Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr Chairman,

I express my gratitude for this initiative, which is becoming a tradition – to conduct G20 ministerial meetings on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Our meeting is taking place in the year of two landmark anniversaries. Eighty years ago – with my country playing a pivotal role – German Nazism and Japanese militarism were defeated, with the People’s Republic of China making a particularly significant contribution to overcoming the latter. This Victory enabled the establishment of the United Nations, whose founding fathers charged it with the mission to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “promote social progress.” Reliance on the principles enshrined in the UN Charter in their entirety, comprehensiveness, and interrelationship guarantees peaceful, progressive development of all States without exception – both large and small.

Refusal to adhere to the principles of the Charter reveals neo-colonial ambitions, fuelling global instability and multiplying regional conflicts. For decades, numerous crises in Africa – many inherited from colonial times, when borders were drawn literally with a ruler and without regard for ethno-religious factors – have remained unresolved. Another glaring example is the crisis in Ukraine, provoked by the West, which NATO and the EU have transformed into a direct war against my country, actively participating in it. The escalation in the Middle East also fits this pattern. The unprecedented and horrific humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza has already claimed 65,000 lives. Some UN staff working in the region cite estimates suggesting casualties may be ten times higher. None of Israel’s neighbours can feel secure. We witness this daily.

In turn, unilateral economic sanctions – grossly violating the UN Charter – tariff wars, outright blackmail of international trade participants, and brazen breaches of WTO rules not only strike at the most vulnerable and unprotected groups of population but also pose a serious threat to the global economy through, inter alia, market fragmentation and supply chain disruptions.

This December we will mark the 65th anniversary of the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Clearly, genuine democratisation of the world order and global economic relations would serve humanity’s interests. The steadily increasing role and importance of such multilateral global governance structures as BRICS and the SCO signify the formation of a multipolar world and exemplify equitable diplomacy.

Even before its expansion, BRICS nations’ share of global GDP by purchasing power parity was twice that of the G7. At the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October 2024, specific proposals were put forward to establish new settlement infrastructure and independent exchange and investment mechanisms. Work has commenced on establishing the SCO development bank. These initiatives should enhance economic cooperation among the Global Majority nations, shielding them from unfair competition.

I would like to emphasise the vast potential of the G20. Its composition reflects contemporary geopolitical realities, encompassing both dynamic emerging centres of growth and influence, including BRICS states, and G7 countries. We urge the swift implementation of prior G20 agreements to amplify the roles of Global South and East nations in the IMF and World Bank, proportionate to their actual weight in global economy and finance. Revitalising the WTO as multilateral trade’s sole recognised regulator remains equally vital.

We maintain that the G20 must – as originally intended – focus on economic issues, avoiding entanglement in military and political agendas to the detriment of the prerogatives of the United Nations and its Security Council.

Mr Chairman,

South Africa’s G20 motto – “Ubuntu” – means “I am because we are”. In other words, it speaks of interconnectedness between the peoples. We hope that the upcoming G20 Summit in Johannesburg in November will send a powerful signal in line with this unifying philosophy and will become an important milestone in addressing numerous present-day challenges.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov participated in the meeting of BRICS foreign ministers, convened on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly High-level Week. As per established practice, the meeting was organised by the Indian side as the forthcoming chair of the group.

The ministers had a substantive exchange of views on a broad range of pressing international issues, including the agenda of the 80th Session of the UN General Assembly. They deliberated on matters related to the maintenance of peace and security, reforming the global governance system to enhance the representation of developing countries therein, and promoting sustainable development. The participants reaffirmed their commitment to bolstering coordination within BRICS across international platforms, grounded in the group’s commitment to multilateral principles and the goal of shaping a more equitable world order centred on the United Nations and anchored in international law.

Sergey Lavrov underscored the significance of jointly implementing practical initiatives launched during the Russian and Brazilian chairmanships, including the establishment of a new investment platform, the BRICS cross-border payment initiative, depository and clearing infrastructure, a reinsurance mechanism, and a BRICS grain exchange.

