India
Source: www.mea.gov.in

Ladies and Gentlemen of the press,

I am very happy to speak to you at the conclusion of the talks I have had this morning with, Foreign Minister Lavrov. I would say the talks were as always very warm, comfortable, comprehensive and productive. We in many ways built upon the conversation we had when the Foreign Minister was in Delhi in April this year, before the talks today I was in Moscow yesterday, I delivered a talk at IMEMO on why our partnership is a Special and Privileged Partnership and I think the uniqueness of our relationship is demonstrated and reaffirmed by our discussion today. I also had a very good meeting yesterday with Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov where we went through issues relevant to the inter-governmental commission.

2. So let me speak a little bit about the talks this morning with the Foreign Minister. I think what it showed was that despite the fact that so many things are changing in our world both before and as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, our time-tested and trust-based relationship is very much not just in place but remains very strong, continues to grow. Seeing that in different ways I would like to right at the start express my appreciation for the support we got from Russia during the second wave of the Covid pandemic this year. There were four consignments which were flown-in on a very expedited basis by the Russian Government and of course as you've also heard now India has become a partner of Russia in the production and use of the Sputnik V vaccine and we believe that this is not only good for the two of us but it has positive implication for the rest of the world.

3. We have always seen our relationship with Russia as a contribution to global peace, security and stability. I think what makes our working together so natural and comfortable is our belief in a multipolar global order. We consider that to be a reflection of a very natural and inevitable process of evolution of inter-state relations in the 21st century.

4. Now much of our talks, especially the bilateral side of it, was to review the progress in different dimensions of our very broad ranging cooperation. I think Foreign Minister Lavrov has spoken about its different developments there. I don't want to repeat that but I would recognize that we have actually made a very good progress even though for the last one year a lot of this has been through virtual contacts and I can assure you that when the Annual Bilateral Summit takes place this year, the development, the progress in our cooperation will be very much on display before all of you. A new dimension that has been added to our relationship of course is the agreement to hold the 2+2 Dialogue of Foreign and Defence Ministers. We felt that we should do that sometime as per mutual convenience this year. Otherwise I can say we are very satisfied with the all round development of our relations.

5. Again as you know a lot of our cooperation is focused on the nuclear, space, energy and defence sectors. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant project is on track and you heard Foreign Minister Lavrov tell you that the concrete first pour for Unit 5 has taken place. Space again has both practical and I would say symbolic importance for our relationship. You have been our original and strongest partners on the space side. The energy cooperation between us has grown very significantly in the last few years and we see that today reflected both in new potential investments and long term commitments which we have agreed to in the field of oil and gas. Our defence military technical cooperation but I would say even industrial collaboration today has been strengthened by Russian interest in Make in India programme, which is very visible.

6. Moving beyond the established areas, we have been discussing greater inter regional cooperation particularly with the Russian far east. We spoke about how we could take that forward, there are some agreements which have to be signed, I think we have made some progress there. We discussed connectivity especially the North South Corridor, we discussed it yesterday with Mr Borisov but also today with Mr Lavrov, the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor as well. I briefed him about what is happening in terms of developments in India and I think overall our sense of economic cooperation and science and technology cooperation was very positive.

7. In terms of regional and global issues, India is poised to hold the Presidency of the Security Council in August. So, I shared with Foreign Minister Lavrov, our plans and ideas for that month and we obviously value Russian participation and cooperation in that regard. I'd say, in the UN security council, this is not a surprise, in fact, it's very much a natural happening, that we've worked very cooperatively and positively, so the strength of our strategic partnership is expressed today when it comes to deliberations in the UN. India is currently the chair of the BRICS and also of the RIC, it is also something we discussed, we have common membership of G-20, of ASEAN led forums, SCO and CICA. We have an SCO Foreign ministers' meeting coming up very soon.

8. In terms of specific regions, of course, the situation in Afghanistan occupied a lot of our attention because it has a direct implication for regional security. We believe that the immediate need of the day is really a reduction in violence and if we have to see peace within Afghanistan and around Afghanistan, it's important for India and Russia to work together and ensure that much of the progress that we've seen in economic, social and democratic terms are maintained. We are both committed to an independent, sovereign, united and democratic Afghanistan.

9. Beyond Afghanistan we spoke in some detail on what was happening in Syria, about the Iran issue, spent some time on Libya and we have both longstanding interests in the region. We believe that Peace and stability in such a sensitive region is very very important for global interest.

10. From my side, I shared our view-point on the Indo-Pacific. We support cooperation that reflects the multi-polar and rebalanced character of global politics. What I told Minister Lavrov, which I repeat to you is, we are very much committed to the centrality and unity of the ASEAN and we believe that the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative which we tabled at the East-Asia Summit is very important for the larger region. We of course because of our larger geo-political compatibility with Russia, we see a more active Russian presence and participation in the region as something very very important.

11. So once again what I would conclude by saying is it was a very good discussion, it is very much part of our regular continuous dialogue that we have been having. It is very good to be back here, Minister Lavrov, and I would say we have today made good progress as part of preparations for the summit. Thank you very much

India
Source: www.mea.gov.in

Dr. Alexander Dynkin, Excellencies, Dear friends,

It is a great pleasure to address the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations on the subject of India-Russia ties in a changing world. In many ways, this is a particularly appropriate venue for such an exercise. In various capacities, Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov led Russia's transition in an era of unprecedented changes. While doing so, he was always cognizant of the importance of the India-Russia relationship. It is, therefore, only fitting that two decades later, we assess both the state of the world and that of our ties in an institution with which he was closely associated.

2. There is no doubt that relations between Russia and India have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the Second World War. Russians will surely recall the ups and downs in their ties with the United States, Europe, China or Japan, or for that matter, Turkey and Iran. On their part, objective Indians would also recognize that this was the case with them as well. Where India-Russia bilateral ties are concerned, there have been changes - even issues - from time to time. But at the end of the day, the logic of geo-politics was so compelling that we barely remember these even as minor aberrations. The undeniable reality of the exceptional resilience of our ties is surely a phenomenon that is worth analyzing. The paradox though is that precisely because it has held so steady, this relationship is sometimes taken for granted. The case for its constant nurturing is therefore as powerful, if not more, than with the more volatile ones.

3. If our ties have been stable, this is not to say that we have remained static as nations and societies. In the last quarter century, India has become the sixth largest economy, a nuclear weapon power, an IT Centre, a reservoir of global talent and an active shaper of global debates. Our interests and influence have grown well beyond the Sub-Continent and we are often perceived as first responders in crisis situations. Russia, of course, has meanwhile transitioned fully into the post-Soviet era and all that this implies. Its inherent strength as a Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power and its long-standing global status - whether as a P5 or what we can call as N2 - makes it unmistakably critical to the world order. Equally important, Russia has regularly demonstrated an ability to influence outcomes across regions and issues. Its salience in domains that matter, like energy or technology, is especially noteworthy. And indeed, both are nations have evolved even as our existence has become more globalized economically, connected virtually and driven technologically. It is not just that India and Russia are a good fit; it is equally that this continues dynamically even as both of them and the world itself undergo continuous changes.

