China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Sergey Ryabkov, after graduating in 1982 from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), worked in various diplomatic positions in the central apparatus of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad. Since August 2008, he is the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Among others, he is in charge of bilateral relations with the countries of the Americas and Russia's participation in BRICS. He holds the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. He was awarded the Order IV Class "For Merit to the Fatherland", the Order of Honour and the Order of Friendship.

In an exclusive interview with TV BRICS, he spoke about what to expect from Russia's chairmanship of the group.

Five new countries – Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia – joined BRICS on 1 January 2024. How has the enlargement of the association affected the concept of the Russian Chairmanship this year?

I would like to say that we entered 2024 with no historical experience of expanding unification. It wasn't clear how the lapping process would go and what would come of it. But today, with a third of the Chairmanship behind us, the engagement has gained full momentum and we are moving at an increasing pace towards success. I'm pretty sure of it. I think that the summit in Kazan this October will mark the achievement of new heights in the interaction between the BRICS countries.

At the end of one third of our chairmanship, we can state that the leaders have taken a decision that has made BRICS unequivocally stronger. It has declared itself even louder as an influential system of interaction, a key link in the emerging architecture of a multipolar world.

It is also important how exactly the accession of new countries to BRICS took place. These states were invited on an equal basis with the founders. Any decisions in the group are made by consensus.

The date of 1 January, set as the official accession day, allowed us to prepare properly for the presidency watch. Its concept was approved in November 2023. At that time we already realised that invitations to a number of countries had been agreed and issued.

During the BRICS Chairmanship, the Russian side will continue its work in all three key areas: politics and security, economy and finance, and humanitarian cooperation. It is worth considering that there has been no example of an entity doubling its membership so far.

We are moving forward, setting an important precedent. I am glad that all the members of the association cooperate in a friendly manner, working for results, nobody imposes anything on anyone.

The Chairmanship's programme is extensive, with a calendar of more than 250 diverse events. All this will be realised in full compliance with the BRICS traditions.

You have already held bilateral meetings with colleagues from Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates. What will the new BRICS members be able to bring to the work of the association?

We have held bilateral meetings at various levels with representatives of all countries that joined BRICS on 1 January. There have already been several rounds of such contacts with some of them. On 30 January-1 February, the first start-up meeting of BRICS Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas was held in Moscow. All agencies, ministries involved in working with BRICS used this format to present programmes, conceptual approaches of Russia's 2024 Chairmanship. I think we have strong support for our priorities. More meetings at this level will soon be forthcoming. It can be said that Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas are the key coordinating tool for all work in BRICS.

We assume that each of the new recruits will bring something new and provide added value to the group. Basically, the rich history, historical roots, cultural traditions of the newcomers who joined the association speak for themselves. All this enriches the BRICS palette.

What do you think needs to be done to make it as easy and quick as possible for newcomers to integrate into the multilateral cooperation architecture? And how can Russia's chairmanship contribute to this?

It is worth mentioning that all the newcomers show great enthusiasm. They are ready to work substantively and professionally on the agenda that the Russian Chairmanship has developed in consultation with all participants. The second thing, of course, for some of the new recruits, the volume and scope of the work that we are doing in BRICS was a bit of a surprise. It is not even so much the number of events, but rather the multi-level mechanism of interaction, formats in which new ideas and certain traditions are worked out, initiatives are introduced into the fabric of BRICS work, and they are implemented. It all takes some adjusting and getting used to.

That's the process that's happening now. We are confident that more than 20 Russian ministries and agencies directly cooperating with BRICS partners have accumulated such an impressive experience of interaction that it will in itself prove to be a catalyst that will ensure a quick and uninterrupted "onboarding" of new recruits.

Unification is moving forward. The Ten are beginning to demonstrate cohesion on international platforms. A joint statement of the BRICS countries was recently adopted at the UN Environment Assembly held in Nairobi. The members of the association make themselves known in a constructive manner on as wide an agenda as possible.

Russia's current BRICS chairmanship has a rather extensive agenda related to finance: enhancing the role of member countries in the international monetary and financial system, developing interbank cooperation and settlements in national currencies. What else will be emphasised?

In practical terms, several options are considered. For example, settlements in stable coins or the option of creating a platform that would unite the financial systems of its members (the so-called BRICS Bridge, which implies the docking of the existing systems of digital currencies of central banks in the BRICS countries). The possibility of interconnecting national financial messaging systems is being discussed. Well here the finance ministers and central bank governors have had their contacts. The face-to-face meeting was held in February in Sao Paulo.

With the digitalisation of many banking processes, security in the storage and transmission of data is at the forefront. We have already established a special channel for information exchange between central banks and approved regulations for cooperation in the field of information security.

The focus of the Russian BRICS Chairmanship will also be on enhancing cooperation in such areas as science, innovation and healthcare. Can you elaborate on that a little bit more?