A joint communiqué was adopted following the meeting.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On September 26, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov convened a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil Mauro Vieira, on the sidelines of the 80th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York.
The parties addressed the current issues pertaining to the deepening of the Russian-Brazilian strategic partnership, alongside the implementation of a schedule for bilateral contacts at various levels.
In regards to the international agenda, the ministers explored avenues for fostering their cooperation within multilateral platforms, notably within the UN, BRICS – where Brazil holds the chairmanship this year – as well as in the G20.
Following to the meeting, a schedule of political consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil for 2026–2029 was signed.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Regionalism disenthralled: from platforms to global organizations

In writing about regionalism in global governance over the course of the past several years we primarily focused on the need to create platforms of cooperation between regional integration arrangements (and their respective development institutions) as well as cooperative links between these regional platforms and global organizations such as the WTO, IMF and the World Bank. In particular, we argued in favor of a platform for regional integration arrangements to work closely with the WTO on issues of trade liberalization, regional development banks to coordinate their policies and projects with the World Bank and the regional financing arrangements (RFAs) to cooperate with the IMF. While there has been some headway in this direction in recent periods (in particular due to the creation of the respective platform of the World Bank with the regional development banks in 2023), we believe there is scope to take the role of regionalism in global governance to a higher level. In what follows, we briefly explore the possible modalities of how regional integration arrangements and their development institutions could be integrated into the frameworks of the respective global institutions, including via full membership in such organizations alongside country members.
The first important thing to realize about regionalism in global organizations is that in virtually all key global economic forums – whether the WTO, the IMF or the G20 – regionalism is already very much present and is playing an increasingly important role. This is particularly the case with the EU that has a full membership status in the WTO as well as in the G20. Going forward, in expanding the role of regional arrangements in global organizations, one of the initial steps could be to explore the possibility of according the status held by the EU to other regional arrangements. This has already been the case with the granting of G20 membership to the African Union and the EU status as a regional bloc in this global forum provided a stronger rationale for such an expansion in G20 membership. 

As regards the G20, our call has been for the creation of a platform for regional integration arrangements in the form of a “regional 20” (R20) engagement group[1]. With the African Union becoming a member of the G20, there are now calls to explore the possibility of other regional blocs such as ASEAN, to target full membership in this global platform[2]. One possible way of approaching the issue of regionalism in the G20 would be to use the R20 (regional 20) engagement group as a way to establish the criteria for the expansion in G20 membership for regional arrangements. In any case, with the accession of the AU, the process of G20 membership expansion is unlikely to end, with other regional integration blocs seeking to emulate the experience and the position held by the EU and the AU.

In the case of the WTO, the membership of the EU creates scope for other regional integration arrangements in the form of a custom union to apply for WTO membership. Such regional blocs may include the likes of Mercosur and the Eurasian Economic Union, provided such regional blocs comply with the legal requirements and norms of the WTO, including notification requirements[3]. Going forward, the reform of the WTO in our view needs to be accompanied by an expansion in the modalities of the organization’s cooperation with RTAs, including the possibility of a forum/platform for such arrangements in the WTO, an observer/partnership/full membership status as well as the incorporation of RTAs into the design and the commitments drawn for the upcoming WTO trade liberalization rounds. In the longer term, when most of the leading RTAs are well on track in cooperating closely with the WTO on trade policy issues, there could be scope for launching “regional trade liberalization rounds” coordinated by these regional trading arrangements with the WTO on the basis of mutual market access commitments and their multilateralization.  