4. As practitioners and analysts of international relations, it is not enough that we recognize or even appreciate trends. If they are to be sustained, we need to probe underlying causes and seek conceptual explanations. To my mind, at the core of our contemporary relationship is the embrace of multi-polarity, both as a reality and as an aspiration. It is this conceptualization that has enabled us to smoothly maintain our relationship in comparison to others. Such an outlook guides our interaction with other nations and groupings and is obviously universal in application. It follows logically that a multi-polar world must have a multi-polar Asia as an essential constituent. In the last few decades, India and Russia may have pursued their national trajectories energetically. But at the same time, they have harmonised them well, both intuitively and as a policy. Related to this is the rebalancing of the global order - economically, politically, even culturally. We have been respectful, I would even say we have been appreciative, of each other's identities and interests. Because there is no burden of history nor an ideological agenda, this too has been a comfortable and a reassuring exercise. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the weight of the variables in the world's equation has changed, though again I would caution against being overly deterministic. Together, what this means is that our relationship rests on the foundation of a more democratic and diverse international order, one that is committed to sovereign equality of all states.

5. Because that concept is so central, it is important to have a clear understanding of the nature and purpose of multi-polarity. We are looking at a world where each pole has its own needs, but its pursuit is to be moderated not by the balance of power, but by balance of interests. This is not just a preference but a compulsion in a world that is more inter-dependent. Balance of interests may be individually defined; but it is the task of diplomacy to ensure that it is collectively realized. Equally, it should be our effort to discourage unrestrained pursuit of balance of power and resist domination in all forms. In such a world, a search for options is an entirely legitimate exercise, both in content and form, including convergence on varying issues to different degrees. The operating principle of a multi-polar world is the legitimate pursuit of flexibility without seeking exclusivity. After all, the latter is anti-thetical to the very logic of multi-polarity. The grammar of multi-polarity too is obviously very different from that of bi-polarity. Attempts to mix the two are not just confusing; they at times can even be deliberately misleading. We must also recognize that translating a multi-polar algorithm on the ground is not easy it is much harder than it sounds. A key concern even while widening options is to ensure consistent sensitivity to the interests of a critical strategic partner. Indeed, it is this deep sense of consideration for each other that has been the formula of our ties. Mutual interest mandates that this continues to be so between India and Russia.

6. An important reason why India and Russia readily accept multi-polarity is their strong sense of independence. Perhaps, such self-confidence is a natural outlook for large polities with a long history, a rich culture and a deep-rooted identity. Our pasts may be different but what they do have in common is a clear sense of national interest and a strong sense of national resolve. We have dealt with each other long enough to know that these qualities are very much part of our basic character

7. A world of convergences that the multi-polar and re-balanced international order has created will inevitably be different from the one that we were used to before. Quite obviously, it will be less structured and more fluid, leaving open the possibility of differences even among those who are together. The inclination would be to look at pragmatic and result-oriented cooperation on defined issues. To some extent, the weakening of multilateralism has contributed to this. Between the collective interests of the entire international community and the compulsions of decision-making, a number of intermediate layers exist in a variety of areas. We are seeing this as both ad hoc and more formal arrangements, on security, on economic and on technology issues, in specialized domains as well and even in global bodies. Given their prominence, India and Russia are members of many such arrangements, whether you talk about the G-20, BRICS, EAS, SCO, MTCR, FATF, Wassenaar, etc. We are not unique in that respect as many others are equally embedded in such understandings. Sub-universal groups have always been a reality; they supplement not replace more universal arrangements. Given the flux in world politics, a large element of our working together is today likely to happen in such formats.

8. Changes in the capabilities and interests of major players naturally lead us to reassess the global arena. Whether it is Europe, the Middle-East, Africa, Eurasia, the Arctic or the Indo-Pacific, new developments have re-defined our understanding of the landscape, as also of its risks and opportunities. None of us can afford to be in denial of these shifting realities. After all, international relations can never be change-proofed. If there are enhanced capabilities in some cases or contractions in others, strategists and diplomats need to adjust their calculations accordingly. That is certainly the case with the Indo-Pacific, whose disconnection was an outcome of a certain moment of history. For a nation like India that now sees much of its trade eastwards, we must look beyond such anachronisms. Both our interests and our reach today extend well into the Pacific. Our major partners are located there, and indeed, cooperation with the Russian Far East is one notable example. The reality is that there is a vast global commons whose safety, security, ecology, environment and activities are increasingly a shared responsibility. For those who wish to better understand our thinking, I would refer them to the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative that Prime Minister Modi announced at the East Asia Summit in 2019. The ability of India and Russia to work together is facilitated by our shared belief in the centrality of the ASEAN.

9. The shift of global growth eastwards has been a continuous phenomenon over the last four decades. Its consequences for the international order are now getting visible. This shift took place largely in the context of globalization, though it was not unaffected by big power calculations. As it unfolds, concerns both during the Covid pandemic and before have provided some insights into the risks of globalization. On the political front, it is essential for India and Russia to work together to ensure the stability and diversity of the world as we know it. This includes insistence on honouring agreements and observing laws. On the economic side, there is a growing realization on the importance of resilient and reliable supply chains. Our collaboration can surely add to the options before the world, as we have already seen in the case of vaccines.

10. If we are to continue influencing the direction of global development positively, it is imperative that we always pay adequate attention to the constant strengthening of our bilateral cooperation. In two decades of strategic partnership and five before that of close friendship, defence, energy, nuclear, space and science and technology have constituted the key propelling forces. Russia has always been a dependable defence partner of India. The enormous experience of past cooperation is today being applied to a more contemporary requirement, including the Make in India programme. This transition can accommodate the interests of both sides and even lead to new areas of military-technical collaboration. The Brahmos example could well be a precursor of what is to come. This needs to be accompanied by a greater focus on military-to-military ties, including in the maritime domain. The establishment of the 2+2 mechanism which was recently agreed to by the Prime Minister and President Putin promises to provide a new vitality.

11. Space and nuclear are among the success stories of our relationship. The Kudankulam project was the first beneficiary of India's resumed civil nuclear collaboration with international partners. The trilateral nuclear cooperation that we both have with Bangladesh also holds interesting possibilities. Insofar as space is concerned, the training of Indian astronauts for the Gaganyaan Mission brings back memories of Rakesh Sharma's flight into space. Overall, science and technology has been a productive area that could be taken forward with the participation of the private sector. This bodes well for both commercialization and start-ups. If I would have to give you examples of the collaboration underway I would particularly point out to Sputnik vaccine and we should recognise, that this has benefits not just for public health in India but actually larger gains for the international community.

