marker on REC’s official website, unlike for other countries, strongly suggests that the office in Indonesia is not yet operational.

Second, due to concerns about secondary sanctions, Indonesian banks are cautious about building payment and settlement cooperation with Russia, particularly when it comes to connecting to the Russian alternative to SWIFT—the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). The Central Bank of Russia does not provide a detailed country-by-country breakdown for the number of banks connected to the system. However, it can be assumed that even if some Indonesian financial institutions are integrated with the SPFS, there are only a few of them.

Third, there is no publicly available data on mutual trade in national currencies. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that most transactions are conducted in U.S. dollars. This conclusion is indirectly supported by Bank Indonesia’s statistics, which show that over 90% of the country’s foreign trade is settled in dollars. In addition, Indonesia has not yet integrated Russia’s Mir payment system, which, among other things, is informed by financial concerns and sanctions compliance requirements.

Nevertheless, developing financial and settlement integration is one of the promising areas in the evolution of Russian–Indonesian relations, which is gradually gaining support at the official level in both countries. For example, back in 2022, at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Indonesia to Russia Jose Tavares stated that the countries were negotiating the launch of settlements in national currencies. In a January 2025 interview with the Jakarta Globe, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Indonesia Sergei Tolchenov confirmed that discussions on this matter were actively underway with Jakarta, though he refrained from speculating on a timeline for implementation. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Ministry of Tourism is looking into ways to accept Russian Mir cards as a payment method for the tourist levy in Bali, considering the high number of tourist arrivals from Russia to the island.

Indonesia takes the issue of de-dollarization seriously, promoting the rupiah and the transition to mutual trade in national currencies with partners as one of the priorities to ensure financial sovereignty and economic resilience. While the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 accelerated this process, Indonesia had been laying the groundwork long before the special military operation. In particular, Bank Indonesia has been promoting the Local Currency Transaction (LCT) mechanism in bilateral trade transactions with partner countries since 2017. As of 2025, Indonesia has signed memorandums of understanding on using the LCT mechanism with the central banks of Japan, South Korea, India, the UAE, China, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. This approach is beginning to bear fruit: according to official data, trade in national currencies reached $6.3 billion in 2023, with further growth expected.

To ensure cross-border financial interconnectivity and facilitate the broader adoption of the LCT mechanism, Bank Indonesia has prepared the Indonesia Payment System Blueprint 2030 (BSPI), which serves as a roadmap for improving cross-border payment systems. The key tool for promoting LCT and implementing this roadmap is the introduction of the Quick Response Code Indonesia Standard (QRIS), which is essentially a QR code-based payment system. This system is already in use for financial transactions in Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, and Bank Indonesia aims to expand it to non-ASEAN partners such as South Korea, the UAE, Japan and India.

Indonesia’s proactive efforts to put in place an alternative financial architecture opens avenues for joint cooperation with Russia and, in the longer term, with the EAEU. This could involve signing a memorandum of understanding between the countries’ central banks to use national currencies in settling trade through the LCT mechanism and/or integrating Russia into QRIS. A more complex approach would be to synchronize national payment systems and enable QR code-based cross-border transfers in national currencies, bypassing the U.S. dollar in conversions.

Despite all the imbalances and complexities, trade and economic relations between Indonesia and Russia are in their honeymoon phase after the beginning of the special military operation. Russian exports have seen record growth, an FTA with the EAEU is on the horizon, and efforts are underway to develop the financial infrastructure for mutual trade. However, it is important not to be misinformed by all these positive signals or set expectations too high. Russia’s goal for the coming years is to increase Indonesia’s reliance on certain Russian exports, such as fertilizers, wheat and coal briquettes. The more ambitious and long-term goal is to scale these achievements across entire industries—agriculture, energy and pharmaceuticals.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Introduction

Amidst the complexities of contemporary international affairs, characterized by intensifying bloc politics and fluid dynamics, the XV BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, conducted from August 22 to August 24, 2023, emerged as a pivotal event. This summit, contrary to widespread skeptical predictions by various media, policy, and academic entities, marked a significant moment for BRICS. This study aims to dissect the summit's outcomes, its broader implications, as well as the potential benefits and challenges for Pakistan's possible integration into this bloc.

Contrary to most predictions, the XV BRICS Summit proved to be a water-shed moment for the group, where countries with diverging views and interests in multiple domains were able to achieve an across-the-board consensus on two major agenda points (among others) of the Summit: a) positive movement of member states towards the use of national currencies in trade and financial transactions among group members and with other nations of the “Global South” and b) agreement on the expansion of the group into a broader platform by inviting new member states into BRICS.

The outcomes of the XV BRICS Summit, especially the ones which saw invitations being extended to six (6) new countries to join the group and numerous important commitments made in the Johannesburg Declaration, such as the ones related to collective economic growth, sustainable development and inclusive multilateralism, have given hope to several emerging economies in the world, including Pakistan, who are seeking for effective mechanisms for the promotion of multilateral cooperation, international law, equality and inclusive, collective development.

However, before delving into other dynamics regarding BRICS, it is pertinent to explore the gradual evolution of the group, in order to properly understand the much-discussed informal organization of emerging economies.

Evolution of BRICS

As mentioned earlier, BRICS is an informal grouping of emerging economies. It is a denotative acronym of its founding/core member states namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The acronym was first introduced by Jim O'Neill (a British economist, previously with Goldman Sachs, now Chatham House) in 2001, in his report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs.”

In this report, the author predicted the collective domination of the global economy by BRIC countries by the year 2050.

On September 20, 2006, in New York, the first Brazil, Russia, India and China "BRIC" Ministerial Meeting was conducted on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The meeting was attended by the defense minister of India, the foreign ministers of China, Brazil, and Russia, and they all indicated interest in enhancing multilateral cooperation.

The inaugural BRIC “Summit” took place in Russia on June 16, 2009. Following the conference, BRIC leaders released a joint statement outlining the group's objectives as well as strategies for addressing the world's financial and economic problems arising in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008.

On December 24, 2010, South Africa joined BRIC after formally accepting the invitation (initiated by China) and transformed the group into BRICS. At that time, South Africa was the only other member state admitted into the group and the sole country from Africa.

Furthermore, the New Development Bank (NDB), the only formal institution of BRICS was established in 2014, after signing of the agreement to establish NDB during the VI BRICS Summit by member states. Prior to this, the proposal for the establishment of NDB was presented by BRICS leaders in 2012 and its feasibility was agreed upon by them in 2013.

