Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Issue 41.2025
2025.10.06 — 2025.10.12
International relations
Foreign policy in the context of BRICS
How BRICS got its name (Как БРИКС получил свое название) / United Kingdom, October, 2025
Keywords: expert_opinion
2025-10-10
2025-10-10
United Kingdom
Source: www.bbc.com
Available for over a year
In 2001, a few months after 9/11, economist Jim O’Neill was working at Goldman Sachs when he wrote a report about which countries might become big players in the world economy.
That’s when he came up with the name BRIC - short for Brazil, Russia, India and China.
At first, nothing much happened.
But in 2009, those countries took his idea and ran with it, holding their first summit.
Since then, the group has grown, adding South Africa to form BRICS.
There are now 11 members, and it’s been making headlines again, as U.S President Donald Trump threatens tariffs.
Jim O’Neill speaks to Megan Jones about coming up with the acronym almost by accident and how he didn’t think he’d still be talking about it almost 25 years later.
Eye-witness accounts brought to life by archive. Witness History is for those fascinated by the past. We take you to the events that have shaped our world through the eyes of the people who were there.
For nine minutes every day, we take you back in time and all over the world, to examine wars, coups, scientific discoveries, cultural moments and much more.
Recent episodes explore everything from the death of Adolf Hitler, the first spacewalk and the making of the movie Jaws, to celebrity tortoise Lonesome George, the Kobe earthquake and the invention of superglue.
We look at the lives of some of the most famous leaders, artists, scientists and personalities in history, including: Eva Peron – Argentina’s Evita; President Ronald Reagan and his famous ‘tear down this wall’ speech; Thomas Keneally on why he wrote Schindler’s List; and Jacques Derrida, France’s ‘rock star’ philosopher.
You can learn all about fascinating and surprising stories, such as the civil rights swimming protest; the disastrous D-Day rehearsal; and the death of one of the world’s oldest languages.
(Photo: Jim O'Neill. Credit: Jim O'Neill)
Source: www.bbc.com
Available for over a year
In 2001, a few months after 9/11, economist Jim O’Neill was working at Goldman Sachs when he wrote a report about which countries might become big players in the world economy.
That’s when he came up with the name BRIC - short for Brazil, Russia, India and China.
At first, nothing much happened.
But in 2009, those countries took his idea and ran with it, holding their first summit.
Since then, the group has grown, adding South Africa to form BRICS.
There are now 11 members, and it’s been making headlines again, as U.S President Donald Trump threatens tariffs.
Jim O’Neill speaks to Megan Jones about coming up with the acronym almost by accident and how he didn’t think he’d still be talking about it almost 25 years later.
Eye-witness accounts brought to life by archive. Witness History is for those fascinated by the past. We take you to the events that have shaped our world through the eyes of the people who were there.
For nine minutes every day, we take you back in time and all over the world, to examine wars, coups, scientific discoveries, cultural moments and much more.
Recent episodes explore everything from the death of Adolf Hitler, the first spacewalk and the making of the movie Jaws, to celebrity tortoise Lonesome George, the Kobe earthquake and the invention of superglue.
We look at the lives of some of the most famous leaders, artists, scientists and personalities in history, including: Eva Peron – Argentina’s Evita; President Ronald Reagan and his famous ‘tear down this wall’ speech; Thomas Keneally on why he wrote Schindler’s List; and Jacques Derrida, France’s ‘rock star’ philosopher.
You can learn all about fascinating and surprising stories, such as the civil rights swimming protest; the disastrous D-Day rehearsal; and the death of one of the world’s oldest languages.
(Photo: Jim O'Neill. Credit: Jim O'Neill)
Why the West Should Take BRICS+ Seriously (But Not Literally) (Почему Западу следует воспринимать БРИКС+ серьезно (но не буквально)) / USA, October, 2025
Keywords: brics+, expert_opinion
2025-10-09
2025-10-09
USA
Source: thediplomat.com
The BRICS countries (henceforth BRICS+) have received growing attention and visibility in international discourses over recent years – in part due to intensifying geopolitical fissures between select members of the grouping and the proverbial “West,” and in part because of a series of expansions that resulted in the bloc doubling in size.
After the 17th BRICS Summit in Brazil in July 2025, BRICS+ expanded to ten full members: the original Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the newly incorporated Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and Nigeria. With 10 further countries as partners, the grouping appears to have been transformed from a loose acronym into something closer to a political brand, though the substance and value of what it apparently offers remains to be seen.
With major energy exporters such as UAE and Iran now inside the tent, alongside emerging economies like Egypt and Indonesia, BRICS+ has achieved a scale that commands attention. The recent signs of a tentative thaw between India and China only add to the bloc’s diplomatic weight, which now represents 56 percent of the world’s population and 44 percent of global GDP.
When Western leaders and policymakers dismiss BRICS+ as little more than a geopolitical vanity project of China and Russia, they risk repeating the error many analysts tend to make: writing off the rhetoric as mere bluster and overlooking the substance beneath it. The correct approach is to take BRICS+ seriously, albeit not literally.
The temptation is to laugh off BRICS+ communiques about de-dollarization or the birth of a “multipolar world order.” The gap between rhetoric and reality is indeed vast, but that does not make the grouping irrelevant. If anything, the danger is the opposite: that Western governments, lulled by a mixture of skepticism and comfortable hubris, miscalculate and are caught off guard when experiments begun in the name of symbolism yield practical innovations.
Three Emerging Clusters
As it stands, the bloc has demonstrated growing interest and influence in three areas.
First, its members collectively command enormous shares of renewable energy supply chains and critical minerals, from rare earths to core ingredients for EV batteries, such as cobalt and nickel. Brazil has the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves, while Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel – a vital component of batteries and stainless steel. The idea of coordinating policies around these resources is no longer theoretical, but was laid out in the Rio de Janeiro Declaration.
As the world transitions toward renewable energy, pay attention to who can extract substantial dividends from a commanding lead in the most ubiquitous technologies. While the United States’ transformative innovation with fracking proved to be a game-changer for its geopolitical ambit in the second decade of the 21st century, the overt weaponization of rare earths by China has proved effective in bringing U.S. negotiators to the table, whether over trade terms and investment securitization. These resources will prove to be increasingly relevant as critical stockpiling becomes a core tool and focus of national security for countries across the world.
Yet even with the incumbent White House pressing full speed ahead with bolstering U.S. mineral production, vast swathes of the European Union and Anglophone countries that are not Australia or the United States remain fundamentally exposed and dependent upon external parties for their mineral supply chain. For these countries, stockpiling and amassing rare earths will demand that they do not put all their eggs in one basket. Engaging countries within BRICS+, especially those that have shown relative openness to economically lucrative partnerships with a wide range of geopolitical interest groups, such as Indonesia and Brazil, could well be key. Diversification, as opposed to disproportionate dependence upon any particular country, is vital.
Second, BRICS+ countries are experimenting with alternatives to the dollar-centric financial order, from cross-border payment systems to local currency settlements.
As it stands, of course, less than 5 percent of transactions through SWIFT are settled in local currencies – small in scale but meaningful as proof of concept. There is sound ground to think that no conventional currency, issued by any central bank within BRICS+, will step up to providing a meaningful substitute for the U.S. dollar. Yet this would be a misplaced expectation concerning the prospective pathway for de-dollarization.
The ideal end-state among BRICS+ technocrats, especially those in Iran and Russia, is not so much one where any BRICS+ currency – or a common currency, for that matter, which remains distantly in the pipeline and apparently infeasible – becomes the “new USD.” Instead, it is a financially multipolar world with increasing volumes of the Japanese yen, the euro, the British pound sterling, as well as offshore Chinese yuan, cryptocurrencies, and even (digitalized) gold as units of transaction. The manifestation of a plurality of choices would significantly reduce the collective dependence of the bloc on the USD, as well as justifying the appeal and case for the BRICS Pay system – a platform that could considerably augment the mBridge model in providing a viable alternative to SWIFT.
Third, the grouping has shown growing capacity for collective maneuvering in multilateral bodies, where coordinated voting patterns amplify grievances of the Global South. With only 13.24 percent of the voting rights in the World Bank, BRICS+ countries have a long way to go within existing multilateral institutions. The disproportionality between their economic and geopolitical heft, and their level of (under-)representation at the “table” creates friction points that the West cannot ignore.
As countries that have been more conventionally overlooked within BRICS+ as geopolitical players, the two African members of BRICS+, Egypt and Ethiopia, will have an important role to play tackling global challenges such as food and water shortages, regional and developmental inequalities, and even climate change. As evidenced by negotiations over the future of Gaza in recent months, Egypt is keen to play a mediating role, as is the UAE, in navigating the geopolitical faultlines between the West and the Arab World.
Calling In, as Opposed to Calling Out
It would also be a mistake to view BRICS+ through a purely adversarial lens. For many of its members, the point is not to choose sides but to maximize options.
To cite one example, India is interested in deepening security and technology ties with the United States, even as its leadership invests political capital in BRICS+. The recent Sino-Indian thaw, apparently depicted by the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in late August came with clear caveats: Modi did not attend the virtual BRICS+ meeting that immediately followed his trip to China, instead sending External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in his place. Nor did Modi stay in Beijing to attend the military parade that followed just days after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. India wants to calibrate and moderate the message being sent to Western audiences.
Additionally, Gulf members remain closely embedded in Western financial and defense networks, while seeing value in joining BRICS+, a club that increases their exposure to multilateral governance discourse.
Indeed, beyond values and rhetorical statements that few would find questionable, there is no robust, coherent vision for BRICS+, much less core answers regarding disputes within the bloc, from the Saudi-Iranian schism to long-standing territorial disputes between China and India. This noticeable gap points to the fact that the BRICS+ is much looser and more amorphously defined than the European Union or even ASEAN.
For many in the Global South, BRICS+ is therefore not a rival to the West, but a means of generating more leverage and bargaining capital. It would be a mistake for the West to at once hype up the “threat” that emerges from BRICS+ while neglecting the clear messages emitted by a vast majority of developing countries: they are not interested in taking sides, though are interested in talk that does not manifest as lectures, and deals that result in real fruition.
For the West to navigate the era of an increasingly potent BRICS+, three shifts would be crucial.
The first is to separate signal from noise. BRICS+ statements are often deliberately loud, crafted as much for domestic consumption as for international audiences. Yet behind the theatrics lie real innovations that deserve monitoring: the establishment of the BRICS Pay initiative that bypasses SWIFT, the growing role of the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank) in developmental financing, and nascent discussions of coordinating energy security and resource policies. Dismissing the rhetoric without tracking these developments is an invitation to be surprised later.
Building up BRICS+ expertise – namely, individuals who understand and track financial, energy, and technological movements across these countries – is an imperative. When in doubt, remember that those who nonchalantly disparaged and cast doubt over China’s ability to manufacture high-quality EVs at the dawn of the century have since been proven wrong in the starkest of ways, by the unfolding events on the ground.
The second is to take stock of both the risks and benefits of BRICS+ emerging as a convening platform. The risks are obvious: financial fragmentation, resource nationalism, or new forms of bloc politics that result in further escalation in geopolitical fissures. Yet there are also potential upsides, from expanded financing options for climate infrastructure to avenues for collaboration on South-South technology transfer.