12. Where investment and trade are concerned, the last few years have seen a visible pick up, especially in the energy sector. As a result, we are seeing more Indian participation in production and import of oil and gas, as well as a greater Russian presence in refining and distribution. Expanding trade in goods is very much the focus, in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, fertilizers, chemicals, petro-chemicals, agro industries and timber being areas of interest. Collaboration in railways and inland waterways can actually make a difference to the pace of India's national development. Where trade is concerned, more efficient connectivity and reduction of non-tariff barriers are areas that need to be addressed.

13. Now as you all know there is an immense legacy of intellectual goodwill in our relationship. Many of us recall an era where our scholars and institutions interacted frequently and productively. And in fact, IMEMO was itself one of the centres of this bonding and I particularly appreciate Dr. Dynkin's commitment to maintain this tradition. Today, there is a need to reconnect our youth and renew appreciation of our languages, literature and sciences. The impact of tourism can never be underestimated. Some initiatives have already started to take shape while others are still in the pipeline. The Sirius-Atal Innovation mission started by PM Modi in 2018 represents a new model of interaction. We welcome the ICCR-Oriental Institute fellowships that were established recently. The Ganga-Volga Dialogue, participation in the Raisina Dialogue, popularity of Yoga, the revived interaction on Buddhism and digitization of manuscripts are all examples that speak of a renewed enthusiasm.

14. As we contemplate the future, how we navigate some important transitions will help define our further ambitions. India and Russia will definitely see more common opportunities in the regions immediately beyond. New partnerships could also be explored, including in trilateral formats. Connectivity will be increasingly central to our interests, whether we speak of the North-South Corridor, the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor or the Northern Sea Route. India is actively engaging the Eurasian Economic Union for a trade agreement and participating in the endeavours of the SCO and BRICS. When it comes to disarmament or technology issues, we seek practical and productive outcomes in multilateral fora. Reformed multilateralism is also in our common interest and we value Russia's support for India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Regional issues like Afghanistan and the Middle-East have seen convergence previously that may be mutually beneficial to continue. As an Observer State, India is also interested in deepening its engagement with Russia, the Chair of the Arctic Council, on Arctic issues. Energy, in particular, holds enormous promise as the two nations engage in long-term planning and cooperation.

15. The big issues of our times are combating terrorism, addressing pandemics and acting on climate change. On all of these, India and Russia are unquestionably on the same page. We have both been victims of fundamentalist thinking and know well the dangers of radicalization and extremism. As pluralistic societies, we must be especially on guard against the revival of such forces. Where global health is concerned, a history of scientific collaboration can today be repurposed to meet this new priority. On climate change, Russia can really be an indispensable partner as India transitions towards greater LNG consumption and renewables.

16. The direction and progress of major relationships is very much dependent on leadership. In our case, Prime Minister Modi and President Putin have met 19 times since 2014. That itself speaks a lot for their commitment. We, of course, look forward to hosting the President in India for the Annual Bilateral Summit. It is also natural in societies for the people to have an image of their partners. Russia has a unique standing with the Indian public and maintaining that sentiment is very much an asset for our relationship.

17. In the world of current diplomacy, ours is a particularly mature relationship. More than its contemporaries, it has withstood the test of time, finding new convergences with changing circumstances. Geo-political compatibility, leadership trust and popular sentiment remain its key drivers. History is very much in our favour, something that cannot always be said for all relationships. Drawing from the past, assessing the present and committing to the future, I have every confidence that our two nations would continue to realize the full benefits of our Special and Privileged Strategic Relationship. Thank you for your attention

India
Source: www.mea.gov.in

Ladies and Gentlemen of the press,

I am very happy to speak to you at the conclusion of the talks I have had this morning with, Foreign Minister Lavrov. I would say the talks were as always very warm, comfortable, comprehensive and productive. We in many ways built upon the conversation we had when the Foreign Minister was in Delhi in April this year, before the talks today I was in Moscow yesterday, I delivered a talk at IMEMO on why our partnership is a Special and Privileged Partnership and I think the uniqueness of our relationship is demonstrated and reaffirmed by our discussion today. I also had a very good meeting yesterday with Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov where we went through issues relevant to the inter-governmental commission.

2. So let me speak a little bit about the talks this morning with the Foreign Minister. I think what it showed was that despite the fact that so many things are changing in our world both before and as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, our time-tested and trust-based relationship is very much not just in place but remains very strong, continues to grow. Seeing that in different ways I would like to right at the start express my appreciation for the support we got from Russia during the second wave of the Covid pandemic this year. There were four consignments which were flown-in on a very expedited basis by the Russian Government and of course as you've also heard now India has become a partner of Russia in the production and use of the Sputnik V vaccine and we believe that this is not only good for the two of us but it has positive implication for the rest of the world.

3. We have always seen our relationship with Russia as a contribution to global peace, security and stability. I think what makes our working together so natural and comfortable is our belief in a multipolar global order. We consider that to be a reflection of a very natural and inevitable process of evolution of inter-state relations in the 21st century.

4. Now much of our talks, especially the bilateral side of it, was to review the progress in different dimensions of our very broad ranging cooperation. I think Foreign Minister Lavrov has spoken about its different developments there. I don't want to repeat that but I would recognize that we have actually made a very good progress even though for the last one year a lot of this has been through virtual contacts and I can assure you that when the Annual Bilateral Summit takes place this year, the development, the progress in our cooperation will be very much on display before all of you. A new dimension that has been added to our relationship of course is the agreement to hold the 2+2 Dialogue of Foreign and Defence Ministers. We felt that we should do that sometime as per mutual convenience this year. Otherwise I can say we are very satisfied with the all round development of our relations.

5. Again as you know a lot of our cooperation is focused on the nuclear, space, energy and defence sectors. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant project is on track and you heard Foreign Minister Lavrov tell you that the concrete first pour for Unit 5 has taken place. Space again has both practical and I would say symbolic importance for our relationship. You have been our original and strongest partners on the space side. The energy cooperation between us has grown very significantly in the last few years and we see that today reflected both in new potential investments and long term commitments which we have agreed to in the field of oil and gas. Our defence military technical cooperation but I would say even industrial collaboration today has been strengthened by Russian interest in Make in India programme, which is very visible.

6. Moving beyond the established areas, we have been discussing greater inter regional cooperation particularly with the Russian far east. We spoke about how we could take that forward, there are some agreements which have to be signed, I think we have made some progress there. We discussed connectivity especially the North South Corridor, we discussed it yesterday with Mr Borisov but also today with Mr Lavrov, the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor as well. I briefed him about what is happening in terms of developments in India and I think overall our sense of economic cooperation and science and technology cooperation was very positive.

7. In terms of regional and global issues, India is poised to hold the Presidency of the Security Council in August. So, I shared with Foreign Minister Lavrov, our plans and ideas for that month and we obviously value Russian participation and cooperation in that regard. I'd say, in the UN security council, this is not a surprise, in fact, it's very much a natural happening, that we've worked very cooperatively and positively, so the strength of our strategic partnership is expressed today when it comes to deliberations in the UN. India is currently the chair of the BRICS and also of the RIC, it is also something we discussed, we have common membership of G-20, of ASEAN led forums, SCO and CICA. We have an SCO Foreign ministers' meeting coming up very soon.

