India
Source: www.indiatoday.in

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva called up PM Narendra Modi. The Indian PM is set to visit China soon for the SCO summit. Brics activity has gained momentum amid Trump's tariffs, attacks on the bloc and his cryptocurrency bet against the reported Brics currency.

At the 2024 BRICS Summit in Russia's Kazan, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came together for high-level discussions.

In Short

• Brics nations unite to counter Trump's aggressive tariffs, dollar dominance
• PM Modi and Brazil's Lula talk of deepening ties amid mounting US tariffs
• Trump embraces crypto amid reports of Brics push for alternative currency

In the past week, the Global South has witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activity. India, China, Brazil, and even Russia, the 'expelled' Global North member, have all been actively engaged in discussions. Much of this momentum can be attributed to US President Donald Trump's aggressive tariff policies and vocal attacks on the bloc. This huddle of the OG Brics members, now expanded by five new member nations, appears to be forging a stronger alliance, one that experts say is preparing to challenge the US dollar's dominance and push back against Trump's daily tariff offensives. A heavy Brics blowback is most likely brewing against the Trump-led US.

The surge in Brics' diplomatic engagement coincides with Trump's imposition of steep tariffs on India, Russia, China, and Brazil, alongside his repeated criticism of the bloc as "anti-American".
Adding to the economic tensions is Trump's evolving stance on cryptocurrency. Once dismissive, calling Bitcoin a "scam", Trump is now aggressively pushing to make the US the world's crypto capital. This is widely viewed as a response to perceived threats from a potential Brics currency aimed at challenging the petrodollar's dominance, as well as an attempt to capitalise on the lucrative digital asset market.

The signs that the Brics is gearing up to take on Trump are undeniable. In just the past week, around half a dozen key developments have indicated concrete moves underway.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday said he had a "very good and detailed conversation" with Russian President Vladimir Putin and reaffirmed India's commitment to deepen the strategic partnership between both countries. Just a day earlier, India's National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met Putin in Moscow.

Reports suggest that Putin will visit New Delhi later this year.

The Indo-Russia bear hug came even as Brazilian President Lula da Silva spoke to PM Modi on Thursday.

Meanwhile, Modi is set to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in China later this month, his first visit there in seven years. Beijing's tone has become cordial, with its mouthpiece, The Global Times, visibly softening its tone toward India.

WHAT BRICS MEMBERS HAVE SAID ON TRUMP'S TARIFFS

Trump has escalated trade tensions by doubling tariffs on Indian goods to 50%, citing India's continued imports of Russian oil, which accounts for 36% of its oil imports. Brazil faced a similar 50% tariff increase, linked to Trump's allegations of political persecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.

Trump's rhetoric has been blunt and nasty. He called India and Russia "dead economies" and accused New Delhi of profiting from reselling Russian oil. He further warned that Brics nations aligning against US interests would face an additional 10% tariff.

India has called the tariffs "unjustified".

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said India's "steady and time-tested" ties with Russia, urging the US not to view these relations through a third-country lens.

Meanwhile, Brazil's Lula rejected Trump's offer for direct trade talks, telling news agency Reuters, "I will not call Trump to negotiate anything I'm not going to humiliate myself". Instead, Lula vowed to use Brazil's Brics presidency to galvanise collective support and responses. He said he was planning discussions with PM Modi and Xi Jinping on the tariffs' impact.

LINK BETWEEN BRICS CURRENCY, TRUMP CRYPTOCURRENCY?

Trump's flip, from dismissing Bitcoin as a "scam" to positioning the US as the global cryptocurrency capital, shows the move might also be aimed at mitigating adverse affects of the potential Brics currency.

On Thursday, Tump signed an executive order allowing cryptocurrencies and alternative assets like private equity and real estate to be included in 401(k) retirement accounts, reported The Guardian.
Since his return to the White House, Trump has taken concrete steps in the crypto domain.

In January, he signed an Executive Order to promote US leadership in digital assets and establish a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve. He appointed crypto advocates like Paul Atkins as the Securities and Exchange Commission chair and David Sacks as "crypto czar". He has even backed his family's crypto venture, World Liberty Financial, which has engaged with Pakistan on cryptocurrency.
This shift is seen as a strategic move to counter the potential threat from Brics nations, who are exploring alternatives to the dollar's dominance through initiatives like Brics Pay and discussions of a commodity-backed currency. India, however, has denied pursuing a common Brics currency.

By promoting a US-controlled crypto ecosystem, including the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve, Trump aims to maintain America's financial edge in a rapidly evolving global economy.

As American businesswoman Sandy Carter noted in Forbes, this approach could significantly impact the dollar's role as the world's main reserve currency. With more countries exploring digital currencies and decentralised finance, the dollar's dominance is at risk, but by embracing digital assets, the US could retain leadership and adapt to this shifting landscape.

MODI AND LULA STRATEGISE AGAINST US TRADE PRESSURE

Representing approximately 46% of the world's population and contributing around 35.6% to global GDP, the Brics bloc is coalescing against Trump's trade and economic policies.

Lula's hour-long call with PM Modi focused on deepening India-Brazil ties in trade, defence, energy, and technology, aiming to boost bilateral trade from $12 billion in 2024 to $20 billion by 2030. Lula also confirmed a state visit to India in early 2026. PM Modi, in a post on X, called for a "people-centric partnership" among Global South nations. He batted for a broader alignment, which is seen as a direct response to Trump's tariffs and policies.

"So basically, the world's largest democracy and South America's biggest player are swapping notes on how to play hardball with the US," said investor and influencer Mario Nawfal, summarising the situation.

"Next stop? Beijing. Modi's first trip to China in seven years, landing this August, as US–India vibes hit their frostiest point in a decade," added Nawfal.

During his recent Moscow visit, NSA Doval described previous India-Russia summits as "watershed moments". Then came the reports on Putin's planned visit to New Delhi later this year. Modi's attendance at the SCO summit in Tianjin signals India's and China's intent to better ties despite persisting border tensions.

As Brics nations tighten their economic and diplomatic bonds following Trump's tariff wars, they are clearly signalling a united front against the American President's aggressive trade tactics and efforts to maintain dollar supremacy. The evolving alliance not only challenges the status quo but also accelerates the shift toward a more multipolar global world, with the Global South seeking its rightful share. With Trump's tariffs hitting hard, the Brics coalition is gathering strength, and is fuelling a storm of resistance. A Brics blowback is likely coming for Trump.

Belgium
Source: www.cadtm.org

The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which have admitted five more states (Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran), met in Rio de Janeiro on 6 and 7 July 2025. Saudi Arabia was present but did not officially join as a member country. Representatives from 20 other states considered partners were also present.

While the President of the United States is stepping up unilateral actions on both the military and commercial fronts, the BRICS countries are defending multilateralism and the United Nations system, which are in crisis. They are also defending the capitalist, productivist-extractivist mode of production that exploits human labour and destroys nature.
The BRICS countries represent half the world’s population, 40% of fossil energy resources, 30% of global GDP and 50% of growth. They have the resources to change their export-oriented capitalist development model, but they don’t want to.

It is necessary to express a clearly critical view of the BRICS. This stance in no way prevents us from denouncing, first and foremost and with the utmost firmness, the government of the United States, as well as its European and Indo-Pacific allies (Japan, Australia, etc.), for their imperialist policies.

This policy is blatantly expressed through their support for the State of Israel, which is responsible for the ongoing genocide in Gaza and military aggression against neighbouring countries. Israel is the armed wing of the United States in the region. Without Washington’s unwavering support and the complicity of Western Europe, the neo-fascist Israeli government would not be able to continue the genocide.

For their part, the BRICS countries are not taking any concrete measures as a group to effectively prevent the continuation of the massacres and genocide.

In this series of questions and answers, the author analyses the final declaration of the BRICS summit released on 6 July 2025, as well as the practical policies of the BRICS and the institutions they have established.

This first part of the series addresses the BRICS’ international policy regarding their relations with Israel and the
genocide being committed by the Israeli government.

In the other parts of the series, the author will address the BRICS position on other international issues: the attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran, the Houthis, the invasion of Ukraine, NATO, etc. He will also address the BRICS’ position on issues such as the international financial system, the dollar, the New Development Bank, the G20, the ecological crisis, and more.

 Sommaire

• Is it true that the BRICS countries are not condemning the ongoing genocide in Gaza?
• Is it true that the BRICS countries are not proposing sanctions against Israel?
• Do the BRICS countries maintain trade relations with Israel?
• What is China’s place in Israel’s trade relations?
• Is China investing in Israel?
• What are the relations between the Russian and Israeli governments?
• What is the state of trade between India and Israel?
• What are South Africa’s relations with Israel?
• What are Brazil’s trade relations with Israel?
• Does this imply that there is an arms trade between Brazil and Israel?
• How is Egypt, a full member of the BRICS, behaving with regard to solidarity with the (…)
• What is the current status of trade between Egypt and Israel?
• Is there military collaboration between Egypt and Israel?
• What relations does the United Arab Emirates have with Israel?
• Is there an arms trade between Israel and the United Arab Emirates?
• Is there direct collaboration between the Emirati armed forces and the Israeli army?
• What does the UAE’s military collaboration with the United States consist of?
• How does Ethiopia act towards Israel? Is there military cooperation between Israel and Ethiopia?
• What relations does Indonesia have with Israel?
• Conclusion of the first part

Is it true that the BRICS countries are not condemning the ongoing genocide in Gaza?

In the final declaration of the BRICS summit published on 6 July 2025, the BRICS countries do not use the term genocide to describe what is happening in Gaza.