Mr. K. V. Kamath was appointed as the first President of the NDB in 2015. The bank received its first paid-in capital from member states in 2016 and became fully operational that year.

The NDB is permanently headquartered in Shanghai, China since 2021, with regional and sub-offices in different locations around the globe including in Africa, Asia, Eurasia and South America.

Moreover, as a major milestone, the NDB approved its first non-USD (United States Dollar - $) loans denominated by Euro, Chinese Yuan, South African Rand and Swiss Franc in 2019. In 2021, Bangladesh, Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Uruguay were admitted as members of the NDB.

The NDB initially authorized a capital of US$ 100 billion. The NDB's founding members in the beginning subscribed $50 billion USD which consisted of $ 10 billion USD of paid-in funds while $ 40 billion USD as callable capital. (See Figure 1).

In 2018, approximately nine years after its first Summit in 2009, South Africa proposed a further expansion of BRICS. However, serious discussions about expansion within the group commenced in 2022 during the XIV BRICS Summit in Beijing, which eventually became one of the main agendas of the XV Summit in 2023.

According to the 2022 International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics, BRICS members held a share of 31.58% of the total Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). (See Figure 2).

BRICS member states (before expansion) represented 41.25% of the total world's population. Until 2022, its global GDP share was 32%, which is expected to grow to 40% by the year 2040.

The BRICS Presidency keeps on shuffling each year between member states. In 2023, South Africa held the BRICS Presidency and was responsible for hosting the XV BRICS Summit. As of now, BRICS has increased the number of its members to eleven.

Who Joined BRICS So Far?

On August 24, 2023, it was announced during the press conference by BRICS members during the XV BRICS Summit, to invite six (6) countries to join BRICS, taking the total number of its members from five to eleven, namely: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran (IRI), Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE.
Membership of these six countries took into effect on January 01, 2024. The five founding BRICS members congratulated the new members and expressed confidence in the further development of the group with the inclusion of its new members.

Chinese President Xi Jinping termed the expansion as "historic and a new starting point for BRICS cooperation.”

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that BRICS countries have reached an agreement on the guiding principles of the BRICS expansion process and noted that interests of other countries in building partnership with BRICS is valued by its members. According to him, over forty countries and regions showed interest in joining BRICS, and 22 of them formally applied to join in 2023.

State of Play Within BRICS

The current state of play of BRICS is highly dynamic and interesting which is why this informal group has gained so much attention from policy spheres and political analysts all around the world. However, the internal dynamics of the group can be understood through several key aspects.

One of the main driving forces and uniting elements behind the BRICS is economic cooperation. These nations trade widely among themselves and have diverse/different modes of economies. They collaborate to encourage investment and trade between member nations, and they frequently talk about how to lower trade barriers and improve economic integration. There is also talk within the group—which also took place during the XV BRICS Summit—regarding the use of national currencies to boost commercial activity between members and with countries of the Global South. BRICS member states have also discussed the idea of introducing a common BRICS currency as well. However, the progress on this front has been rather slow and has hit some major roadblocks pertaining to several geo-political, economic and structural factors.

In the domain of political cooperation, BRICS members continue to hold annual summits and discuss a wide range of political issues which include regional disputes, international security, and global governance. Member states also publish joint statements or communiques on these topics as well. The Johannesburg Declaration is a good example of this, which was jointly released at the conclusion of XV BRICS Summit. In addition, members regularly coordinate their stances on multiple international political issues. On issues like global warming, international peace and security, and reforming organizations like the United Nations and the IMF, they seek common ground regularly.

In the sphere of economic development, each member has its own unique economic development challenges to overcome. While China and India have experienced rapid economic growth, members like Brazil and South Africa have experienced economic slowdowns combined with domestic political instability. Moreover, Russia has also experienced massive economic slump after getting hit by Western economic sanctions imposed after the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Such developments, while presenting their own respective challenges to BRICS, also provided some opportunities for the group as well, with members trying to jointly respond to challenges and capitalize on the presented opportunities collectively as well as individually.

Furthermore, South-South cooperation, or collaboration between developing nations, is a BRICS priority, among others. The member countries collaborate to exchange best practices and support global development projects, notably in Africa. As it was evident during XV BRICS Summit, where according to President Ramaphosa, over 30 heads of state from African countries as well as others from the Global South were invited to the Summit. The leaders from African countries and other leaders from the Global South were hosted at the BRICS-Africa Outreach and BRICS+ Dialogue to have an inclusive dialogue on issues affecting developing economies and identify actions that can be taken collectively to achieve a more equitable, inclusive and representative world.

Apart from formal meetings and summits, BRICS leaders participate in informal dialogue, allowing for more open discussions on numerous problems. These unofficial exchanges promote collaboration and assist member states develop confidence and trust with each other.

Most important of all, the dynamic of geopolitical interests is probably one of the most influential of all among BRICS’ state of play factors. While the BRICS countries share many interests, they also have different geopolitical, geo-strategic interests which are occasionally divergent.

For instance, the long-standing geo-strategic competition and border conflicts between China and India, and Russia's activities in Ukraine have strained its ties with Western countries which obviously have ramifications for rest of the BRICS members in multiple ways.

The visible tilt of India towards the United States and Europe, especially in the geo-political and geo-economic sense has had its negative impact on Indo-Russia relations. Moreover, the recent up-gradation of Sino-Russian relations to strategic level have stressed the “most privileged and strategic partnership” between India and Russia.

The relatively closed capitalist markets of China, the unprecedentedly Western-sanctioned economy of Russia, combined with India’s increasing bonhomie with the West and the United States in particular, as well as New Delhi’s enhanced desire to continue trading in the US dollar are some of the reasons why the idea of a common BRICS currency is unable to gain any meaningful traction so far.

Moreover, it is also important to understand that after the inclusion of six new members into the group, BRICS was no more; instead, a new form was created—BRICS Plus (+). This new form brings its own opportunities and challenges for the group.

On one hand, where the addition of new members into BRICS will add to its geopolitical, geostrategic, geoeconomic clout and material strength. On the other hand, with expansion of voices, more challenges will surface in the group, especially for the consensus-based decision-making within BRICS due to diverging interests of different members. The creation of a larger organization with no Secretariat so far and no legal authority over decisions might further complicate matters within the group.

However, a multi-year study conducted by a group of Canadian and Russian think tanks indicated that despite the absence of any legal authority or mode of compliance assurance at BRICS, the average compliance rate regarding policies and decisions was 72% in 2020, which was mainly complemented by the introduction of the IT-related (information technology) agenda to BRICS in 2015, which might assist in taking this percentage even higher in the coming years.