8. In terms of specific regions, of course, the situation in Afghanistan occupied a lot of our attention because it has a direct implication for regional security. We believe that the immediate need of the day is really a reduction in violence and if we have to see peace within Afghanistan and around Afghanistan, it's important for India and Russia to work together and ensure that much of the progress that we've seen in economic, social and democratic terms are maintained. We are both committed to an independent, sovereign, united and democratic Afghanistan.

9. Beyond Afghanistan we spoke in some detail on what was happening in Syria, about the Iran issue, spent some time on Libya and we have both longstanding interests in the region. We believe that Peace and stability in such a sensitive region is very very important for global interest.

10. From my side, I shared our view-point on the Indo-Pacific. We support cooperation that reflects the multi-polar and rebalanced character of global politics. What I told Minister Lavrov, which I repeat to you is, we are very much committed to the centrality and unity of the ASEAN and we believe that the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative which we tabled at the East-Asia Summit is very important for the larger region. We of course because of our larger geo-political compatibility with Russia, we see a more active Russian presence and participation in the region as something very very important.

11. So once again what I would conclude by saying is it was a very good discussion, it is very much part of our regular continuous dialogue that we have been having. It is very good to be back here, Minister Lavrov, and I would say we have today made good progress as part of preparations for the summit. Thank you very much

India
Source: brics2021.gov.in

We, the BRICS Ministers of Education of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of South Africa, Having met on July 6, 2021 via video conference to discuss actions required for 'leveraging digital and technological solutions for inclusive and equitable quality education', and 'enhancing research and academic collaboration",

Recalling the proposal to promote the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) for improving access to education, enhancing the quality of teaching-learning process, teacher preparation and development, and strengthening educational planning and management (New Delhi Declaration, 2016); and to undertake a comparative study of digital learning (e-learning) across schools, colleges and universities in BRICS countries (Cape Town Declaration, 2018),

Considering approved Concept of the BRICS Network University Operation and Development, as well as Road Map of the BRICS Network University for short and medium term (BRICS Ministers of Education Declaration, 2020)

Acknowledging the significant progress achieved in integrating digital technology into education, especially for ensuring education continuity in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic,

Recognizing the need to intensify efforts to harness the potential of digital technology for expanding access to equitable, inclusive, and quality learning opportunities in our countries, Noting the role of research in enabling evidence-based decisions on education policies, and programmatic initiatives to tackle the learning divide, with special contribution from think tanks in BRICS countries (Beijing Declaration, 2017),

Recalling the proposals for the establishment of networks of researchers and the development of joint projects in areas of mutual interest (Brasilia Declaration, 2014); undertaking joint research projects (Moscow Declaration, 2015); the development of an enabling framework to promote research cooperation (New Delhi Declaration, 2016); pursuing research collaboration through the BRICS University League (Beijing Declaration, 2017) as well as the BRICS Network University (Cape Town Declaration, 2018); and undertaking collaborative research by the BRICS-NU, including research on the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on education (BRICS Ministers of Education Declaration, 2020), hereby declare to support collaborative initiatives for:

1.0. Leveraging digital and technological solutions for inclusive and equitable quality education by:

1.1. Constituting a mechanism in each BRICS country for preparing proposals for analyzing existing research and collaborative research on the use and implications of digital and technological solutions on student learning opportunities and learning outcomes.

1.2. Generating and expanding the knowledge base that would help formulate initiatives for effective use of appropriate digital and technological solutions for promoting inclusive and equitable quality education in BRICS countries.

1.3. Harnessing the potential of digital and technological solutions to improve access to quality school and higher education, and enable teachers and educators to create quality learning experiences for students.

1.4. Sharing information relating to policies and practices, challenges and experiences, and best practices and innovations relating to the use of digital and technological solutions in education across BRICS countries, including through seminars/conferences and other modalities for dissemination of findings of policy analysis and research studies through infographics.

1.5. Organizing regular meetings of experts (this will be available via videoconference) from BRICS countries to discuss and formulate policies and strategies required to harness the potential of appropriate digital and technological solutions for improving students' learning opportunities and outcomes.

1.6. Organizing policy dialogues involving education authorities, experts and other stakeholders in BRICS countries to facilitate effective use of digital and technological solutions for educational purposes.

1.7. Exchanging best practices among BRICS countries on mobilizing public-private partnerships for ensuring appropriate infrastructure and learning environments, accessibility to digital devices, and digital skills among students and educators etc. that would help reduce and eventually eliminate the digital divides that lead to inequities in student learning opportunities and outcomes.

1.8 Developing a repository where resources (policies, strategies, research reports) will be available.

1.9 Sharing best practices on faculty development, on the integration of ICT into teaching and learning, along with development, distribution and access to open digital content.

2.0. Enhancing research and academic collaboration among BRICS countries by:

2.1. Undertaking research in areas of mutual interest, including those relating to the priority fields of study -- Energy, Computer Science & Information Security, BRICS Studies, Ecology & Climate Change, Water resources & pollution treatment, and economics -- identified for collaboration between institutions involved in the BRICS-NU.

2.2. Encouraging 'twining arrangements' whereby students enrolled within a Higher Education Institution (HEI) or Technical Vocational Education and Training organizations (TVET) in one BRICS country may complete their programme of study partly in that country, complying with relevant national regulations, and partly in an HEI or TVET in another BRICS country, and thereafter receive Diploma/Degree from both organizations the HEIs on successful completion of the programme of study.

2.3. Facilitating student mobility across BRICS countries for pursuing Masters, doctoral and post-doctoral programmes of study.

2.4. Facilitating mobility of faculty and scholars by expanding tie-ups between HEIs involved in BRICS-NU in one country and HEIs involved in BRICS-NU in another country for implementing collaborative research.

2.5. Designing and implementing an initiative project that would provide opportunity to faculty from HEIs involved in BRICS-NU in one country to teach courses in HEIs involved in BRICS-NU in another country, and for developing course materials in cutting edge areas that would help balanced faculty mobility.

2.6. Designing and implementing an initiative/project that would provide opportunity to faculty in HEIs involved in BRICS-NU in one BRICS country to participate in research with the faculty in HEIs involved in BRICS-NU in another BRICS country.

2.7. Sharing information on structure of higher educationand Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) systems, description of the higher education and Technical Vocational Education and Training qualifications and learning outcomes pertaining to the various programmes of study, quality assurance, and qualification frameworks; recognition authority that makes decisions on matters pertaining to recognition of qualifications; system of assessment, approval, recognition, and quality assurance of higher educational and professional education institutions; and constituting an expert group to work towards the development of a framework for mutual recognition of qualifications concerning higher education. Technical Vocational Education and professional training, conducting relevant comparative studies;

2.8 Enhancing student exchange programmes, including online, in HEIs to build communication and cooperation ties among the younger generation, provide students with a chance to better understand BRICS cooperation and changes in global governance.