Western governments must avoid the reflex of seeing BRICS+ purely as a spoiler or challenge. They must also consider where the grouping might complement global public goods – such as around food security and the energy transition, and where engagement could steer constructive experiments, especially at a time when climate change is not universally acknowledged to be a salient global governance priority by all national leaders.
The third, and arguably most important, is to develop a roadmap for engagement that calls BRICS+ members “in” rather than calls them “out.” Many of the countries involved are indeed Western partners with no interest in being conscripted into a binary competition. The West should avoid condescension that alienates them, and instead emphasize areas of shared interest – from green investment to pandemic preparedness – that allow dual participation in Western and BRICS+ initiatives. Value-centric preaching only goes so far before it becomes sterile, and falls on deaf ears. Such pragmatism respects agency while reinforcing global institutions.
Taken together, these shifts amount to a key test of Western adaptability and, frankly, statecraft.
Rather than forcing BRICS+ members to quit or withdraw from a bloc that has thus far delivered limited results, albeit one with significant promise, a more constructive option would be to heed their desire for options, and engage and work with those among BRICS+ who have not signed onto overtly antagonistic projects aimed at undermining Western territorial integrity or national interests. It would be erroneous to conflate the stance of one or two BRICS+ members with the stance of the bloc as a whole; it would be tragic if such conflation ended up producing a self-fulfilling prophecy – though geopolitical strategists and leaders are by no means above a natural predisposition to err, under the lethal mixture of fear, arrogance, and naivete.
Source: thediplomat.com
The BRICS countries (henceforth BRICS+) have received growing attention and visibility in international discourses over recent years – in part due to intensifying geopolitical fissures between select members of the grouping and the proverbial “West,” and in part because of a series of expansions that resulted in the bloc doubling in size.
After the 17th BRICS Summit in Brazil in July 2025, BRICS+ expanded to ten full members: the original Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the newly incorporated Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and Nigeria. With 10 further countries as partners, the grouping appears to have been transformed from a loose acronym into something closer to a political brand, though the substance and value of what it apparently offers remains to be seen.
With major energy exporters such as UAE and Iran now inside the tent, alongside emerging economies like Egypt and Indonesia, BRICS+ has achieved a scale that commands attention. The recent signs of a tentative thaw between India and China only add to the bloc’s diplomatic weight, which now represents 56 percent of the world’s population and 44 percent of global GDP.
When Western leaders and policymakers dismiss BRICS+ as little more than a geopolitical vanity project of China and Russia, they risk repeating the error many analysts tend to make: writing off the rhetoric as mere bluster and overlooking the substance beneath it. The correct approach is to take BRICS+ seriously, albeit not literally.
The temptation is to laugh off BRICS+ communiques about de-dollarization or the birth of a “multipolar world order.” The gap between rhetoric and reality is indeed vast, but that does not make the grouping irrelevant. If anything, the danger is the opposite: that Western governments, lulled by a mixture of skepticism and comfortable hubris, miscalculate and are caught off guard when experiments begun in the name of symbolism yield practical innovations.
Three Emerging Clusters
As it stands, the bloc has demonstrated growing interest and influence in three areas.
First, its members collectively command enormous shares of renewable energy supply chains and critical minerals, from rare earths to core ingredients for EV batteries, such as cobalt and nickel. Brazil has the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves, while Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel – a vital component of batteries and stainless steel. The idea of coordinating policies around these resources is no longer theoretical, but was laid out in the Rio de Janeiro Declaration.
As the world transitions toward renewable energy, pay attention to who can extract substantial dividends from a commanding lead in the most ubiquitous technologies. While the United States’ transformative innovation with fracking proved to be a game-changer for its geopolitical ambit in the second decade of the 21st century, the overt weaponization of rare earths by China has proved effective in bringing U.S. negotiators to the table, whether over trade terms and investment securitization. These resources will prove to be increasingly relevant as critical stockpiling becomes a core tool and focus of national security for countries across the world.
Yet even with the incumbent White House pressing full speed ahead with bolstering U.S. mineral production, vast swathes of the European Union and Anglophone countries that are not Australia or the United States remain fundamentally exposed and dependent upon external parties for their mineral supply chain. For these countries, stockpiling and amassing rare earths will demand that they do not put all their eggs in one basket. Engaging countries within BRICS+, especially those that have shown relative openness to economically lucrative partnerships with a wide range of geopolitical interest groups, such as Indonesia and Brazil, could well be key. Diversification, as opposed to disproportionate dependence upon any particular country, is vital.
Second, BRICS+ countries are experimenting with alternatives to the dollar-centric financial order, from cross-border payment systems to local currency settlements.
As it stands, of course, less than 5 percent of transactions through SWIFT are settled in local currencies – small in scale but meaningful as proof of concept. There is sound ground to think that no conventional currency, issued by any central bank within BRICS+, will step up to providing a meaningful substitute for the U.S. dollar. Yet this would be a misplaced expectation concerning the prospective pathway for de-dollarization.
The ideal end-state among BRICS+ technocrats, especially those in Iran and Russia, is not so much one where any BRICS+ currency – or a common currency, for that matter, which remains distantly in the pipeline and apparently infeasible – becomes the “new USD.” Instead, it is a financially multipolar world with increasing volumes of the Japanese yen, the euro, the British pound sterling, as well as offshore Chinese yuan, cryptocurrencies, and even (digitalized) gold as units of transaction. The manifestation of a plurality of choices would significantly reduce the collective dependence of the bloc on the USD, as well as justifying the appeal and case for the BRICS Pay system – a platform that could considerably augment the mBridge model in providing a viable alternative to SWIFT.
Third, the grouping has shown growing capacity for collective maneuvering in multilateral bodies, where coordinated voting patterns amplify grievances of the Global South. With only 13.24 percent of the voting rights in the World Bank, BRICS+ countries have a long way to go within existing multilateral institutions. The disproportionality between their economic and geopolitical heft, and their level of (under-)representation at the “table” creates friction points that the West cannot ignore.
As countries that have been more conventionally overlooked within BRICS+ as geopolitical players, the two African members of BRICS+, Egypt and Ethiopia, will have an important role to play tackling global challenges such as food and water shortages, regional and developmental inequalities, and even climate change. As evidenced by negotiations over the future of Gaza in recent months, Egypt is keen to play a mediating role, as is the UAE, in navigating the geopolitical faultlines between the West and the Arab World.
Calling In, as Opposed to Calling Out
It would also be a mistake to view BRICS+ through a purely adversarial lens. For many of its members, the point is not to choose sides but to maximize options.
To cite one example, India is interested in deepening security and technology ties with the United States, even as its leadership invests political capital in BRICS+. The recent Sino-Indian thaw, apparently depicted by the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in late August came with clear caveats: Modi did not attend the virtual BRICS+ meeting that immediately followed his trip to China, instead sending External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in his place. Nor did Modi stay in Beijing to attend the military parade that followed just days after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. India wants to calibrate and moderate the message being sent to Western audiences.
Additionally, Gulf members remain closely embedded in Western financial and defense networks, while seeing value in joining BRICS+, a club that increases their exposure to multilateral governance discourse.
Indeed, beyond values and rhetorical statements that few would find questionable, there is no robust, coherent vision for BRICS+, much less core answers regarding disputes within the bloc, from the Saudi-Iranian schism to long-standing territorial disputes between China and India. This noticeable gap points to the fact that the BRICS+ is much looser and more amorphously defined than the European Union or even ASEAN.
For many in the Global South, BRICS+ is therefore not a rival to the West, but a means of generating more leverage and bargaining capital. It would be a mistake for the West to at once hype up the “threat” that emerges from BRICS+ while neglecting the clear messages emitted by a vast majority of developing countries: they are not interested in taking sides, though are interested in talk that does not manifest as lectures, and deals that result in real fruition.
For the West to navigate the era of an increasingly potent BRICS+, three shifts would be crucial.
The first is to separate signal from noise. BRICS+ statements are often deliberately loud, crafted as much for domestic consumption as for international audiences. Yet behind the theatrics lie real innovations that deserve monitoring: the establishment of the BRICS Pay initiative that bypasses SWIFT, the growing role of the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank) in developmental financing, and nascent discussions of coordinating energy security and resource policies. Dismissing the rhetoric without tracking these developments is an invitation to be surprised later.
Building up BRICS+ expertise – namely, individuals who understand and track financial, energy, and technological movements across these countries – is an imperative. When in doubt, remember that those who nonchalantly disparaged and cast doubt over China’s ability to manufacture high-quality EVs at the dawn of the century have since been proven wrong in the starkest of ways, by the unfolding events on the ground.
The second is to take stock of both the risks and benefits of BRICS+ emerging as a convening platform. The risks are obvious: financial fragmentation, resource nationalism, or new forms of bloc politics that result in further escalation in geopolitical fissures. Yet there are also potential upsides, from expanded financing options for climate infrastructure to avenues for collaboration on South-South technology transfer.
Western governments must avoid the reflex of seeing BRICS+ purely as a spoiler or challenge. They must also consider where the grouping might complement global public goods – such as around food security and the energy transition, and where engagement could steer constructive experiments, especially at a time when climate change is not universally acknowledged to be a salient global governance priority by all national leaders.
The third, and arguably most important, is to develop a roadmap for engagement that calls BRICS+ members “in” rather than calls them “out.” Many of the countries involved are indeed Western partners with no interest in being conscripted into a binary competition. The West should avoid condescension that alienates them, and instead emphasize areas of shared interest – from green investment to pandemic preparedness – that allow dual participation in Western and BRICS+ initiatives. Value-centric preaching only goes so far before it becomes sterile, and falls on deaf ears. Such pragmatism respects agency while reinforcing global institutions.
Taken together, these shifts amount to a key test of Western adaptability and, frankly, statecraft.
Rather than forcing BRICS+ members to quit or withdraw from a bloc that has thus far delivered limited results, albeit one with significant promise, a more constructive option would be to heed their desire for options, and engage and work with those among BRICS+ who have not signed onto overtly antagonistic projects aimed at undermining Western territorial integrity or national interests. It would be erroneous to conflate the stance of one or two BRICS+ members with the stance of the bloc as a whole; it would be tragic if such conflation ended up producing a self-fulfilling prophecy – though geopolitical strategists and leaders are by no means above a natural predisposition to err, under the lethal mixture of fear, arrogance, and naivete.
Opinion | Why New Zealand joining Brics makes sense in Trump’s ‘America-first’ era (Мнение | Почему присоединение Новой Зеландии к БРИКС имеет смысл в эпоху Трампа «Америка прежде всего») / China, October, 2025
Keywords: brics+, expert_opinion, New Zealand
2025-10-12
2025-10-12
China
Source: www.scmp.com
With the old global order in a heightened state of flux, driven by US President Donald Trump’s attacks on free trade, international organisations and human rights, small states like New Zealand are having to adjust their foreign policies and hedge their bets.
As long-term economic and diplomatic power shifts towards Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, alternative multilateral groups are now growing in importance.