There is an action plan on innovation cooperation, as well as a network of BRICS centres for technology transfer. cooperation between science parks and business incubators in the iBRICS innovation network is well established. We will facilitate direct contacts between research centres and higher education institutions, promote dialogue in the field of digital education, and build the capacity of the BRICS Network University, including the inclusion of new universities.

I can't help but mention artificial intelligence. Here we need to find the optimal platforms and achieve results that will set the bar high on the world stage. We will also cooperate on the implementation of joint projects. There are quite a few of them. These include the creation of a network of smart telescopes, the introduction of big data technology, oceanic and polar research.

We are open to cooperation. A number of expert meetings have taken place over the past months. A kick-off meeting of the Working Group on Nuclear Medicine was held in Moscow in February. It included leading representatives of major medical research centres, manufacturers of medical isotopes and radiopharmaceuticals. Russia's achievements in this area are undeniable. And Rosatom State Corporation is a world leader. We are ready to share our experience and our technologies with partners.

How will cooperation in the spheres of culture, sports, youth exchanges deepen?

Here are some examples of such work. Last month, Khanty-Mansiysk hosted the Spirit of Fire international festival of cinematic debuts. Can you imagine what this is like? Young filmmakers are energised to explore something new. It is a unique fusion of tradition, innovation, creativity and, again, the positive agenda that BRICS embodies.

In February, the first exhibition of the BRICS Universe Project was inaugurated. It showcased photographs taken from space by authors from BRICS countries and UNESCO Creative Cities. They were compared to what the same places look like on Earth. All of this is visualised at the highest technological level, in super high resolution. You can spend not hours but days there, enjoying all the work.

Representatives of the BRICS countries will also take part in another event that has become a tradition: the BRICS Theatre Schools Festival to be held at VDNKh. We also organise the Creative Business Forum and the National Brand Fair during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Meetings of culture ministers and the traditional Festival of Culture at the St Petersburg International Forum of United Cultures are scheduled for September.

Moscow will host the BRICS Fashion Forum, a colourful and original event. If it will not set global trends, it will at least demonstrate a high degree of compliance of our venues with the expectations of the most demanding public.

The BRICS Marathon League is being formed, which will bring together the biggest races of the top ten nations. The BRICS Sports Games are already a traditional format. This year more than 3,000 athletes, including those from European countries, will take part. Competitions will be held in 30 sports.

Youth cooperation is also a well-established component of our work in BRICS. In 2023, the Youth Council of the association was established. The year of the Russian Chairmanship was marked by several youth activities. For example, the "BRICS To You" Youth Volunteer Conference was held in February this year, bringing together representatives from 29 countries. On 16 April, the Youth International Public Diplomacy Forum "InterYes!4.0" was launched.

I would like to hear a few words about the culminating event that will conclude Russia's year in BRICS. This is the summit in Kazan. What do you personally expect from it?

The summit is a new point of reference and an opportunity to build on the leaders' decisions and agreements in the future. I think it will certainly emphasise not just the growing importance of BRICS, but also the policy-shaping function of the Russian chairmanship.

Last question. I wonder what principle was used to choose the cities for the events and why it is important to show our guests not only Moscow and St. Petersburg?

During the Chairmanship year, we would like to better familiarise our partners with our country. I would like to remind you that the first BRICS summit was held in Ekaterinburg. This year we will try to make our colleagues and partners see life in modern Russia. And events are indeed held from Arkhangelsk to Sochi, from St Petersburg to cities in the Far East. There are certain logistical issues, but they are worth it.

And all colleagues, all participants, all guests who have had the opportunity to visit our country outside Moscow and St. Petersburg leave under a huge impression. It works for the image of a modern, powerful, self-confident Russia.

Kazan is the BRICS capital in general. This year it will host ministerial meetings, the BRICS Games and other events. Why Kazan? Among other things, because it is the embodiment of the interfaith harmony peculiar to our country. It is a showcase for the innovative development of modern Russia, as well as an example of how different threads can be woven into the urban fabric. The dynamic and progressive development of this city is taking place against the backdrop of centuries-old traditions and values. I think we have a lot to be proud of in Kazan and something to share with other BRICS members.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today, we have held good talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of Bolivia Celinda Sosa Lunda. Ms Minister and I became personally acquainted not so long ago: we were attending events as part of the G20 Ministerial Council Meeting in Rio de Janeiro in February of this year. It was then that we reaffirmed our shared intention to make comprehensive interaction between our two countries more eventful, coordinate our international steps, and promote bilateral cooperation.

Bolivia is one of Russia's priority and budding partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. We stated that our bilateral ties had become noticeably more active in almost all areas and were developing steadily.

We have taken stock of our bilateral cooperation and mapped further steps. We have noted positive dynamics in various sectors, singling out issues that require more focus.

We maintain intense contacts at the high and highest levels. Ties have become more active between our parliaments, as well as between various ministries and agencies. We are interested in strengthening our partnership and taking it to a qualitatively new level. We have agreed to speed up the work on a number of intergovernmental documents in different areas.