Yes. In the final declaration of the BRICS summit published on 6 July 2025, the BRICS countries do not use the term genocide to describe what is happening in Gaza. The BRICS countries criticise Israel’s use of force in points 24 to 27 of their statement, but nowhere do they use the terms “genocide”, “ethnic cleansing” or “massacre”.

What is also striking is that the part of the 6 July 2025 statement concerning Gaza is almost identical to what is found in the final statement of the previous BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024 (point 30 of the final statement).

It is as if the evidence of genocide, which is mounting every day, still does not justify the clear use of this term.
Is it true that the BRICS countries are not proposing sanctions against Israel?

Yes, it is true: in their final statement, the BRICS countries did not propose sanctions against Israel. They did not propose to break the various agreements that bind them to the State of Israel. Yet the ongoing genocide and massacres of Gazans in search of food justify and demand action that goes beyond protests by the BRICS and other states.

The protests expressed by the BRICS countries were totally insufficient in October 2024 at the Kazan summit and are even more so in 2025. Only governments and multilateral bodies can take the required concrete and strong action. Of course, street demonstrations, occupations of public spaces and universities, and legal initiatives by citizens’ organisations are fundamental, but they cannot replace action by states and international institutions.

Are the BRICS countries taking concrete measures against the Israeli government?

South Africa has taken the initiative to file a complaint against Israel before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but its trade practices contradict this legal action

The BRICS countries as a group are not implementing any concrete measures against the Israeli government, such as boycotts or embargoes. Admittedly, South Africa has taken the initiative of filing a complaint against Israel before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which is positive, but its practices are at odds with this legal action. Indeed, South Africa maintains trade relations with Israel, notably by allowing South African companies to regularly export coal to Israel by ship.

Since the genocide began, it is reliably estimated that 17 shipments have taken 1.6 million tonnes of coal to fuel the Israeli grid. There have been protests attended by hundreds, called by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, community groups in coal-mining areas, and climate activists against Glencore on 22 August 2024 and 28 May 2025 (a global day of action) and at its local partner African Rainbow Minerals on 5 April 2025; that company is run by Patrice Motsepe who is South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s brother in law.

Do the BRICS countries maintain trade relations with Israel?

Apart from Iran, the BRICS member countries maintain trade relations with Israel. In addition to South Africa, Russia, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and China continue to sell fuel (oil, gas, coal, etc.) to Israel. This is significant assistance to the Israeli government, which needs to diversify its energy sources to continue its war effort and normal functioning and to prevent the discontent of the Israeli population from growing to uncontrollable proportions.

We will briefly review the relations between the BRICS member countries and Israel.

What is China’s place in Israel’s trade relations?

China is Israel’s largest source of imports

China is Israel’s largest source of imports. China makes significant investments in Israel. China exported $13 billion worth of goods to Israel in 2022, $16 billion in 2023 and $19 billion in 2024. Growth is set to continue in 2025. The volume could easily exceed $20 billion if no restrictions or boycotts are imposed. The figures quoted are from Israel Imports from China and the Chinese state news agency Xinhua, China remains Israel’s largest source of imports in 2023. Chinese sources report that in 2023, China was Israel’s largest source of imports for the fourth consecutive year. The United States came in second place. In 2024, China’s dominant position was confirmed. Read: China remains Israel’s top source of imports in 2024.

High-tech products dominate the goods traded between Israel and China: electrical/electronic equipment (imports and exports), industrial machinery, and optical and medical products are among the major categories traded.
Israel’s trade deficit with China is very significant. Israel imports much more from China than it exports to China. Israel’s trade deficit with China has increased sharply in recent years, exceeding $10 billion in 2024.

It should be noted that if we take the EU countries as a whole, the EU is Israel’s main supplier, with approximately $26 billion exported to Israel in 2024. In reality, each EU country supplies Israel separately, with Germany leading the way in terms of exports to Israel with approximately $6 billion. This is why China can be considered the leading supplier (with $19 billion in exports from China to Israel in 2024), and the United States the second largest supplier (with just over 9 billion dollars in exports to Israel in 2024).

Among the manufactured goods sold by China to Israel are drones that were not originally intended for military use but are converted into weapons by the Israeli military to kill Palestinian civilians. This is evidenced by an investigation carried out by the independent Israeli media outlet+972 Magazine, which indicates that these drones are produced by the private Chinese company Autel Robotics (based in Shenzhen), which produces EVO drones. Here is an excerpt from what was revealed:

“The Israeli military has weaponized a fleet of Chinese-manufactured commercial drones to attack Palestinians in parts of Gaza that it seeks to depopulate, an investigation by +972 Magazine and Local Call can reveal. According to interviews with seven soldiers and officers who served in the Strip, these drones are operated manually by troops on the ground, and are frequently used to bomb Palestinian civilians — including children — in an effort to force them to leave their homes or prevent them from returning to evacuated areas. Soldiers most commonly use EVO drones, produced by the Chinese company Autel, which are primarily intended for photography and cost around NIS 10,000 (approximately £2,500) on Amazon. However, with a military-issued attachment known internally as an “iron ball,” a hand grenade can be affixed to the drone and dropped with the push of a button to detonate on the ground. Today, the majority of Israeli military companies in Gaza use these drones. S., an Israeli soldier who served in the Rafah area this year, coordinated drone attacks in a neighbourhood of the city that the army had ordered to be evacuated. During the nearly 100 days that his battalion operated there, soldiers conducted dozens of drone strikes, according to daily reports from his battalion commander that +972 and Local Call reviewed. In the reports, all Palestinians killed were listed as “terrorists.” However, S. testified that aside from one person found with a knife and a single encounter with armed fighters, the scores of others killed — an average of one per day in his battalion’s combat zone — were unarmed. According to him, the drone strikes were carried out with the intent to kill, despite the majority of victims being located at such a distance from the soldiers that they could not have posed any threat.” +972 Magazine, ‘Like a video game’: Israel enforcing Gaza evacuations with grenade-firing drones, 10 July 2025.

In an article published in Euro-Med Monitor, an independent NGO based in Geneva (Switzerland), in February 2024, the Israeli military’s use of drones produced by AUTEL Robotics was already denounced - Gaza: Israel systematically uses quadcopters to kill Palestinians from a close distance. This NGO, which is dedicated to the documentation of human rights violations in the Middle East, North Africa (MENA) and Europe, had called on Chinese companies, including AUTEL, to comply with international law:

“In regions affected by armed conflicts, companies face an increased risk of becoming complicit in serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Consequently, businesses operating in such environments must exercise enhanced due diligence to mitigate these heightened risks effectively. More specifically, when a product is misused in ways that contradict the company’s international obligations and non-violent values, particularly for military purposes leading to the commission of international crimes and grave human rights violations, the company must act decisively. It should take immediate steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use leverage to mitigate the remaining impact to the greatest extent possible. Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor emphasises that companies, including Autel Robotics—a Chinese electronics and drone manufacturer—must comply with international law.” Source: Euro-Med Monitor, Chinese companies must prevent their arms, drones from being used in Israeli international crimes, 1 July 2024.

The Israeli army is also using civilian drones from another Chinese company in its war against the Palestinian population in Gaza. These drones are manufactured by DJI (Da-Jiang Innovations), a private Chinese company based in Shenzhen (China) and the world leader in the manufacture of civilian and professional drones. See the article published by Al Jazeera on 8 May 2025: Israel retrofitting DJI commercial drones to bomb and surveil Gaza”.
As Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, wrote in her report entitled From the economy of occupation to the economy of genocide published in June 2025:
20. Where corporate entities continue their activities and relationships with Israel – with its economy, military, public and private sectors connected to the occupied Palestinian territory – they may be found to have knowingly contributed to: violation of the Palestinian right to self-determination; annexation of Palestinian territory, maintenance of an unlawful occupation and therefore the crime of aggression and associated human rights violations; crimes of apartheid and genocide, and other ancillary crimes and violations. Both criminal and civil laws in various jurisdictions can be invoked to hold corporate entities or their executives accountable for violations of human rights and/or crimes under international law.

21. It is therefore incumbent upon the authorities of the country where these companies are based and upon the companies themselves to avoid any form of complicity with the Israeli authorities. This applies to China as it does to the rest of the world.”

It is therefore incumbent upon the authorities of the countries where these companies are based, and upon the companies themselves, to avoid any form of complicity with the Israeli authorities. This obligation applies to China as well as to the rest of the world.

Is China investing in Israel?

China has made significant investments in two strategically important Israeli ports, the Port of Haifa and the Port of Ashdod, both located on the Mediterranean Sea. The Chinese company China Harbour Engineering Company, a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company, has modernised and developed the port terminal in Ashdod. This project has increased the capacity of the port facilities and improved infrastructure to meet the growth in international trade. The port of Ashdod is one of Israel’s main commercial hubs. Its modernisation has strengthened its strategic position in the region, facilitating trade between China and Israel, particularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), another major Chinese company, has acquired a significant stake in the Haifa container terminal as part of a partnership with the Israeli government. This project, like the one in Ashdod, has enabled Israel to attract investment in improving its port infrastructure. In the case of the Port of Haifa facilities, Chinese investment is partly being made through collaboration with Indian companies. Beyond ports, Chinese companies are also investing in other infrastructure sectors, such as transport, energy and high technology. For example, projects in the fields of intelligent transport technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and telecommunications are currently being developed with the participation of major Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE.

What are the relations between the Russian and Israeli governments?