Foremost among these is the grouping known as Brics, a maturing – and potentially dominant – centre of global economic power. Whether New Zealand would consider joining is still moot, but the forum already includes major nations vital to the country’s future.
Formed in September 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, the grouping had its first summit in June 2009, with South Africa joining in December 2010 – thus becoming Brics.
The core strategic logic of Brics is based on consensus and solidarity, not coercion, and to gain member benefits via collective strength. “We share the vision of inclusive growth and prosperity in the world,” as then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh put it in 2009. “We stand for a rule-based, stable and predictable global order.”
Having substantial economies, populations, landmasses and ambitions underpinned this shared goal of a multipolar world, which now seems to be emerging by a different route due to Trump’s isolationist “America first” policies.
Strength in numbers
In 2012, motivated by mutual concerns over food and energy security, terrorism and climate change, Brics members signed the Delhi Declaration, stating: “we envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress … [with] strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance.”
In 2013, Brics launched the New Development Bank, designed to progressively reform the world’s financial architecture after the global financial crisis of 2008.
Seeking to fund sustainable development and infrastructure projects in developing states, the bank now rivals older Western-based institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Xi issues rallying call against protectionism in Brics speech
The rising significance of Brics has been accelerated by its recent expansion. In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates all became members, as did Indonesia earlier this year.
Argentina had also agreed to join in 2024 but then pulled out due to the election of its US-orientated populist president Javier Milei.
The expansion saw Brics’ share of the global economy rise to 39 per cent in 2023. Member states now account for 48.5 per cent of the planet’s population and 36 per cent of total global territory.
Brics also accounts for around 72 per cent of the world’s reserves of rare earth minerals, 43.6 per cent of global oil production, 36 per cent of natural gas production and 78.2 per cent of coal production.
By such measures, Brics is an economic and diplomatic powerhouse. In economic terms, it has been outranking the Group of Seven countries – the US, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy and Canada – since around 2019.
An alternative, not a choice
Diplomatically, Brics members pledge to better synchronise their national policies by meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, IMF, World Bank and G20 summits.
Joining such a body provides an attractive way for countries to enhance their trade and diplomatic bandwidth, as well as hedge against US-inspired instability.
Joining Brics also comes with potential risks, of course. Any perception of traditional Western alliance systems being undercut could see aid and investment reduce. So far, however, Trump’s threat to impose an extra 10 per cent trade tariff on any countries aligned with Brics is yet to materialise.
But as economist Stephen Onyeiwu has written, with the exception of Russia and Iran, most of the countries and partners in Brics are either allies of Western countries or neutral on global issues. They are unlikely to support decisions or actions that are grossly inimical to Western interests.
Given the current geopolitical situation, New Zealand may well balk at closer ties with Russia and Iran. But being inside the forum would also allow diplomatic opportunities to press other member states over their actions or policies.
In fact, New Zealand – along with many US allies – joined the Beijing-inspired Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and signed a free-trade agreement with China in 2008. It didn’t suffer any adverse consequences.
New Brics members can be invited or make a formal request to apply, which is then considered at the next Brics annual summit. Or they can apply to be a partner country, which is akin to “observer” status.
This allows them to take part in special summits and foreign minister meetings, as well as contribute to official documents and policy statements. But they can’t host meetings or select new members and partners.
Most importantly, joining Brics would not mean New Zealand needs to leave other multilateral institutions.
Rather, it would be a pragmatic way for Wellington to spread its diplomatic wings and prepare for a future in which Asia and the Indo-Pacific – already the world’s largest economic and military region – will only become more powerful.
Chris Ogden is an Associate Professor in Global Studies at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. This article was first published by The Conversation.
Source: www.scmp.com
With the old global order in a heightened state of flux, driven by US President Donald Trump’s attacks on free trade, international organisations and human rights, small states like New Zealand are having to adjust their foreign policies and hedge their bets.
As long-term economic and diplomatic power shifts towards Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, alternative multilateral groups are now growing in importance.
Foremost among these is the grouping known as Brics, a maturing – and potentially dominant – centre of global economic power. Whether New Zealand would consider joining is still moot, but the forum already includes major nations vital to the country’s future.
Formed in September 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, the grouping had its first summit in June 2009, with South Africa joining in December 2010 – thus becoming Brics.
The core strategic logic of Brics is based on consensus and solidarity, not coercion, and to gain member benefits via collective strength. “We share the vision of inclusive growth and prosperity in the world,” as then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh put it in 2009. “We stand for a rule-based, stable and predictable global order.”
Having substantial economies, populations, landmasses and ambitions underpinned this shared goal of a multipolar world, which now seems to be emerging by a different route due to Trump’s isolationist “America first” policies.
Strength in numbers
In 2012, motivated by mutual concerns over food and energy security, terrorism and climate change, Brics members signed the Delhi Declaration, stating: “we envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress … [with] strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance.”
In 2013, Brics launched the New Development Bank, designed to progressively reform the world’s financial architecture after the global financial crisis of 2008.
Seeking to fund sustainable development and infrastructure projects in developing states, the bank now rivals older Western-based institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Xi issues rallying call against protectionism in Brics speech
The rising significance of Brics has been accelerated by its recent expansion. In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates all became members, as did Indonesia earlier this year.
Argentina had also agreed to join in 2024 but then pulled out due to the election of its US-orientated populist president Javier Milei.
The expansion saw Brics’ share of the global economy rise to 39 per cent in 2023. Member states now account for 48.5 per cent of the planet’s population and 36 per cent of total global territory.
Brics also accounts for around 72 per cent of the world’s reserves of rare earth minerals, 43.6 per cent of global oil production, 36 per cent of natural gas production and 78.2 per cent of coal production.
By such measures, Brics is an economic and diplomatic powerhouse. In economic terms, it has been outranking the Group of Seven countries – the US, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy and Canada – since around 2019.
An alternative, not a choice
Diplomatically, Brics members pledge to better synchronise their national policies by meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, IMF, World Bank and G20 summits.
Joining such a body provides an attractive way for countries to enhance their trade and diplomatic bandwidth, as well as hedge against US-inspired instability.
Joining Brics also comes with potential risks, of course. Any perception of traditional Western alliance systems being undercut could see aid and investment reduce. So far, however, Trump’s threat to impose an extra 10 per cent trade tariff on any countries aligned with Brics is yet to materialise.
But as economist Stephen Onyeiwu has written, with the exception of Russia and Iran, most of the countries and partners in Brics are either allies of Western countries or neutral on global issues. They are unlikely to support decisions or actions that are grossly inimical to Western interests.
Given the current geopolitical situation, New Zealand may well balk at closer ties with Russia and Iran. But being inside the forum would also allow diplomatic opportunities to press other member states over their actions or policies.
In fact, New Zealand – along with many US allies – joined the Beijing-inspired Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and signed a free-trade agreement with China in 2008. It didn’t suffer any adverse consequences.
New Brics members can be invited or make a formal request to apply, which is then considered at the next Brics annual summit. Or they can apply to be a partner country, which is akin to “observer” status.
This allows them to take part in special summits and foreign minister meetings, as well as contribute to official documents and policy statements. But they can’t host meetings or select new members and partners.
Most importantly, joining Brics would not mean New Zealand needs to leave other multilateral institutions.
Rather, it would be a pragmatic way for Wellington to spread its diplomatic wings and prepare for a future in which Asia and the Indo-Pacific – already the world’s largest economic and military region – will only become more powerful.
Chris Ogden is an Associate Professor in Global Studies at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. This article was first published by The Conversation.
Investment and Finance
Investment and finance in BRICS
When Will BRICS Currency Be Released? What We Know So Far (Когда будет выпущена валюта БРИКС? Что известно на данный момент) / St. Vincent and the Grenadines, October, 2025
Keywords: brics+, economic_challenges, expert_opinion
2025-10-13
2025-10-13
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Source: www.ebc.com
When Will BRICS Currency Be Released? What We Know So Far
At the July 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio, leaders confirmed that no joint currency would be launched in the near term. Instead, they prioritized expanding local-currency trade and developing BRICS Pay, a cross-border payment platform.
Experts suggest any euro-style BRICS currency is at least a decade away, given the need for political alignment, fiscal stability, and central bank cooperation. Traders should watch for incremental steps, such as swap-line agreements, CBDC pilots, and settlement in yuan and rupees, as the real “first phase” of BRICS monetary integration.
Below is an up-to-date assessment of the project, why delays persist, and what traders should watch next.
July 2025 Summit Overview
The 17th BRICS summit, hosted by Brazil on 6–7 July 2025, drew intense speculation that a launch date might finally emerge. Instead, leaders delivered a familiar message: closer monetary co-operation, yes; a single currency, not yet.
Key outcomes:
Bloomberg captured the mood with a telling headline on 6 July: “The decade-old local-currency push by BRICS is still a pipe dream.”
Membership Changes: BRICS Expands to 11 Members
Indonesia formally joined the group on 6 January 2025, and Saudi Arabia completed its accession in mid-2025, bringing total full membership to eleven :
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
New "Partner Country" Tier Created
At the January 2025 expansion, BRICS also established a second tier of 10 partner countries that participate in summits and working groups but lack full voting rights :
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
This two-tier structure allows broader engagement while preserving decision-making authority among core members. Over 30 additional nations have expressed interest in joining, signalling BRICS' growing appeal as a counterweight to Western-dominated institutions.
Impact on Currency Prospects
The larger bloc strengthens collective trade heft—the BRICS-11 now represents approximately 46% of the global population and over 36% of global GDP at purchasing-power parity. However, expansion adds even more complexity to any monetary union.
GDP sizes now range from China's $18 trillion economy to Ethiopia's $156 billion, while inflation rates and fiscal regimes vary even more widely than before, further complicating the already distant prospect of currency convergence.
Local-Currency Trade: Progress and Regional Variations
While a single currency remains distant, intra-BRICS trade is increasingly dollar-free. According to data released at the July summit, about 90% of commerce among BRICS nations is now settled in local currencies, up from roughly 65% two years ago. This sharp jump reflects:
However, the 90% figure largely reflects Russia's reported share and stronger yuan-ruble corridors; not every BRICS bilateral pair has reached this level. Independent metrics vary by corridor, but the trend toward local settlement is clear and accelerating.
For traders, the shift creates new liquidity pockets in EMFX pairs and reduces outright USD demand in certain commodity invoices. Notably, the ruble appreciated 45% against the dollar and 25% against the yuan through 2025, an unexpected development driven partly by capital controls and energy-export strength.
BRICS Pay: Timeline Extended to 2030
First proposed in 2019, BRICS Pay aims to link national fast-payment networks and eventually support CBDC transfers. Contrary to earlier rumours, the platform is not live.
While Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in Rio that a pilot could appear "before the end of 2026", Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov clarified in October 2025 that the system is now targeted for operational status by 2030.
Technical Architecture Confirmed
The platform will be blockchain-based and decentralised, designed to link existing national systems, including Russia's SPFS, China's CIPS, India's UPI, and Brazil's Pix.
It will also integrate central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) from member states, including the digital yuan and digital ruble.