Although, as mentioned earlier, the group does hold informal and formal discussions and consultations to reach common ground on issues, an increase in members might make it more challenging to reach an across-the-board consensus on various matters. However, this will also provide an opportunity for middle-power countries, especially non-Western ones to have a platform to have open and candid internal discussions regarding their issues without Western participants and interference and come up with indigenous, customized solutions according to their requirements.

Furthermore, BRICS and especially BRICS Plus, now have several members that either have a difficult or a hostile relationship with the West, particularly the U.S.—e.g. China, Russia, Iran, and to a certain extent Brazil and South Africa, especially under their current leaderships. On the other hand, there are other members of the group that enjoy warm or at least good working relations with the U.S. and EU such as India, KSA, UAE, and Egypt.

Such a dynamic, where member countries will have to maintain an intricate balance between BRICS commitments and their respective relationships with Western partners will be a profound challenge for BRICS, as far as handling discrepancies and maintaining effective functioning unity of the group is concerned.

Therefore, in the backdrop of the current geopolitical environment, the times ahead for BRICS (now BRICS Plus) seem to be extremely challenging. They will present their own unique challenges and at the same time opportunities. Multiple underlying factors and dynamics will influence the group's collective response and behavior towards these challenges and opportunities. However, it will ultimately depend on how each country views its interests individually within and outside the group, which will determine the BRICS collective action and future trajectory.

Should Pakistan Join BRICS?

The short answer would be a definite yes. Pakistan should apply and go for BRICS membership. However, it is also extremely pertinent to understand the reasons behind this affirmative in order to logically and pragmatically justify the assessment.

The burgeoning influence of BRICS on the international stage, facilitated by the growing economic might of its members—their substantial populations and abundant natural resources—have made it one of the best options for developing countries, especially those from the non-Western world, who want to reduce their dependence on traditional global financial institutions and find an agency where they are enabled to have a much greater share of global influence in the realm of international politics.

As of 2023 data, China (#2), India (#5) and Russia (#8) are among the world's top ten economies (See Figure 3).

All BRICS countries, due to their increasing economic influence, are becoming drivers of global economic growth. While quoting IMF data, Bloomberg reported that by 2028, BRICS countries will contribute close to 40% of global economic growth. As of April 2023, compared to the G7’s (Group of Seven) share of global GDP at PPP—which stood at 29.9%, BRICS members’ share in global GDP collectively—accounted for 32.1% (see Figure 4).

In 2000s, G7 made up approximately 50% of global GDP at PPP, while BRICS was contributing just below 10%. Now, with 6 additional members, BRICS represents almost half of world’s population (55.75%) (See Figure 5) and its share in the global GDP at PPP (in comparison to the G7 during the same period) is approximately 35% (34.92%) (See Figure 6).

Moreover, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development report, foreign direct investment (FDI) has significantly contributed to the growth of BRICS economies since 2001, with annual FDI inflows more than quadrupling from 2001 to 2021. According to World Bank data, BRICS nations received $287.3 billion USD in net foreign direct investment in 2022, representing a 16% world share.

According to the World Trade Statistic Review 2023, BRICS member combined merchandise exports totaled US$5 trillion in 2022, accounting for 20% of global commerce.

The NDB has already approved over 96 projects worth US$ 32.8 billion for supporting infrastructure projects in member countries.

In addition, BRICS members are active members of leading international organizations and agencies where they carry substantial clout such as the UN, G20, WB, and IMF. They had 14% of the total votes at the World Bank as of July 31, 2023, and 15% of the quota share at the IMF as of August 8, 2023.

In light of the latest data stated above, from geopolitical, geostrategic, economic and diplomatic perspectives, BRICS seems to be an appropriate forum for Pakistan to be a part of.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict—a defining conflict in the contemporary era—there has been a massive weaponization of economic and financial institutions by the Western world.

In the past, economic sanctions and economic coercion via international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank (WB) and the IMF by the West were usually used against middle-power or smaller states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Ethiopia, North Korea and Syria to name a few. However, after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, economic sanctions and coercion have been used to target major powers and strong emerging economies such as Russia, China, and Turkey. [7]

These actions led to a sense in the developing world, especially in non-Western states to search for alternatives to the structures created under the Bretton Woods system to sustain their respective economies and have durable and safe mechanisms to continue their commercial activities and trade with minimal interference or influence from the “developed” Western countries. This is where organizations like BRICS, SCO, ECO and ASEAN (and the financial institutions under their umbrellas) came into existence and compelled small and middle-power states to go for them.

In addition, after the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, small and middle-power countries have extensively gravitated to organizations like BRICS and the SCO as alternatives because they do not want to bracketed into any particular bloc, hence increased interests of countries towards such groups which provide safe options for them to carry out their neutral foreign policies without fearing economic and diplomatic isolation.

Therefore, for an emerging economy like Pakistan, which is a member of the SCO, it is a suitable option to join a dynamic organization like BRICS due to its growing political, economic and diplomatic potential which will definitely be beneficial for Pakistan’s short and long term interests, and help in making its much-desired shift from geo-strategy to geoeconomics.

Moreover, by becoming a part of BRICS, Pakistan would be able to expand its diplomatic influence, open lucrative trade and investment opportunities and get access to vast natural resources like oil and gas. Especially after addition of new members, BRICS members will cover half of the world’s oil and gas resources, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration data.

With regards to food production, BRICS countries contribute almost half to the global food production, with 4 of its members being the top food producers in the world, including China, India, Brazil and Russia.

Hence, Pakistan, being a country facing acute food and energy shortages, will greatly benefit by having access to massive energy and food markets by being a part of the BRICS organization.

By joining BRICS, Pakistan will have access to mobilized funds and resources allocated by the NDB for different sustainable development projects that Pakistan critically needs. Also, by becoming a member of the NDB, Pakistan will have alternatives to the Western-created and dominated creditors like the IMF and WB. This will definitely lift off substantial pressure from Pakistan’s policy and decision-making which it had been facing since long as well.

Additionally, as the practice of dealing in national currencies among the BRICS members and with other emerging economies get more strengthened, Pakistan’s trade (as a member) within BRICS will benefit as well and reduce its dependence on the U.S. dollar (reserves of which are already dwindling and effecting the value of Pakistani Rupee—PKR).