It is well known that Vladimir Putin and Netanyahu have a good opinion of each other, even though Russia publicly criticises Israel’s policies in the Middle East. So far, Putin has not denounced the ongoing genocide in Gaza in any of his statements. However, he has used the term genocide very often to justify the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of part of its territory. In his speech on 24 February 2022 justifying the “special military operation” in Ukraine, Putin stated:

“Our goal is to protect people who have been subjected to genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years. We will strive to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.” (Address by the President of the Russian Federation) [1] .

It should also be noted that on 1 July 2025, Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, a few days before travelling to the BRICS summit in Rio, stated:

“We are pleased to note that the leader of the new Israeli government, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian problem twice in the past month. We hope that this position will be backed by practical steps. For our part, we will continue facilitating the resumption of talks – both via bilateral channels and at different international venues, first and foremost, in the format of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators.

It is necessary to monitor the situation in the Gaza Strip where the population continues to experience serious humanitarian difficulties. There is considerable demand for steps aimed at lifting or at least easing the blockade.” (See the full statement on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s message welcoming participants in the international seminar on peace between Palestinians and Israelis. [2]

As can be seen from this statement, Sergey Lavrov does not condemn the ongoing genocide, and his attitude towards the fascist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is positive, which is totally unacceptable.

Israel still depends partially on Russia for food (cereals) and energy (oil, gas, coal), despite geopolitical tensions. Israel exports high value-added products to Russia: agricultural products, medical equipment, chemicals and electronics. Israel has a significant trade deficit with Russia. In 2023, trade volume declined following sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine but rebounded in 2024. Trade volume reached 3.5 billion in 2022, fell to 2.6 billion in 2023, and rebounded to 3.9 billion in 2024.

In summary, Israel does not, in practice, apply Western sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, and Russia does not apply sanctions against Israel despite the ongoing genocide.
In practice, Israel is not applying Western sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, just as Russia is not applying sanctions against Israel despite the ongoing genocide

It should be noted that since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, hundreds of millions of dollars (approximately $300 million per quarter) have been transferred to Israel via the accounts of oligarchs or new migrants (Read: Over 95,000 Russians Have Relocated to Israel). It should also be noted that around 500 Israeli soldiers with Russian passports took part in operations in the Gaza Strip between October 2023 and March 2024, nine of whom were killed. The Israeli authorities provided this information (Read: The Israeli embassy announced the number of Russians mobilized into the IDF who died in Gaza).

For the year 2025, we do not have precise information on the numbers, but it is known that Israeli soldiers participating in the genocide have dual Russian and Israeli nationality. The Russian authorities do not criticise Russians mobilised in the Israeli army, including those engaged in Gaza.

What is the state of trade between India and Israel?

India accounts for more than a third of Israel’s total arms exports

Trade between India and Israel is growing and stands at around $10 billion. India supplies Israel with petroleum products, diamonds and other precious stones, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, as well as arms (including drones).
Israel supplies arms (missiles), ammunition and defence systems to India. According to Moneycontrol.com, one of India’s leading financial websites, arms trade between Israel and India has increased 33-fold in 10 years, between 2015 and 2024, reaching US$185 million in 2024. The magazine New Internationalist writes in its January 2025 issue:
“Indian companies like Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India, Premier Explosives, and the state-owned Munitions India are actively supplying drones and weapons to Israel as it continues its genocidal war against the people of Gaza. In April, careful not to jeopardize these arrangements, India abstained from a UN ceasefire resolution that included calls for an arms embargo on Israel. Israel, in turn, has continued its uninterrupted supply of military equipment to India – a significant commitment as Israel has delayed over $1.5 billion in arms exports to other countries since October 2023. Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rise to power in 2014 India has become a key player in Israel’s arms trade. As the world’s largest arms importer, the South-Asian country has become Israel’s most reliable buyer, accounting for 37 per cent of its total arms exports.” Mohammad Asif Khan, Partners in power: Israel, India and the arms trade, 1 January 2025, New Internationalist.

Regarding the supply of arms to Israel by Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India, read: India: Report alleges Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India Ltd. & Munitions India Ltd. were authorised to continue to send arms products to Israel amid continued war on Gaza.

Also read, Adani’s weapons business with Israel. For more information on new collaborations between Adani, Elbit and a US arms company, visit the Adani group website.

Extractive and mining conglomerates, while providing sources of civilian energy, have fuelled Israel’s military and energy infrastructure, both of which are used to create living conditions aimed at destroying the Palestinian people, Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories”.
There is no indication of any desire to change the Indian Prime Minister’s pro-Israeli stance (he was present in person at the BRICS summit in Rio in July 2025). India and Israel hope to conclude a free trade agreement before the end of 2025. According to the Times of Israel on 18 February 2025:

“Israel and India are seeking to sign a long-awaited free trade agreement this year, following US President Donald Trump’s decision to reorganize plans for a trade route between the United States and India that would pass through Israel”.

With regard to India’s position on Palestine, there has been a significant shift in favour of Israel, especially since the election of Narendra Modi. He broke with tradition in 2017 by becoming the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel without also visiting Palestine. The Modi government has avoided directly criticising Israel, particularly during the bombings of Gaza (2014, 2021, 2023, 2024 and 2025) and the violence committed by settlers in the West Bank. Within the country, solidarity with Palestine is increasingly attacked, denigrated or delegitimised by the Hindu right, particularly in the political and ideological climate shaped by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

What are South Africa’s relations with Israel?

There is no doubt that it is very positive that the South African government filed a complaint against Israel on 29 December 2023 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations tribunal responsible for settling disputes between states. Pretoria accuses Israel of violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in its military assault on Gaza.

South Africa’s application sets out its allegations in what it denounces as the broader context of Israel’s conduct towards the Palestinians during its 75 years of apartheid, its 56 years of belligerent occupation of Palestinian territory and its 16 years of blockade of the Gaza Strip. In its decision of January 26, 2024 the Court ordered Israel to take measures to prevent acts of genocide in the Gaza Strip, although it did not grant South Africa’s request to require Israel to suspend its military operations in Gaza. Since then, Israel has nevertheless continued the genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza and has tightened its blockade of humanitarian aid.

In January 2025, South Africa helped to establish the Hague Group to coordinate legal and diplomatic measures against Israel’s policy in Gaza (see: South Africa and Malaysia to launch campaign to protect international justice. According to the inaugural statement, the main commitments are to demand compliance with the orders of the International Court of Justice and the arrest warrants of the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Israeli leaders, to prohibit the transfer of arms or fuel (for military purposes) that could be used in the conflict, and to block access to ports for ships carrying military equipment to Israel. The founding countries of the group are: South Africa, Colombia, Belize, Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Namibia and Senegal. An emergency meeting was held in mid-July 2025 in Bogota.

On the BRICS side, none of the four founding states (Brazil, Russia, India and China) has so far joined South Africa’s complaint, while 15 states have joined in one way or another. Of the five BRICS countries, only Brazil, very late in the day, i.e., in July 2025, announced its intention to join the complaint against Israel in the future. If we take into account the ten countries that constitute the BRICS in 2025, only Egypt has joined the complaint so far.

On the part of South Africa, the most deplorable relationship, one very seriously inconsistent with its just complaint against Israel, is that it continues to trade with that country, notably by supplying coal. According to some sources, 15% of the coal consumed by Israel comes from South Africa. Patrick Bond, a university professor in South Africa, has regularly denounced South African coal deliveries to Israel. Read more: ‘The Blessing’ for genocide, Nearly all BRICS+ regimes nurture Israel, economically.

According to Bond, the main argument put forward by the Pretoria authorities to justify continuing to supply coal to Israel is that doing so would violate WTO rules. Bond responds that this argument is completely unserious, given that in recent years a considerable number of states have violated WTO rules without any repercussions. Furthermore, ending trade with Israel would undoubtedly be a legitimate action for South Africa.

Indeed, as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, writes in paragraph 89 of her report entitled “From the economy of occupation to the economy of genocide”:

“Extractive energy and mining conglomerates, while providing sources of civilian energy, have fuelled Israel’s military and energy infrastructures – both used to create conditions of life calculated to destroy the Palestinian people.” [3]
It should be noted that this fundamental report was made public at the end of June 2025, before the BRICS summit. However, the final declaration of the BRICS summit, made public on 6 July 2025, makes no mention of it.
Bond has compiled a substantial dossier on the South African arms group Paramount Group, headed by Ivor Ichikowitz, denouncing the close collaboration between this company, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Bond particularly condemns the Paramount Group’s collaboration with the Israeli arms company Elbit. His dossier entitled Does SA-Israel trade include armaments? was published on 21 December 2024.

It should be noted that the head of the Paramount Group, Ivor Ichikowitz, denounced South Africa’s complaint against Israel. He wrote in Fortune magazine:

“South Africa’s most recent position, outrightly hostile to Israel and very sympathetic to Hamas, culminating in dragging the State of Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), could well have led to South Africa being punished and excluded from AGOA–a prospect that still looms over U.S.-South Africa relations.” [4] Source: Ivor Ichikowitz, “South Africa should be truly non-aligned–and stop risking its vital trade ties with the West,” Fortune, 26 January 2024, https://fortune.com/2024/01/26/south-africa-non-aligned-risk-vital-trade-ties-west-us-biden-israel-politics/
Bond, various South African movements and numerous activists are calling on the Pretoria authorities to impose sanctions on Israel by banning coal exports to that country and ending all trade relations.

What are Brazil’s trade relations with Israel?

The volume of trade between Brazil and Israel amounts to just under $2 billion. Brazil imports more from Israel than it exports there. Brazil exports crude oil to Israel, which accounts for a quarter of its exports to that country. It also exports meat, which accounts for around 20% of its exports, and genetically modified soybeans, which also account for 20%. The rest includes kosher chicken, weapons, etc.