Regional Readiness
South American nations have confirmed they are "ready to accept the BRICS payment system" once operational, signalling broader regional interest beyond core members.
However, technical integration, compliance frameworks, and achieving consensus among 11 diverse economies continue to slow progress. Until then, expect only incremental testing and bilateral pilots. [1]
Obstacles to a Unified Currency1. Economic Divergence
The BRICS-11 now span everything from China's $18 trillion economy to Ethiopia's $156 billion output. Saudi Arabia's addition (GDP of approximately $1.1 trillion) helps bridge the gap but doesn't resolve fundamental differences. Inflation ranges from low single digits in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to double digits in Egypt and Argentina (a partner country).
Aligning monetary policy under one roof would require unprecedented fiscal coordination and a supranational central bank—neither exists, and India has repeatedly stated it is not seeking to replace the dollar.
2. Political Sovereignty
Ceding control of interest rates and money supply is politically sensitive, especially for India, Brazil and South Africa, which have deep domestic capital markets and floating currencies.
Beijing's yuan internationalisation agenda also competes with the idea of a brand-new unit. With India set to host the 2026 BRICS summit, analysts expect further emphasis on local-currency trade over monetary union.
3. Legal and Technical Hurdles
The expansion to partner countries adds another layer of complexity, as any future currency arrangement must decide whether these nations would be included or create a two-tier monetary system.
Geopolitical Ripple: Tariff Threats from Washington
The summit spurred a swift response from the United States. President Trump warned of an additional 10% tariff on countries “aligning with anti-American policies of BRICS”.
While largely rhetorical at this stage, the threat adds an extra layer of uncertainty for exporters within the bloc and could stoke EMFX volatility.
Trading Implications
1. Currency Pairs to Watch
2. Rates and Bonds
Local-currency bond issuance by BRICS development banks is likely to expand, offering relative-value opportunities against US Treasuries. Watch yield-spread compression in yuan- and rupee-denominated green bonds.
New dynamic: The ruble's strength has compressed Russian local-currency yields, creating carry-trade opportunities for those able to navigate sanctions and capital-control complexity.
3. Commodities
Russian oil sold in yuan or roubles changes quoting conventions for Urals, with China-Russia energy trade in 2024 reaching record levels as part of the $245 billion bilateral total.
Gold hubs in Dubai and Shanghai are exploring BRICS Pay settlement pilots, potentially shifting LBMA liquidity eastward. With the payment system now targeted for 2030 operational status, precious metals traders should monitor incremental pilot announcements from the UAE and Chinese clearing houses.
4. Equity Themes
Payment-system providers, regional clearing houses and AI-driven FX-matching engines may benefit as cross-border flows in non-dollar pairs scale up. The confirmed blockchain-based architecture of BRICS Pay favours fintech firms with distributed-ledger expertise.
Conversely, export-heavy firms in BRICS-11 face ongoing US tariff risk premia following Trump's July 2025 announcement of 10% tariffs on nations "aligning with anti-American policies of BRICS". Monitor trade-compliance updates, as specific enforcement mechanisms remain fluid.
Partner-country plays: With 10 new partner nations—including Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Nigeria—investors may find value in frontier-market ETFs and regional supply-chain proxies positioned to benefit from BRICS infrastructure and trade corridors.
Risk Checklist for Traders
Practical Strategies
FAQs About BRICS Currency:When will the BRICS currency actually be released?
No unified BRICS currency will be released in the near term. At the October 2025 update, BRICS Pay (the payment platform) has been pushed to a 2030 operational target, and any euro-style currency union remains at least a decade away.
The most realistic timeline shows BRICS Pay pilots in 2025-2027, a possible settlement "unit of account" (similar to IMF's SDR) by 2028-2030, and discussions of a unified digital currency only post-2030, contingent on economic alignment among the now 11 full members plus 10 partner countries.
How can I invest in or trade BRICS currency developments?
Since no actual BRICS currency exists, traders should focus on the "process not the product." Monitor CNY/RUB, INR/CNY, and ZAR/CNY pairs, which saw significant volume increases in 2025.
Consider yuan internationalisation plays (yuan reached 8.5% of global forex trades by September 2025), local-currency bond issuance from BRICS development banks, and thematic equity baskets including payment-rail developers and blockchain firms positioned for the confirmed blockchain-based BRICS Pay architecture.
Hedge using BRICS-11 index funds and watch for volatility around the 2026 India summit.
Will BRICS currency replace the US dollar?
No, not in the foreseeable future. While 90% of intra-BRICS trade now settles in local currencies (up from 65% two years ago), this primarily reflects Russia-China energy deals and regional corridors rather than global dollar displacement.
The dollar still accounts for 58-60% of global reserves and maintains unmatched liquidity depth. BRICS currency initiatives are more likely to create a parallel system for member nations rather than challenge global dollar dominance.
The realistic impact is gradual: more regional trade bypassing dollars, alternative payment rails via BRICS Pay by 2030, and slow adjustments in reserve distributions rather than wholesale currency replacement.
Conclusion
So, when will a BRICS currency be released? The honest answer remains: not anytime soon. Three months after the July 2025 summit, the trajectory has become even clearer—and slower.
BRICS Pay, once expected to pilot by late 2026, is now targeted for operational status by 2030. Any euro-style currency union sits a decade or more beyond that.
Since July, the bloc has expanded to 11 full members (with Saudi Arabia's formal accession) plus 10 partner countries, strengthening its collective economic weight to 46% of the global population and 36% of GDP at purchasing-power parity.
Yet this very expansion—spanning Ethiopia's $156 billion economy to China's $18 trillion—makes monetary convergence more complex, not less.
Disclaimer: This material is for general information purposes only and is not intended as (and should not be considered to be) financial, investment or other advice on which reliance should be placed. No opinion given in the material constitutes a recommendation by EBC or the author that any particular investment, security, transaction or investment strategy is suitable for any specific person.
Sources
[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1dnz7gw92zo
[2] https://watcher.guru/news/south-america-ready-to-accept-the-brics-payment-system
[3] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/03/27/brics-game-changing-blockchain-payment-system-the-future-of-global-transactions/
Source: www.ebc.com
When Will BRICS Currency Be Released? What We Know So Far
At the July 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio, leaders confirmed that no joint currency would be launched in the near term. Instead, they prioritized expanding local-currency trade and developing BRICS Pay, a cross-border payment platform.
Experts suggest any euro-style BRICS currency is at least a decade away, given the need for political alignment, fiscal stability, and central bank cooperation. Traders should watch for incremental steps, such as swap-line agreements, CBDC pilots, and settlement in yuan and rupees, as the real “first phase” of BRICS monetary integration.
Below is an up-to-date assessment of the project, why delays persist, and what traders should watch next.
July 2025 Summit Overview
The 17th BRICS summit, hosted by Brazil on 6–7 July 2025, drew intense speculation that a launch date might finally emerge. Instead, leaders delivered a familiar message: closer monetary co-operation, yes; a single currency, not yet.
Key outcomes:
- No unified BRICS currency was announced.
- Leaders pledged to “continue technical discussions” on payments.
- BRICS Pay—a shared cross-border payment platform, remains “under development”, with Brazil taking responsibility for the next phase.
- India stressed the bloc is “not conspiring to undermine the dollar”, easing some geopolitical tension.
- Russian officials confirmed progress on settling trade in local currencies rather than US dollars.
Bloomberg captured the mood with a telling headline on 6 July: “The decade-old local-currency push by BRICS is still a pipe dream.”
Membership Changes: BRICS Expands to 11 Members
Indonesia formally joined the group on 6 January 2025, and Saudi Arabia completed its accession in mid-2025, bringing total full membership to eleven :
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
New "Partner Country" Tier Created
At the January 2025 expansion, BRICS also established a second tier of 10 partner countries that participate in summits and working groups but lack full voting rights :
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
This two-tier structure allows broader engagement while preserving decision-making authority among core members. Over 30 additional nations have expressed interest in joining, signalling BRICS' growing appeal as a counterweight to Western-dominated institutions.
Impact on Currency Prospects
The larger bloc strengthens collective trade heft—the BRICS-11 now represents approximately 46% of the global population and over 36% of global GDP at purchasing-power parity. However, expansion adds even more complexity to any monetary union.
GDP sizes now range from China's $18 trillion economy to Ethiopia's $156 billion, while inflation rates and fiscal regimes vary even more widely than before, further complicating the already distant prospect of currency convergence.
Local-Currency Trade: Progress and Regional Variations
While a single currency remains distant, intra-BRICS trade is increasingly dollar-free. According to data released at the July summit, about 90% of commerce among BRICS nations is now settled in local currencies, up from roughly 65% two years ago. This sharp jump reflects:
- Energy deals are priced in yuan or roubles, with China-Russia bilateral trade reaching a record $245 billion in 2024.
- Indian rupee-denominated trade corridors with Russia and the UAE expanding.
- A surge in bilateral swap lines that bypass SWIFT.
- The yuan's share of global forex trades rising to 8.5% by September 2025, up from 7% in 2022.
However, the 90% figure largely reflects Russia's reported share and stronger yuan-ruble corridors; not every BRICS bilateral pair has reached this level. Independent metrics vary by corridor, but the trend toward local settlement is clear and accelerating.
For traders, the shift creates new liquidity pockets in EMFX pairs and reduces outright USD demand in certain commodity invoices. Notably, the ruble appreciated 45% against the dollar and 25% against the yuan through 2025, an unexpected development driven partly by capital controls and energy-export strength.
BRICS Pay: Timeline Extended to 2030
First proposed in 2019, BRICS Pay aims to link national fast-payment networks and eventually support CBDC transfers. Contrary to earlier rumours, the platform is not live.
While Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in Rio that a pilot could appear "before the end of 2026", Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov clarified in October 2025 that the system is now targeted for operational status by 2030.
Technical Architecture Confirmed
The platform will be blockchain-based and decentralised, designed to link existing national systems, including Russia's SPFS, China's CIPS, India's UPI, and Brazil's Pix.
It will also integrate central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) from member states, including the digital yuan and digital ruble.
Regional Readiness
South American nations have confirmed they are "ready to accept the BRICS payment system" once operational, signalling broader regional interest beyond core members.
However, technical integration, compliance frameworks, and achieving consensus among 11 diverse economies continue to slow progress. Until then, expect only incremental testing and bilateral pilots. [1]
Obstacles to a Unified Currency1. Economic Divergence
The BRICS-11 now span everything from China's $18 trillion economy to Ethiopia's $156 billion output. Saudi Arabia's addition (GDP of approximately $1.1 trillion) helps bridge the gap but doesn't resolve fundamental differences. Inflation ranges from low single digits in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to double digits in Egypt and Argentina (a partner country).
Aligning monetary policy under one roof would require unprecedented fiscal coordination and a supranational central bank—neither exists, and India has repeatedly stated it is not seeking to replace the dollar.
2. Political Sovereignty
Ceding control of interest rates and money supply is politically sensitive, especially for India, Brazil and South Africa, which have deep domestic capital markets and floating currencies.