Collaboration with other members within the group on various BRICS agendas and commitments (as a member) will benefit Pakistan’s overall national profile and image and help in fulfilling much of its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) efficiently such as climate change, women empowerment, and environment protection among several others.

Pakistan’s membership of BRICS also makes sense because the “BRICS Spirit” and almost all of the BRICS main objectives completely align with the aims and principles that Pakistan actively pursues as well, from inclusive multilateralism, fostering environment an environment for peace and development to partnering for mutual growth.

Challenges for Pakistan in joining BRICS

As mentioned in the previous section, acquiring BRICS full membership will greatly benefit Pakistan and present great opportunities. However, Pakistan’s BRICS membership also faces its unique set of challenges. They include:

• The first and foremost challenge to Pakistan’s BRICS membership is India’s opposition to Pakistan’s inclusion in the organization. Given the current state of bilateral relations between Pakistan and India, and orientation of India’s current government under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Indian opposition to Pakistan’s BRICS membership is sure to come. Since BRICS is an organization that functions on the basis of unanimous decision-making or across-the-board consensus by all members to agree on any matter or issue (as mentioned earlier), it would be a profound challenge to get Pakistan’s membership approved into BRICS with India’s opposition.
• Another challenge for Pakistan in joining BRICS is to efficiently handle to political and economic pressure that Pakistan might face from its Western partners, particularly the United States and European Union, who perceive BRICS as an organization that was created as a counter-weight to Western-created global financial institutions and challenge the global influence of the U.S. dollar. Hence, Pakistan can expect political, economic and diplomatic pressure from these circles if it actively pursues BRICS membership. Since Pakistan’s weak economic position and its dependence on traditional IFIs like the IMF and WB have been used against it as a coercive tool in the past, it is highly probable that similar pressure tactics can be used in this case as well.
• Pakistan is currently facing a plethora of issues that range from political instability, economic stagnation, militancy, climate change to food and energy insecurity. Countries like India within BRICS will try to use these issues against Pakistan in order to weaken its case in front of other members in the group which can pose a serious challenge to Pakistan’s membership.
• Political stability in Pakistan and consensus among all relevant stakeholders is extremely necessary before approaching BRICS for full membership. If political stability (domestically) and consensus does not exist, it can become a challenge for Pakistan’s membership as the strength and efficiency for its bid to join BRICS can critically weaken with rise in political instability or a change of government in the country.
• Besides India, there are also chances of other countries might give into the pressure from external forces and block Pakistan’s entry into BRICS, forces that are antagonistic towards Pakistan. For example, this can include countries within BRICS that still owe a substantial debt to the IMF or countries who own money to the U.S. or have substantial U.S. foreign direct investment into their economy.

More challenges can surface as the international environment inevitable changes in the coming months and more developments take place in the global political arena. However, the above-mentioned challenges seem to be the most significant so far.

Recommendations

The case for Pakistan to join BRICS is strong. However, there is still a lot that needs to be done in order to make Pakistan’s bid undeniable. The following are some recommendations for Pakistan when making its case for BRICS membership:

• Despite of India’s expected opposition to Pakistan’s BRICS membership, Pakistan should continue to make its case as a capable candidate. To constantly and repeatedly oppose Pakistan’s case for BRICS membership, India will have to spend its political capital within the group which will ultimately run out and fatigue may overtake BRICS members. Therefore, Pakistan should never give up on building its case consistently and with credibility for BRICS membership as consistency pays and credibility gives strength.
• To counter India’s efforts to weaken Pakistan’s case in front of other BRICS members, Pakistan will have to conduct an aggressive diplomatic campaign to lobby all members of BRICS to vote in favor of Pakistan and convince India to let Pakistan in BRICS for the larger benefit of the organization.
• However, before any such diplomatic effort, Pakistan needs to undertake important measures for internal balancing to address all the issues and concerns to compliment the merit of Pakistan’s membership case, as well as avoid issues and concerns that may been viewed as weaknesses and be used against Pakistan.
• Pragmatic assessments of Pakistan’s national capacity and capabilities must be made before joining BRICS. This will help Pakistan avoid making commitments which the country would find hard to fulfil later, restrict its policy maneuverability/freedom or infringe upon its interests.
• Pakistan will have to play on its strengths such as increase its agriculture and food production output plus quality. This will help Pakistan’s case for membership as it will show case that it will substantially contribute to the collective output of the group and is capable of commercially dealing in commodities with other members. This will also help Pakistan even after it secures BRICS membership because it will present Pakistan as productive and valuable member of the group that can complement the overall capacity of the organization.
• It is also highly recommended to work on strengthening the national currency—PKR, as it will aid in smoothly dealing in national currencies with other members for commercial purposes.
• Besides working on the existing strength areas of Pakistani exports, the overall export portfolio also needs to be expanded extensively and move towards product specialization will also have to be made to compete with bigger economies within the group and avoid becoming commercially redundant.
• Policy consistency will have to be ensured on every level. This will boost confidence of other BRICS members on Pakistan as a potential candidate for BRICS and will generate economic and political dividends even after becoming a member of the organization.
• Pakistan should immediately apply for NDB membership, even before it formally applies for BRICS full membership. NDB is the first global multi-lateral financial institution initiated completely by developing states. As per NDB rules, its membership is open to all members of the United Nations. Since Pakistan is a member of the UN, it is naturally eligible to apply to the NDB. Being an NDB member will definitely complement and strengthen Pakistan's full membership case into BRICS as well.
• Pakistan should immediately begin internal deliberation on the highest policy level to embark on attaining BRICS membership as soon as possible. The bas about the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Relations being briefed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan officials about Pakistan exploring possibilities of joining BRICS and the start of consultations with relevant stakeholders is encouraging, however, this process needs to be further sped up and related tasks undertaken on an urgent basis.

Conclusion

Despite concerns of a few members, several geopolitical factors have driven BRICS to expand. This trend, which officially began during the XV BRICS Summit in 2023, will most probably continue for the foreseeable future. However, it is imperative for Pakistan to capitalize on this opportunity before this window is no longer available.

It will be beneficial for Pakistan to join BRICS as the group reflects the changing contemporary power dynamics and economic realities. BRICS is going to shape geopolitics, and it would be remiss if Pakistan misses the window of opportunity to join the organization, especially when majority of its members have openly stated that they are ready to welcome all promising members who fit the bill to join BRICS.

The addition of six new members into BRICS is a window into its future orientation. In comparison to the new inductees, Pakistan’s chances of being accepted into the group are extremely bright, provided it effectively fulfils all the criteria and advocate its case consistently, with good merit and strong credibility in a timely manner.