We have a shared interest in stepping up and diversifying bilateral trade and in implementing promising investment projects. We have adopted a decision to use more actively the potential of the Russian-Bolivian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.

In energy, there is much potential for expanding joint activities. Gazprom and Bolivia's YPFB Oil and Gas Company are developing the Ipati and Aquio oil and gas areas. Rosatom is building the Centre for Nuclear Technology Research and Development in El Alto, a unique pilot project for both Bolivia and the rest of Latin America. We regard exploration and industrial development of Bolivia's lithium deposits as an undoubtedly promising area of bilateral interaction.

Today, we covered extensively the kind of additional steps we need to take in order to identify a solution that meets the interests of our countries and reflects the balance of interests with account taken of the initiatives put forward by the Bolivian side in energy and agricultural supplies.

We noted the solid pace of our efforts to expand educational exchanges. We have increased the number of scholarships provided annually to Bolivia for its citizens to receive education at Russian universities. We talked about increasing humanitarian and sports ties. We agreed to facilitate direct contacts between business circles.

Bolivia took part in the Games of the Future in Kazan in February-March and plans to send its athletes to the BRICS Games to be held in Kazan in July. We look forward to seeing Bolivian athletes at the World Friendship Games planned to be held in Moscow and Yekaterinburg in the autumn. Our Bolivian friends have been invited to the upcoming Intervision international competition in Russia.

Notably, this year, Russia handed over the use of its pavilion at the Venice Biennale to our Latin American friends with the coordinating role of Bolivia. As we know from the reports coming from Venice, this exhibition is a great success and is very popular with the visitors.

We discussed regional and global priorities. Russia and Bolivia are consistent like-minded partners when it comes to genuine democratisation of international relations with the central and coordinating role of the United Nations, provided that we all firmly and unwaveringly follow the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety and interrelation. We are united in our understanding of the importance of relying on them as we search for ways of political and diplomatic settlement of international crises and conflicts. We are cooperating and coordinating our actions in international affairs, including in the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter.

We share the opinion that, as multi-ethnic countries with diverse cultures and traditions, we can do a lot to strengthen peace and stability around the world and promote inter-civilisational dialogue and accord.

We support Bolivia's active role in the processes unfolding in Latin America and the Caribbean. We advocate the consolidation of regional integration processes, including on the basis of a platform of high standing such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. This association has recently stepped up its activities. We welcome that. We look forward to resuming soon regular ministerial meetings between Russia and the CELAC quartet, as well as other regional multilateral associations.

We are in favour of a speedy resolution of the problems plaguing the region, including a long-standing need to immediately lift the unlawful trade, economic and financial embargo against Cuba. Alongside Bolivia, we oppose attempts by external forces to interfere in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, in particular Venezuela and Nicaragua.

We touched upon cooperation between our countries within the UN. We are grateful to Bolivia for its consistent support of our initiatives, its co-sponsorship of most of the draft resolutions submitted by Russia, as well as for its balanced and principled position on what brought on the situation around Ukraine and the efforts that the Russian Federation has been undertaking in this regard, as it seeks justice to ensure security interests and rights of people living in the common space.

The talks were productive. Comrade Minister will meet with officials from other agencies, including Rosatom and the Ministry of Economic Development.

We are confident that this visit will give a boost to the bilateral agenda, and we will have every reason to report on this to our respective presidents.

Question (retranslated from Spanish): Bolivia is interested in joining BRICS. Russia chairs the association in 2024. What has been done to turn Bolivia into its full-fledged member?

Sergey Lavrov: We discussed this issue. Comrade Minister reaffirmed Bolivia's sincere interest in joining BRICS. She emphasised its quickly growing authority and appeal amidst the Global Majority countries. These states see in it a democratic, fair alternative to the rules that the world economies, the US and its allies are trying to maintain. Such rules reflect a striving of the collective West to continue conducting affairs by using colonialist and neocolonialist practices.

Russia supports Bolivia's aspirations. As the 2024 BRICS chair, Russia wants to ensure that as many countries as possible, that wish to get closer to the association or become its members or establish permanent partnerships, receive a concrete positive response.

The work of BRICS is based on consensus. Recently it completed regular sherpa and sous-sherpa meetings. In early June, Nizhny Novgorod will host a foreign ministers' meeting. One of the key items on the agenda will be a smooth and natural integration of the new members into the association and setting our common policy on its further expansion.

Question (addressed to Sosa Lunda): This is a question about bilateral cooperation. At the end of March, the Rosatom State Corporation announced that it did not rule out a possibility of building a lithium energy storage plant in Bolivia. Have there been any agreements with Rosatom on this issue? What new interesting projects can Bolivia carry out together with Russia? What areas of bilateral cooperation can they potentially develop in your opinion?