Does this imply that there is an arms trade between Brazil and Israel?

Brazil has maintained arms trade with Israel despite the genocide and, above all, continues to cooperate significantly with Israel in the field of defence technology.

Yes. In 2024, for example, Brazil exported arms to Israel for a limited amount (just under $2 million), but these were war munitions (see https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/exports/israel/arms-ammunition-parts-accessories). In 2024, Brazil imported war weapons from Israel for just under $9 million (see https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/imports/israel/military-weapons-excluding-revolvers-pistols-lances). Brazil, therefore, maintains an arms trade despite the genocide and, above all, continues to cooperate significantly in the field of defence technology, mainly with the Israeli company Elbit Systems (see official website https://www.elbitsystems.com/) and its Brazilian subsidiary Ares Aeroespacial e Defesa.

It should be noted that Elbit System is explicitly mentioned in the report and appears on the list of arms companies directly collaborating in the genocide, according to Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories.Francesca Albanese makes the following statement in point 31 of her report:

“The military-industrial complex has become the economic backbone of the State. Between 2020 and 2024, Israel was the eighth largest arms exporter worldwide. The two most prominent Israeli weapons companies – Elbit Systems, established as a public-private partnership and later privatised, and state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) – are among the top 50 arms manufacturers globally. Since 2023, Elbit has cooperated closely on Israeli military operations, embedding key staff in the Ministry of Defence, and was awarded the 2024 Israeli Defence Prize. Elbit and IAI provide a critical domestic supply of weaponry and reinforce Israel’s military alliances through arms exports and joint development of military technology. Point 31 https://www.un.org/unispal/document/a-hrc-59-23-from-economy-of-occupation-to-economy-of-genocide-report-special-rapporteur-francesca-albanese-palestine-2025/ and https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur

She adds in point 33:

“Drones, hexacopters and quadcopters have also been omnipresent killing machines in the skies of Gaza. Drones largely developed and supplied by Elbit Systems and IAI have long flown alongside these fighter jets, surveilling Palestinians and delivering target intelligence. In the last two decades, with support from these companies and collaborations with institutions like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Israel’s drones acquired automated weapons systems and the ability to fly in swarm formation.”

Military collaboration between Brazil and Israel through Elbit and its subsidiary ARES is well established. For example, Ares has supplied remote-controlled weapon stations (RCWS, REMAX) to Brazil under a contract worth approximately $100 million. The cooperation goes beyond physical exchanges, with technology transfers, co-production and training via Elbit/Ares.

Furthermore, in April 2024, under pressure from the Ministry of Defence, Brazil’s VBCOAP (armoured self-propelled howitzer) programme selected the ATMOS-2000 155 mm truck-mounted system (Tatra T-815 6×6) developed by Elbit Systems as the winner of a tender also involving the Caesar (France), the SH-15 (China) and the Zuzana 2 (Slovakia/CZ). The initial contract provides for the acquisition of 36 howitzers: two units were to be delivered within 12 months for technical and operational evaluation in Brazil. The remaining 34 systems will be delivered annually until 2034. The total value of the contract is estimated at $150-200 million, or even $210 million according to some sources (see the Brazilian newspaper The Rio Times: https://www.riotimesonline.com/lulas-brazil-acquires-israeli-defense-tech-despite-criticism-over-gaza-conflict/).

At the time of writing, the project has been “frozen” since October 2024 due to criticism from President Lula da Silva against Israel and the war in Gaza (https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2024/10/07/brazils-deal-for-israeli-howitzers-frozen-over-gaza-war/). However, no executive decree cancelling the project has been signed. Since the announcement of the contract freeze, the Brazilian Ministry of Defence and the army chief have been trying to unblock the file and persuade the president to proceed with deliveries, in particular the two prototype units for operational testing. At the end of July 2025, Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira announced a hardening of Brazil’s position towards Israel and a halt to arms trade with Israel (in Portuguese:

https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/republica/brasil-sancoes-israel-por-genocidio-gaza-chanceler-onu/).

How is Egypt, a full member of the BRICS, behaving with regard to solidarity with the Palestinian people?

For years, we have observed growing collaboration between Egypt, Israel and the United States, to the detriment of solidarity with Palestine.

Firstly, it should be emphasised that in June 2025, the Egyptian authorities cracked down on and prevented thousands of people from dozens of different countries from travelling within the country to reach the Rafah border crossing to express their solidarity with the Palestinian people, demand an end to the genocide and support the need for a ceasefire. On 10 June 2025, activists from more than 50 countries launched the Global March for Gaza, a civil initiative supported by a broad international coalition to denounce the Israeli blockade and demand the opening of a humanitarian corridor to Gaza via the Rafah border crossing.

However, the Egyptian authorities prevented the march from taking place, mobilising a media smear campaign against the organisers from the outset. The repression intensified with arrests (in the streets, hotels and restaurants), passport confiscations and the destruction of phones, and convoys were prevented from leaving Cairo. Violence and detentions were also reported in Ismailia, where 200 activists were arrested. Several expulsions and refoulements at the airport were also reported. (Read https://jewishcurrents.org/egypt-cracks-down-on-the-global-march-to-gaza).

This repression reflects the growing collaboration between Egypt, Israel and the United States, to the detriment of solidarity with Palestine. Indeed, during the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt refused any normalisation with Israel and continued to severely criticise Israeli abuses against Palestinians. But his successor, Anwar Sadat, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, under the auspices of the United States. Considered a betrayal by Palestinians and the peoples of the region, including the Egyptians, this treaty paved the way for growing military, security and economic cooperation.
Under the presidency of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, this normalisation has intensified to unprecedented levels, with security cooperation, increased economic dependence on Israeli gas, implicit support for the blockade of Gaza, tight control of the Rafah crossing point and the dismantling of trade tunnels to Gaza. The regime continues torepress pro-Palestinian demonstrations systematically, and even symbolic gestures such as waving a Palestinian flag can lead to accusations of terrorism.

What is the current status of trade between Egypt and Israel?

In 2022, trade between Egypt and Israel was estimated at around $300 million, compared to around $330 million according to a 2021 report. In 2023, trade increased by 56% compared to 2022, for an estimated total of approximately $468 million. In 2024, growth accelerated at the end of the year, with a 168% jump in the fourth quarter, but the exact annual total is not specified. The main product purchased by Egypt from Israel is natural gas. Israeli gas accounted for 15-20% of Egyptian consumption in early 2025.

Is there military collaboration between Egypt and Israel?

Yes, there is secret but substantial military collaboration between Egypt and Israel, despite their conflictual history (wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973). Since 2007, Egypt and Israel have effectively organised a blockade of Gaza (restrictions on the movement of goods and people, surveillance of tunnels). Egypt and Israel conduct joint operations to destroy tunnels between Gaza and Egypt (with Israeli technological assistance). Egypt has acquired Israeli surveillance systems (including Elbit radars) via European intermediaries. According to the Wall Street Journal on 7 March 2024, Israel has carried out secret strikes against weapons transiting through Egypt to Gaza with the tacit agreement of the Egyptian authorities. The US grants $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt, contingent on Cairo’s cooperation with Israel. The United States is ensuring that this condition is met.

What relations does the United Arab Emirates have with Israel?

In 2020, under the auspices of President Donald Trump, the Abraham Accords led to the normalisation of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
.
In 2020, under the auspices of President Donald Trump, the Abraham Accords [5] led to the normalisation of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (for more information on the United Arab Emirates, see the box). On 29 August 2020, a few weeks after the announcement of the Abraham Accords, the Emirates repealed the 1972 federal law prohibiting economic relations with Israel. This decision legalised bilateral trade and investment, the import and sale of Israeli products, scientific, cultural and technological cooperation, etc. Prior to this repeal, increasingly close relations had gradually been established.

Following the Abraham Accords, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed on 31 May 2022 and entered into force on 1 April 2023, with the elimination or significant reduction of customs duties on approximately 96% of tariff lines and 99% of the value of trade. This treaty aims to increase bilateral trade to more than $10 billion within five years of its conclusion. The conflict in Gaza reduced the visibility of trade in 2024, but it remained active and grew. As evidence, the volume of trade, which reached $2.5 billion in 2022, is expected to reach $5 billion in 2025.

According to Bloomberg, there are around 600 Israeli companies operating in the UAE in 2025, and according to a report by the Dubai Chamber (2023), more than 200 Emirati companies have established partnerships or opened operations in Israel since the normalization of relations (https://www.dubaichamber.com).

Is there military collaboration between Egypt and Israel?

Yes, there is secret but substantial military collaboration between Egypt and Israel, despite their conflictual history (wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973). Since 2007, Egypt and Israel have effectively organised a blockade of Gaza (restrictions on the movement of goods and people, surveillance of tunnels). Egypt and Israel conduct joint operations to destroy tunnels between Gaza and Egypt (with Israeli technological assistance). Egypt has acquired Israeli surveillance systems (including Elbit radars) via European intermediaries. According to the Wall Street Journal on 7 March 2024, Israel has carried out secret strikes against weapons transiting through Egypt to Gaza with the tacit agreement of the Egyptian authorities. The US grants $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt, contingent on Cairo’s cooperation with Israel. The United States is ensuring that this condition is met.

What relations does the United Arab Emirates have with Israel?