2.9. Organizing periodic policy dialogues involving BRICS countries to facilitate research collaboration, and student and faculty mobility.

2.10 Sharing experiences to improve the structure, quality and effectiveness of training process in educational institutions that implement Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and exploring the possibility to create BRICS platform (including online) for cooperation in TVET.

The Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of South Africa extend their appreciation to the Government of India for coordinating the organization of the 8th meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Education. The English version of this Declaration was unanimously approved on 6 July, 2021 and distributed by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of India.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

Some of the worst consequences of the previous round of neo-liberal globalisation, as well as the global environmental crisis, pose challenges to humanity as a whole, where the effect of diminished global leadership and shrinking multilateral institutions becomes only more acute amidst daunting challenges. Sino-Russian rapprochement, no matter how one defines it, cannot escape from such a hostile environment, writes Zhang Xin , Associate Professor, School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal University.

Officially, the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship was elevated to a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in a new era" in 2015, indicating strong interests at the state level, in further enhancing Sino-Russian cooperation in a constantly evolving global context. In 2021, the foundational document defining China-Russia relations, the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, signed in 2001, is also set to be extended for another five years. More broadly, in the official discourse, Russian-Chinese relations have also been set as a model for post-Cold War great power relations, a model of strategic mutual trust, a guarantor of international stability, and an important force in deterring US unilateralist actions.

However, Russian-Chinese relations have progressed amid recurring internal and external doubts that have shrouded the partnership ever since the early 1990s. Popular narratives in the Anglophone world since the early 2000s, such as the "axis of convenience" thesis, always portrays the bilateral relations as tactic, short-term in nature and predominantly derived from each of the parties' relationship with the West, the US in particular. In contrast, however, real life experiences have already defied some of the most vocal warnings about the fragility of such bilateral relations, and the claims of Sino-Russian Rapprochement being a "strange case".

The recent pandemic and the on-going public health crisis across the world has cast further doubt on the universality of liberal values and America's hegemonic imposition of its own values and institutions onto other actors, further accelerating the diffusing of power once concentrated in the transatlantic space. The loss of moral high ground of post-Cold War monism engenders an urgent call for peaceful coexistence of plural voices in international society. As a result, we have recently witnessed an enhanced willingness by both China and Russia to expand bilateral cooperation, as supporters of state sovereignty, multilateralism, and the democratisation of the international system, which has taken on even more universal appeal in the current international context.

On top of solid person-to-person trust at the level of the heads of state, another opportunity for further China-Russia rapprochement is the frank, cool-headed and pragmatic vision, which has emerged on both sides. The Chinese expert community in particular in recent years have strongly advocated a search for "the endogenous drives" of Sino-Russian relations. The underlying tone of such a policy narrative is to go beyond the US as an omnipresent factor in the Sino-Russian engagement and not to see the bilateral relations only from the prism of China-US relations and Russia-US relations, but rather to highlight the genuinely bilateral agenda between China and Russia. Such a policy narrative implies a pragmatic and rational perception of bilateral relations, as an attempt to bring the overly reliance on external factors in bilateral relations back to a supposedly more pragmatic and natural route. It also candidly acknowledges the notion that we shouldn't expect each of the two parties to be perfectly aligned on every policy issue and shouldn't strive for perfect symmetry between the two countries. Nor should one side expect unconditional support or perfect policy coordination on all key issues from the other side. Lastly, it implies a more solid realisation that both countries need and are developing multiple sets of relations in an increasingly "multiplex" world, and so neither side should take offense at other types of inter-state relations if they occur. Neither side wants to present the other or any third party with an 'either-or' choice.

Alongside these more candid and pragmatic visions, another big plus for Sino-Russian rapprochement is the recent converging assessment between the two states of the overall international situation, potentially aiding in policy coordination between the two states. In what's sometimes called a "model of conservative (or sovereign) internationalism", both states increasingly display features of "conservative" powers looking to pursue independent development without sovereignty being impaired. Since 2014, for Beijing, Russia's anti-sanction measures, partial success in import substitution in certain economic sectors, and more audacious decoupling from dollar-dominated financial markets have provided both a chance to strike bilateral deals on Chinese terms and relevant experiences of how a national economy can be operated in an increasingly dismal external environment. The emphasis on "internal circulation" in the new so-called "dual circulation" strategy advocated by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in July 2020 has been up for intense debate within China. Among the multiple interpretations, at least one major camp sees China's top leader's call for beefing up "internal circulation" as a sign of using self-reliance to respond to a hostile external market, by emphasising the advantages of a large domestic market and huge untapped consumption potential. For the same reason, as China's overreliance on the dollar system seems to be realised with increasing urgency among Chinese authorities and wider policy circles, Russia's experiences and possible policy coordination and even joint counter-reaction on this front have become a new possibility and even a necessity for China.

Oftentimes, on the flipside of opportunities lie challenges and even threats. The demand for more democratisation and multipolarity comes with an increasingly polarised and fractured world amid the absence of effective leadership, where smaller players are also being pushed to pick a side in the geopolitical confrontation between the big powers. To make things even worse, a lack of consensus on the basic principles of a code of conduct on the international scene has often regressed into "no-adults-in-the-room" shouting matches, where the "responsible powers" are busy hurling insults at, and conspiring against, each other. All these structural changes have made it even harder to affect a peaceful co-existence amid a diverse range of ideas and different national systems, taking a toll on Sino-Russian cooperation. The on-going Covid-19 pandemic is very likely to further exacerbate inter-state inequality. Some of the worst consequences of the previous round of neo-liberal globalisation, as well as the global environmental crisis, pose challenges to humanity as a whole, where the effect of diminished global leadership and shrinking multilateral institutions becomes only more acute amidst daunting challenges. Sino-Russian rapprochement, no matter how one defines it, cannot escape from such a hostile environment.

Relatedly, both China and Russia are now being framed as the biggest threats facing a supposedly liberal, democratic, capitalistic Western world, as the challenger, the violator of the supposedly universal and benign liberal international order, and even the ultimate "bad guys" facing humanity as a whole, because of the fundamental difference and incompatibility between their domestic models and Western, liberal democratic models. Such naming and framing has recently added new layers of challenges: not only regime type, but also moral, even civilizational judgment plays a similar exacerbating role in the West's framing of the two countries. This trend is destined to drive a wider wedge in the world, where cooperation, particularly across the fractured fault line, becomes even more difficult.