I also have a question on security. What do you think about Argentina has been amassing troops -up on its border with Bolivia and about a statement by Argentine President Javier Milei about his country's desire to be a NATO global partner? How can this affect the situation in the region in general and in Bolivia, in particular?

Sergey Lavrov (adding after Sosa Lunda): We understand our Bolivian friends' sentiment towards the North Atlantic alliance very well, as much as the overwhelming majority of the Global South and Global East nations. We know from our own experience what this aggressive bloc is all about (it was called "aggressive" in the past and I can't find a better definition for it today, either).

The NATO-Russia Council was established after the advent of what everyone thought to be universal well-being. Insurmountable ideological contradictions perished, and everyone began to proclaim universal human values and common economic and security spaces. Our partners swore that the alliance wouldn't expand. When it started expanding, they promised that it wouldn't permanently deploy combat forces and armed units on the new territories. Their numerous promises turned out to be false. NATO officials are trying to prove that their alliance is designed to defend exclusively the territories of its member-countries. This is yet another lie.

At the same time, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that they are committed to the treaty that binds them to defend their common space but right now, they could not deal with this because they ought to gain access to the Indo-Pacific Region first. They are already creating bloc structures there, which reproduce NATO thinking and mentality. They want to build the bloc's infrastructure there. A NATO-Japan agreement has been already announced.

Now the Asia-Pacific Region is no longer enough for them – they want to go to Latin America. I think that most countries of the Global Majority and the Global South are aware of the dangers it entails. They realise that NATO countries will pump assets out of them and will use them for their own purposes. Probably, those who prefer to deal with their domestic affairs and provide education for their citizens instead of playing this geopolitical game (which the alliance considers a zero-sum game), do the right thing.

Question: Is there a plan to step up cooperation between Russia and ALBA (of which Bolivia is a member) that was established in opposition to the US Pan-American project? What areas of cooperation would be the most promising ones?

Sergey Lavrov: We have sustainable relations and several areas of cooperation with ALBA that was established at Venezuela's initiative. First, this is political dialogue. ALBA is truly opposing the attempts to reproduce neocolonial practices in the region. It wants these countries to decide their destiny independently. In this regard, ALBA is playing a positive role in supporting pan-regional cooperation in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

In its sub-region, ALBA is promoting CELAC's principles and values that we support. I would also like to note active and useful political dialogue as a practical area of cooperation. Russia and ALBA support the UN reform, including its Security Council. They want these bodies to reflect more objectively the weight and lawful interests of the Global Majority countries, Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Our states maintain close coordination at the UN and firm contacts on cultural and educational exchanges. The humanitarian component is playing a major role in our interaction.

A number of ALBA countries, including Bolivia and Venezuela, are members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum. This creates additional opportunities for launching potential promising projects between Russia and this important regional association.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On April 22 and 23, Moscow hosted a meeting of BRICS sherpas/sous-sherpas, chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister, Russia's BRICS Sherpa Sergey Ryabkov. The meeting participants discussed current issues on the agenda of the Russian year in BRICS, including the implementation of decisions adopted at the Johannesburg Summit on August 22-24, 2023.

Russia's representatives also informed the other participants about the ongoing preparations for the upcoming BRICS Foreign Ministers' meeting, scheduled to take place in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10-11, 2024.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

1. BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers and Special Envoys on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) met on 25 April 2024 in Moscow, Russia, to exchange views on the current situation in the region.

2. They expressed serious concern over continued conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, especially the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, that pose threats to regional and international peace, stability and security. Equally, they stated that regional crises should be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic dialogue based on unconditional respect for independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of all MENA countries.

3. They reaffirmed their commitment to the basic principle that peace and security in the MENA region should be achieved and sustained in accordance with, and in full respect for, international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter. They reaffirmed the primary role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in maintaining international peace and security. They acknowledged the important role played by regional organisations, including the League of Arab States (LAS) and the African Union (AU), in addressing threats to peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. They advocated for the strengthening of multilateralism as a means to promoting and ensuring peace, stability and development in the MENA region.

4. They stressed that peace and stability in the MENA region requires developmental cooperation and integration. They reiterated the necessity to address the root causes contributing to regional tensions. They called on the international community to support the countries in the region in working together towards post-pandemic economic recovery. They emphasised the importance of contributing to post-conflict countries' reconstruction and development by supporting greater economic diversification in oil producing countries. They called upon the international community to assist MENA countries in meeting their development goals.

5. They agreed to condemn terrorism and confront extremism in all its forms and manifestations and called on countries of the region to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to terrorism. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the values of moderation, tolerance and peaceful coexistence. They expressed their concern about deployment of Foreign Terrorist Fighters to the region as well as transfer of terrorists to the conflict zones. Furthermore, they stressed the importance of coordination role of the UN and opposing double standards. They called for further consolidation and strengthening of the working methods of UN Security Council Sanctions Committees to ensure their effectiveness, responsiveness and transparency. They agreed that terrorism and extremism must not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization, or ethnic group. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation with countries of the region on counterterrorism. They called for an expeditious finalisation and adoption of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism under the UN umbrella.