Within the IMF there is no full membership for the EU, but an observer status is accorded to the European Central Bank at the Executive Board discussions (on issues of mutual interest), while the European Commission has an observer status in the Fund’s IMFC meetings. The array of observers at the IMFC meetings could be expanded to include representatives of other regional blocs, particularly as they progress further the sphere of regional integration and macroeconomic/monetary policy coordination. There may also be a case for creating a partnership circle for the IMF that includes the regional financing arrangements (RFAs) that have regularly participated in the consultations/discussions with the Fund as part of the IMF’s outreach activities vis-à-vis such regional institutions[4]. The Fund could then in the longer term potentially consider creating “regional financing facilities” that co-finance/address issues of regional economic stability together with the relevant RFAs and member countries. 

In the case of the World Bank, while there is no special status secured by the EU, regional integration arrangements and/or their regional development banks could also be accorded observer/partnership status in the organization. There could also be a case for expanding the array of regional financing facilities by the World Bank – most notably in the environmental sphere where cross-country spillover effects raise the need for wider regional measures. Such financing facilities could be designed to finance regional projects together with the relevant regional development banks and in coordination with the regional integration arrangements. In making further strides towards building closer ties with regional institutions, the World Bank could make use of the already existing platform that since 2023 brought together the leading MDBs, including regional development banks[5].

The creation of layers of regional partnerships in key global economic institutions could serve to reduce the tensions between global and regional organizations, including with respect to contradictions in the conditionality faced by national economies from global and regional arrangements or complications associated with cross-conditionality. At the same time, a greater representation of regional arrangements in global organizations could raise the scale of coordination and resources that could be effectively deployed at the global and regional levels to address economic vulnerabilities and downturns. It could also address the incomplete state of the integration of regionalism into global institutions (primarily via the participation of the EU) and expand the scope for a greater representation of the Global South economies in global economic governance.

In the end, the regional layer of global governance could operate on the basis of horizontal platforms among regional arrangements as well as through their integration into the operation of global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO. Importantly, there is already a notable role and presence of regional arrangements in virtually all key global economic organizations. The task at hand is to focus on extending the position held by the EU to more regional arrangements in the WTO, the G20 and the Bretton Woods institutions. Such an integration of regional arrangements into global organizations should be conducive to forging greater connectivity between regionalism and globalism/multilateralism, reducing the likelihood of tensions between these two forces of international economic cooperation.

[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/connecting-g20-with-the-rest-of-the-world/
[2] https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/12/14/aseans-path-to-g20-membership/
[3] https://notifications.wto.org/en/notification-requirements/regional-trade-agreements
[4] https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/10/23/pr-24391-joint-imf-regional-financing-arrangements-pr-on-the-9th-high-level-rfas-dialogue
[5] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/imf-world-bank-annual-meetings-the-emergence-of-a-platform-for-mdbs/

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Greece
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

Imagine currencies flowing across invisible bridges—no longer slowed by borders, intermediaries, or the weight of dollar dominance. This is the vision behind mBridge, a multi-CBDC project built on a federated architecture and spearheaded by the central banks of China, Hong Kong, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and, most recently, Saudi Arabia. Its trials are not merely about testing faster cross-border transactions; they carry profound geopolitical resonance.

From Experiment to Geopolitical Tool

By mid-2024, mBridge had already reached a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) stage, proving that cross-border transactions using CBDCs can move from theory to practice. Four founding central banks established validator nodes, and commercial banks executed live transactions, while major Chinese banks like Bank of China also joined. This blend of public authority and private innovation demonstrates how mBridge is evolving into more than an experiment.

The project, launched through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) with founding members in Asia and the Gulf, expanded in 2024 when the Saudi Central Bank joined. Interoperability is central: mBridge has the potential to link with systems like Indonesia’s QRIS, India’s UPI, and Brazil’s Pix, offering the possibility of layering national gateways onto a shared global platform. Some reports, including commentary noted by Reuters in late 2024, have suggested that BIS may step back from the project. It raises questions about governance, neutrality, and long-term sustainability. This remains the author’s interpretation of how mBridge might evolve: as either a BRICS-driven initiative or a broader global framework.