1. Shareholding // New Development Bank. URL: https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/shareholding/
2. BRICS Plus members’ share in Global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity // International Monetary Fund (IMF). September 22, 2023. URL: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April/weo-report?c=213,223,924,469,644,534,429,922,456,199,466,&s=PPPSH,&sy=2009&ey=2028&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1
3. The World's Largest Economies // World Data Info. September 15, 2023. URL: https://www.worlddata.info/largest-economies.php
4. Richter, F. The Rise of the BRICS // Statistica. August 22, 2023. URL: https://www.statista.com/chart/30638/brics-and-g7-share-of-global-gdp/
5. World Economic Outlook // IMF, 2023. URL: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LP@WEO/ARG/BRA/CHN/ETH/IND/IRN/RUS/ZAF/ARE/SAU/EGY?year=2023
6. BRICS and G7 countries ‘share in the world’s total GDP in PPP from 2000 to 2024 // Statistica, 2024. URL: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/
7. Fatima Hussein, “US sanctions 398 firms in more than a dozen countries, accusing them of helping Russia’s war effort”, Associated Press (AP), published on October 30, 2024. URL: https://apnews.com/article/treasury-sanctions-finance-russia-ukraine-92d32f9041d24d371d8afb89d4df603...
8. What countries are the top producers and consumers of oil?// U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2023. URL: https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Russia is involving the BRICS and SCO countries in building a new Eurasian security architecture. Moscow has repeatedly noted that the Euro-Atlantic concept has collapsed, so the need to form a new system is obvious. This year, the Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity, first proposed by Belarus in 2023, is expected to be presented.

The official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, told Izvestia that the reaction of foreign partners to this document is "generally interested," but the process of its development does not promise to be simple. The expert community believes that Russia's experience in the field of security allows it to play a central role in shaping a new system on the continent today. The question of whether the Russian initiative is capable of becoming the basis of a new world order is in the Izvestia article.

Russia is building a new security structure in Eurasia

Russian President Vladimir Putin came up with the idea of creating a system of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia during his address to the Federal Assembly in February last year. At that time, the head of state stated that the actions of the United States and its satellites had actually led to the dismantling of the European security system. Subsequently, he repeatedly mentioned this Russian initiative. At a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry in June, the president instructed to establish a dialogue with all potential participants in the future security system.
On the issue of building a Eurasian security architecture, Russia is striving to develop a dialogue with all potential participants on the continent, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told Izvestia.

— The Russian Federation holds relevant discussions in a bilateral format with its neighbors and other partners and in integration structures with Russian participation — the CSTO, the CIS, the SCO, as well as ASEAN and the GCC. Russia will welcome the involvement of the countries of the European part of the continent in the process of continental cooperation, provided that hostile policies and block thinking are abandoned," she said.

At the same time, Moscow is discussing building a new security system with BRICS members located, like Russia, in Eurasia, in a bilateral format or on the platforms of multilateral organizations, such as the SCO, the diplomat said. "When the contours of the new security architecture in Eurasia are settled, it will be possible to think about discussing the experience of its construction by BRICS partners representing non-Eurasian regions of the world," she added.

As for the BRICS, this association is perceived by the world majority as the most promising non-Western format of cooperation, not on a continental, but on a global level.

— Its participants coordinate approaches on a wide variety of topics and promote joint projects in almost all areas. However, the BRICS association is not a Eurasian one, so we do not include on its agenda the issue of the Russian initiative to create a security architecture in Eurasia or the preparation of the Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st century," said Maria Zakharova.

The new system is designed as a response to the existing challenges and threats facing the Eurasian continent.

"On the one hand, the Euro-Atlantic concept has collapsed, and the regional security system based on it has exhausted itself," the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes.
On the other hand, the formation of a continent-wide architecture is in line with an important trend in global development, which is the historical rise of the Eurasian macroregion, which today provides the bulk of global economic growth and strengthens its position in several independent non-Western centers of the multipolar world, she said.

In order to realize the existing potential, the Eurasian states, according to Zakharova, are interested in stable stabilization of the military-political situation in the long term, which implies the creation of a single space of equal and indivisible security on the continent.

— The view of the Eurasian continent as a single whole is conditioned by the mutual influence of military and political processes taking place in its different parts. It is not possible to consider them in isolation, separately. Russia is convinced that the countries of the continent can and should bear primary joint responsibility for solving security problems, preventing negative interference from outside," the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry continued.

The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century

The architecture proposed by Russia is seen as multi-layered. Moscow is confident that it will integrate existing formats, include political agreements, a new regulatory framework and other possible forms of interaction between the participants.

"We are talking, figuratively speaking, about the "sum of actions" of like-minded people, taking into account the accumulated experience of developing confidence-building measures of a political and military nature between states in different parts of the continent in accordance with their needs and existing national potentials," Maria Zakharova said.

The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century, put forward by Belarus in 2023 and supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin, should become a conceptual and programmatic document designed to set out a vision for the framework of interstate cooperation in Eurasia. Thus, the Russian leader instructed to work out the draft charter with partners and with all interested states, while ensuring maximum representativeness and taking into account different approaches and positions.

"The Charter could become a kind of regulatory superstructure of the Eurasian security architecture," the official representative of the ministry noted.

As Izvestia found out, Russia is discussing the Eurasian Charter, in particular, with China and India. Consultations with Beijing took place at least twice last year, in April and October. China views the idea of the document positively. At the same time, it is known that China is promoting its own concept of the global Security initiative, aimed at eliminating the root problems of international conflicts, improving global security governance, and encouraging joint international efforts to ensure greater stability and certainty.

— We wanted to convince China that our initiative does not contradict the Chinese one. At the same time, ours has a clear regional link to Eurasia," an informed source told Izvestia.
As for India, it is wary of all initiatives in which China participates, he noted.

How do other countries perceive the initiative

An important milestone in the development of the charter was the approval of the statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation and Belarus "A joint vision of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century." The document was adopted in November last year following a discussion at the second Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security.

— It became a starting point for interaction with foreign partners in order to further discuss the content of the future charter, which is currently being developed. Their reaction is generally interested," Maria Zakharova explained. — The process of developing such a comprehensive document does not promise to be simple and fast. There is an understanding that we can try, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during a press conference on the results of Russian diplomacy in 2024, to develop a draft Eurasian Charter for the next meeting of the Minsk Conference. However, it would be premature to talk about when the final point in this work can be reached. Russia is actively developing creative cooperation with partners without setting far-fetched restrictions and artificial deadlines.
By the way, Sergey Lavrov also said that Russia and Belarus intend to present the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century at the third Minsk Security Conference, which will be held this fall. He noted that the charter should lay the normative foundation for a new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian continent.