In 2020, under the auspices of President Donald Trump, the Abraham Accords led to the normalisation of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
.
In 2020, under the auspices of President Donald Trump, the Abraham Accords [5] led to the normalisation of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (for more information on the United Arab Emirates, see the box). On 29 August 2020, a few weeks after the announcement of the Abraham Accords, the Emirates repealed the 1972 federal law prohibiting economic relations with Israel. This decision legalised bilateral trade and investment, the import and sale of Israeli products, scientific, cultural and technological cooperation, etc. Prior to this repeal, increasingly close relations had gradually been established.

Following the Abraham Accords, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed on 31 May 2022 and entered into force on 1 April 2023, with the elimination or significant reduction of customs duties on approximately 96% of tariff lines and 99% of the value of trade. This treaty aims to increase bilateral trade to more than $10 billion within five years of its conclusion. The conflict in Gaza reduced the visibility of trade in 2024, but it remained active and grew. As evidence, the volume of trade, which reached $2.5 billion in 2022, is expected to reach $5 billion in 2025.

According to Bloomberg, there are around 600 Israeli companies operating in the UAE in 2025, and according to a report by the Dubai Chamber (2023), more than 200 Emirati companies have established partnerships or opened operations in Israel since the normalization of relations (https://www.dubaichamber.com).

Is there an arms trade between Israel and the United Arab Emirates?

At the arms fair held in Abu Dhabi in February 2025, 34 Israeli arms companies were present
Yes, there has been a very real arms trade between Israel and the Emirates since normalisation in 2020. It mainly concerns anti-aircraft systems (SPYDER, Barak 8, Iron Dome), drones and electronic technologies and is also based on industrial cooperation. Although specific contracts remain sensitive, trade has accelerated since 2022, with increasing public visibility since 2024–2025 through arms fairs such as the IDEX, which takes place every two years. At the IDEX exhibition held in February 2025,34 Israeli arms companies were present. The Emirati company EDGE, which specialises in armaments, actively collaborates with Israeli companies in the armaments sector, such as Elbit, Rafael, IAI, RT and Thirdeye.

Is there direct collaboration between the Emirati armed forces and the Israeli army?

Indeed, the Emirati armed forces and the Israeli army engage in military collaboration, despite neither party officially acknowledging it. The hostility of both countries towards Iran and its influence in the region partially explains this collaboration. The same applies to their common interests against the Houthis in Yemen.

Since the start of the war in Yemen in 2015, the United Arab Emirates has increased its military presence in the region, particularly on the main island of Socotra, which is officially part of Yemen. The UAE has occupied the island, set up a military base there and cooperates with the Israeli army on the ground. The Socotra archipelago, located off the coast of Yemen in the Indian Ocean, controls crucial shipping lanes between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Approximately 20,000 transport ships pass near the Socotra archipelago each year, 9% of which are involved in the global oil supply. Read: Karim Shami, “Tyranny on the waters: The UAE-Israeli occupation of Yemen’s Socotra Island”, 24/03/2023, https://thecradle.co/articles-id/916# See also: “UAE, Israel expand spy bases in Yemen’s Socotra under US sponsorship: Report”, 29/07/2024, https://thecradle.co/articles-id/26154

The UAE is also collaborating with Israel, India and several EU countries (Italy, Germany, France, Greece) on a project to build a land route linking the Gulf of Dubai to the port of Haifa across the Arabian Peninsula via Riyadh in Saudi Arabia in order to avoid passing through the Suez Canal for trade between Asia and Europe. Read: https://www.jns.org/uae-israel-land-corridor-operating-despite-war/ In a way, this is also a means of developing an alternative to the new Silk Roads developed by China. Read: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/imec/

What does the UAE’s military collaboration with the United States consist of?

It is important to note that the UAE is the only BRICS member country to have a permanent US military base on its territory, which is obviously linked to its policy of collaboration with Israel. The US military presence in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is significant, strategic and long-standing, forming part of bilateral defence cooperation that has been strengthened since the Gulf War in 1991. Close to the UAE capital, the United States has a military base hosting fighter jet (F-22, occasionally F-35), surveillance aircraft (AWACS, JSTARS), armed drones (MQ-9 Reaper), refueling aircraft, etc. This base is a key logistics hub for US operations in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Syria, for CENTCOM (Middle East/Central Asia) command, and for surveillance of Iran. There are approximately 2,000 to 3,000 US military personnel stationed there on a permanent or rotational basis.

The United States has deployed missile defence systems, such as Patriot PAC-3s in the UAE. The UAE cooperates with the US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain. The UAE participates in joint naval exercises and initiatives such as the International Maritime Security Cooperation in the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE guarantees access to Emirati ports for the US fleet and its allies.

How does Ethiopia act towards Israel? Is there military cooperation between Israel and Ethiopia?

Since November 2020, there has also been a cooperation agreement between Mossad and the Ethiopian security service (NISS), covering the exchange of expertise and counterinsurgency

Despite the ongoing genocide in Gaza, military cooperation between Israel and Ethiopia, a full member of the BRICS, continues.

According to several sources, Israel remains one of Ethiopia’s main military suppliers, notably through the sale of air defence systems, such as the Spyder-MR, designed to protect the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam against air attacks.

Military cooperation has been ongoing despite regime changes in Addis Ababa. It dates back to the 1960s–1990s: Israel trained paratrooper units and counterinsurgency forces for the Ethiopian army (Nebelbal Division), supplied 150,000 rifles and cluster bombs, and sent military advisers to train the Presidential Guard (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopia%E2%80%93Israel_relations). Since November 2020, there has also been a cooperation agreement between Mossad and the Ethiopian security service (NISS), covering the exchange of expertise and counterinsurgency.

Due to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the military partnership between Ethiopia and Israel is relatively low-key, but it contributes significantly to Ethiopia’s security strategy and Israeli influence in East Africa. This includes intelligence sharing, strategic coordination and capacity building in Ethiopia. Read: https://hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Mar/200683/israel_ethiopia_discuss_joint_efforts_to_combat_al_shabaab_and_houthis.aspx

It should be noted that Israel has excellent relations in this region with the Museveni regime in Uganda (which was represented at the BRICS summit in Rio by the vice-president). Read: www.alestiklal.net/en/article/how-israel-is-penetrating-the-african-continent.

Trade between Israel and Ethiopia is low, at around $100 million per year. However, Israeli companies are increasingly interested in investing in agriculture in Ethiopia.

What relations does Indonesia have with Israel?

Indonesia has imported espionage and surveillance technology from Israel
Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country and a full member of the BRICS, does not have official diplomatic relations with Israel, but the reality is quite different. In May 2024, a joint investigation by the Israeli daily Haaretz, Amnesty International and Tempo revealed that Indonesia had imported espionage and surveillance technology from Israel.

The investigation reveals that between 2017 and 2023, Indonesia imported and deployed a wide range of highly intrusive spyware and other sophisticated surveillance technologies. Several Israeli companies have been identified as indirect suppliers: NSO Group (via Q Cyber Technologies SARL, Luxembourg), which produced the Pegasus spyware; Intellexa Consortium, known for its Predator software; Candiru/Saito Tech; and Wintego Systems Ltd. The spyware acquired by Indonesia, such as Pegasus, Predator, etc., is designed to be ultra-stealthy, infect without explicit interaction, and enable the management of images, messages, calls, location, etc. Among those who have acquired these technologies are the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the National Cybersecurity and Cryptography Agency (BSSN), and, according to some media reports, the Ministry of Defence. Amnesty has warned that these devices pose a major risk to civil rights, including freedom of expression and privacy.

In mid-July 2025, Indonesia officially joined “The Hague Group” at the emergency summit in Bogotá on 15 and 16 July 2025 (https://thehaguegroup.org/meetings-bogota-en/). It is now one of 13 countries that have committed to taking concrete and coordinated measures to enforce international law in response to the ongoing genocide in Gaza.
Apart from this, trade between Israel and Indonesia is low, at less than $200 million per year.

Relations between BRICS member countries and Israel


Legend:
• ✅ = Yes
• ❌ = No
• 🟡 = Announcement of intent
• 🟢 = Already severed or historically opposed

Conclusion of the first part

Gaza and the BRICS: refusal to condemn genocide and impose sanctions

A detailed analysis of the positions and practices of BRICS member countries in response to the ongoing genocide in Gaza reveals a flagrant contradiction between their official rhetoric – often focused on international law, multilateralism and the sovereignty of peoples – and their concrete actions, as in the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or the actions of the UAE. As BRICS+, the ten member states refuse to designate as such the crime of genocide being perpetrated in Gaza, despite it being widely documented and denounced by international bodies and by Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur.

In fact, the BRICS have not taken any strong joint measures: no sanctions, no severance of diplomatic or economic relations, no embargo, not even a symbolic suspension of cooperation with Israel. On the contrary, for most of them, trade relations – particularly in the strategic areas of energy, surveillance technologies, infrastructure and armaments – continued and even intensified in 2024 and 2025. South Africa is certainly an exception with its complaint to the ICJ, but this very positive action is undermined by the continuation of coal exports to Israel and other trade relations.
This diplomatic double-speak highlights a fundamental truth: despite their rhetoric about a “more just world order”, the BRICS countries are primarily defending their geopolitical, economic and security interests, often at the expense of the principles of international justice. This reality dashes the hopes of some progressive sectors for the possibility of an “alternative” pole embodied by this bloc.

For those on the left who harbour illusions about the BRICS’ willingness to take clear initiatives in favour of the people, the latest summit and their attitude as a bloc towards the genocide in Gaza and their relations with Israel should help to open their eyes.