Beyond ideational framing and competition, in the economic sphere, despite the fact that bilateral trade between China and Russia surpassed US$100 billion in 2019, both countries are having a difficult time reaching the target of US$100 billion in the years coming. As there have been breakthroughs in several major economic spheres (energy, agricultural, military weaponry, the Arctic), the hope to rely on the other as THE game changer in structuring a post-American world seems futile. Among others, while the goal of de-dollarisation is tempting and both countries are actively seeking ways to implement it, the specific approach to reach that goal is still highly limited, if not completely elusive. Both sides need to realize that and actively seek economic opportunities beyond each other.

Last but not least, the defence of national sovereignty and criticism of hegemonic behaviour, the celebration of partial success in containing the Covid-19 virus or developing multiple vaccines, shall not translate into hubris and lack of self-reflection and self-criticism in the guise of whataboutism. Both countries indeed face serious challenges in properly handling diversity within the sovereign body, thus impeding the provision of a genuinely attractive alternative system, which is of universal appeal to the world.

On March 23, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers issued a joint statement on "some issues of global governance", advocating for "a more just, democratic, rational and multipolar world order" and rejecting the West's claim to a standard model of democracy and its moral high ground in defining what constitutes "human rights" and "democracy". This statement essentially reiterates the key messages in the Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order signed by Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin in 1997. Such continuity reflects the stable stance shared by Moscow and Beijing in opposition to the hegemonic foundation of the international system, signifying that Sino-Russian rapprochement over the past three decades doesn't merely reflect the policies of any particular national leader, but structural realism.

In the official narratives, the recent phrasing and framing of bilateral relations shows joint efforts to go beyond the US common denominator, beyond the "axis of convenience" thesis or the "liberal international order" framework, to continue to push for endogenous drives and a new type of big power relations, beyond the tradition of military alliances constituting the ultimate and highest form of inter-state relations. As the two countries move from the more constrained, "conservative" mutual role expectation of "do-no-harm-to-each-other", contained in the 'Three No' Principles (No Allies, No Confrontation, No targeting of third parties) to a more proactive "do-something-together" approach, "practice what you preach" shall also the guiding principle in the future to further substantiate the greater bilateral agenda between China and Russia, on both the international and domestic levels. While advocacy for democracy, the coexistence of multiple civilisations and opposition to hegemony on the international level has received consistent support over the past three decades from the two states, one would expect to see a further exploration and practice of how the internal and external circulations, to borrow the concepts from recent "dual circulation" policy guideline advocated by China's president can be logically and practically integrated, as the foundation for further Sino-Russian rapprochement.

China
Source: www.ndb.int

On June 28, 2021, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a framework for strategic, technical and operational cooperation in areas of mutual interest and promote the development of long-term relations between the two institutions. The Memorandum was signed by Mr. Marcos Troyjo, NDB President, Mr. Denis Ivanov, Chairman of the IBEC Board, and Ms. Thinh Thi Hong, Member of the IBEC Board.

The Memorandum formalized the partnership between NDB and IBEC, with a view to jointly participate in financial assistance for infrastructure and sustainable development projects; explore and pursue cooperation in capital markets; establish correspondent relations to support business activities; perform analysis or research on macroeconomics, industries and other topics of mutual interest; promote information exchange and knowledge sharing as well as provide mutual training and development of staff.

"The Memorandum of Understanding between NDB and IBEC provides a good opportunity to leverage our collaboration, especially when it comes to join our strengths in potential infrastructure and sustainable development projects," said Mr. Marcos Troyjo, NDB President.

The Chairman of the IBEC Board Denis Ivanov, in response, noted: "The signed agreement consolidates the existing constructive relationships between our banks. The Memorandum will give the new dynamics, make our collaboration more substantive and effective, and expand the cooperation opportunities for NDB and IBEC. We especially appreciate that NDB, which represents the largest developing economies, shares the values of sustainable development and socio-economic stability, which lie at the core of the new IBEC development strategy. We are confident that our cooperation will be fruitful and will benefit all the member countries of our banks."

Background information

The NDB was established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development. According to the NDB's General Strategy, sustainable infrastructure development is at the core of the Bank's operational strategy for 2017-2021.

International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC) is a multilateral financial development institution established in 1963 and operating under an intergovernmental Agreement registered with the UN Secretariat under № 7388 on 20.08.1964. According to the new development strategy 2021-2025, IBEC aims at supporting economic prosperity of member countries through interconnection of intra- and inter-regional trade operations and facilitation of financing projects that promote UN Sustainable Development Goals.

China
Source: www.ndb.int

The Board of Governors of the New Development Bank (NDB) has appointed Mr. Vladimir Kazbekov, Mr. Qiangwu Zhou and Mr. Leslie Maasdorp as Vice-Presidents of the NDB from July 7, 2021.



Mr. Vladimir Kazbekov

Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer

Throughout his career, Mr. Kazbekov has gained extensive experience in the field of development finance. During 2015-2021, Mr. Vladimir Kazbekov served as Vice-President and Chief Administrative Officer of the NDB. Prior to that, Mr. Kazbekov worked in several executive positions at the Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank) for more than 15 years. One of his greatest contributions was participation in the development of the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, a scheme designed to provide financing and banking services for future investments among the national development banks of BRICS countries.

Prior to his appointment at Vnesheconombank, Mr. Kazbekov served as Deputy Director in the Foreign Policy Department of the Russian Presidential Executive Office. He has accumulated nearly 20 years of experience in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, predominantly in the Asian countries.



Mr. Qiangwu Zhou

Vice-President and Chief Administrative Officer

Over the past 25 years, Mr. Qiangwu Zhou has had several senior positions in the public sector. Most recently, he served as a Director General level official in the Department of International Economic and Financial Cooperation in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of China, while holding the positions of International Development Association (IDA) Deputy, and Council member for China in Global Environment Facility (GEF).

Prior to that, Mr. Zhou was Director General of the International Economic and Financial Institute (IEFI), MOF's leading think tank on international economics and development for eight years. He was also assigned to work in the UN's Administrative and Budgetary Committee, representing the Government of China during 1999-2002, and served as Advisor and then Senior Advisor to the Executive Director for China in the World Bank Group during 2008-2011.

Mr. Zhou has several publications on international economics. He holds a Master Degree from Peking University, China.



Mr. Leslie Maasdorp

Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer

Since 2015, Mr. Leslie Maasdorp has been serving as Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of the New Development Bank.

Over the past 25 years, Mr. Leslie Maasdorp has occupied senior leadership roles in both the private and public sectors. He served as a Managing Director and President of Bank of America Merrill Lynch for Southern Africa for a period of four years. Prior to that he served in a dual role as Vice Chairman of Barclays Capital and Absa Capital. In 2002 he was the first African to be appointed as International Advisor to Goldman Sachs International.

Before his 13 years as a global investment banker, Mr. Maasdorp served in several senior leadership roles in the Government of South Africa.

Mr. Maasdorp holds a BA degree in Economics and Psychology from the University of the Western Cape and a Master of Science degree in Economics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, at the University of London.

China
Source: global.chinadaily.com.cn

It's been a year and a half since the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed productive relations across the world. Constrained access to inputs, problems in accessing vaccines and other medical supplies, and travel restrictions are just a few of the most pressing characteristics of this period.