Russia has the necessary culture of building relations in the field of security and extensive experience, which allows it to play a central role in this issue today, Andrei Kortunov, an expert at Valdai, told Izvestia.

— There are areas where the Russian Federation has obvious advantages. For example, it can act as a leader in issues related to nuclear safety, strengthening strategic stability and confidence-building measures in this area. Let me remind you that the joint experience of the Russian Federation and China in demilitarizing the Russian-Chinese border is an outstanding achievement in disarmament at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century. This experience can also be used," the expert argues.

If the Eurasian countries manage to agree on a security system on the continent, this will increase the chances of forming a global security system, the analyst believes.

— The creation of such a system is a matter of several decades, given the diversity of players and the threats they face. It will be very difficult to create a system covering the entire continent, but nevertheless it is an achievable task," he believes.

As for the next steps, according to the expert, there are two ways to move forward: either to establish regional security systems and then combine them at the continental level, or to follow the pan-Eurasian path. However, in the latter case, "the first steps, by definition, will be more modest and situational than strategic," he concluded.

read more in our Telegram-channel https://t.me/The_International_Affairs

Ethiopia
Source: eea-et.org

The Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA) participated in the BRICS Dialogue Series 2, held on April 4-5, 2025, at Jimma University, Jimma, Ethiopia. This two-day event brought together distinguished diplomats, scientists, researchers, and experts to explore how Ethiopia can optimally leverage the BRICS framework and contribute to global economic development and cooperation discussions.

A key focus of the event was the BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC) recommendations document, which participants used as a foundation to offer valuable insights and forward-looking recommendations for Ethiopia’s engagement within BRICS. Representing the EEA, Professor Mengistu Ketema, CEO of the Association, and Dr. Abule Mehare, Director of Partnerships and Communication, played a prominent role in leading discussions on promoting cooperation for economic growth and development.

During the event, Dr. Abule Mehare presented a paper titled “Unlocking Ethiopia’s Competitive Edge within the BRICS+ Framework.” The paper examined Ethiopia’s comparative advantages within the BRICS framework, analyzing both the potential challenges and opportunities for growth. Dr. Abule also provided key recommendations aimed at maximizing Ethiopia’s benefits from BRICS cooperation, with a particular emphasis on fostering sustainable economic development and strengthening international partnerships.

The event was jointly organized by the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Jimma University, and Bahir Dar University, and provided a significant platform for enhancing Ethiopia’s role within the BRICS initiative. It underscored the country’s strategic potential for future economic collaboration with the global South.

Russia
Source: eng.globalaffairs.ru

Abstract

This paper analyzes India’s response to the stringent sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. and the EU during the Ukraine crisis. It evaluates the applicability of non-classical IR theories to India’s foreign policy, examines the ideology and political traditions underpinning India’s position regarding sanctions, assesses the consistency of this approach and its current state, and explores its influence on the policies of other developing countries.

Ukraine crisis, Narendra Modi, Nehruvianism, Western sanctions, anti-Russian sanctions, anti-Iranian sanctions, Indian foreign policy, Global South, India-Russia relations.

The Global South’s stance regarding the Ukraine crisis and anti-Russian sanctions has emerged as a central issue in global politics over the past three years. Initially, the West was certain that it would be able to rally most of the world around Moscow’s diplomatic isolation. And indeed, after the UN General Assembly adopted several resolutions condemning Russia, it looked like the West would succeed. However, most countries of the Global South have tried to avoid joining sanctions and to instead continue cooperation with Russia, and the West has resorted to applying increasing pressure on the South to align with its position.

The Ukraine crisis, which attained global dimensions in 2022, has highlighted two critical issues: the efficacy of sanctions, and the dynamics of North-South relations. Questions have arisen regarding the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions—both primary and secondary—and regarding the Global South’s developmental needs. In this context, it is worth analyzing the perspectives of directly-affected countries of the Global South.

India, the demographically and economically second-largest non-Western nation, presents a particularly illustrative case. Unlike China, which has steadily ascended to the club of the world’s most developed nations and reclaimed its historical role at the center of the global economy, India is still striving to achieve that status.

India is widely regarded as the world’s largest democracy, and its economy is closely intertwined with the West through trade and corporate ties.

In this respect, India is potential proof that the liberal international community is not exclusively Western.

Yet New Delhi has avoided involvement in the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to isolate Russia, confining itself to declarations advocating for a cessation of hostilities. Indeed, it has significantly increased its engagement with Russia—especially in trade—while simultaneously maintaining its cooperation with the U.S. and other Western nations. In some spheres, such as arms purchases, cooperation with the West has even been enhanced.

Aware of the limitations of traditional (Western) IR theory in explaining the policies of non-Western countries, we examine India’s rich political thought and experience as determinants of its policies regarding sanctions. We then analyze the evolution and current state of India’s sanctions policy, before assessing its potential influence on the sanctions policies of other Global South countries.

The Place of Sanctions in Modern Indian Political Thought

The postcolonial paradigm is warranted in its skepticism of traditional Western IR schools’ claims to universality (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2021). Scholars advocating for the inclusion of non-Western experience in IR theory call for an eclectic approach to explaining global processes (Acharya and Buzan, 2009), one that rejects the projection of Western theories to the entire world, instead emphasizing the importance of individual countries’ unique historical experiences and political thought. Such an approach is essential both for describing the current international situation and for normatively prescribing the best ways of building international relations.

The term ‘Indian political thought’ here refers to what Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2009) defined as ‘pre-theory’: “elements of thinking” by both academics and practitioners “that do not necessarily add up to [IR] theory in their own right, but which provide possible starting points for doing so.”
Practitioners have been the main source of India’s pre-theory of international relations, with the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, serving as a key figure whose ideas shaped India’s foreign policy for many years ahead. As an internationalist and supporter of a UNSC-based system of collective security (Nehru, 1997; Government of India, 1961), Nehru prioritized non-military measures, including economic sanctions, to prevent or halt aggression—if such measures were collectively implemented.

Other influential theorists of Indian foreign policy (Chauhan, 2023) include Ram Manohar Lohia, who believed that economic sanctions could support “national, democratic, and socialist forces” worldwide (Lohia, 1937), and Angadipuram Appadorai, who joined Nehru in endorsing the UN-based collective security system and UNSC-imposed economic sanctions (Appadorai, 1949).