In the next instalment of this series, we will see that the BRICS leaders support the capitalist mode of production that led us to the current disaster. The BRICS countries are in favour of maintaining – and increasing funding contributions to – the international financial architecture (with the IMF and the World Bank at its centre) and the international trade architecture (WTO, free trade agreements, etc.) as they currently exist. The BRICS support so-called green capitalism and engage in greenwashing, such as promoting carbon markets instead of making overdue greenhouse gas emissions cuts. Some of them, such as Russia, resort to military aggression against other peoples, as is the case in Ukraine. In the same way, and more often than others, the United States (and the European powers) has done so repeatedly around the world.

The author would like to thank Gilbert Achcar, Omar Aziki, Patrick Bond, Joseph Daher, Sushovan Dhar, Fernanda Gadea, Gabriella Lima, Jawad Moustakbal, Maxime Perriot and Claude Quemar for their proofreading and advice. The author is solely responsible for the opinions expressed in this text and for any errors it may contain.

Footnotes
[1] In an interview with Tucker Carlson on 9 February 2024, Putin claimed that “Ukraine, under Western control, has waged a war against its own people in the Donbass. Children, women, elderly people have been killed every day. Isn’t that genocide?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYfByTcY49k
[2] It should be noted that during 2024 and 2025, Lavrov began to use the term genocide in relation to Israel’s actions in Gaza. There is clearly a division of roles between Putin, who avoids denouncing Israel’s genocidal actions, and his foreign minister. It should also be noted that Lavrov represented Russia at the BRICS summit in Rio in July and did not use the term genocide in his public statements during the summit. As indicated at the beginning of this article, the term genocide does not appear in the final declaration of the Rio summit, which he helped draft.
[3] “Extractive energy and mining conglomerates, while providing sources of civilian energy, have fuelled Israel’s military and energy infrastructures – both used to create conditions of life calculated to destroy the Palestinian people.” [Read, Agenda item 7: Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories,FROM ECONOMY OF OCCUPATION TO ECONOMY OF GENOCIDE

and From economy of occupation to economy of genocide - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 (Advance edited version).
[4] “South Africa’s most recent position, outrightly hostile to Israel and very sympathetic to Hamas, culminating in dragging the State of Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), could well have led to South Africa being punished and excluded from AGOA–a prospect that still looms over U.S.-South Africa relations.” Source: Ivor Ichikowitz, South Africa should be truly non-aligned–and stop risking its vital trade ties with the West”, Fortune, 26 January 2024, https://fortune.com/2024/01/26/south-africa-non-aligned-risk-vital-trade-ties-west-us-biden-israel-politics/
[5] The Abraham Accords are two peace treaties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on the one hand, and between Israel and Bahrain on the other. The first, between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, was announced on 13 August 2020 by US President Donald Trump. They were signed on 15 September 2020 at the White House in Washington, accompanied by a tripartite declaration also signed by the US president as a witness. These agreements were extended by agreements with Sudan and Morocco. Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Accords
[6] Vincent Lucchese, “ Capter le CO2, un cadeau empoisonné pour les pays du Sud “ (The carbon trap: CO2 capture, a poisoned gift for Southern countries), Reporterre, 11 December 2023, https://reporterre.net/Capter-le-CO2-un-cadeau-empoisonne-pour-les-pays-du-Sud
[7]  Adam Hanieh, “Laundering Carbon—The Gulf’s ‘New Scramble for Africa’”, CADTM, 8 August 2024, 22789

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva presented himself as a torchbearer for multilateralism in a fractured world in an interview with Reuters on Wednesday, revealing plans to call the leaders of India and China to discuss a joint BRICS response to tariffs on U.S. imports imposed by President Donald Trump, Reuters reports.

"What President Trump is doing is tacit — he wants to dismantle multilateralism, where agreements are made collectively within institutions, and replace it with unilateralism, where he negotiates one-on-one with other countries," Lula said.

"What bargaining power does a small Latin American country have against the United States? None."
Lula said he will initiate a conversation at the BRICS group of developing nations about how to tackle Trump's tariffs. He said he planned to call Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Thursday, and China's Xi Jinping and other leaders after. The group also has Russia and other emerging economies among its members.

"I'm going to try to discuss with them about how each one is doing in this situation, what the implications are for each country, so we can make a decision," he said. "It's important to remember that the BRICS have ten countries at the G20," he added, referring to the group that gathers 20 of the world's biggest economies.

Lula stressed that Brazil now holds the presidency of the BRICS and said that he wants to discuss with allies why Trump is attacking multilateralism and what his goals may be.

Trump called the BRICS "anti-American" and threatened to slap an additional 10% tariff on goods imported from those countries last month, while the group gathered in a summit in Rio de Janeiro.
Some of the highest tariffs imposed by Trump have been on imports from those countries.

Brazil climbed to the top of the list last month, when Trump tied 50% tariffs on most of the country's exports to what he called a "witch hunt" against former President Jair Bolsonaro.

On Wednesday, Trump threatened to impose another 25% tariff on Indian imports because of the country's reliance on Russian oil, which would add to the 25% levies that are already in place.
The 30% tariffs on goods from China and South Africa are also among the highest imposed by Trump, though some Chinese products face additional levies.

In July, US President Donald Trump announced that Washington would impose 30% duties on goods imported from South Africa from August 1.

The President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa held a telephone discussion during the morning of 6 August 2025, with US President Donald Trump on bilateral trade matters. “The two leaders undertook to continue with further engagements recognizing the various trade negotiations the US is currently involved in. Respective trade negotiating teams will take forward more detailed discussions.”

USA
Source: www.democracynow.org

From India to Brazil, Trump Intensifies Trade War Against BRICS Nations as New Tariffs Take Effect

Huge tariffs on more than 90 countries took effect shortly after midnight on Thursday. President Trump slapped one of the highest tariff rates of 50% on India — set to go into effect on August 27 — unless India stops buying Russian oil. Democracy Now! speaks with Jayati Ghosh, economics professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, on the hypocrisy of the tariffs. “There’s so many double standards in this particular recent announcement of Trump, because it’s not just that other countries, like China, are buying Russian oil,” says Ghosh. “The European Union is buying Russian oil. The U.S. is buying various Russian exports.”

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: U.S. tariffs on more than 90 countries took effect today, raising import taxes to the highest levels since the Great Depression. They range from 15% on imports from countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Iceland and Nigeria, to up to 50% on India and Brazil. President Trump slapped India with one of the highest tariff rates, which are set to go into effect on August 27th, to pressure India to stop buying Russian oil. Separately, President Trump tied Brazil’s tariffs of 50% to punish Brazil for putting former far-right President Jair Bolsonaro on trial for his 2022 coup attempt. Trump has called Bolsonaro’s prosecution a “witch hunt.” Bolsonaro was placed under house arrest earlier this week.

AMY GOODMAN: For more, we go to New Delhi, India. We’re joined by Jayati Ghosh, economics professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, previously an economics professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, where she taught for 35 years.

Welcome back to Democracy Now! So, you have President Trump imposing 25% tariff on India, to go up to 50% because they’re buying Russian oil. China is also buying Russian oil. They’re not doing the same with China. Talk about what this means for India and why you see Lula in Brazil’s response to Trump as a good example of what India should do — defying him.

JAYATI GHOSH: Well, as you said, there is — there’s so many double standards in this particular recent announcement of Trump, because it’s not just that other countries, like China, are buying Russian oil. The European Union is buying Russian oil. The U.S. is buying various Russian exports, including minerals of different kinds, uranium and so on. So, you know, basically, Trump has picked on this particular one to raise at this point. It could be anything tomorrow, just as he’s announced he doesn’t like BRICS, and any country that’s going to join BRICS is going to suffer for it. So, even if we say, “OK, we’ll stop buying Russian oil,” he could well say, “Well, you’re still in BRICS, so until you leave BRICS, I’m going to actually slap more tariffs on you,” or he could say, “I don’t like anything you’re doing internally in terms of your own justice system or your political system, so I will slap more tariffs on you.” This can go on forever. And it’s becoming not just ridiculous, but a bit bizarre, I would say.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: And you’ve said, Professor Ghosh, that India has not responded the way it might have, and has made too many concessions to the U.S. If you could talk about what those concessions were, when Prime Minister Modi and Foreign Minister Jaishankar were here in the U.S. earlier this year?

JAYATI GHOSH: Well, you know, we don’t have good information on this, because this is all hearsay. It depends on, you know, basically, what we get to know, because none of this is made available to the Indian public.

But, obviously, what happened was that immediately after the threats, the great Liberation Day threats of early April, the prime minister and the external affairs minister, Mr. Jaishankar, they actually presented India as willing to make many concessions. And this has been something that President Trump himself actually pointed out, saying that “There are all these countries coming and kissing my ass and saying, ’We’ll do anything, sir. We’ll do anything.’” They agreed to a rushed trade deal. I’m very, very very glad that that hasn’t happened, because it would have been very much against India’s interests. They agreed to a range of concessions, which we are unaware of at the moment.

We do know there are some red lines that even they have not dared to cross, particularly Indian agriculture. The U.S. has lost a lot of agricultural exports because of the bans on China and that China itself has imposed in retaliation to the U.S. And soybean farmers in the U.S. are hurting. Various farmers are hurting. And they want to push those highly subsidized agricultural products onto India, where agriculture is still livelihood for around half of our population, very, very poor, small farmers, and basically would get wiped out by extremely subsidized multinational agribusinesses shoving a lot of their products into the Indian market. So, that’s an absolute red line for India. There should be many more red lines.