6. They expressed grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in particular the unprecedented escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip as a result of the Israeli military operation that led to mass civilian deaths and casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure including hospitals, schools, places of worship and UN facilities.

In this regard they called for the effective implementation of UNSC resolution 2728 to achieve an immediate, durable, and sustained ceasefire.

They acknowledged the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in the legal proceedings instituted by South Africa against Israel.

They strongly condemned all acts of violence aimed at civilians including acts of terrorism and indiscriminate attacks, as well as all acts of incitement of hatred, dehumanization, destruction and provocation and violations of International human rights law and International humanitarian law.

They emphasized that all sides must adhere to their obligations under International humanitarian law and International human rights law, particularly in regard to the protection of civilians and civilian objects.

They equally called for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and civilians who are being illegally held captive, demanding their safety, well-being, and humane treatment in compliance with international law.

They expressed their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian situation including the onset of famine in the Gaza Strip and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They reiterated the need for full respect of international humanitarian law in conflict situations and the need for full, immediate, safe, unhindered, and sustained humanitarian access and the provision of aid at scale in accordance with the basic principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence established in UNGA resolution 46/182. They emphasized the need for increased access to humanitarian aid, immediate, continuous, sufficient and unhindered provision of essential goods and services to civilians in the Gaza strip including water, food, medical supplies, fuel and electricity and for this goal to open necessary crossings to the Gaza Strip.

They expressed their strong condemnation of the killing of humanitarian aid workers and targeting of humanitarian premises in Gaza which has significantly impacted humanitarian operations in the Gaza Strip.

They reaffirmed their support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and its capacity to uphold its mandate and stressed the need to prevent any interruption or suspension of its vital work which would result in growth of serious humanitarian, political and security risks.

They reiterated their strong support for all regional efforts, including those of Egypt, and international efforts aimed at achieving an immediate cessation of hostilities, ensuring the protection of civilians and providing humanitarian aid including the UN humanitarian efforts pursuant to its Security Council resolution 2720.

They emphasized the importance of preventing further destabilization and escalation of violence in the region and called upon all parties to exercise maximum restraint and upon all those with influence on them to work toward this objective.

They reaffirmed that a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be achieved by peaceful means. They reiterated their unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative that includes the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with international recognized borders of June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital living side by side in peace and security with Israel.

They confirmed that the Gaza Strip is an integral part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In this regard they stressed the importance of contiguity of the Palestinian territories and in that context underlined the importance of unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian authority. They supported internal Palestinian reconciliation through consultation and dialogue, noting regional and international efforts aimed at restoring Palestinian unity on the political platform of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

They reiterated their unwavering support to the Palestinian request to become a full member of the United Nations.

They expressed grave concern with the intensification of settlement policy in the West Bank as well as with demolitions, including in East Jerusalem, and agreed these settlements are illegal under international law and must be stopped and reversed. They also condemned the displacement of Palestinians from their homes and strongly rejected any plan of moving Palestinian communities outside of the Gaza strip, as well as Israeli plans to attack Rafah.

They emphasized the inadmissibility of altering the historical and legal status quo in Jerusalem and its Islamic and Christian sanctities and reaffirmed the significance of the historical Hashemite custodianship.

7. They underlined the importance to prevent the expansion of the armed confrontation in the zone of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They emphasized their firm support for Lebanon's stability, security, sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity. They reiterated the Lebanese people's rights to pursue a development path suited to their national conditions. They reiterated their opposition to international interference in Lebanon's domestic affairs. They called on the international community to support Lebanon in its efforts to restore political, social and economic stability. They encouraged the various political forces in Lebanon to elect the next President of the Republic, which is the utmost importance in order to pave the way for the comprehensive dialogue necessary for the country to overcome the challenges it currently faces.

They stressed the importance of fully implementing all relevant Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1701, and urged all parties involved to refrain from all acts of provocation and violations of sovereignty. They highlighted the vital role played by UNIFIL, especially in current times, and agreed it is imperative to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all United Nations personnel and to respect the integrity of UN premises, while continuing to coordinate with the Government of Lebanon in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

8. They stressed that the key to solving the Syrian issue is to follow the principles enshrined in relevant UNSC resolutions, specifically 2254, in particular promotion of the "Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, UN-facilitated political process" of reconciliation and inclusiveness, respect for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and international support to the Syrians in their humanitarian needs, giving priority to people's livelihoods and accelerating early recovery projects. They condemned all illegitimate actions and provocations by any external forces that lead to increasing the risks of a large-scale conflict in the region. They welcomed the resumption of Syria's participation in the League of Arab States and commended the efforts of the Arab Ministerial Contact Group and Syria as cited in Cairo and Amman declarations, emphasised the importance of continuation of the efforts for the Syrian-Turkish normalisation and supported all the steps conductive to the political resolution of the Syrian issue, including those of the Astana Format. They stressed their continued support for the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Syria as well as for the resumption of the work of the Constitutional Committee as soon as possible. They emphasised the need to support efforts to combat terrorism in Syria in all its forms and manifestations, in accordance with the provisions of international law.