The Nehruvian course remained the guiding principle of India’s foreign policy throughout the bipolar period. Under Nehru’s leadership, India imposed sanctions on South Africa for its apartheid regime and discrimination against ethnic Indians, which, Nehru argued, directly violated the UN Charter and Declaration of Human Rights (Government of India, 1961). Following Nehru’s death, the increasingly complex international landscape led to a shift away from idealism towards pragmatism. During this period, India also faced unilateral sanctions from Canada and Britain due to its nuclear testing.
The 1990s saw a continued shift towards neoliberalism and pragmatism, as well as further unilateral sanctions, including from the U.S., following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Indian leaders unequivocally interpreted these sanctions as aimed at suppressing India’s development, and defiantly asserted their right to pursue policies in the national interest. In response to the 1998 sanctions, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said: “Every decisive action has its consequences. But if the action is inherently in the national interest—and I believe our decision to conduct the tests is in the supreme national interest—then we have to face the consequences and overcome the challenge. Sanctions cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by such threats and punitive measures” (PIIE, 2008). The sanctions were eventually lifted, and relations between India and the U.S. were normalized. Nonetheless, this episode significantly influenced India’s stance on unilateral Western sanctions (Chauhan, 2014; Chemplayil, 2022).

India’s Current Policies Regarding Sanctions

At the beginning of the 21st century, India transitioned from Nehruvian non-alignment to a policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. However, this shift does not signify a radical departure from the country’s established foreign policy trajectory. Some scholars argue that both Nehru’s approach and the current strategy share the objective of transforming India into a great power (Lounev, 2012). Others contend that, rather than completely abandoning the legacy of Nehruvian non-alignment, India has returned to that policy’s core principle—flexibility in pursuit of socio-economic development (Mohan, 2003; Hall, 2019).

India thus remains committed to international institutions, especially the UN, which is perceived by mainstream Indian political and academic communities as the sole legitimate source of sanctions and as a vehicle for advancing India’s interests (see, for example, calls for UN sanctions against Pakistan: Chandra S., 2010; Sareen S., 2010).

The Iranian case exemplifies India’s rejection of unilateral sanctions imposed by Western nations. Both primary sanctions against Iran, and secondary sanctions targeting foreign entities (individuals) interacting with Iran, have significantly impacted Indian businesses and politics. Although India has expressed concerns over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program, India has refrained from endorsing the anti-Iran sanctions imposed by the U.S. In 2010, Foreign Minister Nirupama Rao stated that “we are justifiably concerned that the extra-territorial nature of certain unilateral sanctions recently imposed by individual countries, with their restrictions on investment by third countries in Iran’s energy sector, can have a direct and adverse impact on Indian companies and, more importantly, on our energy security and our attempts to meet the development needs of our people” (The Hindu, 2010). In response to the Trump administration’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran in 2018, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj said: “We recognize only UN sanctions. We do not recognize any country-specific sanctions,” emphasizing that India conducts its foreign policy independently of external pressures (NDTV, 2018). These statements can be interpreted from both pragmatic and institutional perspectives.

The Iranian case marked India’s first encounter with the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions. The second and third instances involved India’s dealings with Russia.

The discussion of secondary sanctions first arose when India and Russia struck a major deal for the acquisition of S-400 missile defense systems. This agreement underscored India’s—and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s—commitment to pursuing an autonomous foreign policy in defiance of considerable pressure from Washington and President Donald Trump (India Today, 2021). Observers noted India’s cautious approach, in particular its avoidance of Nehruvian anti-Western rhetoric (Kaura, 2018). Ultimately, in 2022, the U.S. Congress granted India a waiver.

India’s independent policy has been increasingly challenged by anti-Russian sanctions since the aggravation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022. India capitalized on severed Western-Russian ties to increase its purchases of Russian energy, yielding unprecedented growth in bilateral trade, which has continued to flourish along with political cooperation. For this, India has faced Western criticism and the threat of deteriorated relations and secondary sanctions.

Indian officials have responded with a pragmatic, nonideological defense of their policies (The Hindu, 2022; Global Times, 2022; Hindustan Times, 2022; Cnbctv18, 2022; Business Standard, 2022; Mint, 2023). There has been no fundamental rejection of unilateral coercive measures by Western nations. Instead, India has highlighted how the conflict generates or aggravates the Global South’s problems, which motivate India’s cooperation with Russia despite sanctions (Hindustan Times, 2023). This emphasis on pragmatism, economic interests, and energy security marks a significant departure from Nehruvian anti-colonialism and non-alignment.

BRICS has gone further than India, condemning sanctions—including against Iran and North Korea (Özekin and Sune, 2023)—on grounds of their harm to developing nations and on grounds of principle. From the 2013 Durban Summit to the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS declarations condemned “unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions, and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations. We emphasize that no country should enhance its security at the expense of the security of others” (BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, 2017). A similar provision is contained in the 2023 Johannesburg Declaration adopted at the 15th BRICS Summit in August 2023, albeit in a revised and less articulate wording: “We express concern about the use of unilateral coercive measures, which are incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter and produce negative effects, notably in the developing world” (XV BRICS Summit Declaration, 2023).

BRICS’s stance on sanctions is consonant with those articulated by various political forces in India. However, this alignment has not been solidified in doctrinal documents or regulations governing the response to unilateral sanctions (Chemplayil, 2022, or legal framework for addressing potential secondary or primary sanctions (Tirkey, 2019).

India’s main political forces—the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Indian National Congress (INC), the Communist Party, and various regional parties—have formed a consensus on maintaining sovereignty and strategic autonomy in the face of Western pressure, especially if sanctions threaten India’s economic or geopolitical interests.

The BJP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has adopted a policy of balancing between the West and Russia, refraining from endorsing anti-Russian sanctions and emphasizing the need to prioritize India’s national interests (Fubini, 2023).

The INC, the primary opposition party, calls for strategic autonomy and nonalignment with Western sanctions. INC leader Rahul Gandhi has stressed the importance of maintaining ties with traditional partners like Russia notwithstanding Western pressure (NDTV, 2023).