I’m hoping that this latest very ridiculous demand will actually put some steel in the spine of the Indian government. It already seems to have reacted, I think, sensibly. We know that the Lula government, the South African government — I mean, everybody is actually, shall we say, rethinking any kind of deal they may strike with the U.S. at the moment, because it’s also evident that even if you strike a deal, it’s not safe. You never know what the president of the U.S. is going to decide tomorrow, and whether then he will say, you know, “That’s off. I’m now going to impose some other punishment on you, because you’ve done this.”

AMY GOODMAN: Wasn’t it President Biden that encouraged India to buy Russian oil?

JAYATI GHOSH: Yes. You know, the Russian oil example is so, so typical of the double standards of the U.S. When Biden imposed those sanctions, they encouraged India to buy oil from Russia, so long as it remained under the $60 cap, precisely because they wanted to keep the global oil price down. So, they wanted to harm Russia without destabilizing global oil prices, because it’s such a sensitive thing within the U.S. economy. And so they actively encouraged India to import from Russia, and they knew full well that a lot of those imports were then being, effectively, processed and reexported back to the European Union. So, now for the Trump administration to claim that this is horrifying and shocking and so on, it’s really — shall we say, it’s not very convincing.

And let’s face it: We also don’t know three months from now whether Russia will still be an enemy or will become a friend again. Mr. Trump loved Mr. Putin a few months ago and thought that Russia was the victim in that particular conflict. The whole thing may change in a few months, and he may decide that China is now the bigger enemy, and Russia is our friend again. So, you know, in this kind of context, for any country to hope that a trade deal, on often really adverse terms, with the U.S. is something that is going to stick and that is something that will actually benefit them in the medium term is ridiculous.

AMY GOODMAN: Jayati Ghosh, we want to thank you for being with us, economics professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, speaking to us from New Delhi, India.

This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org. Up next. Israel may soon expand its assault on Gaza to a full military takeover of the area. Stay with us.
[break]

AMY GOODMAN: “King Tide and the Sunny Day Flood” by Billy Bragg in our Democracy Now! studio.

Vietnam
Source: theinvestor.vn

Malaysia’s trade with BRICS nations climbed to RM818 billion ($193.47 billion) in 2024, making up 35.2% of the country’s total global trade, according to the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI).

Investment from BRICS countries amounted to RM104.9 billion last year, the ministry said, noting that the BRICS partner status allows Malaysia to explore new market access and attract additional capital.

Although Malaysia is not yet a full member of BRICS, it is already benefiting from economic relations with the countries of the association, as most of them are trading partners and stable sources of foreign investment in Malaysia, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was quoted by TV BRICS as saying.

Earlier, the head of government confirmed the country's commitment to the values that underpin BRICS' activities. He also took part in the 17th BRICS Leaders’ Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on July 6–7.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Head of the Youth Association for International Cooperation Development (ANO YAIC), Lecturer at the Center for the Study of Foreign Languages of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Expert on Food Security Issues in the MENA Region

U.S. President Donald Trump issued a stern ultimatum to Russia, BRICS member states, and their economic partners. He warned that unless a peace agreement with Ukraine is signed within 50 days—by September 3, 2025—Washington will impose a 100% import tariff on goods from Russia, as well as “secondary” tariffs on countries that would continue buying Russian oil and gas. Speaking in the Oval Office alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump emphasized that he is “discontented” with Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise and is ready for “extremely tough” measures.

In the meantime, he threatened to increase sanctions pressure on any country “sympathizing with the anti-American course of BRICS,” by introducing an additional 10% tariff on top of the base rates. According to Trump, “there will be no exceptions” for those who support BRICS plans for de-dollarization or the creation of alternative global governance institutions.

Economic and Financial Repercussions

The statement by the President of the United States regarding the introduction of a universal 10-percent tariff on BRICS member states is not merely guided by populism or a trade measure, but rather the beginning of a new phase in the economic conflict targeting both the redistribution of trade flows and fundamental rethinking of the U.S. role in the global economy.

The reason is quite obvious—BRICS countries are visibly stepping up their efforts to create a parallel financial, economic and institutional architecture, thereby undermining the status quo in which the dollar and the U.S. have been the uncontested centers of power.

Washington’s response in the form of tariff pressure is aimed at destabilizing this alternative BRICS model. The tariffs announced by Donald Trump are not only an economic measure but also a kind of political weapon meant to dismantle alternative centers of power.

However, in this case, the result can be quite the opposite. The U.S. risks losing its role as an arbiter in global trade, while the reaction of BRICS nations will likely be not only symmetrical but also strategic, and range from accelerating de-dollarization to moving towards a new architecture of global settlements. This could betoken the end of Washington’s dominance in the global economy and trade, fueling the formation of a new multipolar trade architecture. Thus, the world is entering an era of new turbulence, where non-economic factors will increasingly determine the economic future.

Speaking generally about the impact of the announced tariffs on the global economy, a number of BRICS nations, as well as key economies of the Global South and the global majority, have already reacted in one way or another. For instance, China condemned the actions of the U.S. and the announced tariff policy, viewing them as economic blackmail. As is well known, China is currently activating the CIPS platform for settlements with Brazil, South Africa, Russia, and other BRICS member states.

Tariffs are not only about trade but also—as U.S. experts point out—control. Trump is trying to contain the rise of new alternative globalization, which is forming around BRICS and even broader, around BRICS+. However, the paradox of this situation is that such measures do not restrain the development of trade and financial directions within BRICS but rather accelerate it.

A new wave of protectionist trade policies in the U.S, which surged after the announced plans to raise the “basic mutual” tariff rate to 15–20% and extend it to partners importing Russian or Iranian oil on July 10, 2025, has once again called into question the sustainability of global agri-food supply chains. Negotiations between the finance ministers of the “Group of Twenty” in Durban on July 17, were effectively under the threat of a new tariff escalation, with European and Asian countries warning of a possible mirror response, increasing the risk of further global trade fragmentation.

Impact of Trump’s Tariff Policy on Food Security in BRICS Countries

The final declaration of the XVII BRICS Summit, adopted in Rio de Janeiro, includes several substantial and comprehensive provisions dedicated to food security in the member states.
First, the document emphasizes the key role of BRICS member states in global food production and in assuring global food and nutritional security. The parties condemn unilateral coercive measures, primarily referring to economic sanctions, whose imposition negatively affects the realization of human rights, including the right of access to food resources. Furthermore, the declaration once again highlights the relevance of the initiative to establish a BRICS grain exchange and its development.

The emerging food sovereignty of the alliance, as well as the idea of creating a grain exchange, inevitably raises concerns in Washington regarding the preservation of its role as a regulator of prices, demand, and supply, even though the process of implementing the grain exchange initiative is rather gradual and unhurried.

The economic protectionism policy pursued by the Trump administration since 2017, including the introduction of tariff restrictions against China, Brazil, India, and other trading partners, has had significant repercussions for global agri-food chains. For BRICS nations, which play a key role as producers and importers of food, these measures have exacerbated food instability risks, increased external trade costs, and have stimulated the development of their own agrarian strategies that respond to current realities.

BRICS Nations: Food Vulnerability and Adaptation in a Turbulent Trade Environment

Washington’s decision to impose a universal 10% tariff on all imports to the U.S., along with the threat of additional charges for countries that “have joined the anti-American policies of BRICS,” has actually marked a new milestone in the escalation of trade conflicts. Formally, this concerns tariffs, but in reality, such measures are nothing else than a tool of geopolitical pressure called to restrain the growing influence of BRICS and to hamper its de-dollarization initiatives. A wide circle of states is affected, however a key question remains: how capable are these measures of undermining BRICS food security and economic stability?

Below is a chart of the current and upcoming tariffs to be imposed on all BRICS member states starting August 1, 2025. Another 10% tariff for BRICS ideological solidarity should be imposed in addition to the existing ones.

Russia and Iran will most likely be indirectly affected by the potential tariffs. Formally, Washington has imposed a 10% “basic” duty on all imports, but for Iranian food products, it is purely theoretical: food shipments from Iran to the U.S. have been banned since September 29, 2010, by OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury) and their sanctions.

Considering that fertilizers are an important element of food security, in 2024, about 7% of Russia’s fertilizer export revenues came from U.S supplies. (approximately 2.5 million tons of urea, ammonium nitrate, and potassium salts). Of course, there is no threat to food security; the measures taken by the U.S. will mainly affect producers and tax revenues flowing to the national treasury. A decrease in fertilizer supplies to the U.S. will push domestic producers to diversify their exports. For example, in the first half of 2025, exports of Russian fertilizers to Brazil increased by almost 30%.

A different situation is observed for BRICS member states located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The fact is that the existing 10% basic tariff and the deprivation of Ethiopia’s AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) benefits affect the supply of a key food product—coffee—while the impact of tariffs on non-food products (clothing) reduces the availability of hard currency in the country, with grain, fertilizers and bread prices steeply rising and the national currency being destabilized as a result. Egypt and the UAE, on the contrary, find themselves in relatively benign circumstances: their food chains are diversified, and the costs are currently limited to rising transactional expenses.

South Africa has not gone unnoticed either. For South Africa, the U.S. market accounts for only about 8% of its exports, but the share in citrus fruits reaches up to 16%, making the 30% customs hit (which may be accompanied by additional measures) surgical but strong and painful. Undoubtedly, South Africa has numerous markets, including those in BRICS, to reorient to. Moreover, the country remains a major producer of maize and fruits. However, the tripling of tariffs will severely impact the incomes of countless farming families, increasing pressure on the local currency. As a result, access to and stability of food for low-income groups will deteriorate, while the prices for imported bread and sunflower oil will rise. The key question is whether Pretoria can negotiate partial exemptions or expedite the reorientation of its exports before the tariffs begin to take a heavy toll, in order to prevent hunger and maintain the availability of existing products for the local population.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia—also a member of BRICS since this January—has become the main target of Washington D.C. In addition to the base tariff, the U.S. has imposed a separate 32% duty on palm oil, with Jakarta covering 85% of U.S. imports required for this product.