9. They condemned the attack against the diplomatic premises of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Syrian capital Damascus by Israel on 1 April 2024 that constitutes a violation of the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and, following attack on 14 April 2024 in response by Iran, they called for immediate de-escalation, exercise of restraint.

10. They reaffirmed their support for Yemen's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and for a political settlement to the Yemeni issue. They called on all parties to engage in inclusive negotiations, mediated by the UN, and conveyed appreciation for the efforts of the United Nation's Secretary General (UNSG)'s Special Envoy in this regard. They reiterated their deep concern about Yemen's humanitarian crisis and encouraged the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemen. They welcomed and commended the efforts of regional countries including Saudi Arabia and Oman to address the situation in Yemen through direct talks with the parties concerned and mediation efforts aimed at establishment of permanent ceasefire as well as moving forward of the political settlement process.

11. They expressed deep concern regarding the repercussions of the attacks on maritime navigation in Baab Al-Mandab and the Red Sea.. They reaffirmed that the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by merchant and commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Baab Al-Mandab strait, in accordance with international law, must be respected.

12. They stressed the importance of the international community's constant engagement with Iraq, and to further develop cooperation prospects in various fields in a way that serves the interest of the country, its people and wider region. They reiterated their firm support for Iraq's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. They reaffirmed their support for Iraq in safeguarding their national security and stability and fighting terrorism. They reaffirmed their support for the Iraqi people in their quest for peace, prosperity, and development. They reaffirmed their opposition to any external interference in Iraq's domestic affairs, and supported Iraq's efforts to promote economic reconstruction and to play a greater role in regional affairs. They expressed their hope that all parties in Iraq would engage in a mutually respectful and inclusive dialogue to achieve lasting stability and prosperity.

13. They stressed their support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. They reiterated their support for a "Libyan-led and Libyan-owned" political process with UN-led mediation and acknowledge in this regard the endeavours of regional organizations and the neighbouring countries of Libya. They reiterated their respect for the will and choice of the Libyan people and called on all parties to strengthen consultation and dialogue and to refrain from any actions that could undermine the October 2020 ceasefire and emphasised the necessity that all foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries withdraw from Libya without further delay in a synchronized, phased, gradual and balanced manner. They welcomed the efforts of the League of Arab States, African Union, including its High-Level Committee for Libya, in restoring stability and fostering the unification of Libya. They reaffirmed their call to hold simultaneous, free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible. They reaffirmed their call on all parties to create necessary conditions for holding elections, based on a sound and agreed constitutional framework.

14. They stressed their support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Sudan. They expressed deep concern over the ongoing conflict in Sudan. They called for non-interference in the Sudanese conflict. They expressed grave concern over the humanitarian situation in the country. They called for redoubling of global efforts to address the worsening humanitarian crisis. They deeply regret the deaths and injuries of civilians. They called for an unconditional, urgent and sustained ceasefire and stressed the need to respect international law, including International humanitarian law. They also stressed the importance of a Sudanese-led process toward restoration of civilian rule. They encouraged all parties in Sudan to return to political process so that peace can be achieved. They stressed the need of preventing the conflict from expanding to other countries in the region and underscored the need for harmonized and coordinated peace process, including the recognition of the role of the AU and under Sudanese national ownership. They reiterated their support to regional efforts aimed at finding a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the crisis. They welcomed regional efforts and initiatives aimed at conveying basic messages in order to halt escalation and reach a sustainable ceasefire agreement, as well as to preserve the cohesion of the Sudanese state, and to urge the international community to provide all humanitarian and medical assistance to meet the needs of the Sudanese people.

15. They agreed to meet again under Brazil's Chairship of BRICS in 2025. In this regard they reiterated the need to hold regular consultations on the Middle East and North Africa, including at the UN. They decided to hold annual working-level mid-term consultations in preparation for the BRICS Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Special Envoys meeting on the Middle East and North Africa.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

On January 1, 2024, Egypt and four other countries from the Global South became members of BRICS. Egypt had previously joined the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) in December 2021 with a contribution of $1.2 billion. This represents an important turning point in Egyptian policy. Since the 1970s, Egypt has submitted to the Western economy, which is dominated by the United States. Egypt's membership in BRICS confirms the popularity and support for BRICS among the Global South, which groans from the greed and exploitation of the West. The developing countries seek balanced, win-win partnerships and true opportunities for development. The Egyptian step indicates its desire to pursue an alternative path. I is poised to enhance African and Arab support for BRICS measures to achieve a new multipolar economic order.