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other leftist parties have traditionally opposed Western hegemony and imperialism. They criticize cooperation with Western nations as a threat to India’s sovereignty and reject sanctions as tools of pressure on developing countries (CPIM, 2022).
And regional parties, regardless of their differences, tend to support an autonomous foreign policy that distances itself from sanctions and Western hegemony. For instance, the Trinamool Congress Party, led by Mamata Banerjee, calls for strengthening ties with neighboring countries and opposes external interference in regional affairs (Sarki, 2023). The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), led by Muthuvel Karunanidhi Stalin, supports strategic independence and opposes domination by any external powers, including the West. The Marathi nationalist Shiv Sena Party advocates for enhancing India’s defense capabilities and opposes external pressure, including sanctions (Chacko, 2011).

India’s Influence on the Global South

India holds significant ideological, political, and economic influence within the Global South, shaping its agenda on the world stage and leading “by example” of an independent international actor. Consequently, India’s political thought and practice have the capacity to influence, to varying degrees, other developing counties’ approaches to sanctions.

India’s influence has been especially strong in the ideological sphere, as the works of Indian political thinkers had an important role in the process of decolonization and directly influenced foreign policy approaches of the Global South countries. The interconnection of Indian political thought and the political theories of post-colonial nations is vividly exemplified by the 1955 Bandung Declaration: five of the ten articulated principles of international relations are the Panchashila, i.e., the five tenets of peaceful coexistence outlined in the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954. These principles—mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—were championed by the Indian government and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Politically, India has historically played a pivotal role within the Global South, shaped by its colonial past and struggle for independence. This experience has enabled India to establish itself as a cornerstone of anti-colonial and post-colonial solidarity. India had a key role in convening the Bandung Conference and founding the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to provide newly liberated states with an alternative to the Cold War alliances.

These efforts reflected India’s commitment to combating neo-colonial influence and strengthening the collective voice of liberated nations in world affairs.

Economically, India plays a dual role within the Global South. It advocates for economically disadvantaged regions, promoting South-South cooperation and a just global order, while simultaneously aligning its interests with those of developed nations. This duality complicates its potential position as a leader of the Global South. India’s participation in multilateral forums such as the G20 and BRICS reflects this ambivalence, as it seeks to balance its domestic priorities with the needs of less influential countries while striving for recognition as a global power. Maintaining this balance is an intricate task, as India has to maintain its status as a cooperative world power among developed nations while fulfilling its commitments to protecting the interests of developing regions—an expectation that, during the Nehruvian era, encouraged India to adopt anti-Western positions (Cooper, 2021).

India’s active engagement in multilateral organizations and initiatives reaffirms its dedication to safeguarding the interests of the Global South. Within the UN’s Group of 77, India consistently advocates for policies addressing global inequalities, focusing on trade, climate change, and sustainable development. This reinforces India’s image as a proponent of cooperation, challenging traditional power structures dominated by developed countries. However, disparities in socio-economic development and geopolitical interests within the Global South create obstacles to maintaining a unified identity (Haug, Braveboy-Wagner, and Maihold, 2021).
India’s anticolonial legacy significantly shapes its resistance to hegemony. It advocates global governance reforms based on historical justice and sovereignty of postcolonial states.

India’s pursuit of a multipolar world order aligns with anti-colonial objectives aimed at countering the dominance of a powerful few.

Other developing nations have leveraged their influence to resist the economic and political diktat of developed nations in various ways, including abstention from sanctions regimes.

Nonetheless, India’s role in the Global South is fraught with complexities. Its emergence as a regional power has brought new challenges to the traditional North-South dichotomy, complicating its identity as an advocate for marginalized countries. Although India is perceived as a leading voice for the Global South, its growing economic clout and engagement with global markets increasingly align it with developed nations, raising tensions and questioning its role of a counter-hegemonic force. Furthermore, the increasing diversity within the Global South prompts questions about India’s ability to effectively represent the varied needs of all developing countries. The differences between leading states in the Global South and less developed nations highlight the fluidity of the Global South as a category (Waisbich, Roychoudhury, and Haug, 2021).

In this article, it is pertinent to examine the issue of sanctions within the context of the Global South’s developmental problems and political thought in general, as it will provide further insight into how sanctions are perceived in India. A recurring thesis found in much of the literature on this topic is that sanctions imposed by the West against Global South countries are viewed as manifestations of unilateral dictating, reflecting a desire to impose interests that conflict with those of developing nations. In the context of the North-South dichotomy, sanctions regimes appear as a useful power tool for developed countries, where developing countries prove to be most vulnerable (Timofeev, 2018). This raises the issue of unilateral sanctions’ legitimacy and ethics of use. Some analysts say that sanctions are often used by major powers for control of postcolonial countries, suppressing movement towards decolonization, and imposing neoliberal values and interests. “As decolonization and anti-imperialism accelerated and consolidated … imperial reaction would accordingly intensify and expand the deployment of sanctions as an instrument of colonial restoration” (Sial, 2022). Such a conspicuously postcolonial approach to sanctions is often echoed by Indian politicians (as shown above) and Indian academia. Indian Professor Debangana Chatterjee (2022) notes “the racial tilting of the West’s sanctions policies, the complex power bias of the sanctions and the intricate politics of otherization, of which racism becomes key.”

However, following India’s departure from Nehruvian anti-colonialism and non-alignment, New Delhi is unwilling to engage in an ideological antagonism with the Western powers. Thus, the impact of India’s approach towards sanctions on the policy of other developing countries is rather limited as it tries to stay away from direct leadership among Global South nations and rejects anti-Western rhetoric.

* * *
Under the BJP, Indian official rhetoric regarding sanctions has completed its shift from Nehruvian anti-Westernism and pro-UN institutionalism towards dry pragmatism, although still emphasizing developing countries’ problems. This shift is driven by a desire to avoid antagonism with the West.
However, the domestic consensus on foreign policy issues—including on cooperation with Russia despite secondary sanctions—could empower Modi to adopt a clear and sustainable sanctions policy rooted in India’s political tradition. The question remains whether India needs such clarity.
The lack of decisive action may suggest that clarity is not required at this moment, indicating that India does not feel compelled to assert its position overtly—in all likelihood, to maintain flexibility in line with its policy of multi-alignment. This, however, introduces additional uncertainty into an already volatile world order.

Historically, India was seen as a leader of the Third World, exemplified by its role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, New Delhi aspires to establish itself among the great powers, distancing itself from its former position as a leader of the developing world, but continues to be a significant voice for the Global South, including on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and anti-Russian sanctions, which Indian officials argue are harmful to the Global South. Establishing a more stable and clear Indian position on sanctions might not only reinforce India’s foreign policy independence, but also enhance its leadership role in the Global South.