In terms of seafood (mainly shrimp), only a 10% tariff was imposed in 2024. For Indonesia, U.S. tariffs are not a threat to food availability per se, but rather a blow to exporter revenues, and through them, to the financial access to food for people residing in coastal and palm regions. Additional tariffs on top of the existing ones will have a more destructive effect, which is why Indonesia is currently combining “tough bargaining” with Washington (for example, a guarantee for the purchase of 2 million tons of wheat, reorientation of export flows, and targeted fiscal measures domestically) with subsidies to Indonesian farmers.

Overall, this gives a chance to limit the macroeconomic damage done by tariffs (reaching around 0.05% of GDP) and prevent the further deterioration of food security for vulnerable population groups.
It is not that easy for U.S. customs duties to “bend” the Celestial Empire.

The United States accounts for about 5% of China’s total agricultural exports. Washington’s tariffs of 10% and 55% would eliminate a significant portion of these sales, but will affect only a small portion of the entire sector’s foreign exchange earnings. The introduction of effective supportive domestic measures by Beijing—including an increase in the budget for domestic grain reserves, subsidizing agricultural insurance, and loans for fish processors—will neutralize the potential systemic threat to China’s food security considering the existing and potential tariff measures taken by the United States.

As for India, U.S. tariffs will undoubtedly take a heavy toll on the export revenues of certain sectors (shrimp, spices, basmati), but they will not undermine the overall food security of this nation. The U.S. imports about 12% of India’s total agricultural exports. In turn, Delhi adheres to the diplomatic principle of “removing the surcharge” and has already proposed to the U.S. the reduction of its own tariffs on several U.S. goods, as well as guaranteed wheat purchases in exchange for exempting shrimp and rice from excessive customs duties. Simultaneously, the government is already launching market reorientation and targeted subsidies to soften the impact on farmer incomes.

The tariff policy unfolding around Brazil may well be the most notorious “tariff case.” Trump, accusing Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of a “witch hunt” against former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, intends to impose a record 50% tariff (the highest since China) on imports from Brazil starting August 1.
Brazil is quite unusual among Trump’s recent tariff targets, as it has a trade deficit with the U.S., while nearly all other countries have significant surpluses. In 2024, this country imported goods worth about 44 billion USD from the U.S., while exports from Brazil to the U.S. amounted to around 42 billion USD.

China’s De-dollarization Mechanisms within the Yuan Internationalization Strategy. RIAC Report

Brazil is a net exporter of grains, sugar, and meat. The surplus supply in a closed U.S. market lowers domestic prices; however, the incomes of 2 million coffee producers, 60,000 citrus growers, and 120,000 people employed in meat processing are declining.

Currently, the United States is the largest buyer of Brazilian coffee. If a tariff is implemented, U.S. roasters will have to seek alternative sources of coffee from other countries, while Brazilian coffee exporters are likely to redirect their supplies to markets in Europe and Asia, as well as BRICS member states, to make up for the U.S. market. U.S. coffee roasters will not be able to absorb a 50% increase in prices for Brazilian beans, while Brazilian exporters do not have sufficient margin flexibility to lower prices, to offset such a significant tariff. Again, Brazil’s food supply system will not be affected, even though without targeted government support, the incomes of coffee producers, citrus farmers, and meat processors are vulnerable.

Thus, U.S. tariff pressure does not lead BRICS nations to a direct food deficit, but it increases currency volatility and impacts the incomes of millions of households. The reciprocal strategies used by BRICS economies are similar: market diversification, subsidies for key exporters, increasing domestic reserves, and in some cases, negotiations with Washington on regulating mutual tariffs, or bargaining.

However, national measures are already insufficient. Washington is accelerating what it is actually trying to avoid: the rapprochement of BRICS member states, the rapid formation of alternative financial institutions and integration mechanisms, including the launch of a payment system based on national currencies, the reorientation of food sale and import markets, as well as the development of a consolidated geopolitical strategy for BRICS. The declarative nature of the initiatives gives way to joint practical steps.

Washington is shifting away from “targeted” sanctions to tough tariff diplomacy, where trade duties serve as the main tool of coercion. For the United States, the outcome of the confrontation will depend on how willing it is to endure real economic losses for the sake of achieving geopolitical objectives. As for BRICS states, the burdensome consequences of the U.S. tariff policy will directly depend on their ability to develop a unified position and not to allow tariff aggression to disrupt their cohesion. It is extremely important to strengthen unity in views and perspectives, strive for the further expansion of BRICS economies and markets, providing each state with mutual trade preferences and financial support.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

South Africa’s Presidency in the G20 is of great importance for quite a number of reasons. It is the first time that an African country has assumed leadership of this key international economic forum. And this is exactly one of the manifestations of the emergence of a new world order.

In 2025 the G20 rounds off its first full cycle of presidencies, which offers a good opportunity to review our past efforts and discuss the goals ahead.

On top of that, several anniversary dates create an exceptional historical context for the G20 this year. Namely the 80th anniversary of our Victory in the World War II and the founding of the United Nations; as well as the 65th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Declaration on Decolonization.
South Africa is steadily setting the tone for G20 endeavors with a focus on urgent issues of economic growth, food security, artificial intelligence, debt burden, and critical minerals. We support Pretoria’s priorities and strive to contribute to tangible practical results.

On July 24-25, the G20 Development Ministerial Meeting convened in Mpumalanga Province, opening a number of high-level G20 events this year. It provided for successful adoption of documents on sensitive matters for Africa, such as illicit financial flows and social protection. Now we embark on the final stretch towards the November G20 Summit.

Against the backdrop of rising geo-economic fragmentation, G20’s activities attract increasing attention. The Forum adopted its present form in 2008 – at a challenging time for the world economy – and since then proved itself an effective “crisis manager” on numerous occasions. G20 has remained resilient and efficient even at the peak of Western anti-Russian hysteria in 2022-2023. Today it continues to develop very much-needed consensus solutions on pressing economic and global issues.

The successive chairmanships of BRICS countries in 2022-2025 made a significant input to the productive work of the G20. Thanks to the well-balanced and independent stance of recent Chairs (Indonesia, India, Brazil and now South Africa), we could advance a unifying agenda at the Forum and transform it into a major channel to enable equitable communication among the largest economies.

The cycle of the BRICS leaderships in the G20 coincided with the steady strengthening of its positions in economic affairs. Today, BRICS and G7’ shares in the global GDP are measured as 40 and 29 percent respectively.

The mounting influence of BRICS asserts it as a center for growth, innovation and one of the main pillars of a new and more just world order. Its principles of consensus, equality, mutual consideration of each other’s interests resonate with a growing number of countries in the Global South, which enhances the role of BRICS as a sort of “spokesperson” for the World Majority.

In the G20, increasing weight and consolidation of a new pole of power enabled to rectify the long-standing pro-Western bias, and to focus discussions on the needs of developing nations. Finally, what we have at the top of our agenda is the long overdue issues of how to make economic governance more democratic and eliminate the digital and technological divides between the Global North and South. Such problems as illegitimate sanctions and other methods of unfair competition alongside the failure of developed countries to deliver on their ODA commitments were accorded the attention they rightly deserved.

South African Presidency has predictably placed G20 emphasis on the African agenda – a step that we fully support. Amidst the alarming developments in the global economy, situation in African countries looks particularly precarious. They routinely have to deal with the aftermaths of colonialism, thriving neocolonial practices, and inequitable division of labor. Their takes at development and industrialization get hindered by proliferating protectionist barriers, unbearable borrowing costs, and draining of resources.

Together with like-minded partners, we take efforts to consolidate the achievements of the BRICS presidencies in the G20 and give a strong political impetus to overcoming the challenges faced by developing countries, especially in Africa. We suggest our colleagues consider providing a “permanent seat” for BRICS in the G20.

Africa will only benefit from boosting cooperation with BRICS as a conduit for the priorities of the Global South, including at major multilateral fora such as G20. BRICS membership now comprises South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia, who seek to promote both national objectives and pan-African agenda. Since 2025, Nigeria and Uganda have joined in as partner states. In addition, further enlargement of the New Development Bank through African shareholders seems rather promising.

The status of BRICS as a leading international format was vividly stressed at the Summits in Kazan in 2024 and in Rio de Janeiro this year. The key results of Russian and recent Brazilian chairmanships keep evolving. That includes initiatives for interbank cooperation and elaboration of independent settlement and insurance instruments. Also, broad support was given to our proposals on the new mechanisms of exchange trading, strengthening the resilience of supply chains and resistance to protectionism.

Both in Kazan and Rio de Janeiro, member states committed to building a more just, resilient, polycentric world order and putting an end to the Western dominance in the Bretton Woods institutions. We will continue to advance this common ground within the G20.

Russia is a responsible contributor to the development agenda, both bilaterally and at international venues. Our focus is on maximizing the potential of Russian-African partnership. Every year the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) serves as an acclaimed platform for promoting Africa’s interests. And again we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa Paul Mashatile for his participation in the event this year.

SPIEF’s distinguished stance is largely based on our competitive advantages in energy, digitalization and infrastructure, as well as extensive experience in terms of import substitution. We look forward to further fruitful cooperation and offer our African friends effective tools to enhance their economic sovereignty. In current difficult geopolitical situation sovereignty is the key to the true economic and political independence.