Egypt's geopolitical position represents an important addition to BRICS. It is one of the most influential players in the security of two very important bodies of water, the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. It also controls the Suez Canal, which represents a major artery for global trade and logistics. It provides a key hub for many industries and grain, as well as an important link in global supply chains. Egypt is a gateway to the Middle East, Africa and the Mediterranean countries, by virtue of its geographical location and the economic blocks to which it belongs. It is also a large market, with 106 million people, for a wide range of goods and products. It is also an important market for technology in various fields, including nuclear energy. Egypt has unlimited potential and development opportunities in various fields.

On the other hand, Egypt's acceptance of BRICS membership represents an international testimony to the strength of the Egyptian economy and the important potentials it possesses. It gives Egypt the opportunity to be an active participate in establishing a more just and independent global economic system. It enhances Egypt's position, given the importance of BRICS, and reflects its expanding global economic influence. BRICS represents 36% of global GDP, surpassing the G7's 30%.

Egypt's accession to BRICS guarantees its financial security by trading in national currencies. One of the main goals of BRICS is de-dollarisation: ending the dominance of the US dollar and its weaponisation through the use of local currencies in commercial transactions. The plans of BRICS include creating an international payment system, "BRICS Pay", which would use blockchain technology to create digital assets for use in financial settlements. This will break the monopoly of the Western SWIFT system on financial operations around the world. It enhances the ability to repay and strengthens economic stability against uncertainty and external shocks. It will release the pressure on foreign exchange in Egypt at a time when it is experiencing difficulties providing US dollars.

Egyptian membership in BRICS is poised to help increase Egypt's exports by integrating it more into the Belt and Road project and economic blocs led by BRICS countries, i.e. the Eurasian Economic Union and Mercosur. Egypt's exports to the BRICS countries increased 5.3% in 2022, reaching $4.9 billion. This figure is expected to double. That would also ensure Egypt's access to strategic commodities, such as grain, as the BRICS countries produce a third of the world's grain. Russia is the largest exporter of grain, while Egypt is the largest importer, globally.

Egypt stands to gain from better opportunities to attract foreign direct investment from BRICS countries. The investments of the BRICS countries in Egypt amounted to $891.2 million in 2021/2022. This figure is very limited, given the capabilities of the BRICS and the opportunities available in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt's membership in the BRICS NDB allows it to obtain concessional financing for development projects without the kind of unfair political and economic conditions that are imposed by the World Bank and IMF.

Egypt, which is considered a favourite tourist destination among Russians and other BRICS citizens, also expects an increase in tourism. Activating acceptance of national payment cards such as Russia's "Mir" will greatly encourage tourists to choose Egypt. Tourism is a major pillar of the Egyptian economy and a primary source of foreign currency. It supports many other economic sectors and provides millions of job opportunities for Egyptians.

There is a solid base of mutual interest between Egypt and BRICS countries that ensures the launch of a sustainable and growing partnership between them, as well as effective progress towards a new multipolar, more just, equitable and stable world economic order.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

China trip notes

I visited Beijing from April 11 to April 20^th to meet with representatives of China's corporates, universities and think-tanks. My overall impression is that while consumption and tourism are yet recover more emphatically from the pandemic lows, there are no signs of a "confidence crisis" or loss of direction. What was perhaps most encouraging was the intensity of competition and innovation in China's corporate sector that will likely be key to boosting the dynamism of China's economy in the longer term. The main macroeconomic questions revolve around China's consumer – my sense was that there is scope for the household consumption to recover, in which case the pressures to forge ahead with higher growth in investment would be attenuated, thus reducing concerns regarding China's "overcapacity problem".

Beijing as a city has been transformed in the past decade not only in terms of new modernistic architecture, but also by the Zeitgeist of our time – the digital and the green transformation of the economy. Compared to 7 years ago (the last time that I was in Beijing) there is significantly less air pollution in the city, something that was a result of a concerted effort aimed at bringing greater environmental awareness and sustainability into China's capital. There were also less street slogans on billboards, less construction and much more consumerism and digital economy attributes. The most common mode of payment appeared to be Alipay, with the share of cash transactions appearing to be relatively low. These observations while limited to just one city may be indicative of the transformation that the rest of China's economy is set to experience in the coming decades.

In the middle of April China released its macroeconomic data for March 2024 that showed positive GDP growth figures for the first quarter, with lower than expected figures for household consumption. China's GDP grew 5.3% YoY in January-March 2024 well above the analysts' forecast of 4.6% expansion and higher than the 5.2% growth in the previous quarter. On a quarterly basis growth accelerated to 1.6% from 1.4% in the previous three months. Across the main GDP growth drivers, it was fixed investment growth of 4.5% (compared to expectations of 4.1% YoY) that accounted for some of the over-performance in GDP dynamics. At the same time, retail sales statistics disappointed with consumption growing 3.1% year-on-year in March, falling short of the 4.6% growth forecast and showing a marked deceleration compared to a 5.5% growth in the January-February period[1]. Quite naturally then the focus in the macroeconomic discussions focused on the state of the Chinese consumer.