Beijing's yuan internationalisation agenda also competes with the idea of a brand-new unit. With India set to host the 2026 BRICS summit, analysts expect further emphasis on local-currency trade over monetary union.
3. Legal and Technical Hurdles
- Capital-control regimes differ sharply across members and the 10 partner countries
- No shared deposit-insurance or banking-resolution framework is in place
- FX-clearing infrastructure would need to handle eleven full members, plus ten partner jurisdictions, and multiple script systems
- Blockchain integration and CBDC interoperability remain in pilot stages, with no unified standard
The expansion to partner countries adds another layer of complexity, as any future currency arrangement must decide whether these nations would be included or create a two-tier monetary system.
Timeframe | What’s Plausible | Likelihood* |
2025–2027 | BRICS Pay pilot; more trade in local currencies; CBDC interoperability tests | High |
2028–2030 | Settlement “unit of account” (similar to IMF’s SDR) but not a true currency | Moderate |
Post-2030 | Discussion of a unified digital currency, contingent on economic alignment | Low |
Geopolitical Ripple: Tariff Threats from Washington
The summit spurred a swift response from the United States. President Trump warned of an additional 10% tariff on countries “aligning with anti-American policies of BRICS”.
While largely rhetorical at this stage, the threat adds an extra layer of uncertainty for exporters within the bloc and could stoke EMFX volatility.
Trading Implications
1. Currency Pairs to Watch
- CNY/RUB, INR/CNY and ZAR/CNY volumes continue to rise, with the yuan-ruble pair hitting 33 trillion rubles ($420 billion) in 2024 trade volume. The ruble's unexpected 45% appreciation against the dollar and 25% gain versus the yuan in 2025 created profitable positioning opportunities for those tracking Russian capital controls and energy flows.
- USD/BRL and USD/ZAR may see episodic weakness as local-currency settlement grows. However, Trump's 10% tariff threats announced in July 2025 have added volatility to these pairs, requiring wider stop-loss buffers. [2]
- Synthetic baskets: Desks now quote a "BRICS-11 index" (equal-weighted) versus USD for hedging, updated to include Saudi Arabia. Some brokers also track a broader "BRICS+Partners" basket covering all 21 nations.
- Yuan gains ground: The yuan's share of global forex trades climbed to 8.5% by September 2025, reinforcing its role as the primary BRICS settlement currency and creating deeper liquidity in CNY crosses.
2. Rates and Bonds
Local-currency bond issuance by BRICS development banks is likely to expand, offering relative-value opportunities against US Treasuries. Watch yield-spread compression in yuan- and rupee-denominated green bonds.
New dynamic: The ruble's strength has compressed Russian local-currency yields, creating carry-trade opportunities for those able to navigate sanctions and capital-control complexity.
3. Commodities
Russian oil sold in yuan or roubles changes quoting conventions for Urals, with China-Russia energy trade in 2024 reaching record levels as part of the $245 billion bilateral total.
Gold hubs in Dubai and Shanghai are exploring BRICS Pay settlement pilots, potentially shifting LBMA liquidity eastward. With the payment system now targeted for 2030 operational status, precious metals traders should monitor incremental pilot announcements from the UAE and Chinese clearing houses.
4. Equity Themes
Payment-system providers, regional clearing houses and AI-driven FX-matching engines may benefit as cross-border flows in non-dollar pairs scale up. The confirmed blockchain-based architecture of BRICS Pay favours fintech firms with distributed-ledger expertise.
Conversely, export-heavy firms in BRICS-11 face ongoing US tariff risk premia following Trump's July 2025 announcement of 10% tariffs on nations "aligning with anti-American policies of BRICS". Monitor trade-compliance updates, as specific enforcement mechanisms remain fluid.
Partner-country plays: With 10 new partner nations—including Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Nigeria—investors may find value in frontier-market ETFs and regional supply-chain proxies positioned to benefit from BRICS infrastructure and trade corridors.
Risk Checklist for Traders
- Headline Shock: Summit rumours can whipsaw EMFX quotes; keep tight stops during BRICS meetings. The next summit is scheduled for 2026 in India, where analysts expect continued emphasis on de-dollarisation rhetoric that can trigger short-term volatility even without concrete policy changes.
- Liquidity Gaps: Some BRICS cross-pairs remain thin; use limit orders and beware of weekend gaps. The ruble's 45% surge in 2025 caught many traders off-guard, demonstrating how capital controls and thin order books can produce extreme moves in peripheral pairs.
- Geopolitical Escalation: Monitor tariff announcements or sanctions that could freeze payment-system progress. Trump's 10% tariff on BRICS nations announced in July 2025 has materialised as an ongoing compliance risk, though specific enforcement remains inconsistent. Track the Trump 2.0 tariff tracker for real-time updates on implementation.
- Regulatory Shifts: CBDC frameworks evolve quickly—check local capital-control changes weekly. With BRICS Pay now targeting 2030 instead of 2026, regulatory timelines have shifted, but individual member states continue piloting CBDCs at different speeds.
- Data Quality: Macro statistics from smaller BRICS members can be revised heavily; build buffers into models. This risk has increased with 10 partner countries (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam) now participating in working groups, where data transparency varies widely.
- Membership Uncertainty: With over 30 nations expressing interest in joining BRICS and the new partner-country tier creating ambiguity around decision-making authority, watch for surprise expansion announcements that can shift regional FX dynamics.
Practical Strategies
- Event-Driven Volatility Trades: Straddles around future BRICS summits or NDB announcements remain viable. The 2026 India summit will be a key test of whether the bloc can maintain unity as it expands, creating setup opportunities in INR, CNY, and BRL several weeks ahead.
- Carry-and-Roll: Short-tenor swaps exploiting higher local rates in India and Brazil versus low-yield currencies. The ruble's unexpected strength has also created compressed-yield carry opportunities for those able to navigate Russian capital controls.
- Relative-Value Bonds: Long on NDB real-denominated issuance hedged with US dollar bonds of similar duration. Consider adding Saudi riyal and UAE dirham bond exposure now that both Gulf states are full BRICS members.
- Thematic Equity Baskets: Payment-rail developers, emerging-market infra plays and regional commodity exchanges. Focus on firms with blockchain and distributed-ledger expertise, given BRICS Pay's confirmed technical architecture. Also consider frontier-market funds tracking the 10 partner countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, which offer liquid exposure to BRICS trade corridor growth. [3]
- Yuan Internationalisation Plays: With the yuan reaching 8.5% of global forex trades in September 2025, positioning for further CNY payment-system expansion offers asymmetric upside if BRICS Pay pilots accelerate ahead of the 2030 target.
FAQs About BRICS Currency:When will the BRICS currency actually be released?
No unified BRICS currency will be released in the near term. At the October 2025 update, BRICS Pay (the payment platform) has been pushed to a 2030 operational target, and any euro-style currency union remains at least a decade away.
The most realistic timeline shows BRICS Pay pilots in 2025-2027, a possible settlement "unit of account" (similar to IMF's SDR) by 2028-2030, and discussions of a unified digital currency only post-2030, contingent on economic alignment among the now 11 full members plus 10 partner countries.
How can I invest in or trade BRICS currency developments?
Since no actual BRICS currency exists, traders should focus on the "process not the product." Monitor CNY/RUB, INR/CNY, and ZAR/CNY pairs, which saw significant volume increases in 2025.
Consider yuan internationalisation plays (yuan reached 8.5% of global forex trades by September 2025), local-currency bond issuance from BRICS development banks, and thematic equity baskets including payment-rail developers and blockchain firms positioned for the confirmed blockchain-based BRICS Pay architecture.
Hedge using BRICS-11 index funds and watch for volatility around the 2026 India summit.
Will BRICS currency replace the US dollar?
No, not in the foreseeable future. While 90% of intra-BRICS trade now settles in local currencies (up from 65% two years ago), this primarily reflects Russia-China energy deals and regional corridors rather than global dollar displacement.
The dollar still accounts for 58-60% of global reserves and maintains unmatched liquidity depth. BRICS currency initiatives are more likely to create a parallel system for member nations rather than challenge global dollar dominance.
The realistic impact is gradual: more regional trade bypassing dollars, alternative payment rails via BRICS Pay by 2030, and slow adjustments in reserve distributions rather than wholesale currency replacement.
Conclusion
So, when will a BRICS currency be released? The honest answer remains: not anytime soon. Three months after the July 2025 summit, the trajectory has become even clearer—and slower.
BRICS Pay, once expected to pilot by late 2026, is now targeted for operational status by 2030. Any euro-style currency union sits a decade or more beyond that.
Since July, the bloc has expanded to 11 full members (with Saudi Arabia's formal accession) plus 10 partner countries, strengthening its collective economic weight to 46% of the global population and 36% of GDP at purchasing-power parity.
Yet this very expansion—spanning Ethiopia's $156 billion economy to China's $18 trillion—makes monetary convergence more complex, not less.
Disclaimer: This material is for general information purposes only and is not intended as (and should not be considered to be) financial, investment or other advice on which reliance should be placed. No opinion given in the material constitutes a recommendation by EBC or the author that any particular investment, security, transaction or investment strategy is suitable for any specific person.
Sources
[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1dnz7gw92zo
[2] https://watcher.guru/news/south-america-ready-to-accept-the-brics-payment-system
[3] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/03/27/brics-game-changing-blockchain-payment-system-the-future-of-global-transactions/
The BRICS and de-dollarisation (БРИКС и дедолларизация) / Belgium, October, 2025
Keywords: brics+, economic_challenges, expert_opinion, trade_relations
2025-10-06
2025-10-06
Belgium
Source: www.cadtm.org
Many perceive the BRICS countries as a counterweight to the dollar-dominated monetary order. However, the facts speak for themselves: at the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro (6–7 July 2025), no real desire to break away from the US currency was expressed. De-dollarisation remains a distant prospect.
Sommaire
Nowhere in the 126-point Rio de Janeiro BRICS leaders’ declaration is there any mention of the term de-dollarisation. It makes no mention of initiatives to lessen the role of the dollar. It states that trade in local currencies must be encouraged, but this remains very vague and limited and has nothing to do with the creation of a common BRICS currency. The BRICS countries do not wish to adopt a common currency, and the final declaration of the Rio summit makes no mention of the creation of a common currency.
Among the leaders of the five founding BRICS countries, only Lula continues to talk about a common reserve currency, and he does so less and less frequently. Putin stopped mentioning it and explicitly stated in 2024 that it was not one of his objectives.
As proof, here is what Vladimir Putin said at an important public meeting organised by the Kremlin after the BRICS summit held in Kazan at the end of October 2024 and two days after Trump’s election:
“I have heard a lot of discussion among experts and in journalistic circles that we should think about creating a single currency. But it is too early to talk about this. And we do not have such goals among ourselves.” (Source: Valdai Discussion Club meeting: Vladimir Putin’s answers to participants’ questions).
Later in the public meeting, he added:
“We have not sought to abandon the dollar and we are not seeking to do so.”
And again:
“Our proposals are not aimed at fighting the dollar.”