Dunbar, Jura, and Why mBridge Stands Out

Other federated CBDC experiments exist. The Dunbar Project, led by BIS with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa, built a prototype for multi-CBDC settlements, though governance questions remain. The Jura Project, run by Banque de France and the Swiss National Bank, showed cross-border wholesale transfers between the Euro and Swiss Franc, but on a narrow regional scale.
These initiatives demonstrate feasibility. But mBridge is best positioned to scale because it is backed by BRICS economies, combining geopolitical weight with massive domestic markets. BRICS members already run robust payment systems like QRIS, UPI, and Pix, which could be layered onto mBridge. Just as crucially, these countries need innovative systems to reach millions who remain unbanked—giving mBridge both supply and demand power.

Visa, Mastercard, and the Global Stakes

The inclusion of Visa and Mastercard could redefine mBridge’s future. Their global networks cover billions of consumers, enabling CBDCs to move quickly from state-led pilots to everyday payments. They also bring expertise in fraud prevention, scalability, and value-added services like digital identity and loyalty programs. Their presence could also weaken reliance on the U.S. dollar and SWIFT, offering the Global South greater autonomy in trade.

Yet challenges loom. Visa and Mastercard’s fee-based business models may erode as CBDCs allow direct settlements. Sovereignty concerns will rise as BRICS nations prioritize national systems over external players. Privacy and regulatory compliance will demand careful balancing, especially given the firms’ history of data collection. And entrenched powers defending the dollar’s dominance and SWIFT’s legacy role may resist change. Above all, mass adoption remains uncertain—requiring trust, incentives, and infrastructure.

Inclusion, Efficiency, and the Digital Economy Ahead

CBDCs promise not just faster payments but broader financial inclusion. Mobile-based access can reach the 1.6 billion unbanked worldwide, while reducing remittance costs for migrant workers in Asia and Africa. For the Global South, the stakes are practical and immediate.

Looking forward, mBridge could become the settlement backbone for the digital economy. As NFTs, in-game assets, virtual real estate, intellectual property, and carbon credits are traded across borders, demand for a trusted, real-time settlement system will grow. Current rails are siloed and costly; a federated CBDC like mBridge could clear digital trade globally.

Examples are already visible:

• In Southeast Asia, gaming economies generate billions as players trade digital items across borders. A federated CBDC could provide the backbone to scale these markets.
• In Africa, digital art and design services face hurdles in international payments. A trusted CBDC system could pay creators instantly and fairly.
• In Latin America, carbon credit trading is emerging. Embedding settlement in a CBDC framework could make these green markets more credible and liquid.

Bridging the Global South and North

Institutions such as Brookings and Chatham House have highlighted that CBDCs should serve as tools of efficiency while also fostering global cooperation. Brookings has argued for interoperable standards and inclusive governance frameworks, while Chatham House stresses balancing innovation with systemic stability. Embedding these principles into mBridge could transform it into more than a BRICS-led initiative: it could become a platform for dialogue between the Global South and North. The South contributes innovation and inclusion, while the North offers regulatory safeguards and governance experience—creating co-ownership rather than confrontation.
Closing Reflection

mBridge is more than a technical milestone—it is a geopolitical trial. It shows how the Global South can design infrastructures that accelerate transactions, expand inclusion, and challenge financial orthodoxies. If successful, it could rebalance who writes the rules of global finance—placing cities like Beijing, Bangkok, Jakarta, São Paulo, and Nairobi alongside New York and London.

The choice ahead is stark. Will mBridge become a bridge of collaboration or another frontier of polarization? Policymakers must decide whether to build shared systems that deliver inclusion—or cling to old rivalries that preserve the dollar’s dominance and SWIFT’s control. As Brookings and Chatham House suggest, cooperative governance offers the best chance to make mBridge a genuine bridge—not just for currencies, but for dialogue between South and North.

South Africa
Source: Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations on the margins of 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, BRICS Joint Media Statement, 26 September 2025