In terms of the consumer trends a cursory look at the state of play in Beijing's shopping malls in the center suggests that consumption is yet to stage a comeback from previous years of weakness. At the same time representatives of Chinese companies involved in the e-commerce segment pointed to positive regional trends in consumption, in particular the spillovers in consumption from Beijing and Shanghai to the surrounding regions. There was also a positive consumption dynamic that was noted for regions such as Heilongjiang (North-East of the country) as well as parts of the country's North-West. There was also a clear trend towards longer travels by Chinese tourists within the country after the lifting of the Covid restrictions. Perhaps most interestingly, companies pointed to the importance of generational trends in China's consumption, in particular the rising dynamism and versatility in the consumption patterns of the young generation. Generation Z (born between 1995 and 2009) that accounts for nearly 19% of the country's population sets off consumer trends such as emphasis on health wellness, importance of brands and new digital products and services. There are also signs that Gen Z in China is exhibiting greater proclivity towards environmental and sustainable consumption – a trend that will need to be increasingly taken into account by the corporates.

In the environmental sphere, the scale of adoption of ESG standards by China's corporates is rather moderate, though when companies plan to go public they almost universally follow the rules governing the disclosure of such policies and standards to investors. This in turn suggests that there is an important link between the pace of adoption of ESG standards in China's corporate sector and the development of China's capital markets. One of the examples of such linkages emerged earlier this year when China's mainland stock exchanges called for sweeping environmental disclosure rules for large listed companies, with the "Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing exchanges taking a double materiality approach, requiring companies to report on the impact that their activities have on the environment as well as the risks and impact of environmental factors on their business. Around half of China's listed companies will be obliged to carry out the reporting, including the biggest 180 listed in Shanghai (the SSE 180) along with the top 50 firms on the exchange's Star 50 science and technology board[2]."

On the much discussed "China over-capacity" problem, the main line from the respondents appears to have been that industrial policy and state support has been increasingly used across the globe, including in the advanced economies. In China's case it appears that there are more resources, coordination and planning to direct state support towards priority sectors that are seen as crucial for China's competitive advantage on the international stage. At the same time, it was noted that concerns around "China's overcapacity" were likely to diminish in case China were to proceed with the transition to growth that is more based on the expansion of the consumer and services sectors rather than ever higher investments from the state in manufacturing.

With respect to BRICS, China does seem to view this platform as key in its outreach to the developing world, including via the BRICS+ framework. At the same time, there does not yet appear to be a clear blueprint for some of the key trajectories of BRICS economic development, including with respect to trade liberalization. The latter would be instrumental for China in opening markets for its products across the Global South and facilitating export-led growth to complement other drivers of its economic expansion. There also seems to be little interest and clarity on how the "integration of integrations" phase of BRICS development (via bringing together the main regional integration blocs of the Global South) would prove superior to the current approach of expanding the ranks of the BRICS core via admitting large developing economies.

Interestingly, Trump and US politics were hardly mentioned in any of the meetings, which suggests that this scenario is already incorporated into China's expectations – the re-orientation of trade flows towards the Global South away from the developed world may be part of this adjustment in expectations. Another explanation may be that Biden's activism in introducing new restrictions on China has blurred the boundaries and differences in China's perceptions of the two camps in terms of US treatment of China's economy.

There was naturally much skepticism during the meetings regarding the much discussed "peak China" paradigm. Some of the Chinese scholars reasoned that it was too early to write off China on account of demographics or lower investment in view of the centrality of productivity/efficiency improvements in the longer term performance of its economy. In this respect the technological advances made by China in the sphere of digital and green economy bode well for its ability to transition to higher quality and more broad-based growth. Furthermore, not all of China's reserves of catch-up growth have been exhausted – this refers in particular to growth in services and consumption as well as the accelerated expansion of inward regions of China. Nevertheless, challenges and headwinds abound, most notably with respect to the main economic battle of the 21^st century – the AI race. Leadership in the world economy in the coming years will be increasingly determined by the ability of key contenders in the AI race to attract top talent – something that China is yet to achieve vis-à-vis the US and the EU. Indeed, the feedback from companies and corporate associations clearly pointed to lack of qualified labour as being the single most important constraint for foreign companies in China.

In the end, my main conclusion was that there may have been an overshooting in the "peak China" rhetoric and the FDI outflows observed throughout the past year. China holds the initiative in a number of key segments of the global economy (EVs, batteries, solar panels, key natural resources such as rare-earth minerals), its platform of international alliances is set to further expand on the back of BRICS+ and refinements in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With localization being such an important factor in the competitive race to reach the Chinese consumer, a recovery in demand and household consumption in China may well necessitate a re-think for those multinationals that opted to scale down their presence in China.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-q1-gdp-...

[2] https://greencentralbanking.com/2024/02/23/china-s...