Vladimir Putin on 7 November 2024: “I have heard a lot of discussion among experts and in journalistic circles that we should think about creating a single currency. But it is too early to talk about this. And we do not have such goals among ourselves. (...) We have not sought to abandon the dollar and we are not seeking to do so.”
Putin made these statements in November 2024 in response to Paulo Nogueira Batista, who from 2015 to 2017 was vice-president of the New Development Bank created by the BRICS. One of the questions posed by Paulo Nogueira Batista to Putin specifically concerned the creation of a new BRICS currency:
“Would you agree that payments in national currencies have certain limitations and that we will gradually, step by step, cautiously move towards a new means of payment, a new reserve currency? President Lula also mentioned this in his statement at the Kazan summit.”
It should be noted, as mentioned above, that Lula had advocated for a common currency both at the 2023 BRICS summit held in Johannesburg (South Africa) and in a remote address at the 2024 summit in Kazan (Russia). However, it is clear that Putin, who seemed to favour this prospect, has abandoned it. What is the reason for this? Besides the significant challenge of establishing a shared currency among vastly diverse economies across four continents, Putin is also attempting to placate Trump, who has made it clear that any attempt to diminish the role of the dollar would be met with intense retaliation.
In the same vein, Putin is seeking to reduce the sanctions imposed on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and is therefore trying to reduce antagonism with Trump. Through mid-2025 (including during a meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska in August 2025), this seemed to have worked, to a certain limited extent. I discussed the points of convergence between Trump and Putin on Ukraine concerning the grabbing of natural resources in an article published on 20 May 2025 entitled “Natural resource grabbing in Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Imperial powers on the offensive.”
However, their relationship could deteriorate at any moment, particularly if Trump posts something controversial, as he did on September 23:
“After getting to know and fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation and, after seeing the Economic trouble it is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.”
The future of Putin-Trump relations is difficult to predict. But even if relations deteriorate significantly, the creation of a common currency will remain off the agenda because the other important members of the BRICS are not in favour of it.
Indeed, India and China, the two largest powers among the BRICS countries, for their own reasons, do not see the point of developing a common BRICS currency.
So India is opposed to a common currency?
India has repeatedly stated during internal BRICS negotiations that it does not want a common currency. Then, certainly under the threat of tariff and other reprisals from Trump, it stated its position publicly on the eve of the BRICS summit in Rio (see Republic World, an Indian television channel, close to the government: “India Not Supporting Russia in BRICS Currency Plan — Here’s Why”. Since Trump implemented his tariff threats in August 2025, the prime minister has made no statements in favour of a common currency.
Is China also not in favour of a common currency?
For its part, China considers that the renminbi is gradually but surely becoming an international currency and that there is no point in participating in the creation of a new BRICS currency. The Chinese currency is one of the five currencies recognised for IMF repayments, and China has significantly increased its foreign loans in the renminbi (see the study published by the US Federal Reserve in May 2025: “Chinese Banks’ Dollar Lending Decline”).
Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that if China internationalised its currency, it would lose its power to control cross-border capital movements. Due to financial speculation and the Chinese stock market crashes of the mid-2010s, maintaining and strengthening exchange controls have been essential tools for disciplining members of the ‘unpatriotic bourgeoisie’ of society who regularly engaged in illicit financial flows (IFFs). The NGO Global Financial Integrity estimated illicit financial outflows from China at $258 billion in 2013, prior to the tightening of capital controls in 2016-2017. See https://financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final.pdf Table C page 8.
What is South Africa’s position on de-dollarisation?
South Africa’s financial elite also campaigned against de-dollarisation at the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, and the SA Ambassador to the U.S., Ebrahim Rasool, also warned, in March 2025,
“We must avoid actions that cock a snoot at the USA, such as de-dollarization. Not even China is speaking about de-dollarization anymore; Russia certainly isn’t. Not only is it performative, but it’s not practical or economically viable. Even mentioning it could invoke punitive immediate
measures.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1ILz1S_AdQ&t=1147s
Conclusion
There has been no collective progress by the BRICS countries as a coalition towards de-dollarisation. Behind the rhetoric of a multipolar order, national interests, dependence on international trade and fear of US retaliation are holding back the collective momentum of BRICS countries.
Lula remains isolated in his advocacy for a common currency, while Beijing, Delhi, Moscow and Pretoria, all favour national strategies. Ultimately, the BRICS of 2025 appear more like a coalition of divergent interests than a coherent bloc capable of transforming the global monetary order.
Summary
At the last BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro (6–7 July 2025), no serious concrete progress towards de-dollarisation was made. The final declaration makes no mention of the creation of a common currency or a coordinated strategy to reduce the use of the dollar. What they are actually doing is far more modest: settling some trade in local currencies to reduce costs and diminish reliance on the greenback for specific transactions (see part 6 of this series)
Only Lula continues to raise the idea of a common reserve currency among the BRICS leaders, and he does so infrequently. Vladimir Putin, who had previously shown interest, has clearly abandoned this prospect. In November 2024, he publicly stated that Russia was not seeking to move away from the dollar, thereby seeking to ease tensions with Donald Trump, who was hostile to any initiative that threatened the supremacy of the greenback.
This caution also reflects internal differences within the BRICS. India has opposed any idea of a common currency, fearing US trade reprisals. China, for its part, is banking on the gradual internationalisation of the renminbi while maintaining strict control over capital flows. South Africa believes that a policy of de-dollarisation would be economically risky and likely to provoke immediate sanctions from Washington.
Thus, despite frequent talk in certain circles about the BRICS’ progress in challenging the dominance of the dollar, the political and economic reality shows a lack of willingness to adopt a common currency.
The author would like to thank Patrick Bond, Sushovan Dhar and Maxime Perriot for their proofreading and advice. The author is solely responsible for the opinions expressed in this text and any errors it may contain.
Source: www.cadtm.org
Many perceive the BRICS countries as a counterweight to the dollar-dominated monetary order. However, the facts speak for themselves: at the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro (6–7 July 2025), no real desire to break away from the US currency was expressed. De-dollarisation remains a distant prospect.
- Why are the BRICS countries not condemning the ongoing genocide in Gaza?
- The passivity or complicity of BRICS+ with imperialist wars
- The BRICS are the new defenders of free trade, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank
- China and the IMF, supported by BRICS+, provided a lifeline to Javier Milei’s far-right government in Argentina
- The BRICS and de-dollarisation
Sommaire
- Many BRICS supporters claim that the bloc is moving towards de-dollarisation. Is this really (…)
- So India is opposed to a common currency?
- Is China also not in favour of a common currency?
- What is South Africa’s position on de-dollarisation?
- Conclusion
- Summary
Nowhere in the 126-point Rio de Janeiro BRICS leaders’ declaration is there any mention of the term de-dollarisation. It makes no mention of initiatives to lessen the role of the dollar. It states that trade in local currencies must be encouraged, but this remains very vague and limited and has nothing to do with the creation of a common BRICS currency. The BRICS countries do not wish to adopt a common currency, and the final declaration of the Rio summit makes no mention of the creation of a common currency.
Among the leaders of the five founding BRICS countries, only Lula continues to talk about a common reserve currency, and he does so less and less frequently. Putin stopped mentioning it and explicitly stated in 2024 that it was not one of his objectives.
As proof, here is what Vladimir Putin said at an important public meeting organised by the Kremlin after the BRICS summit held in Kazan at the end of October 2024 and two days after Trump’s election:
“I have heard a lot of discussion among experts and in journalistic circles that we should think about creating a single currency. But it is too early to talk about this. And we do not have such goals among ourselves.” (Source: Valdai Discussion Club meeting: Vladimir Putin’s answers to participants’ questions).
Later in the public meeting, he added:
“We have not sought to abandon the dollar and we are not seeking to do so.”
And again:
“Our proposals are not aimed at fighting the dollar.”
Vladimir Putin on 7 November 2024: “I have heard a lot of discussion among experts and in journalistic circles that we should think about creating a single currency. But it is too early to talk about this. And we do not have such goals among ourselves. (...) We have not sought to abandon the dollar and we are not seeking to do so.”
Putin made these statements in November 2024 in response to Paulo Nogueira Batista, who from 2015 to 2017 was vice-president of the New Development Bank created by the BRICS. One of the questions posed by Paulo Nogueira Batista to Putin specifically concerned the creation of a new BRICS currency:
“Would you agree that payments in national currencies have certain limitations and that we will gradually, step by step, cautiously move towards a new means of payment, a new reserve currency? President Lula also mentioned this in his statement at the Kazan summit.”
It should be noted, as mentioned above, that Lula had advocated for a common currency both at the 2023 BRICS summit held in Johannesburg (South Africa) and in a remote address at the 2024 summit in Kazan (Russia). However, it is clear that Putin, who seemed to favour this prospect, has abandoned it. What is the reason for this? Besides the significant challenge of establishing a shared currency among vastly diverse economies across four continents, Putin is also attempting to placate Trump, who has made it clear that any attempt to diminish the role of the dollar would be met with intense retaliation.
In the same vein, Putin is seeking to reduce the sanctions imposed on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and is therefore trying to reduce antagonism with Trump. Through mid-2025 (including during a meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska in August 2025), this seemed to have worked, to a certain limited extent. I discussed the points of convergence between Trump and Putin on Ukraine concerning the grabbing of natural resources in an article published on 20 May 2025 entitled “Natural resource grabbing in Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Imperial powers on the offensive.”
However, their relationship could deteriorate at any moment, particularly if Trump posts something controversial, as he did on September 23:
“After getting to know and fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation and, after seeing the Economic trouble it is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.”
The future of Putin-Trump relations is difficult to predict. But even if relations deteriorate significantly, the creation of a common currency will remain off the agenda because the other important members of the BRICS are not in favour of it.
Indeed, India and China, the two largest powers among the BRICS countries, for their own reasons, do not see the point of developing a common BRICS currency.
So India is opposed to a common currency?
India has repeatedly stated during internal BRICS negotiations that it does not want a common currency. Then, certainly under the threat of tariff and other reprisals from Trump, it stated its position publicly on the eve of the BRICS summit in Rio (see Republic World, an Indian television channel, close to the government: “India Not Supporting Russia in BRICS Currency Plan — Here’s Why”. Since Trump implemented his tariff threats in August 2025, the prime minister has made no statements in favour of a common currency.
Is China also not in favour of a common currency?
For its part, China considers that the renminbi is gradually but surely becoming an international currency and that there is no point in participating in the creation of a new BRICS currency. The Chinese currency is one of the five currencies recognised for IMF repayments, and China has significantly increased its foreign loans in the renminbi (see the study published by the US Federal Reserve in May 2025: “Chinese Banks’ Dollar Lending Decline”).
Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that if China internationalised its currency, it would lose its power to control cross-border capital movements. Due to financial speculation and the Chinese stock market crashes of the mid-2010s, maintaining and strengthening exchange controls have been essential tools for disciplining members of the ‘unpatriotic bourgeoisie’ of society who regularly engaged in illicit financial flows (IFFs). The NGO Global Financial Integrity estimated illicit financial outflows from China at $258 billion in 2013, prior to the tightening of capital controls in 2016-2017. See https://financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final.pdf Table C page 8.