But despite the unprecedented conditions, China-Brazil economic exchanges have progressed well and also benefited from spillovers of Sino-US relations, especially on trade in agricultural products, adding to an already significant trade relationship.

Since 2013, China has been the most important destination for Brazilian exports. As for direct investment, China has invested quite significantly in Brazil since the early 2000s－initially in production of commodities such as petroleum, minerals and soy, but later also in transportation, telecommunications, financial services, energy and the industrial sector. And heavy investment has been made in infrastructure, mainly energy generation and transmission.

Sino-Brazilian economic ties, however, are not limited to trade and investment. The two countries' partnership in technology has allowed them to launch a good number of joint satellites. Globally, the two countries are members of groups such as BRICS, which allow them to launch joint initiatives on a broader scale.

However, China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) will certainly influence post-pandemic bilateral relations. In particular, "internal circulation", which along with "external circulation", makes up the new "dual circulation" development paradigm China is following, comprises certain factors that will likely affect bilateral ties: consolidation of social development, including a higher rate of urbanization; reduced dependence on imported resources and technology; industrial modernization; and technological innovation.

China's decision to achieve "higher-quality development" instead of pursuing quantitative growth implies a new consumption pattern that could create opportunities for middle-income economies such as Brazil, which might exploit the new market segments and different demand patterns in different regions of China, provided there are no barriers to trade.

Yet the fact that the 14th Five-Year Plan also aims to increase agricultural production, in order to make China self-sufficient in food grains and strengthen food security, is a cause for concern for some countries including Brazil, especially because a big part of Brazil's total exports to China is soy. The potentially positive aspect is that it also implies higher demand for agricultural production technology in which Brazil has comparative advantages.

The five-year plan's goal is also to develop more sophisticated and efficient machinery for agricultural production, including grain processing and oil production. This is good news for Brazilian producers, because it might foster global competition in the sector.

China has also chosen the health sector, too, for further development, which will have a big impact on China's foreign trade. There will be incentives for basic research leading to curative treatment for serious diseases. The objective is to apply high-tech, such as regenerative medicine and new therapies, to prevent and treat easily transmissible diseases.

The emphasis on the health sector and the industries producing equipment for the sector create opportunities for investment in the area in both countries, particularly since the pandemic has highlighted its need, and Brazil is one of the few emerging economies that has the capacity to produce vaccines and medicines.

The Chinese authorities have also emphasized the importance of research in synthetic biology and genetics, creating new types of agricultural microorganisms, and research and development of vaccines. The emphasis on biotechnology suggests a China-Brazil R&D partnership could be established, especially because Brazil is a country with one of the highest degrees of biodiversity.

The focus on investment in high-tech, including artificial intelligence and its practical use, will lead to the development and production of new equipment which, apart from affecting the international market for machinery, could benefit Brazilian producers.

Moreover, the Chinese leadership has set ambitious carbon emission reduction targets, and promotes efficient use of energy in order to meet the Paris Agreement targets. Which is important for bilateral relations from the perspective of South-South cooperation to strengthen the global fight against climate change, especially because China has adopted a proactive policy on financing "green activities" as a way to contribute to the 2030 Agenda.

Way back in 2015, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding creating a China-Brazil Fund for Cooperation in the Expansion of Productive Capacity. More than a typical investment fund, it is designed as a mechanism to strengthen bilateral relations, as any decision on financing of projects is to be taken by a steering committee comprising vice-ministers from the two countries. An important area in which the fund can play a big role is preservation of Brazil's forests and promoting environmentally friendly agricultural practices.

The China-Brazil economic relationship can be strengthened in diverse ways, and a good deal of the direction to be taken will be determined at the highest level, by the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Consultation and Cooperation that is jointly chaired by the vice-presidents of the two countries. And a more ambitious agenda for joint initiatives will likely promote the interests of both countries.

The author is coordinator, International Cooperation and Investments at the Institute of Applied Economic Research, Brazil.

Bangladesh
Source: infobrics.org

Bangladesh has called on the New Development Bank (NDB) to expedite awarding its membership of the Shanghai-based multilateral lending institution, officials said.

Finance Minister AHM Mustafa Kamal made the request to NDB President Marcos Prado Troyjo at a virtual meeting.

Meanwhile, the government has formed a team, headed by the additional secretary of the Economic Relations Division (ERD), to expedite the process of obtaining the membership through meeting the requirements, said an official at the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

He said the team is scheduled to sit on July 15 next to work out all the necessary processes and documentation as required by the bank, formed by the BRICS member nations, he told the FE.

Earlier at a meeting in February last, Mr Kamal had informed the NDB president about Bangladesh's formal decision to join the development bank as a shareholder.

The NDB president has assured the finance minister of expediting the process, according to a press release issued here by the MoF.

Mr Troyjo expressed the bank's willingness to stand beside Bangladesh, which is achieving a ballooning economic development.

The NDB, led by BRICS members - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, had already offered shares to the UN member countries, including Bangladesh.

At the last meeting in February, Bangladesh sought at least 1.0 per cent stake in the bank, which was established in July 2015 through an agreement reached in Brazil.

The initial authorised capital of the bank is US$100 billion divided into 1.0 million shares having a face value of $100,000 each.

The initial subscribed capital of the NDB is $50 billion divided into paid-in shares ($10 billion) and callable shares ($40 billion).

The initial subscribed capital of the bank was equally distributed among the founding members.

The agreement on the NDB specifies that every member will have one vote and no one would have any veto powers.

Meanwhile, a MoF official told the FE that Bangladesh had been offered nearly 0.76 per cent shares in the NDB initially.

If the UN member countries join the bank, the share of Bangladesh would ultimately reach 0.42 per cent.

Dhaka will have to pay some $382 million in the next seven years for becoming a shareholder of the bank, he added.

According to the NDB's plan, the BRICS countries would offload 49 per cent share among the aspirant countries.

In 2016, Bangladesh joined the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

The Beijing-based lender has been financing many projects in Bangladesh in several sectors such as power, transportation, water supply and sanitation.

The Financial Express

Russia
Author: Dmitri Trenin
Source: carnegie.ru

The central feature of the new strategy is its focus on Russia itself. The Russian leadership has every reason right now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country's internal situation.

Russia's new, forty-four-page National Security Strategy signed by President Vladimir Putin on July 2 is a remarkable document. It is much more than an update of the previous paper, adopted in 2015. Back then, relations with the West had already sharply deteriorated as a result of the Ukraine crisis, but were still considered salvageable; much of the liberal phraseology inherited from the 1990s was still in use; and the world still looked more or less unified. The current version of arguably the most important Kremlin strategy statement—covering not only national security issues, but a whole range of others, from the economy to the environment, and values to defense—is a manifesto for a different era: one defined by the increasingly intense confrontation with the United States and its allies; a return to traditional Russian values; and the critical importance for Russia's future of such issues as technology and climate.

The strategy lays out a view of a world undergoing transformation and turmoil. The hegemony of the West, it concludes, is on the way out, but that is leading to more conflicts, and more serious ones at that. This combination of historical optimism (the imminent end of Western hegemony) and deep concern (as it is losing, the West will fight back with even more ferocity) is vaguely reminiscent of Stalin's famous dictum of the sharpening of the class struggle along the road to socialism. Economically, Russia faces unfair competition in the form of various restrictions designed to damage it and hold it back; in terms of security, the use of force is a growing threat; in the realm of ethics, Russia's traditional values and historical legacy are under attack; in domestic politics, Russia has to deal with foreign machinations aimed at provoking long-term instability in the country. This external environment fraught with mounting threats and insecurities is regarded as an epoch, rather than an episode.

Against this sobering background, the central feature of the strategy is its focus on Russia itself: its demographics, its political stability and sovereignty, national accord and harmony, economic development on the basis of new technologies, protection of the environment and adaptation to climate change, and—last but not least—the nation's spiritual and moral climate. This inward focus is informed by history. Exactly thirty years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed just as its military power was at its peak, and not as a result of a foreign invasion. Having recently regained the country's great power status and successfully reformed and rearmed its military, the Russian leadership has every reason now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country's internal situation.

The paper outlines a lengthy series of measures for dealing with a host of domestic issues, from rising poverty and continued critical dependence on imported technology to the advent of green energy and the loss of the Soviet-era technological and educational edge. This certainly makes sense. Indeed, the recent Kremlin discovery of climate change as a top-tier issue is a hopeful sign that Russia is overcoming its former denial of the problem, along with inordinately exuberant expectations of the promise of global warming for a predominantly cold country. After all, the Kremlin's earlier embrace of digitalization has given a major push to the spread of digital services across Russia.

The strategy does not ignore the moral and ethical aspects of national security. It provides a list of traditional Russian values and discusses them at length. It sees these values as being under attack through Westernization, which threatens to rob the Russians of their cultural sovereignty, and through attempts to vilify Russia by rewriting history. In sum, the paper marks an important milestone in Russia's official abandonment of the liberal phraseology of the 1990s and its replacement with a moral code rooted in the country's own traditions. Yet here, the strategy misses a key point at the root of Russia's many economic and social problems: the widespread absence of any values, other than purely materialistic ones, among much of the country's ruling elite. The paper mentions in passing the need to root out corruption, but the real issue is bigger by an order of magnitude. As each of President Putin's annual phone-in sessions with the Russian people demonstrates—including the most recent one on June 30—Russia is governed by a class of people who are, for the most part, self-serving, and do not care at all for ordinary people or the country, instead focusing single-mindedly on making themselves rich on the job. Money—or rather Big Money—has become that group's top value, and the most corrosive element in today's Russia. Therein lies perhaps the biggest vulnerability of modern Russia.

On foreign policy, the strategy is fairly elliptic, but it gives a hint of what the upcoming Foreign Policy Concept might include. The United States and some of its NATO allies are now officially branded unfriendly states. Relations with the West are de-prioritized and those countries ranked last in terms of closeness, behind former Soviet countries; the strategic partners China and India; non-Western institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Russia-India-China trio; and other Asian, Latin American, and African countries. In addition to U.S. military deployments and its system of alliances, U.S.-based internet giants with their virtual monopoly in the information sphere, and the U.S. dollar that dominates global finances are also seen as instruments of containing Russia.

Overall, the 2021 Russian National Security Strategy seeks to adapt the country to a still interconnected world of fragmentation and sharpening divisions, in which the main battle lines are drawn not only—and not even mostly—between countries, but within them. Victories will be won and defeats suffered largely on domestic turf. Accordingly, it is the Home Front that presents the greatest challenges, and it is there that the main thrust of government policies must be directed.

This article was published as part of the "Relaunching U.S.-Russia Dialogue on Global Challenges: The Role of the Next Generation" project, implemented in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy to Russia. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Embassy to Russia.

India
Source: brics2021.gov.in

Education Ministers from the five BRICS countries virtually signed a joint declaration on 6 July 2021, with the resolve to further strengthen their academic and research collaboration in higher education and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). In the 8 th meeting of BRICS education Ministers that was held as part of the 13th BRICS Summit being hosted by India, ministers deliberated on two themes - Leveraging digital and technological solutions for ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and enhancing research and academic collaboration.

Regarding the need to leverage digital and technological solutions for ensuring quality inclusive education, the member states agreed to generate and expand their knowledge base that would help formulate initiatives in this regard. They also agreed to facilitate creation of mechanisms that would allow sharing of knowledge and best practices with each other. These could include seminars, policy dialogues, interactions with experts, to name a few.

In order to enhance their collaboration in academics and research, the ministers agreed on facilitating the mobility of students and faculty among BRICS partner states, besides encouraging joint and dual degrees between higher education institutions in BRICS countries. They also recognized Technical and Vocational Training and Education as a priority area for every BRICS country and expressed their commitment to promoting collaboration in this area.

Chairing the meeting Shri Sanjay Dhotre, Union Minister of State for Education, Communications and Electronics & Information Technology said that India acknowledges the concerted efforts being made by students, teachers, parents, communities and governments across the world to mitigate the effects of the pandemic and build back a more resilient education system. He underscored the importance of multilateral cooperation, especially among the BRICS nations, for harnessing the full potential of education.

Shri Dhotre further said that online learning and digital delivery of education have emerged as important means for achieving education sector development goals and targets set by each BRICS country. He also added that it is therefore necessary to recognize the importance of leveraging technology to promote access to inclusive and equitable quality education for all.

The BRICS Education Ministers also shared the policies and initiatives that each country launched to mitigate the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on education. Speaking for India Shri Dhotre informed about our initiatives under PM eVidya for providing access to quality education through multi-modal means. He spoke of SWAYAM MOOCs platform, SWAYAM PRABHA TV Channels, DIKSHA, Virtual labs .

Shri Dhotre further said that while India realizes the potential of digital and technological solutions for achieving the goal of inclusive and equitable quality education, it also acknowledges the need to reduce and eventually eliminate the digital divide that restricts full realization of this potential. He added that there is a need to intensify efforts to eliminate disparity in access to digital resources, including digital devices, especially in the case of socially and economically disadvantaged population groups. In this context he said that India is rapidly expanding digital infrastructure through the Digital India Campaign and FTTH connectivity.

Prior to the meeting, the International Governing Board of the BRICS Network Universities met on the 29th of June, to take a look at the progress made by member states under this initiative so far, and discussed ways to take it further. A meeting of Senior BRICS Officers on Education was also chaired by Shri Amit Khare, Secretary Higher Education on 2nd of July and attended by Shri DP Singh, Chairman UGC, Shri Anil Sahsrabuddhe Chairman AICTE and Prof Subhasis Chaudhary, Director IIT .