What is South Africa’s position on de-dollarisation?
South Africa’s financial elite also campaigned against de-dollarisation at the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, and the SA Ambassador to the U.S., Ebrahim Rasool, also warned, in March 2025,
“We must avoid actions that cock a snoot at the USA, such as de-dollarization. Not even China is speaking about de-dollarization anymore; Russia certainly isn’t. Not only is it performative, but it’s not practical or economically viable. Even mentioning it could invoke punitive immediate
measures.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1ILz1S_AdQ&t=1147s
Conclusion
There has been no collective progress by the BRICS countries as a coalition towards de-dollarisation. Behind the rhetoric of a multipolar order, national interests, dependence on international trade and fear of US retaliation are holding back the collective momentum of BRICS countries.
Lula remains isolated in his advocacy for a common currency, while Beijing, Delhi, Moscow and Pretoria, all favour national strategies. Ultimately, the BRICS of 2025 appear more like a coalition of divergent interests than a coherent bloc capable of transforming the global monetary order.
Summary
At the last BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro (6–7 July 2025), no serious concrete progress towards de-dollarisation was made. The final declaration makes no mention of the creation of a common currency or a coordinated strategy to reduce the use of the dollar. What they are actually doing is far more modest: settling some trade in local currencies to reduce costs and diminish reliance on the greenback for specific transactions (see part 6 of this series)
Only Lula continues to raise the idea of a common reserve currency among the BRICS leaders, and he does so infrequently. Vladimir Putin, who had previously shown interest, has clearly abandoned this prospect. In November 2024, he publicly stated that Russia was not seeking to move away from the dollar, thereby seeking to ease tensions with Donald Trump, who was hostile to any initiative that threatened the supremacy of the greenback.
This caution also reflects internal differences within the BRICS. India has opposed any idea of a common currency, fearing US trade reprisals. China, for its part, is banking on the gradual internationalisation of the renminbi while maintaining strict control over capital flows. South Africa believes that a policy of de-dollarisation would be economically risky and likely to provoke immediate sanctions from Washington.
Thus, despite frequent talk in certain circles about the BRICS’ progress in challenging the dominance of the dollar, the political and economic reality shows a lack of willingness to adopt a common currency.
The author would like to thank Patrick Bond, Sushovan Dhar and Maxime Perriot for their proofreading and advice. The author is solely responsible for the opinions expressed in this text and any errors it may contain.
Bridge economies: taking a broader view (part 2) (Соединяя экономики: более широкий взгляд (часть 2)) / Russia, October, 2025
Keywords:
2025-10-
2025-10-
Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org
Continued from Part 1: https://brics-plus-analytics.org/bridge-economies-taking-a-broader-view-part-1/
Indeed, from the point of view of our “bridge theory” nearly all BRICS economies may be considered as bridges/entry points into their respective regions/regional blocs as well as the wider BRICS/BRICS+ platform of the Global South. Within the expanded BRICS core, two new members stand out in terms of their “bridge capabilities” – Egypt and the UAE. In the case of the UAE, Dubai serves as a key global financial center as well as a key port that ranks among the global leaders of the world’s best shipping hubs[1]. In the case of Egypt, nearly 30% of world’s shipping container volume and around 12% of global goods trade transits through the Suez canal[2]. More generally, within the global connectivity framework, BRICS economies may deliver the most important of contributions in reducing the gravity of distance in international trade, given that these are large emerging economies that at times are separated by extreme distances (as in the case of Brazil and China).
In terms of gravity model indications, the active role of bridge economies in intermediating trade/investment between two partners may serve to increase the intensity of trade turnover and/or investment – Mexico serving as a gateway for Asia’s exports and FDI into the US being one case in point. The existence of such bridges or regional “bridge networks” improves the competitiveness of the broader regional ecosystem (much like the RTAs/FTAs) in attracting trade and investment flows. There is also scope to explore the impact of digital bridges in boosting trade flows via the gravity model by accounting for digital economic agreements (DEAs) – the relevant dummy variable in the gravity regression may shed light on the “bridge dividends” of digital economic accords[3]. In a way, from the point of view of the gravity model, the presence of bridge economies in intermediating trade and investment may be seen as a factor that cuts the distance (not only in terms of geography, but also in terms of cultural distance), with some of the recent research arguing in favor of the involvement of “bridge economy partners” in inter-organizational triads for foreign market entry[4].
Another important aspect of the “bridge economy” concept is the role of such bridges in building up the momentum for a revitalized globalization effort in the world economy. In particular, bridge economies can develop bilateral economic ties that facilitate the subsequent efforts directed at building alliances between the broader regions on the basis of “integration of integrations”/economic cooperation between regional blocs/RTAs. Indeed, the presence of well-connected bridge economies serves to improve the bridge capabilities of the broader region/regional bloc – as Singapore improves the international positioning and prowess of the ASEAN regional bloc. Rather than attempting to build an RTA-to-RTA alliance outright, regional blocs could use bilateral trade/economic ties between the respective bridge economies to facilitate their “integration of integrations” project[5]. Such a pattern of combining bilateral accords and regional trade agreements (as well as micro-regional accords at the level of sub-national entities) may serve to bring together the various drivers of economic integration in a coherent fashion, creating a more sustainable globalization momentum in the world economy.
In quantifying the effects of the various segments of the global “bridge economy”, one of the important reference points are the figures on the revenues obtained by “bridge economies” from the operation of key trade arteries such as the Suez canal and the Panama canal. In 2024 the Panama Canal Authority’s revenue reached USD 3.38 billion (equivalent to nearly 4% of GDP), despite unfavorable drought conditions, and revenue posted increments every year since 2017[6]. At the same time, according to the estimates of IDB (Inter-American Development Bank Group), the total effect of Panama canal operation for Panama’s GDP that includes direct, indirect and induced effects amounts to 7.7% of GDP and accounts for nearly 16% of total annual exports and nearly 3% of total employment[7]. Furthermore, IDB also notes that “according to projections on the demand of the Canal, it is estimated that its activity will increase Panama’s GDP by 3.45% in 2030, compared to 2022”[8]. Such a contribution to higher GDP may have accounted for what the World Bank referred to as Panama’s “remarkable economic growth”, with annual GDP growth averaging 5.7% in the period from 1990 to 2023 (much higher than the regional average of 2.5%)[9].
But just like the operation of the Canals may be a source of crucial revenues, it can also induce volatility due to factors such as regional instability and geopolitics. A case in point is the Suez Canal that has generated USD 153.4 billion in revenues and facilitated the transit of approximately 1.1 million ships since the waterway’s nationalization in 1956 to date. At the same time, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi declared in March 2025 that the Suez Canal was losing approximately USD 800 million in receipts each month due to the situation in the region[10]. The IMF stated in its 2025 Article IV Consultation document that “trade disruptions in the Red Sea since December 2023 have reduced foreign exchange inflows from the Suez Canal by US$6 billion in 2024 relative to 2023, while transit trade volumes remain at about a third of pre-conflict levels”[11].
What this suggests is the need for alternative bridge routes and bridge economies to expand the array of logistical back-up options in the global supply network. Recent developments suggest the emergence of such projects as the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to the southern routes that among others frequently involve the Suez Canal (the Northern Sea Route offers significant days-saving for shipping between East Asia and Western Europe compared to the Suez Canal, with potential reductions of 10 to 15 days or more[12]); there is also a rising number of proposals on the bi-oceanic corridors via Colombia[13], Nicaragua[14] or Brazil-Peru[15] as a back-up to Panama Canal disruptions. Indeed, the key message from the optimization simulations of bridge economy networks (based on graph theory) with respect to the resilience and sustained growth of the global economy is the importance of key logistical arteries/connections being backed up by alternative routes or bridge platforms[16].
Another crucial segment of the global bridge economy, namely re-exports, is experiencing growth that notably outstrips that of global trade[17]. In the case of some of the bridge economies such as the Netherlands, re-exports are starting to exceed or rival the scale of national goods exports. According to the Dutch statistical agency, “in 2022, the Netherlands exported 731.4 billion euros worth of goods, of which 368.3 billion euros were accounted for by re-exports. In 2022, the value of re-exports was nearly 58 percent higher than in the pre-pandemic year 2019… As a result, the value of re-exports exceeded the export value of Dutch-made products…”[18]. These trends are further confirmed by the OECD that observes with respect to the Dutch economy that “in 2023, about 49% of total exports were re-exports with most of them destined to EU member states. Particularly to close neighbours like Germany, France and Belgium the shares of re-exports are high, at 60%, 63% and 55%, respectively, highlighting the Netherlands’ function as a European trade hub”[19].
Overall, bridge economies could serve as key nodes of connectivity among national economies as well as between regional integration blocs. The very concept of a bridge economy could serve to transform economic policy in the direction of cooperative “win-win” outcomes by explicitly incorporating into the national economic strategies approaches to building economic connectivity and to reaping the corresponding “bridge rewards”. Explicitly targeting higher “bridge dividends” may also serve to intensify international efforts to measure/quantify cross-country spillover effects (both positive and negative) as well as to send a credible signal to actual and potential partners on the benefits of concluding alliances and economic cooperation agreements with such a country/regional bloc. Lastly, the bridge economy policy approach also renders economic strategies more focused on longer term planning, contributing to longer time horizons and the evolution of economic cooperation[20].
[1] https://www.investindubai.gov.ae/en/insights-and-resources/news-insights/dubai-logistics-hub-role-ports-road-infrastructure
[2] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/03/the-suez-canal-in-numbers/
As we further show in the article, these figures can change significantly due to the volatility and disruptions in trade flows through the Suez Canal in recent years.
[3] One of the recent research papers finds “a significant positive impact of e-commerce agreements on bilateral trade flows”: https://www.jsie.jp/Annual_Meeting/2024s_Tohoku_Gakuin_Univ/pdf/H-2_Kimata_full.pdf
[4]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375720281_Interorganizational_triads_for_foreign-market_entry_Partnerships_among_Western_bridge-economy_and_local_VCs_in_Mainland_China
[5] Provided the respective RTAs do not have exclusive authority over trade policy and other aspects of economic policy, thus constraining the use of bilateral accords as initial bridges.
[6] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/01/28/all-options-on-table-with-panama-canal-trump-top-marine-official.html
[7] https://idbinvest.org/en/publications/economic-contribution-panama-canal-and-its-sensitivity-internal-and-external-shocks#:~:text=12.19.2024-,The%20Economic%20Contribution%20of%20the%20Panama%20Canal%20and%20its%20Sensitivity,in%202030%2C%20compared%20to%202022.
[8] https://idbinvest.org/en/publications/economic-contribution-panama-canal-and-its-sensitivity-internal-and-external-shocks#:~:text=12.19.2024-,The%20Economic%20Contribution%20of%20the%20Panama%20Canal%20and%20its%20Sensitivity,in%202030%2C%20compared%20to%202022.
[9] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/28b48a1e-a424-4f71-a8f8-2abd4bfe9da1
[10] https://english.news.cn/africa/20250801/540763769b8542a495bfc4b11e4e562c/c.html
[11] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/07/15/Arab-Republic-of-Egypt-2025-Article-IV-Consultation-Fourth-Review-Under-the-Extended-568598
[12] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405535214000096#:~:text=The%20Northern%20Sea%20Route%20along,lessening%20maritime%20shipping%20distances%20substantially.
[13] https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/colombia-advances-studies-for-interoceanic-corridor#:~:text=The%20study%20will%20determine%20%E2%80%9Chow,Legal%2C%20Financial%20and%20Insurance%20industries.
[14] https://brixsweden.org/china-celac-2025/#:~:text=Nicaragua%20Canal%20Project/Bluefields%20Port,Panama%20Canal%20Authority%20(ACP).
[15] https://impact.economist.com/new-globalisation/nearshoring-new-era-connection-latin-america
[16] https://chat.deepseek.com/ and https://x.com/i/grok
[17] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4833771_Re-exports_international_comparison_and_implications_for_performance_indicators
[18] https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2023/36/re-exports-higher-than-domestic-exports-in-2022
[19] https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-economic-surveys-netherlands-2025_aa9d215c/full-report/preserving-trade-competitiveness-amidst-increasing-global-fragmentation_d7457f46.html#CBS24_e7804ac420
[20]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316766066_Robert_Axelrod’s_1984_The_Evolution_of_Cooperation
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org
Continued from Part 1: https://brics-plus-analytics.org/bridge-economies-taking-a-broader-view-part-1/
Indeed, from the point of view of our “bridge theory” nearly all BRICS economies may be considered as bridges/entry points into their respective regions/regional blocs as well as the wider BRICS/BRICS+ platform of the Global South. Within the expanded BRICS core, two new members stand out in terms of their “bridge capabilities” – Egypt and the UAE. In the case of the UAE, Dubai serves as a key global financial center as well as a key port that ranks among the global leaders of the world’s best shipping hubs[1]. In the case of Egypt, nearly 30% of world’s shipping container volume and around 12% of global goods trade transits through the Suez canal[2]. More generally, within the global connectivity framework, BRICS economies may deliver the most important of contributions in reducing the gravity of distance in international trade, given that these are large emerging economies that at times are separated by extreme distances (as in the case of Brazil and China).
In terms of gravity model indications, the active role of bridge economies in intermediating trade/investment between two partners may serve to increase the intensity of trade turnover and/or investment – Mexico serving as a gateway for Asia’s exports and FDI into the US being one case in point. The existence of such bridges or regional “bridge networks” improves the competitiveness of the broader regional ecosystem (much like the RTAs/FTAs) in attracting trade and investment flows. There is also scope to explore the impact of digital bridges in boosting trade flows via the gravity model by accounting for digital economic agreements (DEAs) – the relevant dummy variable in the gravity regression may shed light on the “bridge dividends” of digital economic accords[3]. In a way, from the point of view of the gravity model, the presence of bridge economies in intermediating trade and investment may be seen as a factor that cuts the distance (not only in terms of geography, but also in terms of cultural distance), with some of the recent research arguing in favor of the involvement of “bridge economy partners” in inter-organizational triads for foreign market entry[4].
Another important aspect of the “bridge economy” concept is the role of such bridges in building up the momentum for a revitalized globalization effort in the world economy. In particular, bridge economies can develop bilateral economic ties that facilitate the subsequent efforts directed at building alliances between the broader regions on the basis of “integration of integrations”/economic cooperation between regional blocs/RTAs. Indeed, the presence of well-connected bridge economies serves to improve the bridge capabilities of the broader region/regional bloc – as Singapore improves the international positioning and prowess of the ASEAN regional bloc. Rather than attempting to build an RTA-to-RTA alliance outright, regional blocs could use bilateral trade/economic ties between the respective bridge economies to facilitate their “integration of integrations” project[5]. Such a pattern of combining bilateral accords and regional trade agreements (as well as micro-regional accords at the level of sub-national entities) may serve to bring together the various drivers of economic integration in a coherent fashion, creating a more sustainable globalization momentum in the world economy.
In quantifying the effects of the various segments of the global “bridge economy”, one of the important reference points are the figures on the revenues obtained by “bridge economies” from the operation of key trade arteries such as the Suez canal and the Panama canal. In 2024 the Panama Canal Authority’s revenue reached USD 3.38 billion (equivalent to nearly 4% of GDP), despite unfavorable drought conditions, and revenue posted increments every year since 2017[6]. At the same time, according to the estimates of IDB (Inter-American Development Bank Group), the total effect of Panama canal operation for Panama’s GDP that includes direct, indirect and induced effects amounts to 7.7% of GDP and accounts for nearly 16% of total annual exports and nearly 3% of total employment[7]. Furthermore, IDB also notes that “according to projections on the demand of the Canal, it is estimated that its activity will increase Panama’s GDP by 3.45% in 2030, compared to 2022”[8]. Such a contribution to higher GDP may have accounted for what the World Bank referred to as Panama’s “remarkable economic growth”, with annual GDP growth averaging 5.7% in the period from 1990 to 2023 (much higher than the regional average of 2.5%)[9].
But just like the operation of the Canals may be a source of crucial revenues, it can also induce volatility due to factors such as regional instability and geopolitics. A case in point is the Suez Canal that has generated USD 153.4 billion in revenues and facilitated the transit of approximately 1.1 million ships since the waterway’s nationalization in 1956 to date. At the same time, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi declared in March 2025 that the Suez Canal was losing approximately USD 800 million in receipts each month due to the situation in the region[10]. The IMF stated in its 2025 Article IV Consultation document that “trade disruptions in the Red Sea since December 2023 have reduced foreign exchange inflows from the Suez Canal by US$6 billion in 2024 relative to 2023, while transit trade volumes remain at about a third of pre-conflict levels”[11].
What this suggests is the need for alternative bridge routes and bridge economies to expand the array of logistical back-up options in the global supply network. Recent developments suggest the emergence of such projects as the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to the southern routes that among others frequently involve the Suez Canal (the Northern Sea Route offers significant days-saving for shipping between East Asia and Western Europe compared to the Suez Canal, with potential reductions of 10 to 15 days or more[12]); there is also a rising number of proposals on the bi-oceanic corridors via Colombia[13], Nicaragua[14] or Brazil-Peru[15] as a back-up to Panama Canal disruptions. Indeed, the key message from the optimization simulations of bridge economy networks (based on graph theory) with respect to the resilience and sustained growth of the global economy is the importance of key logistical arteries/connections being backed up by alternative routes or bridge platforms[16].
Another crucial segment of the global bridge economy, namely re-exports, is experiencing growth that notably outstrips that of global trade[17]. In the case of some of the bridge economies such as the Netherlands, re-exports are starting to exceed or rival the scale of national goods exports. According to the Dutch statistical agency, “in 2022, the Netherlands exported 731.4 billion euros worth of goods, of which 368.3 billion euros were accounted for by re-exports. In 2022, the value of re-exports was nearly 58 percent higher than in the pre-pandemic year 2019… As a result, the value of re-exports exceeded the export value of Dutch-made products…”[18]. These trends are further confirmed by the OECD that observes with respect to the Dutch economy that “in 2023, about 49% of total exports were re-exports with most of them destined to EU member states. Particularly to close neighbours like Germany, France and Belgium the shares of re-exports are high, at 60%, 63% and 55%, respectively, highlighting the Netherlands’ function as a European trade hub”[19].
Overall, bridge economies could serve as key nodes of connectivity among national economies as well as between regional integration blocs. The very concept of a bridge economy could serve to transform economic policy in the direction of cooperative “win-win” outcomes by explicitly incorporating into the national economic strategies approaches to building economic connectivity and to reaping the corresponding “bridge rewards”. Explicitly targeting higher “bridge dividends” may also serve to intensify international efforts to measure/quantify cross-country spillover effects (both positive and negative) as well as to send a credible signal to actual and potential partners on the benefits of concluding alliances and economic cooperation agreements with such a country/regional bloc. Lastly, the bridge economy policy approach also renders economic strategies more focused on longer term planning, contributing to longer time horizons and the evolution of economic cooperation[20].
[1] https://www.investindubai.gov.ae/en/insights-and-resources/news-insights/dubai-logistics-hub-role-ports-road-infrastructure
[2] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/03/the-suez-canal-in-numbers/
As we further show in the article, these figures can change significantly due to the volatility and disruptions in trade flows through the Suez Canal in recent years.
[3] One of the recent research papers finds “a significant positive impact of e-commerce agreements on bilateral trade flows”: https://www.jsie.jp/Annual_Meeting/2024s_Tohoku_Gakuin_Univ/pdf/H-2_Kimata_full.pdf
[4]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375720281_Interorganizational_triads_for_foreign-market_entry_Partnerships_among_Western_bridge-economy_and_local_VCs_in_Mainland_China
[5] Provided the respective RTAs do not have exclusive authority over trade policy and other aspects of economic policy, thus constraining the use of bilateral accords as initial bridges.
[6] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/01/28/all-options-on-table-with-panama-canal-trump-top-marine-official.html
[7] https://idbinvest.org/en/publications/economic-contribution-panama-canal-and-its-sensitivity-internal-and-external-shocks#:~:text=12.19.2024-,The%20Economic%20Contribution%20of%20the%20Panama%20Canal%20and%20its%20Sensitivity,in%202030%2C%20compared%20to%202022.
[8] https://idbinvest.org/en/publications/economic-contribution-panama-canal-and-its-sensitivity-internal-and-external-shocks#:~:text=12.19.2024-,The%20Economic%20Contribution%20of%20the%20Panama%20Canal%20and%20its%20Sensitivity,in%202030%2C%20compared%20to%202022.
[9] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/28b48a1e-a424-4f71-a8f8-2abd4bfe9da1
[10] https://english.news.cn/africa/20250801/540763769b8542a495bfc4b11e4e562c/c.html
[11] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/07/15/Arab-Republic-of-Egypt-2025-Article-IV-Consultation-Fourth-Review-Under-the-Extended-568598
[12] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405535214000096#:~:text=The%20Northern%20Sea%20Route%20along,lessening%20maritime%20shipping%20distances%20substantially.
[13] https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/colombia-advances-studies-for-interoceanic-corridor#:~:text=The%20study%20will%20determine%20%E2%80%9Chow,Legal%2C%20Financial%20and%20Insurance%20industries.
[14] https://brixsweden.org/china-celac-2025/#:~:text=Nicaragua%20Canal%20Project/Bluefields%20Port,Panama%20Canal%20Authority%20(ACP).
[15] https://impact.economist.com/new-globalisation/nearshoring-new-era-connection-latin-america
[16] https://chat.deepseek.com/ and https://x.com/i/grok
[17] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4833771_Re-exports_international_comparison_and_implications_for_performance_indicators
[18] https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2023/36/re-exports-higher-than-domestic-exports-in-2022
[19] https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-economic-surveys-netherlands-2025_aa9d215c/full-report/preserving-trade-competitiveness-amidst-increasing-global-fragmentation_d7457f46.html#CBS24_e7804ac420
[20]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316766066_Robert_Axelrod’s_1984_The_Evolution_of_Cooperation
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